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This dissertation is a history of an idea that has endured in rhetorical theory from Plato to 
Weaver – the idea that rhetoric can lead souls to their own betterment; that is, guide them in an 
ascent along a metaphysical hierarchy through beauty, goodness, and truth to a fuller 
participation in being.  This is a study of what Plato calls psychagogia.  Comprising replicating 
hierarchies, the Platonic tradition saw intricate connections between cosmology, theology, 
psychology, and language.  At the height of this tradition, St. Bonaventure notes that rational 
philosophy is consummated in rhetoric, indicating that such an inquiry transcends the 
disciplinary sub-field of “the history of rhetoric” and engages much larger issues concerning the 
nature of language, language’s relationship with human rationality, and its analogy with the 
divine.   
Thus, this study maps the structural framework of the Platonic intellectual tradition from 
antiquity to the Middle Ages in order to identify the conditions necessary for rhetorical activity 
under a tripartite metaphysics.  By comparing the parallel structures inherent in reality, language, 
and the mind, I contend that rhetoric plays a definitive role for the Platonist in the process of 
spiritual formation.  Indeed, in some cases it represents the only machinery that humanity has to 
achieve intellectual, spiritual, and societal amelioration.  But reality, knowledge, and language 
for the Platonist were all living things.  So while I do not deny Plato’s rationalism, idealism, or 
realism in this study, I seek to investigate their interaction with his own skepticism, aestheticism, 
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 v 
and above all, mysticism.  The same is true for Augustine, Bonaventure, and the Platonic 
tradition as a whole.  Such models as the Platonists provide can illustrate how philosophical 
tensions now thought to be in diametrical opposition can be brought into dialectical synthesis.  
The result is a truly organic intellectual framework that informs a rhetorical theory of equal 
vitality – a tripartite rhetoric, at once rational, spiritual, and emotive, culminating in the soul in a 
rhetoric of ascent. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: PSYCHAGOGIA AS A RHETORICAL CONCEPT 
This dissertation is a history of an idea that has endured in rhetorical theory from Plato to 
Weaver – the idea that rhetoric can lead souls to their own betterment; that is, guide them in an 
ascent along a metaphysical hierarchy through beauty, goodness, and truth to a fuller 
participation in being.  In a word, this is a study of psychagogia or ‘soul-leading.’  The term 
itself is neither innately rhetorical nor innately positive.1  But Plato’s definition of rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus as “a way of directing the soul [psychagogia] by means of speech [logon]” (261a)  has 
assured its place in rhetorical history.2  In so defining rhetoric, he argues that the “true” art 
imposes a number of epistemic criteria on the would-be rhetor concerning the object of rhetorical 
activity – the soul; and the means by which this object is affected – speech: 
 
First, [he will] describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand 
what it is…Second, he will explain how, in virtue of its nature, it acts and is acted upon 
by certain things…Third, he will classify the kinds of speech and soul there are, as well 
as the various ways in which they are affected, and explain what causes each.  He will 
                                               
1 Indeed, Plato uses cognates in other dialogues with negative connotation (see Tim. 71a and Laws 909b).  The 
history of the term is discussed more fully in section 3.4. 
2 “…τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων” Greek texts of Plato are taken from Platonis Opera. Ed. John Burnet, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1903.  Accessed via www.perseus.tufts.edu. English translations of Plato are from Plato: 
Complete Works. Ed. James M. Cooper, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1997.   
For the convenience of non-Greek reading reviewers, Greek terms appear transliterated in the main text 
without diacritic marks.  Primary citations appear in-text, while more general references to primary sources and all 
secondary citations and references appear in footnotes. 
 2 
then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it.  And he will 
give instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced 
by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced.  (271a-b) 3 
 
Plato’s definition and the criteria that it implies are noted in any digest of the Phaedrus and 
present a milestone in rhetorical history.  Yet in so far as we can talk about a received history in 
the contemporary rhetorical discipline, his suggestion of a psychagogic rhetoric is dismissed as 
an impractical ideal.  Although it is frequently assumed that this ideal influenced Aristotle’s 
more practical treatment of human psychology in the Rhetoric, the possibility of meeting Plato’s 
lofty requirements have been rejected by prominent historians of rhetoric in no uncertain terms.4   
                                               
3 This is in addition to the general criterion that would-be rhetoricians know the truth of the topic on which they are 
about to speak (262c). 
4 This is true from the renaissance of American rhetorical studies to today and is rather unaffected by one’s personal 
appraisal of Plato.  For example, see Everett Lee Hunt. “Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians.” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 6.3 (1920), 33-53; and “Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians.” Studies in Rhetoric and Public 
Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans. Ed. Alexander Drummond. New York: The Century Company, 1925. 3-
60; George A. Kennedy. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963, and Classical Rhetoric & 
its Christian & Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1999; Oscar L. 
Brownstein. “Plato’s Phaedrus: Dialectic as the Genuine Art of Speaking.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 51.4 (1965), 
392-398; James J. Murphy. “The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine, and McLuhan: A Pointing Essay.” Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 4.4 (1971) 201-214; Roger Moss. “The Case for Sophistry.” Rhetoric Revalued: Papers from the 
International Society for the History of Rhetoric. Ed. Brian Vickers. Binghamton, N.Y.: Center for Medieval & 
Early Renaissance Studies, 1982. 207-224; Harvey Yunis. “Eros in Plato's ‘Phaedrus’ and the Shape of Greek 
Rhetoric.” Arion 3.13.1 (2005), 101-126; and Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Listening to the Logos: Speech and the 
Coming of Wisdom in Ancient Greece. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2009. 
In one of the earliest contemporary pieces on Plato and rhetoric, Hunt states that the “psychological 
demands of the theory are little short of appalling” (“Plato on Rhetoric” 47), saying later that “the ideal rhetoric 
sketched in the Phaedrus is as far from the possibilities of mankind as his Republic was from Athens” (“Plato and 
Aristotle” 42).  Likewise, Kennedy holds that “Plato’s account of rhetorical psychology is rather unsatisfactory” and 
unrealistic compared to its sophistic counterparts (The Art of Persuasion 79).  Though Kennedy later reads Plato 
more positively, he still characterizes the psychological theory as incomplete and of questionable practicality 
(Classical Rhetoric 72).  Brownstein is adamant that Plato presents dialectic as the only art that meets his criteria for 
a true art of speech, while “persuasion of the sort the rhetoricians claim is clearly impossible in Plato's view” (397).  
Murphy praises Plato for the clarity of his fundamentals of rhetoric while asserting their inadequacy since, “Plato's 
ideal of knowing the soul’s of men is impossible for mortal man to achieve (even with computers)” (Metarhetorics 
212-213).  In Vickers’ Rhetoric Revalued, Moss calls Plato’s ideal rhetor a “dubious entity” and maintains that “the 
gap between human need and Plato’s idealism remains as great as ever” (217).  More recently, despite a very 
positive read, Yunis concludes that “the vast systematic psychology of desire and discourse that [Plato] proposes has 
so far proved unachievable and seems likely to remain so” (“Eros in Plato” 120).  And Johnstone concludes his 
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Given the commonplace verdict that Plato’s psycho-philosophical rhetoric is incomplete 
and impracticable, psychagogia has yet to enjoy a full analysis in rhetorical scholarship.  Yet this 
does not mean that it has been widely ignored by scholars in general.  In fact a number of studies 
have emerged over the past decades that view psychagogy in terms of philosophy, education, and 
theology.5  This is not surprising, as rhetoric and philosophy were both fluid concepts at the time 
the Phaedrus was composed, both at the heart of educational theory, and both intimately tied to 
the divine.  Indeed, much of the ancient debates between rhetoric and philosophy were attempts 
to demarcate the legitimate provinces of the two fields of study. 
What is surprising is the degree to which rhetorical theory and tradition have been left to 
historians of other disciplines to cultivate in this instance.  Granted, some of these extra-
rhetorical studies accept the commonplace that psychagogia is a non-starter in terms of practical 
rhetorical theory and argue that Plato holds interpersonal dialectical inquiry as the “true” 
rhetoric.6  Were this the extent of the findings offered by the various analyses of Platonic 
psychagogy the dearth of rhetorical scholarship might be justified, but it is not.  Rather than an 
impractical ideal or a call to dialectic, recent philosophical interpretations have argued that 
                                                                                                                                                       
balanced analysis by asserting Plato’s lack of optimism for even the philosophical rhetorician.  Indeed, Johnstone 
suggests Plato was in knowing agreement with Hunt, that he knew his rhetoric was nothing more than an impractical 
ideal (Listening to the Logos 185; citing Hunt “Plato and Aristotle” 42). 
5 See Elizabeth Asmis. “Psychagogia in Plato’s Phaedrus.” Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986): 153-172; Henry 
Teloh. Socratic Education in Plato's Early Dialogues. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986; Dong 
Kwang Kim. “Plato's Ideal Education: From Elenchus to Psychagogia.” Dissertation. University of Texas, 1997; 
Clarence E. Glad. Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy. Leiden, New 
York: E.J. Brill, 1995; Mariana McCoy. “Love and Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus.” Plato on the Rhetoric of 
Philosophers and Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 167-196; Paul R. Kolbet. Augustine and 
the Care of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009; Daniel 
Werner. “Rhetoric and Philosophy in the Phaedrus.” Greece & Rome 57.1 (2010): 21-46; and Jessica Moss. “Soul-
Leading: The Unity of the Phaedrus, Again.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43 (2012): 1-24. 
6 See Teloh, Socratic Education, where psychagogia is meant to be the positive counterpart in dialectical inquiry to 
the refutative elenchus.  Also, Kim takes the impossibility of Platonic rhetoric as one of the major premises of his 
dissertation: “As I believe Plato thought that there could be no such thing as true rhetoric, I present the view in this 
dissertation that psychagogia is in fact Plato's ideal of philosophy and education” (“Plato’s Ideal Education” 1).  
And Werner argues that “if dialectic represents the best approximation of the ideal τέχνη of rhetoric, then…in the 
process of supposedly ‘reforming’ rhetoric…Plato has all but done away with it.” (“Rhetoric and Philosophy” 25). 
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Plato’s “philosophical” rhetoric is actually the practical application of his ideal philosophy to the 
imperfect circumstances of the political state and the human soul.7  The auditor is not led 
through philosophy to a better life, but rather is led to philosophy through rhetoric.  This may 
sound off-putting to the sensitive rhetorician who has long played second fiddle to the celebrated 
philosopher, but rendered in the love language of the Phaedrus it means only this – the beloved 
is brought to the love of truth through the love of the lover.  Rhetoric as psychagogia is love.8   
Beyond philosophical reinterpretation, however, historical studies in early Christianity 
have traced a fairly uncontroversial path of development showing the impact that psychagogia as 
a rhetorical concept has had on theories and practices of pastoral care, such as the adaptation of 
the Gospel message to particular audiences and the administration of therapeutic aid to troubled 
souls.9  Even if it does not fit squarely with the “received” disciplinary history, historians of 
medieval rhetoric recognize that rhetoricians such as Victorinus and St. Augustine were deeply 
influenced by Platonic thought concerning the notion of the soul’s ascension to God through the 
liberal arts, as were the Arabic commentators of Aristotle who so influenced the Scholastics.10  
However well-documented this tradition may be concerning the supposed effects rhetoric could 
have on the soul, Plato’s criteria for psychagogic rhetoric remains relatively neglected in terms 
of the ability to analyze and account for the soul itself – its make-up, its types, and the means by 
which it is affected.  Although we know the concept was transmitted in a variety of forms 
                                               
7 See Moss: “The Republic’s education may in Plato’s view be the ideal means of soul-turning, but it is dependent 
on the existence of the ideal city; rhetoric turns out to be a means for the same end, and one available in actual, 
imperfect states like Athens” (“Soul-leading” n.9).  See also McCoy, “Love and Rhetoric”. 
8 Again, see Moss, “Soul-Leading,” and McCoy, “Love and Rhetoric.” 
9 See Glad, Paul and Philodemus, who traces the concept of psychagogia in terms of adaptability to audience in 
order to contrast the genuine rhetorician with the flatterer.  See also Kolbet, Augustine and the Care of Souls, who 
traces the therapeutic tradition of psychagogy and its effect on the preaching and teaching of St. Augustine. 
10 For instance, Neoplatonism and spiritual ascent through the liberal arts appear throughout the translations and 
commentary offered by Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter in their authoritative anthology Medieval Grammar and 
Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory, Ad 300 -1475. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  Many of the 
primary works in this collection, as well as their commentaries, are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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through antiquity to the Middle Ages, we still lack a clear understanding of how rhetoric 
supposedly “worked” on the soul.  Thus, the medieval picture remains incomplete so long as the 
classical antecedent – Platonic rhetoric – is perceived as an unanalyzable ideal. 
In this dissertation, I seek to understand the tradition of rhetoric as psychagogia by first 
arguing that the epistemology and psychology presented in Plato’s dialogues offer a workable 
model of the psyche that meets the criteria laid out in the Phaedrus.  As such, this dissertation 
serves as a corrective for the commonplace notion that Plato’s theory of rhetoric is untenable.  I 
then show that the structure of this model influenced thinkers in late antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, establishing a continuous tradition of Platonic rhetoric that held similar assumptions about 
the soul’s structure and functions.  In so doing, it both deepens and compliments contemporary 
studies concerning the influence of Platonic psychagogia in the history of Christian thought by 
offering a structural foundation above and beyond the notions of adaptation to, care for, or ascent 
of the soul.  In fact, the structural analysis I offer shows how all three actions are performed 
simultaneously through the structural reformation of the soul through rhetoric.   
1.1 BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS 
One would most correctly characterize this dissertation as a study in the history of rhetoric.  
However, it is largely motivated by contemporary circumstances that should be articulated in 
order to illustrate the frame of mind in which I pursue it.  As a discipline, rhetoric is filled with 
many, sometimes antithetical, voices.  Theorists engage in earnest debate about whether rhetoric 
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is epistemic or aesthetic;11 whether its situations are given or invented;12 whether it can be 
employed as a hermeneutical tool or is capable only of production,13 and so on.  Such a 
circumstance alone is not cause for lamentation or correction.  Indeed, it has historically been the 
role of rhetoric to complicate perceived certainties and to voice opposition to issues that were 
once thought settled.  It is a role celebrated by theorists and practitioners even today.   
 Fittingly, however, contradiction and critique form only one side of rhetoric's historic 
function.  For it was also the role of rhetoric to find harmony among seemingly disparate theories 
and practices.  Having lost sight of this function, the contemporary field has become internally 
fragmented as healthy debate has slipped into entrenched ideology.  Moreover, such ideology has 
separated the discipline from the rest of humanistic study.  Age-old skepticism about the value of 
“knowledge” produced by either faith or reason has transformed into separation along 
disciplinary lines.  Rhetoricians no longer seek the generalized learning that was once their 
hallmark, but have rather pitted themselves against departments of philosophy, theology, and the 
various sciences.  We anachronistically interpret historic controversies as interdepartmental 
struggles in which each discipline is the champion of a worldview that is incompatible with the 
others.  The other disciplines are only too happy to oblige.  Indeed, without rhetoric's 
architectonic function, the humanities themselves have become woefully fractured. 
                                               
11 The concept of rhetoric-as-epistemic presents its own share of internal controversy since the publication of Robert 
L. Scott’s “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic.” Central States Speech Journal (1967): 9-16. A litany of prominent 
responses is offered by Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins, Barry Brummett, Thomas B. Farrell, Alan Gross and 
others.  The turn to aesthetics is taken by Steve Whitson and John Poulakos with “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of 
Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 79 (1993): 131-45.  A heated exchange with Hikins ensued, beginning with 
his “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible: A Commentary on the Whitson and Poulakos ‘Aesthetic 
View’ of Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 81 (1995): 353-377. 
12 Seminal articles in this debate are: Lloyd Bitzer. “The Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968) 1-
14; and Richard Vatz.  “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 6.3 (1973): 154-161.  
13 See the collection of essays in: Eds. Alan Gross and William Keith. Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and 
Interpretation in the Age of Science. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996. 
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 These theoretical conflicts, both within and outside the discipline, are reflected in a 
pedagogical tension that has resulted in an identity crisis for rhetoric as it has struggled to define 
its place between logic and poetry.14  This tension was recognized by the ancient Greeks, and the 
relationship among the three arts of the logos has remained tenuous ever since.  However, though 
debates raged throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages about the proper relationship of the 
language arts, most agreed that there was a relationship.  Today there exists nothing like an 
integrated language arts curriculum at any level of education.  In our universities, the arts are 
each subsumed under departments of communication, literature, English, and philosophy, where 
there is little interplay between them, if any.  That is of course if the arts of language are taught 
at all and not merely replaced with arts of criticism.  It is ironic that dialectic no longer has an 
academic home since it was dethroned by analytic logic, yet its deconstructive activity is what 
occupies contemporary rhetoricians and grammarians.  For the most part we remember only the 
ancient antagonisms, each discipline laying sovereign claim over knowledge production, critical 
thinking, social cohesion, etc.  We do not realize that so divided we have turned cannibal and 
have eaten away at our very foundations.  The arts of language, the truly humanistic arts, have 
warred themselves into irrelevance; their once glorious societal functions replaced by the 
teacher, the psychiatrist, the political scientist, the lawyer, the advertiser, and the screenwriter.   
I hope that by recalling the cooperative nature that the language arts once shared, I can 
illustrate how mutual communion rather than disdain or neglect might better serve the disciplines 
and better serve the human community for which they all profess to care.  From the standpoint of 
                                               
14 For contemporary attempts to articulate and reconcile these tensions see: Wilbur Samuel Howell. Poetics, 
Rhetoric and Logic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975.  In this work, Howell brings Kenneth Burke’s 
Counterstatement to task for not making an adequate distinction between poetics and rhetoric.  This prompted a 
colloquy between the two in the Quarterly Journal of Speech 62.1 (1976) 62-77.  More recently, see Jeffrey 
Walker’s attempt to collapse a hard-line historical separation between the arts in his Rhetoric and Poetics in 
Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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the rhetorician this means demonstrating that, while distinct from the logician’s and the poet’s 
art, our art entails a respect and understanding of both to the degree that we must employ their 
tools to achieve our own ends.  It further means the more difficult task of realizing the 
subordinate role we must play in aiding the logician and poet in their own work.  Perhaps most 
radically, the study of the Platonic tradition suggests that beyond the need for society to have its 
share of philosophers, poets, and orators, there lies a more pressing need for these arts to be 
unified in the individual soul.  The speaker must also be thinker and dreamer; the audience must 
be taught, delighted and moved.  So the true humanist is neither the rhetorician nor the poet nor 
the sage, but that person who has mastered all three arts and knows the proper use of each.  
Rhetoric, although necessary, is insufficient for the humanistic endeavor.  It is an obvious truth, 
but a bitter one nonetheless. 
These conflicts represent huge issues that span the whole of contemporary academia.  
While this dissertation has implications that affect them, I do not claim that it comes close to 
resolving any.  Rather, as I have noted, these conditions should be recognized as providing 
numerous related tensions that motivate the conciliatory nature of this study.  At a time when the 
humanistic disciplines operate in relative isolation, I deliberately chose psychagogia as an object 
of inquiry that sits historically at the intersection of rhetoric, philosophy, theology, and pedagogy 
so as to recover at least one view that asserts an inextricable connection among them.  The 
theorists in this tradition often attempt to reconcile the antipathies that have permeated the 
various branches of human inquiry from antiquity to the present.  Additionally, such theorists 
maintain a view of rhetoric and the language arts that unify many of the concepts that our 
contemporary discipline finds incompatible.  Thus, whatever its scholarly implications, I hope 
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that this dissertation might point a way towards repairing the discord in which the rhetorical 
discipline now finds itself, both internally and externally. 
1.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINTIONS 
Although motivated by broad contemporary concerns, the study is a focused conceptual history, 
tracing the development of interrelated concepts as they are appropriated and refined from 
theorist to theorist over an extended period of time.15  Specifically, this study investigates the 
development of rhetorical thought in the Platonic tradition.  I purposefully use the adjective 
‘Platonic’ even when discussing concepts presented in the dialogues themselves in order to avoid 
the controversial practice of ascribing doctrines to Plato based on the views put forth by his 
characters.16  Furthermore, I do not take the Platonic tradition to be a sustained and direct 
engagement with Plato’s texts, but rather refer to it as a living tradition in which Platonic 
threads in a theory can be traced back to concepts presented in the dialogues via previous 
thinkers, although the authors under consideration may not have engaged them directly.  
Consequently, and in keeping with the classical sources, I use the term ‘Platonist’ and similar 
terms where contemporary intellectual historians might use the term ‘Neoplatonist.’  My focus 
here is on the rhetorical concepts and structures that pass through and reach back to Plato. 
 Recognizing that various threads of Platonic thought run throughout late antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, I focus on a single, well-documented thread running from Plato through St. 
                                               
15 Terms appear in bold followed by definition in italics. 
16 E.g. “Platonic psychology” as opposed to “Plato’s psychology.” 
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Augustine17 to St. Bonaventure.18  The lineage is a fairly uncontroversial one and well 
documented in many regards.19  However, the importance of rhetoric in this lineage is less 
recognized and forms the focus of this study.  I contend that a reciprocal relationship exists 
within this tradition, meaning that the development of rhetorical theory is greatly influenced by 
the greater intellectual framework and the rhetorical theory greatly influences the development 
of the framework itself.  As such, I investigate the rhetorical theory together with a number of 
other interrelated concepts.  I employ the term psychagogia to refer to the complex of concepts 
under consideration, denoting a rhetorical theory in the Platonic tradition for which the main 
object is the soul and for which the main activity is the leading of the soul.20  Its application is 
taken from Plato’s description of rhetoric as an art that leads souls by means of speech.21  This 
means that knowledge of the soul’s nature is necessary for any would-be rhetorician to possess.22  
A basic thesis that is demonstrated in the following chapters is that psychagogia implies leading 
the soul upward along a metaphysical hierarchy.  As such, soul, speech, psychology, and 
metaphysics are key concepts implied by psychagogia, to which I add cosmology and theology. 
 I understand metaphysics in its classic sense as the first philosophy or the study of first 
principles.  Since the basic metaphysical structure is replicated from macro to microcosm, the 
various other studies – cosmology, theology and psychology – represent subfields of 
metaphysics.  I take each in the most literal sense as an account of that which the name implies, 
                                               
17 Via Cicero, the Greek Platonists and Victorinus. 
18 Via St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius (hereafter referred to simply as Dionysius), the Victorines and the Arabic 
commentators.  
19 There are many controversies over the degrees of influence that one theorist had over another, especially 
concerning the effect of Platonic thought on St. Augustine.  But that Augustine was familiar with some forms of 
Platonism, and that later thinkers, including St. Bonaventure, picked up Platonic themes through Augustine, is fairly 
uncontroversial.  Indeed, these influences are well documented by the theorists themselves. 
20 The term literally means “leading the soul” and carries with it the implication of “soul raising” in the necromantic 
sense of conjuring spirits.  As stated above, its etymology will be further discussed in section 3.4. 
21 Speech here translating logos.  Phaedrus 261a 
22 Phaedrus 270e-272b 
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so that cosmology simply means an account of the cosmos; theology, an account of God, the 
gods or the divine; and psychology, an account of the soul.  Soul indicates the seat of human 
intellect, emotion and will and is used in this study to translate the Greek psyche and the Latin 
animus, unless the original context clearly indicates ‘mind’ specifically, i.e. the rational faculties 
alone.  Speech translates the Greek logos, where appropriate, and the Latin oratio and sermo.  
However, I use the term logos when I feel that more is implied in the original than speech alone 
or where the Greek term is employed specifically by authors writing in languages other than 
Greek.   
 Additionally, the trivium, language arts, and arts of the logos are employed 
synonymously in reference to grammar, dialectic and rhetoric as a single unit, inclusive of 
poetry and logic.  Another basic thesis that I demonstrate is that the structure of the tripartite 
soul in Platonic psychology, that is, its division into three distinct elements – rational, spirited 
and appetitive – is indicative of the structure that underlies all the concepts considered in this 
history, including Platonic rhetoric itself.  Finally, I use modern to refer to the period of time 
from the Enlightenment to the present and contemporary to refer to the period of time from the 
early 1900’s to the present; not in contrast with modernity, but as a segment thereof.   
1.3 OVERVIEW 
Comprising a complex of replicating hierarchies, the Platonic tradition saw intricate connections 
between cosmology, theology, psychology and language.  At the height of this tradition, St. 
Bonaventure notes that rational philosophy is consummated in rhetoric (Collations on the Seven 
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Gifts of the Holy Spirit, IV.12),23 indicating that a study of Platonic rhetoric transcends the 
disciplinary sub-field of “the history of rhetoric” and engages much larger issues that concern the 
nature of language itself, language’s relationship with human rationality and its analogy with the 
divine.  In order to understand this tradition I will establish what James J. Murphy has termed a 
metarhetoric – the first principles of a rhetorical theory – by situating the rhetoric of each theorist 
in relationship with their own theories of metaphysics and the language arts.24  Since the 
tripartite soul marks the proper object of rhetoric and indicates its structure, I contend that 
Platonic psychology plays a central role among the other metaphysical disciplines in the 
articulation of this rhetorical tradition.  As the foundation of this tradition, I begin this study with 
a thorough analysis of Platonic psychology, starting with an investigation into the roles of each 
part of the soul and the interplay among them.   
Since the advent of modernity it has been common to reduce Platonic psychology, and 
psychological schemes in general, to a simple dichotomy between the rational and the non-
rational, with reason and calculation on the one side and emotion, passion and appetite on the 
other.  Accordingly, modes of persuasion are reduced to two: arguing in order to convince the 
rational part and describing so as to entice and incite the non-rational part.  Left out of this 
                                               
23 Bonaventure defined rational philosophy as consisting of the arts of the trivium, which he identifies as grammar, 
logic, and rhetoric. 
24 See Murphy, “Metarhetorics.”  In this piece, Murphy argues that every student of rhetoric should be concerned 
with metarhetoric, which “investigates what a rhetorician needs to know in order to be a rhetorician” (202).  To 
illustrate this concept he gives a cursory outline of the metarhetorics of Plato, St. Augustine, and Marshall McLuhan.  
He finds them all connected by certain Platonic assumptions that “images are not realities,” but ultimately finds each 
inadequate for various reasons (212-213).  He concludes that, “the most practical kind of metarhetoric so far 
proposed in Western culture is to be found scattered through the books on logic, psychology, ethics, and politics 
written by a famous pupil of Plato, Aristotle “ (213).  This is somewhat ironic since Murphy praises Plato’s 
statements about psychagogia as a clear and concise statement of his metarhetoric while condemning its inadequacy 
and impracticality, yet touts Aristotle for his practical metarhetoric which is scattered throughout various works and 
needs to be reconstructed.  The irony is exaggerated in this dissertation by the fact that, while I agree with Murphy’s 
assumptions about the value of metarhetorical investigation, I hold that it is Plato who offers the most complete and 
functional metarhetoric, which can only be assessed if we look through the lens of the Phaedrus at his various works 
on psychology, epistemology, politics etc.  The aim of Chapter 4 is to do just that. 
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dualism is any notion of the spirited element, which for Plato is much more than simply non-
reason, but rather the seat of courage and the auxiliary to rational action.  The importance of this 
psychological structure for rhetoric has yet to be explored by either historians or contemporary 
theorists of rhetoric and so a major element of classical theory is often overlooked.  For in the 
internal struggle of the soul it is the spirited element that often decides the fate of the agent by 
aligning with either reason or the appetites.  The Platonist rhetoricians of antiquity and the 
Middle Ages were well aware of this psychological condition and so viewed rhetoric’s final end 
as neither to teach nor to delight, but to move the will to action. 
Although this movement was recognized in its mundane sense as moving the individual 
to practical socio-political action, the ultimate goal was the transcendent movement of the soul 
upwards towards a higher level of being.  Hence, this study investigates a rhetorical tradition that 
begins with Plato’s characterization of rhetoric as psychagogic and develops in an intellectual 
and spiritual tradition that touts rhetoric’s anagogic or soul-raising function.25  This represents a 
special development of Plato’s exhortation that rhetoricians correlate the psyche with the logos – 
the soul with speech.  In the Platonic tradition, logos-as-speech is structurally analogous to the 
Divine Logos, a structure that the soul also shares.  Thus, by adapting an argument to a particular 
audience, one could reform their souls in the image of the divine.  Through its merger with 
Catholic thought in the Patristic era, Platonic psychology becomes intricately tied to Trinitarian 
theology.  For Trinitarians such as Augustine and Bonaventure, this means there exists a 
corresponding alignment between language, the soul and the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.  The result is a rhetoric with an underlying geometrical scheme as informed by 
Platonic philosophy as it is by Judeo-Christian theology.   
                                               
25 Again, “soul-raising” was a possible meaning of psychagogia. 
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Beginning with Plato and his predecessors, I articulate the triadic structure that connects 
the soul, speech, and the metaphysical order.  In particular, I look at the concept of the soul as 
Plato presents it in the Phaedrus, the Republic, and the Timaeus.  In addition, I consider the 
accounts of the logos in the Theaetetus and the structure of the cosmos presented in the Timaeus.  
I then trace the development of these concepts and their corresponding structures over the next 
two thousand years with focus on the thought of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure.  
Specifically, I consider Augustine’s account of spiritual ascent as it appears in the Confessions, 
his explanation of the oratorical duties as they appear in On Christian Doctrine, and his 
psychological analogy of the Trinity as it is presented in the Confessions and On the Trinity.  
Finally, I investigate the role that the unified language arts play in realigning the soul with the 
Trinity, thus aiding in its ascent as articulated in Bonaventure’s Reduction of the Arts to 
Theology, Journey of the Mind to God, Collations on Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit and 
Collations on the Six Days.  Through this analysis I demonstrate that a Platonic tradition of 
rhetoric existed throughout the Middle Ages in contrast to the overt Ciceronianism of the 
medieval teaching curriculum and the Aristotelian logicized rhetoric of the Arabic-Thomistic 
tradition.  These are broad and often overlapping categories the boundaries and intersections of 
which are drawn with more precision in the following chapters.  But the basic distinction is one 
of focus: while the Ciceronians focus on the practical applications of rhetoric that would become 
the arts of letter writing, poetry and preaching and the Aristotelians subsume rhetoric under logic 
as a genre of argument, the Platonists focus on the capacity of rhetorical activity to reform the 
soul of speaker and auditor.   
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In short, this study maps the structural framework of the Platonic intellectual tradition 
from antiquity to the Middle Ages.26  While such a map might serve as the foundation for a 
number of studies in intellectual history, I construct it primarily to identify the conditions 
necessary for rhetorical activity under a tripartite metaphysics.  By comparing the parallel 
structures inherent in reality, language, and the mind, I contend that rhetoric plays a definitive 
role for the Platonist in the process of spiritual formation.  Indeed, in some cases it represents the 
only machinery that humanity has to achieve intellectual, spiritual, and societal amelioration.  
Although this is largely a study in parallel structures, the tripartitions are not often neat 
and tidy, and indeed sometimes slide along a scale of much larger conceptual hierarchies.  
Therefore, I do not simply point out correlations three by three.  Rather, I untangle masses of 
knotted concepts, seeking to find consonance where possible, and pointing out variations among 
theorists and the implications that they bring.  I attempt to bring to this ostensibly untidy 
hodgepodge a sense of geometrical elegance while at the same time allowing for the organic 
adaptability that permeates the Platonic tradition.  Reality, knowledge, and language for the 
Platonist were all living things.  It is only by way of a crass caricature derived from the 
modernist’s celebration (and perversion) of Platonic rationalism that we now think of him as a 
stodgy idealist.  I do not deny Plato’s rationalism, idealism, or realism in this study, but seek to 
investigate their interaction with his own skepticism, aestheticism and, above all, mysticism.  
The same is true for Augustine, Bonaventure and the Platonic tradition as a whole.  Such models 
as the Platonists provide can illustrate how philosophical tensions now thought to be in 
diametrical opposition can be brought into dialectical synthesis.  The result is a truly organic 
                                               
26 Though this may seem like an overly broad goal, I mean ‘structural framework’ in the very exact sense of the 
overarching tripartite apparatus that governs the intellectual inquiry of this tradition.    
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intellectual framework that informs a rhetorical theory of equal vitality – a tripartite rhetoric, at 
once rational, spiritual, and emotive, culminating in the soul in a rhetoric of ascent.27 
1.4 DISCIPLINARY SIGNIFICANCE 
This study presents two main areas of significance for contemporary rhetorical scholarship.  The 
first pertains to current thinking in the history of rhetoric, the second to the trend of rooting 
contemporary theory in recovered historical traditions.  As a history of rhetoric that purports to 
investigate the Platonic tradition from Plato through St. Augustine to St. Bonaventure, it is clear 
that some revisionary historical analysis must be undertaken.  Here the most substantial 
rethinking comes by way of my treatment of Plato and Augustine.   
In the first instance, it is a truism that while Plato indicated a more philosophical 
trajectory for rhetorical theory, he himself never constructed one.  Much less than being a 
founder of a rhetorical tradition, Plato is often viewed as the discipline’s preeminent critic whose 
dialectical method is antithetical to the rhetorical enterprise.  Nonetheless, I treat Plato as a 
rhetorical theorist whose theory is discernible through a wider encounter with his works than is 
typical; that is to say, by looking beyond the Gorgias and the Phaedrus.28  Thus, I seek to 
                                               
27 While the terminus of this ascent differs among Platonists, the process consistently entails a reordering of the 
inward elements of the soul in imitation of the outward, intelligible world.  This goal of achieving inward harmony 
through participation in the liberal arts might appeal to pagan, Christian and secular humanists alike. 
28 Such a scope of study may appear to be a radical rethinking of Plato.  In reality, it is very much in line with 
perennial, if peripheral, calls to extend our disciplinary familiarity with the Platonic corpus.  See, for instance, 
Weaver’s works, especially “The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric.” Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago: H. Regnery 
Co., 1953. 3-26; Edwin Black. “Plato’s View of Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 44 (1958): 361-374; Rollin 
W. Quimby. “The Growth of Plato's Perception of Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 7.2 (1974): 71-79; David S. 
Kaufer. “The Influence of Plato’s Developing Psychology on His Views of Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 
64 (1978): 63-78; Charles Kauffman. “The Axiological Foundations of Plato’s Theory of Rhetoric.” Central States 
Speech Journal 33 (1982): 353-366. Reprinted in Landmark Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric. Ed. Edward 
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advance our thinking of Platonic rhetorical theory by demonstrating that the knowledge deemed 
necessary for the art of rhetoric in the Phaedrus can be obtained in part by considering the model 
of the soul in the Republic and the discussion of the logos in the Theaetetus.   
Less reviled in our discipline, indeed often revered, is the figure of St. Augustine.  
However, an increase in reverence does not amount to a decrease in controversy.  For general 
Augustinian scholarship holds that the saint had a complicated relationship with Platonism, 
ultimately refining or even abandoning many of the philosophical ideas that so influenced his 
younger writings.29  Given disciplinary biases against Platonism, however, we have been quick 
to interpret this complex developmental narrative as offering rhetorical history a Plato-free 
Augustine.  This despite Augustine’s own mature exhortation that rhetoricians take from the 
Platonists what is worthy, as the Hebrews took treasures from Egypt (DDC 2.40).  As such, this 
study challenges the current mainstream of Augustinian rhetorical scholarship.30  Nevertheless, 
rather than argue that Augustine may or may not have been a Platonist, to what degree, and for 
how long – a procedure Augustine himself would have held as useless for understanding his 
writings – I proceed by asking what we may gain by reading Augustine’s rhetoric through a 
Platonic lens.  I hold that regardless of any theological differences, Augustine’s theories of 
psychology and language place him squarely in the Platonic tradition of rhetorical theory.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Schiappa. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994: 101-116; James Kastley. Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition: From 
Plato to Postmodernism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997; Carol Poster. “Framing Theaetetus: Plato and 
Rhetorical (Mis)Representation.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35.3 (2005): 31-73; Ekaterina Haskins. “Choosing 
Between Isocrates and Aristotle: Disciplinary Assumptions and Pedagogical Implications.” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly, 36 (2006): 191-201 (pp. 197-8); and Nathan Crick and John Poulakos. “Go Tell Alcibiades: Tragedy, 
Comedy, and Rhetoric in Plato’s Symposium.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 94.1 (2008): 1-22. 
29 What Platonic works Augustine actually read is a matter of continued discussion.   Concerning this project, it is 
enough that Augustine was steeped in Ciceronian thought and had almost certainly read some Plotinus and likely 
some Porphyry.  These authors would have given Augustine ample grounding in Platonic metaphysics and 
psychology. 
30 See, for example, Martin Camargo. “‘Non Solum Sibi Sed Aliis Etiam’: Neoplatonism and Rhetoric in Saint 
Augustine’s de doctrina Christiana.” Rhetorica 16.4 (1998): 393-408; and Calvin L. Troup. Temporality, Eternity, 
and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine's Confessions. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. 
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Reading Augustine in this manner reveals a number of connections between the theory of 
rhetoric presented in On Christian Doctrine and the theory of spiritual progress found in the 
Confessions.  These connections not only indicate the mystical foundations of Augustinian 
rhetoric, but also suggest that Augustine’s rhetorical theory greatly impacted his spiritual 
theology. 
The third contribution to the history of rhetoric comes not by way of revision, but by 
introduction; since the third major theorist to be considered is St. Bonaventure, who remains a 
marginal figure in the history of rhetoric.  Granted, McKeon makes much of Bonaventure in his 
seminal article, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” and identifies him as the culminating figure of 
the Platonic-Augustinian rhetorical tradition, but little has been said of him before or since by 
our disciplinary historians.31  In agreement with McKeon, I contend that Bonaventure represents 
the most developed and systematic view of the relationship between the divine, language and the 
human soul.  The result of this theory is a pedagogy of ascent in which rhetoric plays a 
consummative role amongst the arts of reason and language.  To leave Bonaventure out of the 
history of rhetoric is to overlook the most spiritual development of rhetoric in the high Middle 
Ages.  Thus, investigation into his thought offers more than just the contribution of a previously 
neglected rhetorical theorist; it provides us with an account of rhetorical theory pushed to the 
limits of significance for traditional Western theology.   
However, as each theorist attests to his influences, there would be no Bonaventure 
without Augustine, and no Augustine without Plato.  So the major contribution that this study 
provides the history of rhetoric is a developmental account of a rhetorical tradition that flowed 
from antiquity to the Middle Ages and beyond.  Such an account is all the more important 
                                               
31 Richard McKeon. “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages.” Speculum 17.1 (1942): 1-32. 
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because it does not merely mark the discovery of some overlooked thread of rhetorical history, 
but rather documents a tradition that, due to contemporary biases, is widely believed to have 
never existed.  That Plato never constructed a rhetorical theory and that rhetorical theory 
stagnated in the Middle Ages are contemporary commonplaces born out of the assumption that 
rhetoric is a democratic activity essentially opposed to Platonic elitism and medieval dogmatism.  
A documented history of an evolving Platonic tradition of rhetoric in the Middle Ages should 
cause us to rethink these basic disciplinary assumptions.   
Beyond its value as a work of rhetorical history, this study offers the foundation for a 
Neoplatonic/Neomedieval rhetorical theory.  Although it might seem that such a rigidly 
geometrical system must result in a wooden, unwieldy, and unnatural rhetoric, I contend that its 
foundation in triadic psychology makes for a more flexible rhetorical theory than the dualisms of 
our own age.  In much the same way that the middle term joins two seemingly unconnected 
terms in the Aristotelian syllogism, the middle element of the soul forms a link between our 
animal and rational natures.  When we view this psychological triad as representative of the 
structure of both human speech and the divine cosmos, a link appears between a number of 
concepts thought to be incompatible by scholars since the Enlightenment.  As such, this study 
can point the way towards repairing some of the fractures that motivated it in the first place. 
For instance, within the discipline, a study of the Platonic tradition brings to light 
insightful attitudes towards the epistemic and aesthetic qualities of rhetoric.  Despite the 
caricature of Plato that currently exists within our discipline, he was no rigid logician.  Indeed, 
lovers of beauty stand beside philosophers atop Socrates’ psychic taxonomy in the Phaedrus 
(248d), and Plato’s intellectual descendants were quite aware of both the epistemic and aesthetic 
roles that rhetoric played.  Rather than viewing these roles in opposition, the Platonic tradition 
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saw them as operating in harmony.  Moreover, the role of transmitting knowledge and the role of 
appealing to the senses were joined by a third role, that of moving the soul.  Thus, this study 
offers suggestions for rapprochement in the epistemic versus aesthetic debates by tracing the 
three duties of the orator to their origins in Platonic psychology.  Such an analysis shows that the 
epistemic and the aesthetic views are not mutually exclusive and can be theoretically balanced in 
a more robust sense of the duties and functions of the rhetorical enterprise. 
From an interdisciplinary perspective, the parallel dichotomies of “faith and reason” 
[fides et ratio] and “reason and speech” [ratio et oratio] are major concerns in this study.  These 
dichotomies permeated philosophical and pedagogical debates in the Middles Ages and persist 
today under such monikers as “religion versus science” and “philosophy versus rhetoric.”  When 
viewed through the dialectical lens of a tripartite rhetoric we see that ratio plays the middle term 
and sets up a syllogistic relationship between faith and rhetoric that has gone overlooked for 
quite some time.  Indeed, for many contemporary rhetoricians, faith and reason are both false 
authorities which dogmatically constrain humanity, and so they seek a rhetorical theory that has 
a foundation of neither faith nor reason, indeed no foundation at all.  Far from expelling faith and 
reason from rhetorical practice, Platonic theorists sought to unify these concepts, recognizing 
that each term has for itself the same object, the human soul in its entirety.  To suppress or 
neglect any of the terms completely is to maim our abilities to know, to act individually and to 
come together in joint activity.  By restoring the spirited element to rhetorical psychology, I 
argue that we can see the humanistic importance of a rhetoric that recognizes the value of faith 
and reason, while not subordinating itself to either.  Thus a balance is sought between fides et 
ratio et oratio instead of the perpetuation of an interdisciplinary conflict that merely mirrors the 
internal conflict of our souls. 
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1.5 THEORETICAL COMMITMENTS 
This history is a study of the rhetorical tradition, a concept that has met with some misgivings in 
contemporary scholarship and not without good reason.  Rhetoric and tradition have endured an 
uncertain relationship since the nomos/physis controversies of ancient Greece.  On the one hand, 
rhetoric and tradition are inseparable.  As teachings handed down through generations by means 
of oral and written discourse, there is no tradition without rhetoric.  Insofar as discourse must be 
adapted to the norms of a given cultural context in order to be effective, there is no rhetoric 
without tradition.   
On the other hand, rhetoric and tradition exist in common tension.  Since the Sophists, 
rhetoricians have worried about tradition masquerading as natural law, converting doxa into 
dogma, presenting nomos as physis.  At the same time, traditionalists have worried about the 
disruption that seems inherent in rhetorical skepticism – testing the foundations to shore them up 
is one thing, tearing them down with wild abandon is quite another.  With such an ambivalent 
relationship, it is no wonder that the rhetorical tradition is a concept of some angst amongst 
rhetoricians.  Over the past few decades it has been defended, revalued, reinvented, reclaimed, 
rethought, retold, regendered, reread, refigured and challenged outright.32  In this study I view 
the rhetorical tradition as extant and worthy of regard, yet always incomplete.  As such, I seek to 
                                               
32 Brian Vickers. In Defence of Rhetoric. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1988; Vickers (ed). Rhetoric Revalued: Papers 
from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric. Binghamton, N.Y.: Center for Medieval & Early 
Renaissance Studies, 1982; Aviva Freedman and Ian Pringle. Reinventing the Rhetorical Tradition. Ontario: 
Canadian Council of Teachers of English (L & S Books), 1980; Andrea A. Lunsford. Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women 
in the Rhetorical Tradition. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995; Janet M. Atwill. Rhetoric Reclaimed: 
Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998; James L. Kastely. Rethinking the 
Rhetorical Tradition; Cheryl Glenn. Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity through the 
Renaissance. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997; Susan Jarratt. Rereading the Sophists: Classical 
Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991; Laura Gray-Rosendale and Sibylle 
Gruber. Alternative Rhetorics: Challenges to the Rhetorical Tradition. Albany: SUNY Press, 2001. 
 22 
add to the critical reexamination of the tradition, not by way of sweeping revision, but by 
recovering a particular tradition of rhetorical thought – a tradition that according to some does 
not exist as a matter of fact, and to others, should not exist as a matter of preference. 
Given the nature of the Platonic tradition and my current study of it, I should 
acknowledge my own commitment to metaphysical and ontological realism.  However, as these 
viewpoints are often misunderstood in contemporary academia, I would quickly add that similar 
to the Platonic tradition I propose to study, my own realism is no unreflective dogmatism; rather 
it is tempered with a high dose of skepticism towards any claims about what exists and what can 
be known, including and especially my own.  As such, I labor to make my presuppositions clear 
throughout this study, as well as the logical implications that seem apparent to me, in order that 
the arguments I produce do not take on the air of dogmatic assertions about the nature of the 
world, but rather are taken for what they are meant to be – dialectical propositions which 
welcome further confirmation or refutation.   
I should also note that while my philosophical orientation is consciously pre-modern,33 
my philosophical training is that of contemporary analytic philosophy.  Thus, the conversation I 
initiate between rhetoric and philosophy throughout this study is one of bringing contemporary 
analytic work on Plato, Augustine and Bonaventure to bear on rhetorical scholarship and vice 
versa.  I feel justified in this focus for two related reasons: First, much attention has already been 
given to Continental philosophy by rhetorical scholars.  Second, little attention has been given to 
analytic philosophy.  I believe that this mutual neglect is unfortunate and hope that this study 
shows that there is a lot of room for fruitful interdisciplinary discussion.  With that said, I 
acknowledge that this study will be devoid of a sustained engagement with Nietzsche, 
                                               
33 I would sooner identify my philosophical disposition as Platonist, or Augustinian, or Scholastic than as analytic, 
Continental, or post-modern. 
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Heidegger, Focualt, Derridas and the like.  I recognize this as a necessary limitation for an 
already ambitious undertaking and look forward to entertaining any objections raised against this 
study by students of Continental and post-modern philosophy. 
Finally, it may be noticed that a good deal of this study is focused on the Catholic 
intellectual tradition.  I readily acknowledge my commitment to this tradition and hope that this 
study falls in line with it; for I recognize it as the last living intellectual tradition in the West to 
be directly rooted in antiquity.34  Thus, as a historian of rhetoric, I openly lament the separation 
that has occurred in modernity between the rhetorical and Catholic intellectual traditions, which 
were intertwined for centuries.  Hopefully, I show that this union was beneficial to humanistic 
study as a whole, and that its reintegration can once again offer benefits to humanity beyond the 
scope of Catholic adherents or post-modern rhetoricians.  However, some may be prompted to 
suggest that I have too easily conflated the Catholic, Platonic and rhetorical traditions and might 
even acknowledge their separation as a point of celebration.  Towards such individuals I offer 
this study in humble disagreement and only ask that such readers not reject the arguments that I 
proffer simply because they are rooted in a rival ideology, philosophy, or theology.  Rather, I 
hope that they can engage the arguments on their own merits, acknowledging that which seems 
plausible and offering correction where correction is needed.   
                                               
34 Excepting, or rather, including, the extant tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the smaller national 
churches that have retained their identity since antiquity. 
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1.6 HISTORICAL LIMITS 
Although it is my intention to recover a rather neglected tradition, such a task cannot be 
completed entirely in one sitting, especially one that ranges over thousands of years.  As I have 
indicated above, the focus is on certain epochs within this tradition, spread out by some 800 
years apiece: Plato in the late fifth and early fourth centuries of antiquity, St. Augustine in the 
late fourth and early fifth centuries on the cusp of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and St. 
Bonaventure in the thirteenth century of the high Middle Ages.  That leaves roughly the same 
800-year span until the contemporary period.  Although the majority of the study focuses on 
these rather disparate eras, I review and summarize relevant primary and secondary literature at 
the beginning of each chapter concerning the development of the tradition in the near century 
between each theorist. 
1.7 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND RHETORIC – This chapter engages 
disciplinary concerns that attempt to delimit appropriate practices for investigating rhetorical 
concepts in the works of Plato and his predecessors.  In particular, I consider the thought of 
Edward Schiappa and Carol Poster in order to forestall methodological criticism and open the 
appropriate space for investigating concepts that adherence to their methodological concerns 
would ultimately close off.  At the close of this chapter, I lay out my procedures for investigating 
concept clusters in ancient works and articulate the basic structures that will guide the remainder 
of the study. 
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 CHAPTER 3: PRE-PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGIA – In this chapter I summarize the pre-Platonic 
metaphysical and psychological landscape with a synoptic overview of the various tripartite 
structures and psychagogic concepts that run through Homer, Heraclitus, Gorgias and 
Aristophanes.  Through this analysis I establish certain latent structural threads that situate Plato 
in a tradition of implicit psychagogical instruction and provide him with the materials he needs 
to construct a robust theory of psychagogic rhetoric.   
CHAPTER 4: PSYCHAGOGIC RHETORIC IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS – After establishing the 
intellectual and cultural background, I begin the analysis of Platonic rhetoric by highlighting the 
importance of psychagogia in the Phaedrus.  I argue that Plato is in earnest when he admonishes 
the would-be rhetorician to acquire systematic knowledge of the soul, its structure, and its types 
in order that one may then know which type of speech corresponds to which soul.  I argue that 
such admonishment goes far beyond considerations of simple (but impossible to meet) criteria of 
audience adaptation and strikes at the heart of Plato’s system of internal reform.  I then show that 
such a systematic explanation of the soul is laid out in the Republic with a corresponding 
discussion of speech and argument indicated in the Theaetetus.  However, a proper alignment 
requires that the spirited element of the soul function in a way that runs counter to most 
contemporary views of Platonic psychology.  Ultimately, I construct a model of Platonic 
psychagogic rhetoric and explain its basic functions. 
CHAPTER 5: THE PERIAGOGIC RHETORIC OF SAINT AUGUSTINE – The opening section of 
this chapter engages the methodological concerns of Calvin Troup, who argues against the 
possibility of reading St. Augustine’s rhetoric Platonically.  The chapter then reviews the 
development of Platonic metaphysics and psychology in late antiquity with special attention paid 
to Cicero, Plotinus, and Victorinus, who are all identified as influences by St. Augustine.  In the 
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following section I examine the contemporary thesis that St. Augustine wholly abandoned 
Platonic thought in the development of his rhetoric and demonstrate that many of the recognized 
aspects of his rhetorical theory can be enlightened by the Platonic psychagogy developed in the 
previous sections.  In the end, I demonstrate that the Platonic tripartite soul gives Augustinian 
rhetoric an object, an aim, and a structure that undergirds its more obviously Ciceronian 
framework. 
CHAPTER 6: SAINT BONAVENTURE’S ANAGOGIC THEOLOGY OF LANGUAGE – Due to the 
diversity of influences that bear on the development of intellectual history in the centuries 
between St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, this chapter opens with two separate reviews. The 
first section summarizes the three major strands in the history of rhetoric: 1) the Ciceronian 
preceptive tradition articulated by Murphy, which remains the major focus of contemporary 
studies in the history of medieval rhetoric, 2) the Aristotelian tradition of Boethius and the 
Arabic commentators in which rhetoric was recognized as a subspecies of logical argumentation, 
and 3) the Platonic influence on rhetorical thinking as explored in recent literature on the 
cathedral school of Chartres.  The second section summarizes pseudo-Dionysius’ Platonically 
inspired hierarchical metaphysics and its impact on the pedagogical thought of Hugh of St. 
Victor.  I argue that all three of these lines – the Ciceronian, the Aristotelian, and the Platonic – 
overlap in many regards and collectively influence the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century to 
varying degrees.  The dominant influence of Platonism over, but not to the exclusion of, the 
other strains in the rhetorical thought of St. Bonaventure serves as the topic of investigation for 
the remainder of the chapter.  
 In the following sections I trace the unique confluence of pedagogy and theology in the 
works of St. Bonaventure.  For Bonaventure, all arts emanated from God.  As such, practice and 
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contemplation of the arts brought us closer to Him.  Bonaventure’s unique Trinitarian system 
collates the arts into sets of three, the trivium among them, each mirroring the Trinity in some 
fashion.  I illustrate how for Bonaventure, in the tradition of Plato and Augustine, the arts of 
language hold a central place in the soul’s ascent, since more than any other triad in his scheme 
the trivium functions analogously to both God and the human mind.  However, more than a mere 
descendent in the Platonic tradition, I demonstrate that Bonaventure presents a number of 
innovations that result in the most systematic view of the relationship between language, 
humanity and the divine that the tradition has to offer among the Scholastics.  Consequently, 
more than Plato or Augustine, Bonaventure explores the effect that rhetorical practice has on the 
speaker, who is raised up by the very contemplation of his linguistic abilities.   
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – The final chapter opens with a brief summary and moves to 
an exploration of the development of Platonic psychagogy as it progressed through the 
Renaissance and into Modernity in the likes of Ficino, Coleridge, Brownson, Lewis and Weaver.  
I close by discussing the broader implications that a neo-medieval theory of rhetoric in the 
Platonic tradition has to offer contemporary rhetorical practice and instruction.  
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2.0  METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND RHETORIC 
Given some of the methodological suggestions and accompanying biases that have arisen over 
the last few decades concerning the proper way to address rhetorical concepts in and before 
Plato, it is prudent to set forth exactly what I hope to achieve in this chapter and by what means 
as precisely as possible.  But first it may be prudent to discuss what aims and means I also reject.   
In particular, Edward Schiappa and Carol Poster have voiced important and influential 
methodological concerns that I would like to address, mainly because I intentionally choose to 
ignore some of their more prominent methodological suggestions in this study.35  I do recognize 
that the suggestions and cautions of each offer many insights to the historian and philosopher of 
rhetoric and I am far from rejecting them outright.  However, often despite professed authorial 
intentions, their suggestions can carry a dogmatic tone and their cautions a sense of arbitrary 
constraint.  By directly acknowledging and justifying my calculated transgressions, I hope to 
forestall some popular objections based on their writings that my study might otherwise incur. 
                                               
35 See, for example, the following works of Edward Schiappa: “Did Plato Coin Rhētorikē?” The American Journal 
of Philology 11.4 (1990): 457-470; “Rhêtorikê: What's In a Name? Toward a Revised History of Early Greek 
Rhetorical Theory.” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 78.1 (1992): 1-15; The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in 
Classical Greece. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999; and, along with David Timmerman. Classical Greek 
Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  See also, the 
following works of Carol Poster: “Aristotle’s Rhetoric against Rhetoric: Unitarian Reading and Esoteric 
Hermeneutics.” The American Journal of Philology 118.2 (1997): 219-249; “The Idea(s) of Order of Platonic 
Dialogues and Their Hermeneutic Consequences.” Phoenix 52.3/4 (1998): 282-298; and “Framing Theaetetus: Plato 
and Rhetorical (Mis)Representation.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35.3 (2005): 31-73. 
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2.1 PLATONIC RHETORIC AND THE TERM RHETORIKE  
In the first instance, Edward Schiappa makes much of the idea that Plato likely coined the term 
rhetorike.  He infers from this probability that “fifth-century texts concerning logos differ 
substantially from fourth-century texts” that employ the newly coined term.36  Schiappa argues 
that as a consequence of overlooking this difference, scholars have been reading back the 
thought of Plato and Aristotle anachronistically on to the Sophists.37  This observation naturally 
leads to the methodological suggestion to pay greater attention to the conceptual terms that are 
employed by the Sophists, Plato and others concerning the arts of speech.  However, this sensible 
suggestion morphed into a hard and fast methodological distinction between the “historical 
reconstruction” of sophistical rhetoric and its “contemporary appropriation.”38  
                                               
36 “Rhêtorikê” 1. 
37 Ibid. 4. 
38 While Schiappa might have sought to draw a simple line in an attempt to avoid scholarly anachronism, his 
categories did not sit well with the newly minted “neosophists” who had previously considered themselves 
historians of rhetoric, and still do.  See the following – Schiappa’s attempts to reclassify the works of John Poulakos 
given his methodological suggestions: “Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of 
Sophistic Doctrines?” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23.3 (1990): 192-217; Poulakos’ response: “Interpreting Sophistical 
Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23.3 (1990): 218-228; and Schiappa’s reply: “History 
and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23.4 (1990): 307-315. 
Against Schiappa’s protestations that he was not valorizing or condemning methodologies, historians and 
philosophers of rhetoric took methodological sides using Schiappa’s categories.  See, for instance, the somewhat 
belatedly published opinion of Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., the editor of Philosophy & Rhetoric during the Schiappa-
Poulakos colloquy (“On Schiappa versus Poulakos.” Rhetoric Review 14.2 (1996): 438-440).  Johnstone awards 
points to both sides, but in the end he “can’t give [Schiappa] much comfort” on methodological grounds, finding the 
totalizing force of the reconstruction/appropriation dichotomy too constraining to be useful for historical work in 
rhetorical studies (440).   
Scott Consigny briefly took up the methodological mantle of “Schiappa’s neosophistic rivals” against the 
“foundationalist” methodologies championed by “Schiappa’s camp” (“Edward Schiappa’s Reading of the Sophists.” 
Rhetoric Review 14.2 (1996): 253-269 (p.253)).  Schiappa replied by insisting on the value neutral distinction 
between appropriation and reconstruction – both were good scholarship in which he himself was involved, but only 
one was properly historical scholarship (“Some of My Best Friends are Neosophists: A Response to Scott 
Consigny.” Rhetoric Review 14.2 (1996): 272-279; See also the earlier “Forum” between the two concerning 
Schiappa’s Protagoras and Logos in Rhetoric Society Quarterly 25 (1995): 217-222.)   
Later, trying to steer a methodological middle course, Consigny placed himself somewhere between 
Schiappa’s “empiricism/objectivism” and Poulakos’ “rhapsodic/idiosyncratic” methodology.  Rather, he attempts a 
“pragmatic, conventionalist, or ‘communitarian’” approach that makes the most persuasive case of interpreting the 
text based on the criteria of a given interpretive community.  Thus, Consigny does not avoid “anachronistic” 
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While I do not consider this study to be a “neosophistical appropriation,” the focus of this 
chapter and the foundation of my subsequent analysis is the critical juncture of rhetorike and 
logos in the thought of Plato.  In some ways, this is exactly where Schiappa says the focus should 
be: “it is the transition from logos to rhêtorikê that deserves the attention of the historian of 
Greek rhetorical theory.”39  However, while I agree with Schiappa that Plato at times seeks to 
distinguish the arts of logos through coining terms by which to label them, my study is 
concerned far more with the similarities that Plato shares with his predecessors and successors.  
In Platonic terms, where Schiappa emphasizes division, I look at collection.  In so doing, I do 
read Plato back on to his predecessors and I admittedly seek to show that the difference between 
fifth-century texts concerning logos and fourth-century texts concerning rhetorike is less 
substantial than he suggests.   
To those that subscribe to Schiappa’s revised historical methodology, my basic 
assumptions might appear as methodological anathema.  But insofar as my analysis is grounded 
in textual evidence, I believe that there should be little problem with the arguments I set forth as 
arguments about the history of rhetoric – whether they stand on logical grounds is another 
matter.  As such, I want to forestall the objection that because I look for rhetorical concepts 
where they supposedly aren’t, my arguments are therefore anachronistic and I am somehow a 
                                                                                                                                                       
application of modern thought to classical theorists, but embraces his ideological prejudices upfront (Gorgias, 
Sophist and Artist. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 17-21).  Despite Consigny’s 
methodological concessions, Schiappa held fast to his distinctions in his review of the book, thinking it “fair to say 
that classicists and historians will be disappointed, if not frustrated” for various methodological reasons while 
“scholars interested primarily in the contemporary appropriation of neosophistic theory are likely to find much to 
admire in the book, and what may be a vice to a historian may be a virtue to a neosophistic theorist”  (Book Reviews 
section. Argumentation and Advocacy, 39.4 (2003): 287-290 (p. 289)).  
Although Schiappa maintains his value neutrality, it is fair to say that “neosophistic” scholars often feel 
slighted by his devaluing of their historical scholarship as historical scholarship, while those who subscribe to his 
historical methodology see his work as an important corrective to past scholarly errors: “historians of rhetoric, keep 
up the good fight against anachronism with Timmerman and Schiappa” (Brandon Inabinet. “Review of: Classical 
Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 41:4 (2011): 393-396 (p. 
396)). 
39 “Rhêtorikê” 3. 
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contemporary appropriator of historical rhetoric as opposed to a proper historian of the art.  As I 
hopefully made clear in the introduction, I am both; for while a scholar may work exclusively as 
one or the other, the categories are not themselves exclusive by nature.40  This study, however, is 
strictly historical. 
2.2 RHETORICAL FETISHISM IN PLATO 
When faced with a constraining tendency to narrowly focus on keywords, one impulse might be 
to invoke Carol Poster’s concept of “rhetorical fetishism” to justify expanding attention to a 
broader constellation of concepts.  The argument is simple and important enough to restate fully: 
 
Rhetorical historiography (perhaps as yet another unfortunate side-effect of a manner of 
thinking based on “keywords”) has tended to fetishize the term “rhetoric,” treating the 
word “rhetoric” as if it represented some transcendent reality rather than simply being a 
convenient label existing within a system of differences, and thus ignoring works dealing 
with issues of persuasion, language, oratory, writing, writing pedagogy, etc. in which the 
word “rhetoric” does not occur.41  
 
                                               
40 In this way, I too seek a middle ground between the popular conceptions of Schiappa’s and Poulakos’ 
methodology.  But unlike Consigny, I do not see the two as representing unattractive and untenable extremes.  
Rather, I reject the hard and fast distinction altogether and see them as offering a number of useful methodological 
suggestions that I will appropriate as I see prudent.  While I do trace the conceptual development of certain 
keywords throughout history, I do so in part by following their “traces” and “echoes” (Poulakos, “Interpreting” 225).  
Nevertheless, I will always follow the single methodological guideline on which I think both would agree: make 
good arguments.  It is my hope that the end result will be acceptable to members of all methodological “camps.” 
41 “Reframing Theaetetus” 39. 
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The warning seems to directly engage the sort of terminological puritanism that I am consciously 
attempting to avoid while preserving the kind of rigor that such fetishes hope to maintain.   
Indeed, Poster offers many methodological suggestions that seek to expand how both 
rhetoricians and classicists approach rhetorical concepts in Plato that I take as general guidelines 
in this study.  In addition to a broader conceptual outlook, I also embrace Poster’s call to widen 
disciplinary boarders in terms of secondary literature,42 as well as the call to expand the 
disciplinary notion of Plato’s rhetorical canon.43  However, a closer analysis of Poster’s 
suggestions demonstrates why one cannot adhere to them uncritically.  For in her enumerated 
areas where classicists and rhetoricians could benefit from interdisciplinary conversations of 
method, an interesting interaction takes place between (5): “Broadening the Platonic Canon” and 
(6): “Avoiding Rhetorical Fetishism.”44  And what they expand with one hand, they contract 
with the other.  As these movements bear directly on the central methodological assumptions of 
the following chapters, I would like to look at them carefully.   
                                               
42 “Rhetorical awareness of underlying polemical impulses, however, should lead, not to dismissing all scholarship 
as biased, but rather lead to citing works from several disciplines more judiciously while avoiding the tunnel-vision 
resulting from allegiance to individual disciplinary ideologies” (ibid. 34).  This is more or less the difference 
between my middle ground and Consigny’s discussed in the note above. 
43 This appears as the fifth of Poster’s seven general areas where rhetoricians and classicists could benefit from an 
interdisciplinary conversation on methodology:   
 
The Platonic canon in rhetorical scholarship is often limited to a very small group of dialogues, which do 
not adequately reflect the range of positions articulated by Platonic characters. Protagoras is often read 
without the Theaetetus (which presents Socrates correcting his own earlier misrepresentations of 
Protagoras), Gorgias and Meno without Parmenides and Sophist (which further analyze “sophist” and 
provide a reductio ad absurdum of the “theory of forms”), Republic without Laws, and Phaedrus and 
Symposium without Philebus (which gives a more complex analysis of love and pleasure). The sheer 
number of cross-references and shared characters among the dialogues suggests that the Platonic corpus 
needs to be studied as a whole, and that dialogues read in isolation are liable to egregious misinterpretation.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to read each dialogue as a dramatic whole, rather than interpreting in isolation 
those sections of a dialogue that contain the word “rhetoric,” a fault exacerbated by the frequent use of 
anthologies rather than complete texts in graduate courses on the history of rhetoric. (Ibid. 38) 
 
Rhetorical fetishism follows as number 6.  See n.28 above for other iterations of this perennial call to expand our 
disciplinary familiarity with the Platonic corpus.    
44 Ibid. 38-40.  The abbreviated names in quotations are my own construction. 
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In (5) we are told that by expanding the rhetorical canon to include the entire Platonic 
corpus we gain a greater sense of what concepts and figures are important to Plato.  As a 
consequence, we learn that it is language that is important to Plato, not rhetoric.45  This assertion 
seems plausible at first read, but when mixed with (6) the methodological implications lead to 
perplexing results.  
In (6), as we have seen, Poster warns against a narrow focus on the term “rhetoric” and 
its cognates and favors a broader investigation into related ideas.  Poster asserts that if rhetorical 
scholars want to have greater extra-disciplinary impact, “we need to incorporate into our research 
studies of the entire range of verbal and persuasive practices.”46  But the target of her correction 
is not Schiappa’s terminological fixation;47 instead it is the likes of Edwin Black and James S. 
Murray.48  The resulting polemic is difficult to follow, but if I am reading it correctly, those who 
see the Phaedrus as an account of “true rhetoric” as opposed to “false rhetoric,” are guilty of 
rhetorical fetishism because: “In Plato’s Greek, the good arts being praised by Socrates, with the 
assent of Phaedrus, are called those of ‘dialectic’ and ‘speech,’ not ‘rhetoric’”;49 that is to say, 
their investigation is unsupportable because the term “rhetoric” does not appear at the right 
moment in the text, only terms that deal with other “verbal and persuasive practices.”  But if that 
is the case, are Black and Murray not doing exactly what Poster says they should by avoiding 
                                               
45 Ibid. 38.  We also learn that Isocrates “is an insignificant figure for Plato and efforts in rhetorical scholarship to 
read a significant degree of interest in Isocrates into the Platonic dialogue…are based on the false assumption, that 
because modern rhetorical scholars are interested in both Plato and Isocrates, Plato must have been interested in 
Isocrates.”  Rather, focus should be given to those figures that Plato names directly. (39). Cf. n.51. 
46 Ibid. 40 
47 Indeed, Schiappa’s historical work is conspicuously absent from the entire article, save for a footnote that 
recognizes him as one of the few scholars in the discipline who relies on his own translations (ibid. 57n.6).  To 
underscore the oddity of the omission, Schiappa’s contemporary work is cited in support against rhetorical 
fetishism, noting that “scholarship advances not through metadisciplinary wrangling . . . but through the production 
of exemplary work” (40).  Ellipsis in Poster’s citation of Schiappa. “Second Thoughts on the Critique of Big 
Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34:3 (2001): 260-274 (p. 271).  
48 Black, “Plato’s View”; Murray. “Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (Phaedrus 
261-266).” Philosophy and Rhetoric 21:4 (1988): 279-289. 
49 Ibid. 40 
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terminological tunnel-vision and looking at larger conceptual constructs within Plato’s theory of 
language?  If their only error is that they have focused on the Gorgias and/or the Phaedrus, it 
seems more related to (5) than (6).  But if we look back at (5) with their indiscretions in mind, 
we see that the combination of (5) and (6) results in a self-defeating methodology for historians 
of rhetoric interested in Plato. 
 Simply put, in (6) we are told to expand research from the term “rhetoric” to other 
linguistic concepts in Plato.  This would naturally lead to the sort of textual and conceptual 
expansion that is advocated in (5).  However, if we are not allowed to read “rhetoric” back in to 
the text in which it does not appear, then all that we can learn by expanding the texts and 
concepts we investigate in Plato is that he is not interested in rhetoric, only language.50  Thus in 
combining the two, it seems that all that is legitimately left to the historian of rhetoric is to show 
how Plato did not care for rhetoric despite any indication to the contrary.   
It appears that Poster has opened up the methodological stores of academia only to 
drastically restrain the purposes to which they could be applied.51  If we add (3): “Order and 
Developmentalism” to (5) and (6), we get a sense of the hermeneutic roadblock Poster tries to set 
                                               
50 Similarly, we learn that he is not interested in Isocrates, only the sophists. 
51 Granted, her reading of Theaetetus offers a number of insights to the historian of rhetoric, but I would argue that 
this is due to the opening of method and not the closing of aim.  That such positive and negative heuristic 
suggestions result in a confused methodology is evidenced by the fact that Brad McAdon’s “Plato’s Denunciation of 
Rhetoric in the Phaedrus” (Rhetoric Review 23:1 (2004): 21-39) is twice invoked as a paradigm example of the 
refutation of the “Phaedrus = True Rhetoric” thesis; once in (5), and again in (6) in direct opposition to Black and 
Murray (Ibid. 39, 40).  The problem?  McAdon’s textual analysis that Poster finds so insightful is rooted in a reading 
that sees Plato’s Phaedrus as a direct interaction with Isocrates.  Thus his argument should be methodologically 
suspect at best, since the historical context from which he gleans his philological insights is one that Poster explicitly 
rejects as anachronistic and mistaken.  This is compounded by the fact that the rejection of the scholarly importance 
of the Plato/Isocrates relationship is the main argument that appears between the two McAdon citations (see n.45).  
It might appear to the cynic that Poster is happy to hold up as exemplary what she would otherwise denounce as 
methodologically questionable if it supports her own conclusions. 
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up in front of scholars who want to assert that Plato discusses “true rhetoric” in the Phaedrus.52  
For obvious reasons, this is a roadblock I would like to circumvent before the study proceeds.   
In (3) Poster argues that the order in which we arrange the dialogues has hermeneutical 
consequences that often serve the interpreter’s biases.53  There is sound advice in the caution.  
Scholars really should consider whether they have begged the question in their arrangement of 
the dialogues rather than proven something about their arrangement based on contextual or 
historical evidence.  But the caution is not itself an argument for or against a particular 
arrangement.54 
In Poster’s “Aristotle’s Rhetoric against Rhetoric,” (3), (5) and (6) come together in a 
definitive challenge to those who want to read the Phaedrus as indicating a positive direction for 
rhetorical activity.55  As I engage in a thorough refutation of Poster’s arguments, I would like to 
give her the courtesy of stating them in her own words: 
                                               
52 Ibid.  37.  Again, the abbreviated name for (3) in quotation marks is my own construction. 
53 The argument is sparse on content and directs the reader to the author’s other work on the topic, “The Idea(s) of 
Order.”  
54 In (3), Poster attempts to cast doubt on the “Phaedrus = True Rhetoric” hypothesis using nothing more than the 
suggestion that it can’t be proven that the Phaedrus was written after the Gorgias, since many scholars who make 
the argument rely “on the (possibly unprovable) assumption that Phaedrus was written after Gorgias to support the 
claim that a Platonic critique of rhetoric was followed by a reconstruction of an ‘ideal’ rhetoric” (“Framing 
Theaetetus” 37).  The problems with this line of argument appear in the main text below; but in case of (3) the 
biggest problem is that it is not an argument, it is a simple assertion meant to undo a whole tradition of scholarship 
on the assumption that because something might be unprovable it is therefore unreasonable to assume.  Not that 
tradition trumps reason, but in the face of a well-established tradition among reasonably knowledgeable scholars, the 
onus of proof is placed on the one who wishes to revise the common wisdom.  Moreover, there is no indication that 
the order of writing is important when one juxtaposes a critique and an ideal construction (the prefix “re-” affixed to 
the notion of “construction” is logically unnecessary here and only gives the appearance of a necessary temporal 
order).  It should be noted that Poster does not make such an argument in her earlier “Idea(s) of Order” to which she 
refers.  Still, Poster’s suggestion has been taken as a serious challenge by some, regardless of their views.  See for 
example James Kastely. “Addressing Souls: Persuasion and Psychological Praxis.” Style 45.3 (2011): 464-488.  
Kastely cites Poster’s organizational qualms in his opening footnote only to say that his argument about the 
Phaedrus is not developmentally dependent and so not subject to Poster’s critique. 
55 Poster refers the reader to this article directly in (6) when she rejects the “Phaedrus = True Rhetoric” thesis as 
rhetorical fetishism.  The basic argument of the article is that since Plato did not outline a positive art of rhetoric in 
the Phaedrus, Aristotle’s Rhetoric could not be viewed as a positive art based on that outline.  Rather, it is either an 
anti-Platonic art or, as Poster argues, it is an anti-rhetorical text unified with Plato’s view.  These arguments have 
been influential in recent years.  For instance, Poster’s essay forms the foundation for McAdon’s “Reconsidering the 
Intention or Purpose of Aristotle's Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Review, 23.3 (2004): 216-234.  McAdon goes so far as to 
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Poster’s Challenge 
There are two problems with considering Phaedrus as a work describing an ideal 
rhetoric: the evidence of the other dialogues and the argumentative movement of 
Phaedrus itself. 
Three of the four Platonic dialogues which directly address rhetoric are 
uncompromisingly negative towards it: Gorgias, Protagoras, and Sophist. Passing 
mentions of rhetoric in Apology are equally negative, as are the portrayal of the 
polymathic sophist in Hippias Major and the caricature of the wrangling eristics in 
Euthydemus.  Unless one makes a developmental argument for a Platonic reconciliation 
with rhetoric by assuming Phaedrus is later than Sophist and by giving some reason why 
Plato might have transformed himself from a lover of sophia to a lover of sophistes, a 
reading of Phaedrus as promoting an ideal rhetoric is difficult to reconcile with the 
overwhelming majority of available textual evidence. 
In the Phaedrus itself, the description of the suspiciously philosophical form of 
ideal rhetoric is immediately followed by a firm statement of the superiority of dialectic 
as the techne appropriate to serious speech. At 276e4-6 Socrates says “but, in my 
opinion, serious discourse about them [subjects like justice] is far nobler, when one 
                                                                                                                                                       
recognize Poster’s as “the historical approach” against the “popular/prevailing view” that suggests that Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric establishes the art as a preferred mode of civic discourse promoted by the likes of Schiappa, Thomas 
Farrell, Eugene Garver, and Gerard Hauser (216-217).  More recently, Robin Reames characterizes her own 
narrative analysis of rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle as “a third option in addition to the two outlined by Poster” (“The 
μῦθος of Pernicious Rhetoric: The Platonic Possibilities of λογός in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.” Rhetorica, 30.2 (2012): 
134-152 (p.135)).  Note that in rejecting the “Phaedrus = True Rhetoric” thesis in both “Framing Theaetetus” (40) 
and “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” (221n.9; 222n.11) Poster refers to her “Plato's Unwritten Doctrines: A Hermeneutic 
Problem in Rhetorical Historiography.” Pre/text 14.1-2 (1993): 127-38, as if it offers solid philosophical and 
philological argumentation for the refutation of scholarship that supports such a reading based on her own analysis 
of the available textual evidence.  However, the argument is not as developed as it is in “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” as it 
simply consists of the claim that “reading into Plato a bifurcation between ‘true’ and ‘false’ rhetorics or good and 
bad writing, is difficult to reconcile with the available textual evidence” (130).  See n.61. 
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employs the dialectic method [dialectike techne].”  When Socrates continues to discuss 
the components of the techne of his ideal discourse at 277b5-c6, he does not use the term 
“rhetorike” at all, but in describing this ideal speech, refers to it exclusively as “logos.” 
The dialectical logos leads the rational soul, much as rhetoric sways the emotions. Here, 
Plato seems to be setting up a series of analogies, implying that rhetoric is to dialectic as 
emotions are to intellect or as body to soul or as phenomena to noeta.56 
 
I will begin with the second argument first and will invoke Poster’s own caution against 
rhetorical fetishism.  I would amend this with a similar caution against “dialectical repulsion.”   
That is to say, we cannot simply assert that the presence of the term “dialektike” forces out any 
room for an ideal “rhetorike.”  There is no doubt that Plato’s ideal rhetoric would be subordinate 
to dialectic; subordination, however, does not entail repudiation.57  If we are to avoid being 
                                               
56 “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222-223. 
57 In many ways, Poster’s is a more philologically sophisticated version of Oscar L. Brownstein’s attempted 
refutation of Black, Weaver and other Platonic sympathizers: 
 
Plato is here following the same line that he follows everywhere, that of arguing the superiority of 
philosophy and its methodological aspect, dialectic.  We might argue that Plato is wrong in his arguments, 
that Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric answers most of Plato’s objections or makes them irrelevant, that 
Plato himself uses what we now call rhetoric, that Plato's dialectic can be or has been made a useful 
instrument of rhetoric, or that his dialectic was neither so disinterested nor so universally useful as he 
hopefully thought, but none of this will make Plato a lover of rhetoric.  To argue that his criticism was 
directed merely against the rhetoricians of his own time, however, is wholly specious, for his objections to 
rhetoric are as fundamental as his objections to poetry, and for much the same reasons – by his standard of 
truth they both lie.  (“Plato’s Phaedrus” 398) 
 
Consequently, my response to Poster is not unlike Kaufer’s response to Brownstein: 
 
But if Plato really believed that a true rhetoric was impossible and if, as Brownstein asserts (p. 397), it 
would require that the speaker had “absolute knowledge,” then not only the possibility of a true rhetoric but 
a true dialectic would be undermined.  I agree with Brownstein that Plato identifies the true rhetor and the 
dialectician.  But, unlike Brownstein, I do not associate dialectic with superhuman knowledge or morality. 
Plato's dialectician is distinguished by rigor and openness of arguments, not by their perfection. 
(“Influence” 64n.4) 
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fetishists then the argument must rely on something more than the mere presence or absence of a 
given term.  The argument must show that the presence of the one term excludes the possibility 
of the other.  Though it is not how I would divide the labor between the arts, Poster’s analogies 
between dialectic/intellect/soul/noeta and rhetoric/emotions/body/phenomena far from expel 
rhetoric as an art of discourse;58 rather they show that such an art would be necessary in any but 
a purely mental world.  In other words, the analogies show the insufficiency of dialectic.    
If we insist on terminological exactitude, however, a number of things become 
immediately obvious.  First, although Poster sees Plato as setting up dichotomous analogies, 
there is no philological indication of them in the text at 277b or any of the other locations she 
cites.  As for what is present, dialektike techne does not follow immediately after a description of 
the ideal rhetoric.  Rather, it directly follows the discussion of “aptness and ineptness in 
connection with writing [graphes]” (274b).  The entire context of discourses about justice and 
similar subjects sets up a contrast between the noble dialectic that plants and waters the seeds of 
these discourses in the soul (276e-277a) and the art of writing about which “the man who knows 
what is just, noble, and good” won’t be serious (276c).   He will, however, occupy his time in 
later life by using writing to recall these noble matters and thus he sows and waters “gardens of 
letters for the sake of amusing himself…and for everyone who wants to follow in his footsteps,” 
while others “water themselves with drinking parties” (276d).  Phaedrus replies that Socrates is 
“contrasting a vulgar amusement with the very noblest – with the amusement of a man who can 
while away his time telling stories [mythologounta] of justice and the other matters you 
                                                                                                                                                       
It is interesting to note that Kaufer apparently conceived of himself as fighting against the prevalent current of 
rhetorical studies in viewing Plato as amicable to some sort of rhetorical practice (63n.1).  I should also note that 
while I agree with Kaufer on this point, I disagree with much of his developmental analysis which I discuss later. 
58 The main outlier here is the soul/body portion of the analogy.  While emotions may be a consequence of 
embodiment, Plato obviously locates them within the soul, not the body.  Emotions are not the same as sensations. 
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mentioned.”59  It is here that Socrates replies that while writing and telling such stories is indeed 
a noble pastime, “it is much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectic” 
(276e).  As such, the contrast is not between the noble and the base, but between more and less 
noble intellectual pursuits both of which Socrates and Phaedrus recognize as being superior to 
other base worldly activities.   
Of greater philological importance, the term “rhetorike” is nowhere to be found in 
contrast with dialektike, only graphe and mythologeo.60  It will not do to argue that graphe is the 
part of rhetorike which is currently under investigation, for the part of rhetoric directly preceding 
the discussion of writing is none other than the art of logos (274b).61  If the term “logos” is 
somehow exclusive of rhetoric at the end of the Phaedrus, it must be explained how the term is 
not only inclusive of rhetoric, but subordinate to it just prior to the discussion of writing.   
The focus on the term “logos” raises another related issue, because Poster is accurate in 
pointing out that when “Socrates continues to discuss the components of the techne of his ideal 
discourse at 277b5-c6, he does not use the term “rhetorike” at all, but in describing this ideal 
speech, refers to it exclusively as ‘logos.’”62  If the exclusive term that Plato uses is “logos,” then 
not only is the term “rhetorike” absent, but so is the term “dialektike.”  Thus, in addition to 
explaining why “logos” now means “not rhetorike” where before it meant “a part of rhetorike,” 
                                               
59 παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων 
ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα. 
60 I do believe that Plato is discussing a part of the art of rhetoric; the point is simply that “rhetorike” is absent. 
61 Before switching focus to graphe at 274b, Socrates formerly closes the discussion about what constitutes the art of 
speech and what does not: “οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.”  So within the same 
Stephanus page of text, Socrates declares that having finished discussing what is and is not art in speaking, they will 
move on to the question of proper and improper writing.  With this in mind, it seems very uncharitable of Poster to 
assert without argument that prominent scholars have employed “a considerable degree of ingenuity in claiming that 
Plato did not condemn all writing but rather was attempting to distinguish between good and bad writing or true and 
false rhetorics” (“Unwritten Doctrines” 130).  Contrary to Poster’s multiple assertions that such a view is difficult to 
reconcile with the textual evidence (“Unwritten Doctrines” 30; “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 221n.9; “Framing Theaetetus” 
40) this appears to be Socrates overtly professed goal so far as the text is concerned.  The ingenuity would be in 
explaining that Socrates does not mean what he says.  See n.55. 
62 “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222. 
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Poster must explain why we are entitled to add the absent term “dialektike” to Plato’s description 
of the ideal art of speech and not “rhetorike.”  Terminological absence is either telling on its 
own, or it is not. 
 If we insist on terminological presence as a measure of what Socrates means in his final 
summary of the art of logos, we will find that while neither dialektike nor rhetorike is directly 
mentioned both are directly indicated in the summary.63  For when Socrates states that “you must 
know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to 
define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until 
you reach something indivisible,” this is exactly what he has defined as the art of dialectic at 
265d-266c.64   
Socrates follows the summary of dialectic by stating that “you must understand the nature 
of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each 
kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate 
speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one.” Whether we interpret this 
passage as ideal, ironic, impossible, or simply dialectic in disguise, the text itself clearly links the 
                                               
63 The full Greek text of the summary at 277b-c is as follows: 
 
πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἰδῇ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ᾽ αὐτό τε πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, 
ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ᾽ εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ, περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν κατὰ 
ταὐτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστῃ φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλῃ μὲν 
ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῇ, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνῃ ἔσεσθαι 
καθ᾽ ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ὁ 
ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος. 
 
64 Indeed, the term “dialektike” does not appear again in the text until 276e, and it only appears three times 
throughout the entire text in inflected forms – twice at 266c (once by Socrates when he calls the practitioners of  
collection and division dialecticians, and once by Phaedrus when he confirms that the art should be called dialectic) 
and once at 276e.  Any broader application of the term to the content of the Phaedrus, while certainly defensible by 
argument, must be read in to the text as a matter of interpretation.  I admittedly read the term back into the summary 
at 277b, but believe that this textual interpretation is argumentatively sound. 
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description to Socrates earlier definition of rhetoric at 271c-272b.65  He is clear that this is an art 
that is separate from dialectic proper and that it belongs to the rhetorician to master and 
practice.66  
While this second part might be rooted in dialectic, it is not the art itself.  This is made 
clear in the two passages Poster cites concerning dialektike and logos.  For the “dialectician 
chooses a proper soul [psychen prosekousan] and plants and sows within it discourse 
accompanied by knowledge [epistemes logous]” (276e).  The dialectician deals with one type of 
psyche and one type of logos, and the interaction between the two imparts knowledge to the 
hearer.  The master of the art of logos deals with many psychai and many logoi, “either in order 
to teach [didaxai] or to persuade [peisai]” (277e).67  Persuasion has never been a hallmark of 
dialectic.  So while there is little doubt that dialectic is represented in this ideal art of logos, all 
the textual evidence indicates that rhetoric is represented as well.   
If we reject that Socrates outlines an ideal rhetoric informed by dialectic, then we must 
admit that he transforms dialectic to be more like rhetoric.  I’m not sure which would be more 
uncharacteristic of our typical view of Plato.  What Socrates does not do is suggest that dialectic 
as it is usually presented in the Platonic corpus is capable of doing everything that the ideal art of 
logos is said to be capable of doing.  In reality, he appears to transform both rhetoric and 
                                               
65 For examples of these various readings, see the first section of the Introduction. 
66 At 266c-d, Phaedrus acknowledges that they have discovered dialectic, but that “rhetoric still eludes us.”  Socrates 
replies “Could there be anything valuable still grasped by art?  If there is, you and I must certainly honor it, and we 
must say what part of rhetoric it is that has been left out.”  They then embark on the inquiry that terminates with the 
list of criteria that the rhetorician needs in order to become a master of his art (271c-272b).  It is important to realize 
that the criteria are not arbitrary but follow from the very definition of rhetoric as a type of psychagogia: “Since the 
nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul 
there are...” [ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι 
ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει] (271c-d).  Of course, we may quibble again about whether “the nature of logos” entails rhetoric 
in this passage; but it would be difficult to maintain the negative argument against Socrates blatant definition of the 
rhetoric as an art of psychagogia through logos at 261a: ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία 
τις διὰ λόγων.  Again, interpretation would have to show how Socrates’ meaning is different from the literal text. 
67 See the discussion of Statesman 304d-e below.  Here rhetoric is defined as the art of persuading by telling stories 
as opposed to teaching using the same vocabulary as the Phaedrus.  
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dialectic to form a single art of logos.68  I would agree that rhetoric is still subordinate to 
dialectic.  However, going strictly from the textual evidence it is difficult to deny that if we had 
to give the single art a name it would be psychagogia, which Socrates associates with rhetoric, 
not dialectic.69  Of course, one could mount a philosophical argument that explains how the text 
does not actually mean what it appears to say.  But Black, Murray, and the like who read the 
Phaedrus as outlining an ideal rhetoric cannot simply be dismissed on textual grounds.  There is 
no textual necessity that prohibits such a prima facie reading, and no great ingenuity is needed to 
interpret the text in this way.  Indeed, the “argumentative movement” of the Phaedrus appears to 
support this reading from start to finish.70 
In showing that there is no textual incongruity involved in maintaining that the Phaedrus 
advocates an ideal rhetoric, we free Black and Murray from the charge of (6), rhetorical 
fetishism.  And we do so somewhat ironically by showing that the term is either present or 
clearly indicated where it is absent.  The second obstacle that Poster sets up is a mixture of (3) 
and (5), which constructs a developmental challenge to a pro-rhetoric reading of the Phaedrus 
that stretches through the entire Platonic corpus.  As stated in (3), it cannot be proven that the 
                                               
68 If this is true, then what Schiappa sees as a wholesale demarcation of rhetoric from the more philosophical art of 
logos in the Gorgias is somewhat reversed in the Phaedrus.  Harvey Yunis makes an argument approaching these 
lines in “Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato's Phaedrus.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy 24 (2009), 229-48.  
69 Despite her objection to reading the Phaedrus as pro-rhetoric, Poster appears to tacitly accept this position when 
she states: “While Platonic texts are overtly opposed not only to rhetoric but also to language, they do deploy 
language in a dramatically rhetorical fashion to control the reader and lead her anagogically to a vision of an extra-
linguistic reality” (“Unwritten Doctrines” 128).  This is exactly the type of activity Plato designates to rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus according to many of the scholars she dismisses. 
70 To offer a counterstatement to Brownstein (see n.57): We might argue that Plato endorses an ideal rhetoric that we 
find repugnant, that it denies everything that modern rhetoricians suppose rhetoric to be, that it is impractical or 
impossible to enact, that it is subordinate to dialectic, that it could only be wielded by the philosopher or the 
intellectual or societal elite or worse yet, by an oppressive tyrant-king, that it is based on deceit and lies, or that it is 
a rouse or a parody of true rhetoric, but none of this will alter the textual fact that Socrates claims to be engaging in 
constructing a true art of rhetoric.  Arguments that Plato simply hated all rhetoric and so therefore could not be 
serious about the stated intent of Socrates beg the interpretive question and close a door to investigation due to 
disciplinary biases about what Plato could and could not believe. 
 43 
Gorgias was written before the Phaedrus, so any argument that relies on this as a fact of 
composition is dubious at best.  The more sophisticated developmental challenge articulated in 
“Aristotle’s Rhetoric” asserts that any pro-rhetoric reading of the Phaedrus must place its 
composition after the Sophist, since rhetoric is still ridiculed in that dialogue. 
Since Poster seems to be placing all pro-rhetoric readers of the Phaedrus into a single 
class, it should first be noted that there at least two kinds of readers that make up this class.  The 
developmental challenge applies to only one of them.  The first type consists of scholars like 
Black, Murray, and Curran, who clearly state that they are not making a developmental 
argument.71  Rather they take Plato at his word when he discusses the possibility of a true art of 
rhetoric in the Gorgias, which he outlines at length in the Phaedrus.72  To maintain this position 
one need not say that Plato necessarily deconstructs rhetoric in the Gorgias first, and only 
afterwards is able to reconstruct it in the Phaedrus.73  Even less does one need to say that Plato 
has changed his mind about rhetoric from one dialogue to the next. 
In asserting that Plato maintains a clear distinction between a “true” or “good” rhetoric 
and a “false” or “bad” one throughout his writings, this class has freed themselves of 
developmental charges altogether.  For all Black or Murray or Curran care, the Gorgias could be 
Plato’s last work.  This doesn’t change the fact that the type of rhetorical practice Plato 
condemns there is exactly the type of rhetorical practice he chastises as being artless in the 
Phaedrus; while the positive type he alludes to in the Gorgias is the type identified as artful in 
the Phaedrus.  For the same reason, this group need not worry about any condemnation of 
rhetoric in the Sophist, so long as the kind of rhetoric being condemned can be identified as the 
                                               
71 Black “Plato’s View”; Murray “Disputation”; Jane V. Curran. “The Rhetorical Technique of Plato's Phaedrus.” 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 19.1 (1986): 66-72. 
72 See the qualifications for the “true rhetorician” (ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν) at Grg. 508c. 
73 See n.54 above. 
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type that is condemned in both the Phaedrus and the Gorgias – what they would argue is, for 
Plato, the false art of rhetoric.  Thus, there is no need for members of this group to give “some 
reason why Plato might have transformed himself from a lover of sophia to a lover of 
sophistes.”74  He can still value “philosophical” rhetoric while condemning the “sophistical” 
practice.  If their interpretations are correct, no amount of condemning false rhetoric will 
undermine Plato’s construction of an ideal rhetoric no matter where the condemnation lies in the 
corpus, either dramatically or compositionally.  Consequently, the only way to prove their 
interpretations false is to engage the arguments they present.  No amount of citing Plato’s dislike 
for “false” rhetoric will suffice. 
However, there is a second group of scholars who do read Plato developmentally and 
Poster’s roadblock may very well cause trouble for them.75  Poster rightly acknowledges Harvey 
Yunis’ description of Platonic rhetoric in Taming Democracy as such an account.  In so doing, 
she criticizes him for overlooking the fact that the later Sophist seems to reiterate the position of 
the Gorgias, rendering the genetic description of development moot.76  This is a combination of 
the negative aspects of (3) and (5), which argues that if we expand the corpus and properly order 
it we are forced to acknowledge that Plato is overwhelmingly critical of rhetoric.  The only 
problem is that this not the textual case as Poster presents it.  Again, it is merely an interpretive 
                                               
74 Poster “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222.  This leg of the challenge relies solely on an anachronistic conflation of rhetoric 
and sophistry.  To parallel Poster’s claim concerning Plato and Isocrates (see n.45 above), it is based on the false 
assumption that, because modern rhetorical scholars equate rhetoric and sophistry, Plato must have equated rhetoric 
with sophistry. 
75 My own analysis of the Platonic corpus below offers a more unified reading and so situates me in the first group.  
However, Poster’s developmental objection implies that Plato’s treatment of rhetoric throughout the corpus is 
overwhelmingly negative.  As my own analysis makes the opposite case, it is worth presently refuting this line of 
argument as thoroughly as possible. 
76 “Yunis 1996 has attempted a politically oriented reading, which assumes a genetic model of Plato moving from an 
antirhetorical stance in Gorgias to a later reconstructed rhetoric in Phaedrus. Yunis does not, however, account for 
the relatively late Sophist's promulgating a critique of rhetoric quite similar to the one of Gorgias” (ibid. 222n.11); 
referencing Yunis. Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996. 
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one.  If we follow the positive guidelines of (3), (5) and (6), we see that Poster’s case collapses in 
much the same way that the micro-level argument regarding the text of the Phaedrus did.   
Concerning rhetorike, the pro-rhetoric reader finds Plato saying what we anticipate he should be 
saying where he should be saying it. 
The first thing to note is that there is no philological rhyme or reason to Poster’s assertion 
that “Three of the four Platonic dialogues which directly address rhetoric are uncompromisingly 
negative towards it: Gorgias, Protagoras, and Sophist.”77  Whatever the criteria for labeling 
Phaedrus, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Sophist as the four dialogues that directly address rhetoric, 
it is not a philological one – of the many dialogues in which Plato mentions rhetorike, the term is 
not mentioned once in either Protagoras or Sophist.78  The cognate term “rhetors” [rhetors] does 
appear at Prt. 329a.  But it is used to distinguish Protagoras – as a sophist capable of answering 
questions – from the typical demagogue [demegoron].  Likewise, in the Sophist, the Eleatic 
stranger twice differentiates the subject of their inquiry from the public speaker (222c-223b and 
268b), distinguishing between the sophist and the demologikon (268b).  This is the converse of 
the distinction made in the Gorgias, where Socrates distinguishes between rhetoric and sophistry 
in order to maintain that their current inquiry is focused on rhetoric, not sophistry (465c-d).79  In 
this same vein, it should be noted that while Socrates does caricature “eristic wrangling” 
negatively in the Euthydemus, he closes the dialogue by advising Crito not to be dissuaded by 
these bad practitioners of philosophia (307b).  Socrates suggests that we carefully distinguish 
between good arts and bad practitioners in every case and lists rhetoric among the fine arts – 
                                               
77 Ibid. 222 
78 All term searches have been verified using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG).   
79 This is complicated by the fact that in the Sophist, the demagogue is contrasted with the statesmen and the sophist 
with the philosopher; while in the Gorigias, rhetoric is contrasted with justice (as cookery is with health) and 
sophistry contrasted with legislation (as cosmetics are to gymnastics).  However, even though the analogies don’t 
quite match up, it is clear that Plato maintains and important distinction between sophistry and rhetoric. 
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along with gymnastics, generalship and moneymaking (307a).80  As far as the text is concerned, 
Protagoras, Sophist, and Euthydemus engage a topic similar to, but distinct from, rhetoric.  
Hence, even on a developmental model of Plato’s rhetoric we do not need to account for a switch 
in admiration from sophos to sophistes because Plato maintains a constant distinction between 
“public speaking” and sophistry. 
Granted, one may now invoke the injunction against rhetorical fetishism to argue that 
Plato is clearly concerned with concepts germane to rhetoric in these dialogues, thus reading 
rhetoric back in to them.  However, one could not ignore that the term rhetorike and descriptions 
of persuasive activities appear in later dialogues that align with Plato’s description of “true” 
rhetoric in the Phaedrus.  Most notably, the Statesman does directly deal with “that part of 
rhetoric [rhetoreia] that in partnership with kingship persuades people of what is just and so 
helps in steering through the business of cities” (304a).  It is thus an art subordinate to, but 
necessary for, the art of statecraft – on par with generalship and legal judgment (304a-e).81  It is 
an art that in the shared vocabulary of the Phaedrus, “is capable of persuading [peistikon] mass 
and crowd, through the telling of stories [mythologias], and not through teaching [didaxes]” 
(304d-e).  So if Yunis’ account falters because it does not consider the later critique of sophistry 
offered by the Sophist, which mirrors the condemnation of rhetoric in the Gorgias; then Poster’s 
critique similarly fails because it does not consider the presumably later acknowledgement in the 
Statesman of a positive art of rhetoric that can persuade the many of what is just – one that 
directly alludes to the “true” art of rhetoric in the Phaedrus.   
                                               
80 ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι 
ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;  
Granted, the presence of moneymaking might make us think that Socrates is being ironic, but even moneymakers 
have a proper place in the just city.  Thus, there is a right and wrong way to practice the art. 
81 The more technical terms ῥητορικῇ (304d) and ῥητορικόν (304e) appear as well.  Indeed, the Stranger goes so far 
as to call rhetoric the scientific knowledge [ἐπιστήμῃ] of persuasion (304c). 
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However, I would argue that Yunis’ account does not falter by neglecting the Sophist or 
Statesman at all.82  First, because he does mention this period of composition as “presenting no 
straightforward development on rhetoric”; noting the above passage from the Statesman, but not 
deriving from it any meaningful evolution in Plato’s rhetorical thought.83  Nor is this surprising, 
for as Poster and I agree, Sophist and Statesman at best reiterate thoughts concerning rhetoric 
that can be found more fully developed in earlier dialogues.  Poster, however, fails to mention 
that Yunis ends his analysis with Plato’s last work, the Laws.  While rhetorike does not appear in 
the Laws, Yunis gives a reasoned account of how the preambles of the laws conform to the 
“true” art of rhetoric prescribed in both Phaedrus and Statesman.84   
In the Laws the Athenian is clear that the preambles are necessary so that the laws can 
gain the acquiescence of the citizens principally through persuasion and education, rather than 
relying on coercion alone.85  Moreover, in this final text the Athenian reiterates all the 
distinctions we have noticed about rhetoric in the rest of the corpus.  Persuasion should be 
employed by the statesman to persuade the masses about justice while sophistry, demagoguery 
                                               
82 I do offer criticisms on other grounds in Chapter 4. 
83 Taming Democracy 212n.2. 
84 See Taming Democracy, Ch. 8 “Laws: Rhetoric, Preambles, and Mass Political Instruction.”  Yunis is hardly 
alone in this observation.  Among rhetoricians and philosophers who have examined the Laws in the last sixty years 
the question has not been whether Plato endorses using rhetoric in the preambles, but whether his use of rhetoric is 
noble or base.  See, for example, Glenn R. Morrow. “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion.” The Philosophical Review 
62.2 (1953): 234-250; Charles Kauffman’s section on ‘Rhetoric and Social Control’ in “Axiological Foundations” 
(111-115); The closing of Ch. 2 “Plato’s Attack on Rhetoric” in Vickers, In Defence, (1988) 143-7; Yunis. “Rhetoric 
as Instruction: A Response to Vickers on Rhetoric in the Laws.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23 (1990): 125-35; 
Christopher Bobonich. “Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws.” The Classical Quarterly 41 (1991): 
365-88; Andrea Nightingale. “Writing/Reading a Sacred Text: A Literary Interpretation of Plato’s Laws.” Classical 
Philology 88.4 (1993): 279-300; and sections 2.3 “Preludes to the Laws” and 2.4 “The Place of the Preludes,” in 
Bobonich. Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. 97-119.  See 
505n.18 in Plato’s Utopia for a more complete bibliographical list of philosophical sources.  
85 While such contrasts abound in the early books of the Laws, the primary theoretical conversation appears in Book 
IV.  In particular, see the closing passage (720-723) in which πείθω and πειστικός are the primary focus of the 
preambles in contrast to the βία of the unadorned law.  See also Book IX, where the preludes are identified as a 
means of educating [παιδεύει] (857e) and instructing [διδάσκοντα] (858d) the citizens in matters of justice (857c-
859a).  Yunis (“Rhetoric as Instruction”; Taming Democracy, Ch.8) and Bobonich (“Persuasion”; Plato’s Utopia, 
2.3 & 2.4) provide solid textual arguments that the rhetoric of the preambles is meant to instruct through persuasion.  
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and sycophancy should be condemned and punished by law.86  Thus without employing the term 
rhetorike, Plato appears to maintain the distinction between “true” and “false” rhetoric – 
exhorting the use of the first and condemning the use of the second. 
  The Laws presents an endpoint for the corpus, so it is the terminus for any 
developmental narrative of Platonic theory.  Its seeming embrace of the dichotomy between 
“true” and “false” rhetoric thus trumps any interpretation of the Sophist as a foil for those who 
would read Plato as developing a positive space for rhetorical practice.  There is, however, one 
criticism that the Laws might offer a developmental account like that of Yunis:87 by reiterating 
both the criticism of the Gorgias and the cautious optimism of the Phaedrus, the Laws might 
show that Plato’s view of rhetoric remained amazingly consistent as Black, Curran, and Murray 
argue.  This is the line that I take in my analysis of Plato.   
In short, on either the micro-level of the Phaedrus or the macro-level of the entire corpus, 
the text itself does not bar the way for an interpretation of Plato as advocating certain rhetorical 
practices.  In fact, if we follow Poster’s positive methodological suggestions in (3), (5) and (6) 
we find that by expanding the canon, appreciating its order and avoiding terminological tunnel-
vision, such readings are encouraged by the text.  My goal in the remainder of this study will be 
to analyze what those practices are and how they work.  My focus, however, is not the state-
                                               
86 Plato condemns naturally talented atheists who become tyrants [τύραννοι] and demagogues [δημηγόροι], the likes 
of which produce the tricks of the sophist [σοφιστῶν] (908d).  Plato also condemns those who would corrupt justice 
and the role of the advocate by pursuing court cases without regard to truth through employing a so-called skill or “a 
knack born of casual trial and error” [εἴτ᾽ οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἄτεχνός ἐστίν τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή] (937d-938c).  This 
skill sounds a lot like “false” rhetoric and employs the same terminology of the Gorgias.  Plato shows a consistency 
of condemning the part of rhetoric which serves injustice (and so could not be a true science or art) without 
contradicting his embrace of a technical science of persuasion that can be employed in the name of justice. 
From a psychological perspective, it is interesting to note that the Athenian recognizes two motives for 
sycophancy – the love of victory [φιλονικία] and the love of money [φιλοχρηματία].  The individual who pleads 
unjustly and dishonestly due to love of money is to be put to death immediately; the one who does so through love 
of victory should be punished and only be put to death after the second offense.  On the psychological significance 
of the love of honor and money, see the relevant sections below and in Chapter 4. 
87 Or Kaufer, Bobonich, etc. 
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employed use of rhetoric, at least not directly.  Rather, I focus on what it means to correlate a 
logos with a psyche and lead it thereby. 
2.3 KEYWORDS AND PATTERNS 
Having identified what popular methodological procedures I am intentionally choosing to 
observe or ignore, I would like to outline some further methodological guidelines that will direct 
my investigation into Plato and his predecessors.  In the remainder of this chapter I deal little 
with the term rhetorike as it is used in the Platonic corpus.  Rather, following Socrates’ lead in 
the Phaedrus, I investigate the concept of rhetoric as a certain art of leading the soul through 
words – techne psychagogia tis dia logon (261a).  While the noun psychagogia implies an 
activity, I do not consider soul-leading as a process until Chapter 4.  My current aim instead is to 
construct a model of psychagogia by examining those elements that Socrates asserts the process 
entails: psyche and logos (271c-d).88  Thus the following chapter offers an historical overview of 
the two concepts as they are employed from Homeric times until Plato.   
Even in limiting the initial overview to these two terms, the possible ways to proceed are 
virtually limitless.  With Plato’s use of psyche and logos in mind and his exhortation to the 
would-be psychagogue to correlate the one to the other, I confine my initial analysis to those 
thinkers who specifically address the relationship between speech and soul.  In many ways this 
procedure results in a keywords analysis.  However, I do consider instances in which the specific 
Greek terms “psyche” and “logos” are not present if the text can reasonably be interpreted as 
                                               
88 Remaining portions of this chapter and subsequent chapters on Greek texts from Homer to Plato represent a 
substantial revision and expansion of the original research and analysis that appears in my master’s thesis, “The 
Psyche and the Logos: The Platonic Corpus as Rhetorical Theory,” Kansas State University, 2007. 
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expressing the effects of verbal articulation upon the internal mental or psychic movement of a 
given agent.  Such a procedure is not only justifiable but actually necessary given contemporary 
analysis that demonstrates that terms like logos and mythos can mean almost exactly the opposite 
in Homeric language than they do in the vocabulary of later thinkers like Heraclitus and Plato.89 
Perhaps the most important and delimiting guideline I follow in my analysis is one of 
structure.  As the introduction of this study might suggest, I am specifically interested in 
tripartite structures that can serve as prototypes to Plato’s well-known division of the soul into 
rational, spirited, and appetitive elements; structure that can likewise aid in identifying and 
developing a similar arrangement in Plato’s concept of logos.  Thus I not only focus on 
keywords and their relationship, but I actively engage in conceptual “pattern recognition.”90   
This focus on a preconceived structure does mean that I am approaching the literature 
with a certain degree of bias about what I expect to find.  However, rather than a methodological 
hindrance, my acknowledgment of this bias motivates me to supply rigorous evidence and 
argument in support of my structural findings and their presumed influence on the development 
of Plato’s thought.91  Viewed in a more positive light, the focus on structure drastically reduces 
the applicable pre-Platonic literature to a very manageable size.  While I do not claim that my 
selection of texts is exhaustive, even given the conceptual and structural criteria, I do maintain 
                                               
89 See, for instance, Martha C. Nussbaum’s discussion of the history of the term logos prior to Heraclitus in “ΨYXH 
in Heraclitus, I.” Phronesis 17.1 (1972): 1-16.  Despite a renewed interest in Heraclitus among rhetoric scholars, this 
particularly germane work of Nussbaum’s seems to be overlooked.  See also, Bruce Lincoln. “Competing 
Discourses: Rethinking the Prehistory of Mythos and Logos.” Arethusa 30 (1997): 341–367.  Though thorough in 
many other regards and covering much of the same ground as Nussbaum, the author oddly enough does not seem to 
be aware of Nussbaum’s earlier article.  For a specific contrast between the rhetorical use of terms like mythos and 
logos in Homer, Plato and Aristotle, see Raymond Adolph Prier. “Achilles Rheter? Homer and Proto-Rhetorical 
Truth.” The Rhetoric Canon. Ed. Brenda Deen Schildgen. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997. 63-81. 
90 For a similar approach to concept clusters prior to Plato, see John T. Kirby. “The ‘Great Triangle’ in Early Greek 
Rhetoric and Poetics.” Rhetorica 8.3 (1990): 213-228.  For a similar approach to concept clusters within the Platonic 
corpus see Kenneth Dorter. “Three Disappearing Ladders in Plato.” Philosophy & Rhetoric: Plato Redux 29.3 
(1996): 279-299. 
91 There are admittedly findings that I acknowledge as merely indicative or suggestive of particular conclusions 
rather than fully defensible in terms of philological or philosophical argumentation, but I characterize them as such. 
 51 
that the selection represents some of the major influences that Plato draws upon and specifically 
alludes to in his discussions of the psyche, the logos, and the interactions between the two.  
Consequently, I believe that my analysis of these texts in the following chapter can offer insights 
in to a number of issues that have perennially perplexed contemporary scholars interested in 
Plato’s rhetorical thought. 
At this point it might appear that the importance of the term “psychagogia” is reduced to 
the concepts of psyche and logos and the relationship between them.  Indeed, it is likely that the 
astute reader could piece together a robust model of psychagogic rhetoric based on nothing more 
than Plato’s discussions of psyche and logos throughout the dialogues.92  However, I end the 
conceptual overview of the next chapter by tracing the history of the term “psychagogia” itself.  
For in investigating the term in light of its historical usage, the importance of the vocabulary 
choice is made clear.  And what initially appears to be just a witty pun is found to carry with it 
allusions that aid the reader in situating Plato’s discussion of rhetoric, dialectic and the arts of 
discourse in the Phaedrus with its counterpart in the Gorgias – bringing both to bear more fully 
on the relationship between the psyche and the logos. 
2.4 A PRIMA FACIE RENDERING OF THE PLATONIC PSYCHE 
The following inquiry into pre-Platonic psychagogy is guided by the structure of the psyche as it 
appears in Plato’s dialogues, with which most readers will be at least superficially acquainted.  
                                               
92 What Plato says about these concepts, their structure and their possible relationship in the dialogues will be the 
focus of Chapter 4.  Amazingly, although Plato’s use of these terms has been much studied by rhetoricians, 
classicists, and philosophers – a comprehensive, correlative analysis of their structure does not exist in the literature 
of which I am aware. 
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While this structure itself is a subject of controversy and will undergo closer scrutiny in the later 
chapters, a basic understanding of Socrates’ description of the psyche as it appears in the 
Republic is necessary to have in mind at this point.  As such, a brief summary of Platonic 
psychology is warranted prior to the investigation, with the caveat that the results of the inquiry 
will later aid in a deeper analysis of the very structure that is its guide.  In this brief account, I 
will combine Socrates’ comments on the polis with those of the psyche in ways that should not 
be problematic for such a superficial rendering.93     
In Plato’s Republic there is a complex and systematic examination of the psyche, its 
elements, and the nature of the different types of psychai that might be generated from the 
interplay of these elements.  The psyche is partitioned into three distinct elements, each with its 
own peculiar domain: one over reason and calculation, one over spiritedness and passion, and 
one over appetite and desire.94   
                                               
93 In fact, such a rendering might help to shine light on claims that Plato’s psychological tripartition evolved from 
his political observations in completely original, if somewhat awkward, ways.  See, for instance, John Dewey’s 
characterization of Plato’s psychological tripartition as originating in political reflection (Art as Experience (1934) 
New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005. 257-58); a perspective that Burke appropriated directly from 
Dewey (Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
132).   
For comments on the awkward forced fit of the correlation accompanied by a defense of tripartition, see 
John M. Cooper. “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1.1 (1984): 3-21 (see 
especially the discussion on p. 4 and the brief bibliography of philosophical sources who have proclaimed the 
awkwardness of the tripartite soul p. 18n.3); See also M.F. Burnyeat. “The Presidential Address: The Truth of 
Tripartition.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 106 (2006): 1-23. 
For comments on the originality of the tripartite psychological scheme and its analogy with the polis see 
G.R.F. Ferrari. City and Soul in Plato's Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 (pp. 61-65).  See also 
Norbert Blössner’s rejection of a literary tradition upon which Plato derived the tripartition (“The City-Soul 
Analogy.” The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic. Ed. G.R.F. Ferrari, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 345-386 (p.356)).   
In the following investigation I demonstrate, if not a literary and philosophical tradition of a tripartite 
psyche, at least a tradition of a prototypical tri-motivational scheme that runs throughout sources undeniably 
influential to Plato.  Such a demonstration, if sound, at least suggests that 1) Plato’s tripartite vision of the psyche 
did not originate wholly in his observations of the polis and 2) such a psychological model is not entirely without 
precedent in the extant literature.       
94 For ease of reading, I refer to each element with the typical English labels of “reason/rational element” 
“spirit/spirited element” and “appetite/appetitive element” instead of the Greek τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, and τὸ 
επιθυμητικόν respectively. Whether the provinces of each element are exclusive (i.e., whether the rational part has 
desires or whether the spirited part can calculate) is a topic of controversy that will be addressed later.  For now, a 
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2.4.1 The Rational Element 
Early in the Republic (376c), Socrates lists attributes that any “fine and good” [kalos kagathos] 
guardian of the state requires.  Among other things the guardian must be a lover of wisdom 
[philosophos] and a lover of learning [philomathe].  Later, in discussing the nature of the 
philosopher-king, Socrates remarks that such a disposition naturally entails the love of truth and 
being.95  Unsurprisingly then, terms that denote concepts like “wisdom,” “learning,” “truth,” and 
“being” are key when inquiring into philosophical and literary prototypes of the rational element.   
However, when Socrates discusses the particular virtue of wisdom [sophia] that is 
attributed to the deliberative class in the polis (428bff), it is not directly linked with philosophy 
or abstract contemplation but is described as a sort of practical knowledge that exhibits euboulia, 
‘good judgment’ or ‘prudence.’  While such wisdom is practical, it is not the sort that enables 
one to “judge about any particular matter” such as the kind possessed by carpenters, metal 
smiths, farmers or the like.  Rather, it is knowledge “about the city as a whole and the 
maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities” (428b-d).  In the city this 
knowledge is attached to guardianship and right rule “and is possessed by those rulers 
[archousin] we just now called complete guardians” (428d).  Similarly, in discussing the rational 
part of the psyche, Socrates states that it is appropriate for the rational element to rule because “it 
is really wise and exercises forethought on behalf of the whole soul” (441e).96  Thus the 
                                                                                                                                                       
general understanding of the supposed provinces is all that is needed.  See chiefly Books IV, VIII and IX of the 
Republic for discussion about the elements and subsequent psychological constitutions. 
95 See Socrates’ comments at 485c: “They must be without falsehood – they must refuse to accept what is false, hate 
it, and have a love for the truth.” [τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, 
τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν]; and 501d: “Would they deny that philosophers are lovers of what is or of truth?” 
[πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους]. 
96 Actually, Socrates poses the following question, which is affirmed by Glaucon: “Therefore, isn’t it appropriate for 
the rational part to rule, since it is really wise and exercises forethought on behalf of the whole soul, and for the 
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individual is called wise “because of that small part of himself that rules in him…and has within 
it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the 
community of all three parts” (442c).  In short, Socrates describes the rational element as the 
natural and right ruler [archon] of the soul because of its capacity for good council and 
forethought in regards to all the soul’s parts.  Therefore prototypes of this element are not 
relegated simply to discussion of reason and wisdom, but encompass notions of right rule and 
good council. 
2.4.2 The Spirited Element 
Though Socrates discovers spirit last, he regards it as the “middle” element of the soul and it is 
usually treated as such – and so spirit will take the middle position on this model.  It is first 
discovered as a state of anger distinct from appetite in the example of Leontius rebuking the 
desire of his eyes to gaze upon dead bodies (440a).  It is thus the source of emotions like shame, 
when such anger is geared inwards at appetites that drive us away from reason’s plan (440b); and 
righteous indignation, when it is directed at someone who has treated us unjustly (440c-d).97  
However, though it is allied with reason in these regards it is distinct from it, for a primitive 
spirit is found in agents that lack refined reasoning ability like infants and animals (441a-b).  
Thus the middle element is defined by strong emotions which are often regulative in nature but 
dependent on education for its normative formation.   
                                                                                                                                                       
spirited part to obey it and be its ally?” [οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ 
ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου] 
97 On the other hand, a properly developed spirit will endure any number of trials and pains if reason tells it that 
these are being administered justly (440b).  
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Spirit is thus the psychic counterpart of the auxiliary class that serves as both a military 
and police force in the state – it regulates internal and external behavior.  And as Socrates 
attributes a city’s courage [andrea] to “that part of itself that has the power [dynamis] to preserve 
through everything its belief [doxa] about what things are to be feared” (429b-c), he also 
identifies courage as the distinctive virtue of the spirited element: “And it is because of the 
spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves 
through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t” 
(442b-c).  So, spirit is also defined as the ability of an agent to maintain its “moral compass” 
when tempted to the contrary.  This might seem to mean the same as getting angry or not at the 
right times for the right reasons, but that is merely the capacity to fear what should be feared and 
endure what should be endured.  Rather, Socrates’ definition of courage highlights spirit’s 
preservative role in the belief system of the soul, granting it a special place in self-reflection, the 
management of self-identity and the projection of one’s normative belief’s on to others.  Thus 
spirit does not merely house reactionary emotions, but is key in self-preservation and self-
maintenance in both reality (what one might refer to as moral conscience) and appearance (what 
one might refer to as saving face or social posturing).98  And since the very image it doggedly 
preserves is provided by the dictates of reason, it proves itself loyal and obedient to the rational 
element like a sheepdog to a shepherd (4.440d).  So maintenance of self-image and loyalty to an 
ideal are also key concepts to consider when seeking out prototypes of the spirited element. 
                                               
98 Of course, whether personal integrity always translates into social recognition becomes a prominent question in 
the Republic; but again, the ideal is what concerns us here and spirit ideally maintains our self-image both privately 
and publicly. 
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In Book VIII, Socrates further develops his portrait of the spirited element.  He attributes 
to spirit a love of victory [philonikia] and love of honor [philotimia] (548c),99 which along with a 
love of rule [philarchos] actually makes the spirited person vehemently obedient to superiors 
(549a).  In a constitution in which such natures rule it is not facility in political thought or public 
speech that recommends one to high office, but rather one’s “abilities and exploits [ergon] in 
warfare and warlike activities” – as is natural among those whose love of music [philomousia] 
and listening to discourse [philekoia] is overshadowed by a love of gymnastics [philogymnastia] 
and hunting [philotheria] (438b-439a).  This explains why spirited people “value the tricks and 
stratagems [dolous te kai mechanas] of war” (547e-548a) over peaceful contemplation and 
artistic appreciation.  More importantly, it highlights the active nature of the spirited element in 
comparison to the more passive character of reason.   
Socrates summarizes the list of spirit’s rather scattered characteristics in Book IX when 
he states that the spirited element wholeheartedly pursues control [kratein], victory [nikan] and 
good repute [eudokimein] (581a).  Prototypes of spirit, then, might deal not only with 
competiveness and military prowess, but also with moral education, management of social status, 
regulation of emotions and actions, and the desire for effective action in general.  
2.4.3 The Appetitive Element 
The appetitive element is the most varied of the three in that it houses numerous seemingly 
unconnected appetites and desires.  Socrates’ first examples of such desires are the basic 
biological urges for food and drink (437b).  But he augments the list soon after with sexual desire 
                                               
99 Actually, he attributes these loves to the constitution that arises between aristocracy and oligarchy because of the 
rule of the spirited element – hence he calls the soul that mimics this constitution “timocratic” (549b). 
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and the tantalization of various other pleasures [tas allas epithumias], finally designating the 
appetitive element as the “companion of certain indulgences and pleasures [hedonon]” (439d).  
Moreover, in discussing the decline from aristocracy, the worst constitutions – oligarchy, 
democracy, and ultimately tyranny – arise from appetites’ ascent to rule in the soul.100  So it is 
easy to see how discussion of appetite might devolve from what is physically basic into what is 
morally base.  Both are obviously entailed to some degree, but the immorality of certain 
appetites often outshines the necessary functions that others play in discussions of the tripartite 
soul.   
While the destructive hedonism of the tyrant looms large over characterizations of 
appetite, it will not do to simply identify this element as a basic impulse towards pleasure or, 
worse yet, the corrupting influence in the soul.  Rather, it should be remembered that the miserly 
attitude of the oligarch, in whom necessary appetites rule, does more than foreshadows the blind 
lust of the tyrant.  For in many ways oligarchy is a perverse mirror image of Socrates’ original 
city.  Not aristocracy, but the simple city which arises out of basic human needs like food, 
clothing and shelter.101  Although it is commonly referred to deridingly as the “City of Pigs,” this 
title is bestowed upon it by Glaucon.  Socrates, on the other hand, asserts that this is the true city 
[alethine polis], a healthy one in comparison to the luxurious and feverish city they are about to 
investigate (372e). 
With the morally ambivalent nature of appetite in mind, possible prototypes abound.  
Thus one must not only take into consideration instances in which following desire leads to 
                                               
100 See Books VIII and IX. 
101 Compare the description of the first city 369b-373a, which is generated out of, and constrained by, human 
necessity [τἀναγκαῖα] (373a), with the distinction between the necessary appetites [ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας] that 
motivate the oligarchy and the unnecessary ones that join in ruling the democracy at 558d-559d.  The main 
difference between the two, I suggest, is that the first city does not subordinate reason and spirit to appetite, but 
naturally harmonizes the three in a way the exceeds even the aristocratic constitution. 
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disharmony and troublesome outcomes, but also those that demonstrate that properly ordered 
desires form the foundation of a healthy life.  The key is, simply, that appetitive prototypes 
should deal with motives arising from basic physical urges – e.g., the desire for food, shelter, 
sex, etc.; and the activities that are associated with them, be they consumptive or productive – 
i.e., both feasting and farming could be considered examples of appetitive prototypes under 
certain conditions.  Thus we are not only on the lookout for examples of “lust” and “hedonism,” 
but for traces of “contentment” and “moderation” [sophrosune], which is the virtue that Socrates 
associates with the appetitive part (389d-d; 430d-e).102 
2.4.4  Harmony, Justice, and the Whole Soul 
The identification of each element is for the express purpose of locating justice, which Socrates 
describes as the virtue of the whole soul.  In truth, the exploration of justice is the driving theme 
of the Republic, but its structural importance is fairly abstract in relation to the constituent parts 
and can be briefly summarized: The just soul is a type of harmonia, in which each element in the 
soul – the rational, spirited, and appetitive – plays the part it is suppose to, just like the notes of a 
chord.  Injustice occurs when one part does the work of another, a discord in the soul (443b-
445b).  Hence prototypical accounts relaying events of discord or unity, especially in relationship 
to fragmented or integrated tripartitions, are of special interest to the investigation. 
With the rendering of the psychological model complete, I can now turn to investigating 
the historical literary and philosophical antecedents that establish a subtle tradition of 
psychagogic rhetoric which Plato inherits and makes overtly manifest.  It should be remembered 
                                               
102 Socrates admits that this virtue is peculiar within the psyche in that it concerns itself with all three elements, 
whereas courage and knowledge each affect only the element of which they are a virtue (432a). 
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that I make no claim to completeness in the following analysis nor do I consider disconfirming 
examples for the simple reason that I am not attempting to draw out a comprehensive model 
applicable to all ancient Greek thought.  However, I do claim that the samples I have selected are 
representative of a tradition of thought that Plato knew and drew from, and are therefore 
instructive for understanding Platonic rhetorical psychology. 
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3.0  PRE-PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGIA 
3.1 NASCENT PSYCHAGOGICAL STRUCTURES IN HOMER 
The review begins at the extant textual beginning of Greek poetic thought, with Homer and the 
Iliad.103  No doubt the epic provides a rich catalogue of motivational forces that influence 
action.104  In the first few lines alone we see motives that resonate with the Platonic elements 
described in the previous chapter: Homer opens by identifying the poem as a song of Achilles’ 
wrath [menis] (1.1).  This wrath is brought about by a slight from the high-lord and military 
commander, Agamemnon.  Agamemnon, in turn is motivated both by his desire for the girl 
Chryseis, whom he must give up; and by his own anger at the insolence of Achilles, who dares 
                                               
103 The question of whether Homeric literature demonstrates knowledge of rhetorical theory is perennial among 
classicists and historians of rhetoric.  For a good digest of the historical debate with commentary, see George 
Kennedy. “The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer.” The American Journal of Philology, 78.1 (1957): 23-35.  
This section, however, falls outside the scope of that discussion for it is less about formal modes of speech and more 
about the insights we might derive from Homer about the structure of the soul, its motivations, and the effect that 
words have on these motivations.   
Similar projects in the history of philosophy have recently emerged, especially attempting to tease out the 
philosophical connections between the Odyssey and Plato.  See, for example, the works of Zdravko Planinc: Plato’s 
Political Philosophy: Prudence in the “Republic” and the “Laws.” Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 
1991; “Homeric imagery in Plato’s Phaedrus.” Politics, Philosophy, Writing: Plato's Art of Caring for Souls. Ed. 
Zdravko Planinc. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2001: 152-159; and Plato through Homer: Poetry 
and Philosophy in the Cosmological Dialogues. Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 2003.  See also, Jacob 
Howland. The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy. New York, Toronto; Twayne Publishers, Macmillan Publisher, 
1993. As well as Seth Benardete. The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey. Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.  More recently, see David N. McNeill. An Image of the Soul in Speech: 
Plato and the Problem of Socrates. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.  McNeill’s 
analysis draws heavily on the Iliad as well, as does Planinc’s “Homeric Imagery”. 
104 See Bruno Snell. The Discovery of the Mind; the Greek Origins of European Thought. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1953.  Snell highlights eight different words employed by Homer that translate into ‘force’, each 
with a distinct meaning that is “precise, concrete and full of implications” (20).  
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address him as if his equal.  In lust and anger Agamemnon lays claim to Briseis, Achilles’ own 
prize (1.182-187).  But a hodgepodge of forces does not necessarily grant insight into Plato’s 
thinking.  The question remains whether there is any continuity between Homer and Plato 
regarding the nature of speech, the structure of the soul, and the effect that the one has on the 
other.105   
Given the significant difference in terminology between Homeric Greek and later Greek 
philosophical vocabularies, a keyword analysis would only lead to confusion.106  Rather, I will 
seek out possible correlations that both underscore and inform the structure of human motivation 
                                               
105 Snell (Discovery) points to the Homeric corpus as “the first stage of European thinking” as regards self-
understanding; a seminal moment in the concept of ‘mind’ in which people “no longer feel that they are the 
playthings of irrational forces” (22).  Yet Snell outlines a long and complex conceptual evolution from Homer to 
Plato and beyond.  In tracing the development of concept of logos, Johnstone (Listening) describes the contrast 
between the mythic worldview of Homer and the rational view of Greek philosophers as a “paradigm shift” akin to 
the difference between the worldviews of creationists and evolutionists (36).  Yet he maintains that the transition 
“from mythopoetic to naturalistic ways of understanding the world – was neither sudden nor linear nor final” (37). 
106 See n.89.  See also Snell’s characterization: “Since the time of Aristarchus, the great Alexandrian scholar, it has 
been the rule among philologists not to base the interpretation of Homeric words on references to classical Greek, 
and not to allow themselves to be influenced by the usage of a later generation when investigating Homeric speech.  
To-day we may expect even richer rewards from this rule…Let us explain Homer in no terms but his own, and our 
understanding will be the fresher for it” (Discovery, 1).   
An example of the sort of false certainty that can arise by not following this rule can be seen in Johnstone’s 
analysis of Athena’s intervention to stay the hand of Achilles against Agamemnon (1.193-222).  For Johnstone, 
“What is particularly interesting about this episode is the picture it paints of the act of choosing.  The contest is not 
between two elements of Achilles’ own psyche but between his own thymos (his passion or anger) and the logos of 
the goddess.  Thus does the locus of self-control lie outside the self, and thus is divine action a factor in all human 
decision” (Listening, 20).  This simplification of terminology is an anachronism that forces a dichotomy between 
psyche and thymos that was foreign to Homer.  For instance, as the Liddel-Scott entry for thymos shows, the word 
could mean a great deal more than passion or anger, with the important inclusion of Homeric examples (including 
the passage under consideration) where the term means “mind, soul, as the seat of thought, ταῦθ᾽ ὥρμαινε κατὰ 
φρένα καὶ κατὰ θ. Il.1.193, etc.”  John Cooper describes the anachronism best: “τὸ θυμοειδές derives from a Greek 
word, θύμος, that by Plato’s time seems to have been in ordinary use mostly as a name for anger: the word is in fact 
etymologically the same as our word “fume” someone in a state of θύμος would be “fuming” about something.  But 
in Homer, where it appears very frequently, the word has a broader usage: it names the part of themselves to which 
Homeric heroes speak, or which speaks to them, when they are aroused for action, and into which they, or some 
tutelary deity, pour might and strength when their prowess is about to be put to the test” (“Plato’s Theory” 12).  
Thus, for Homer the terms psyche and thymos are more akin to synonyms than the whole-part relationship of later 
Greek thought.  So Johnstone’s reading reduces a complex psychological moment of inner conflict in which a 
goddess comes to aid Achilles into a cut-and-dry episode of divine determination.  Cf. n.123 and 127.  The reduction 
works for Johnstone, who we saw above (n.105) wants to present a paradigm shift between Homer and the Greek 
philosophical tradition concerning the individual’s relationship to logos.  But if we consider the context of the terms 
more closely, we see that Achilles is truly divided.  The search for patterns and structures is meant to offset the 
anachronistic tendency without becoming too philologically tedious. 
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and the effect that speech has on it.  There are four instances from the Iliad that I will examine as 
instructive for Platonic psychagogy: the Judgment of Paris (alluded to at 24.28-31), the Shield of 
Achilles (18.478-608), the Embassy to Achilles (the whole of Bk. 9) and the Supplication of 
Priam (the whole of Bk. 24).  The first two, the Judgment and the Shield, act as counterparts that 
lay out the motivational map for the second, more rhetorically significant pair. 
3.1.1 The Judgment of Paris 
The first instance, the Judgment of Paris, is not actually recounted in the text of the Iliad; but it 
supplies the context for the entire Trojan conflict.107  The story reads somewhat like a fairy-
tale,108 but it is a fairy-tale of Platonic psychological forces if ever there was one.  During the 
marriage of Thetis and Peleus, the goddess Eris (Discord or Strife) – not invited to the wedding – 
threw into the festivities a golden apple on which was inscribed “To the Fairest.”  Hera, Athena, 
and Aphrodite vied for the apple, appealing to Zeus as arbiter.  Unwilling to decide the fairest 
between the three, Zeus commanded Hermes to lead them to Paris, Prince of Ilion, who was 
                                               
107 As mentioned above, the Judgment is alluded to at 24.28-31.  Whether Homer was aware of the judgment is not 
without historical controversy.  For detailed accounts of the historical controversy and its contemporary evolution, 
see T.W.C. Stinton. Euripides and the Judgement of Paris. Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 
Supplementary Paper No. 11 (1965): 1-5; and Malcolm Davies. “The Judgement of Paris and Iliad Book XXIV.” 
The Journal of Hellenic Studies 101 (1981): 56-62 (pp. 56-58).  In short, beginning with Aristarchus of Samothrace, 
the second century librarian of Alexandria, the passage is athetized as a later addition to the text, possibly 
originating with the Cypria of the late seventh century in which the tale is first fully recounted.  This was the 
traditional position of Homericists until the relatively recent discovery of a Spartan comb that depicts the Judgment, 
which could be dated back to the early seventh century (R. M. Dawkins. The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta. 
B.S.A. Athens, 1929: 223, fig. 127. Cited in Stinton, Euripedes 2n.1 and Davies, “Judgement” 56n.1).  Inspired by 
the discovery, Karl Reinhardt defended the passage as a genuine and necessary element for the backdrop of the 
action in the Iliad, without which the enmity of the goddesses would not make sense (Das Parisurteil, Wissenschajt 
und Gegenwart. vol. xi, Frankfurt, 1938. Cited in Stinton 2n.2 and Davies 56n.1).  Reinhardt’s position has since 
shifted the burden of proof unto claims of spuriousness among contemporary Homericists.  Regardless, even 
Aristarchus acknowledges that the Judgment belongs to the “mythic” age, and so would have been understood as 
supplying the context of the Iliad for Plato, as it did for Euripides and Isocrates (the myth occurs in Euripides Trojan 
Women (914-940), Adromache (274-290), and Iphigenia in Aulis (1179-1310) and in Isocrates’ Encomium to Helen 
(43-43).  For the importance of the myth on the works of Euripides, see Stinton’s study cited above). 
108 The lack of epic quality is one reason that Aristarchus cites in favor of athetisation. 
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herding sheep on Mount Ida.  At Hermes behest, Paris agrees to act as judge.  However, during 
his judgment each goddess offers Paris a certain gift befitting their character:  Hera offers Paris 
sovereignty over Europe and Asia; Athena offers victory and skill in battle; and Aphrodite offers 
the hand of Helen in marriage.  Finding marriage to Helen most appealing, Paris awards the 
apple to Aphrodite.   
The judgment, then, transfers from the appearances of the goddesses to the gifts they 
offer – or rather, to the promise of the gifts.  Hence Paris transforms from a judge of spectacle 
into a judge of speech, with the criteria for victory being the affect that each speech has on his 
soul.  Hence, Homer describes the enmity of Hera and Athena towards the Trojans: “Ilion and 
Priam and his people had incurred their hatred first, the day Alexandros [Paris] made his mad 
choice and piqued two goddesses, visitors in his sheepfold: he praised a third, who offered 
ruinous lust” (24.27-31).109  However, the parable here is not simply about the perils of choosing 
                                               
109 Unless otherwise noted, I follow the Robert Fitzgerald translation (The Iliad. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 
1975). The bibliographical history and evolution of the story is well digested and recounted by Sir James George 
Frazier and is worth citing in its entirety (Apollodorus, Epitome, E.3 n.1.  Accessed from <www.perseus.tufts.edu>):  
 
As to the judgment of Paris (Alexander), see Hom. Il. 24.25ff.; Cypria, in Proclus, Chrestom. i. (Epicorum 
Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. G. Kinkel, pp. 16ff.); Eur. Tro. 924ff.; Eur. IA 1290ff.; Eur. Hel. 23ff.; Eur. 
And. 274ff.; Isoc. 10.41; Lucian, Dial. Deorum 20, Dial. marin. 5; Tzetzes, Scholiast on Lycophron 93; 
Hyginus, Fab. 92; Serv. Verg. A. 1.27; Scriptores rerum mythicarum Latini, ed. Bode, i. pp. 65ff., 142ff. 
(First Vatican Mythographer 208; Second Vatican Mythographer 205). The story ran that all the gods and 
goddesses, except Strife, were invited to attend the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, and that Strife, out of 
spite at being overlooked, threw among the wedding guests a golden apple inscribed with the words, “Let 
the fair one take it,” or “The apple for the fair.” Three goddesses, Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite, contended 
for this prize of beauty, and Zeus referred the disputants to the judgment of Paris. The intervention of Strife 
was mentioned in the Cypria according to Proclus, but without mention of the golden apple, which first 
appears in late writers, such as Lucian and Hyginus. The offers made by the three divine competitors to 
Paris are recorded with substantial agreement by Eur. Tro. 924ff., Isocrates, Lucian, and Apollodorus. 
Hyginus is also in harmony with them, if in his text we read fortissimum for the formissimum of the MSS., 
for which some editors wrongly read formosissimum. The scene of the judgment of Paris was represented 
on the throne of Apollo at Amyclae and on the chest of Cypselus at Olympia （Paus. 3.8.12; Paus. 5.19.5).   
 
Note that while Hyginus is in relative agreement with the other authors, he does add great wealth [divitem praeter 
ceteros praestaturum] to Hera’s bribe and knowledge of every craft [omni artificio scium], not just warcraft, to 
Athena’s. (Fabulae 92. Latin text from: <www.thelatinlibrary.com/hyginus/hyginus5.shtml#paridis>).  Once 
material gain becomes a consideration of sovereignty and universal knowledge a part of victory, the delicate balance 
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lust over better motives.  Indeed, behind the fairy-tale exterior, there are subtle complexities that 
are easily overlooked and provide insight beyond the superficial identification of Platonic 
psychological prototypes in ancient myth.   
There is a tendency in digesting the myth for children to too quickly cast the story in 
superficially Platonic terms, in which the reader is told that Athena offers Paris wisdom, Hera 
power and Aphrodite the hand of Helen.110  Most children would see, not only that Paris made a 
bad choice, but that the wisdom of Athena was the proper one.  This makes the correlation with 
the psychic structure rather easy.  But Paris’ job was much more difficult, and much more 
instructive.  For the choice was between sovereign rule, victory in battle and the satiation of 
one’s physical and emotional desires.  Now perhaps Paris proclaimed the most foolish of the 
three possible verdicts by pitting the enmity of Hera and Athena against the aid of Aphrodite, but 
it was not this choice that brought forth discord.  There was no good choice, for the implication 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the tripartition starts to teeter.  Such overlap may play well into an integrated model of the tripartite divisions, but 
if done carelessly it may also make proper distinction difficult, if not impossible.  See n.110 below. 
110 See, for instance, C. Witt. The Trojan War. Trans. Francis Edward Younghusband. London: Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1884; Olivia E. Coolidge.  The Trojan War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. 8-11; Ingri and Edgar Parin 
D'Aulaire. Ingri and Edgar Parin D'aulaire’s Book of Greek Myths. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962. 179-180; 
and Rosemary Sutcliff. Black Ships before Troy: The Story of the Iliad. London: Frances Lincoln, 1993. Reprinted, 
New York: Laurel-Leaf (an imprint of Random House Children's Books), 2005. 4-5.  
In Sutcliff’s Black Ships Athena promises wisdom, while Hera offers wealth, power, and honor.  This 
points to another trend of complicating the bribes in later retellings by blending the original gifts with the later 
evolutions.  This is perhaps an evolution of Hyginus’ additions (Cf. n.109) but such blending often causes the 
goddesses’ gifts to overlap.  For instance, in Bernard Evslin’s, The Trojan War (New York: Scholastic Book 
Services, 1971. 11-13), Hera argues that sovereign rule will naturally lead to great wealth, while Athena counters 
that rule and wealth are meaningless without great wisdom to maintain them.  Without connecting wisdom and war, 
Athena concludes by adding the she is the “Mistress of Strategy” and that victory in war is also necessary for 
maintaining rule and wealth.  See also, Cheryl Evans and Anne Millard, Usborne Illustrated Guide to Greek Myths 
and Legends, New York: Scholastic, 2001. 40-41; and the Wikipedia entry on the Judgment of Paris 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgement_of_Paris>.  Even the notable poet-scholar, Robert Graves, who mainly 
recounts the Lucian version of the Judgment (Deorum Dialogi XX), adds wealth to the gifts of Hera along with 
wisdom and, uniquely, handsomeness, to the gifts of Athena (The Greek Myths, Revised Edition, London, New 
York: Penguin Books, 1960, Vol. 2.  Reprinted, London: The Folio Society, 1996: 571-575).   
Despite these trends, the retelling remains fairly constant in more careful chronicles even up until Thomas 
Bulfinch’s The Age of Fable (Originally published in 1855, the Judgment is recounted in Ch. 27 “The Trojan War.”  
The work is now a part of the classic and often reprinted collection Bulfinch’s Mythology which varies widely in 
pagination) and Edith Hamilton’s Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942. 
Reprinted, New York: Warner Books, 1999. 186-188).  Both recount the gifts as power and rule from Hera, victory 
and glory from Athena and the hand of the fairest mortal woman, Helen, from Aphrodite.   
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is that the choosing of any one goddess would entail the withdrawal of favor from the other two.  
Eris’ scheme was no long and drawn out affair.  She did not necessarily anticipate Paris’ 
decision.  Rather, discord struck the minute the three goddesses vied for the apple and the 
question was posed which one was most fair.  Zeus realized the futility in choosing and the 
dangers inherent in even trying.  It was not a question that a divine mind would ponder.  It was, 
however, a question with which humanity was preoccupied and it is the question itself that brings 
discord – the fragmentation of right rule, normative force and the overall satisfaction of life. The 
moral of the parable then is not that wisdom is to be preferred over carnal lusts; it is that the 
components of a happy life cannot be separated from one another.  It is not simply satisfaction, 
but discord, that should be avoided.  Unfortunately, the appeal to one often brings with it the 
circumstances of the other.111 
   In some ways, the themes of the Judgment provide a recurring motif throughout the epic 
– and each judgment is always a futile one that ends in fragmentation.  Even as sovereign, 
Agamemnon cannot satiate all his appetites while maintaining the integrity of his military forces. 
And the invocation of his sovereignty as he attempts to do so only spurns Achilles and 
jeopardizes the Achaeans’ victory in battle.  The misjudgment of Agamemnon results in a 
divided army, with Achilles and his Myrmidon troops sitting idle while the remaining Achaean 
forces argue over strategy.  As such, the Achaeans foreshadow the middle tableau represented on 
the Shield bestowed to Achilles (18.509-19).  The Shield depicts an ordered world in almost 
every detail the counterpart to the Judgments’ fragmentation.  It also heralds Achilles’ reentrance 
                                               
111 For an in-depth analysis of the psychological, philosophical and aesthetic considerations underlying the Judgment 
and its evolution in narrative and, especially, visual art, see Hubert Damisch. The Judgment of Paris. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996.  Damisch deftly explores many of these tensions, such as whether Aphrodite had 
an unfair advantage in a beauty contest (121-22), how the Judgment is less about choice and more about integration 
(150), and how Athena’s gifts transitioned from prowess and fortitude to that of wisdom (186).  
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into the fray, the reintegration of the Achaean army, and the downfall of Troy.  It is to the details 
of the shield that we now turn. 
3.1.2 The Shield of Achilles 
In Book Eighteen of the Iliad, Homer recounts the fashioning of Achilles’ armor prior to his 
reentry into battle.  His original armor – a wedding gift to his father, Peleus112 – had been lost 
when Patroclus donned it to push back the Trojans from the Achaeans ships, subsequently falling 
to Hector in battle.113  It is the death of Patroclus that finely rouses Achilles to rejoin the war.  
But before he can fight he must find new armor, which his mother, Thetis, promises to procure 
from the divine metal-smith Hephaestus.  The process of making the armor occupies one 
hundred and forty-six lines (18.468-614), but only the Shield is described in great detail (478-
608).   
The armor is made of four metals – durable bronze and tin, and honorable gold and silver.  
The shield is five layers thick, bound by a threefold rim (479-482).114  Upon the Shield are a 
series of tableaus that Homer describes in a famous ekphrasis.  Although it is unclear in what 
order or shape the collected images appear on the Shield,115 the content of each is relayed in 
                                               
112 This is the same wedding at which Eris sowed the seeds of discord that began the Trojan War.  A marriage, we 
learn in this same Book, into which the bride was resistant in heart but nonetheless was duty-bound to endure 
(18.430-435).  Thus the old armor is a symbol of the discord’s beginning; the new armor, a symbol of its end.   
113 Scenes covered in Books Sixteen and Seventeen. 
114 Although Plato attributes his “noble lie” or “Phoenician tale” of four metal types of humans that should not be 
intermingled (Rep. 414c-415c) to Hesiod’s four metal ages (546e-547a), it is worth noting the Hephaestus also 
builds his world with four metals interacting simultaneously (unlike Hesiod’s progressive stages), though Plato and 
Hesiod substitute iron [σίδηρος] for tin [κασσίτερος].  Further numerological analysis might suggest more 
connections.  For instance, Plato’s political scheme of five descending constitutions with an underlying tripartite 
structure could also be described as constructed out of four metals, five layers thick with a triple-binding, and his 
ideal procreative cycle was based on some mathematical relationship between 3, 4 and 5 (546 b-c).  
115 The Shield is usually assumed to be round with the images forming concentric circles, but Homer is unclear and 
scholars underscore this uncertainty often. For discussion of the composition of the Shield and further 
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vivid detail.  The passage opens with mention of the earth and the sea and a description of the 
cosmos (484-89).  At its close, Homer describes the Ocean streaming around the rim of the 
shield (607-08).  Between sky and Ocean are several depictions of human activity: A city at 
peace, a city besieged, and various agricultural vignettes.   
Like the Judgment of Paris, the Shield’s superficial correlation with the Platonic structure 
is immediately obvious – the Shield depicts wise rule, military combat, fecundity and festivity.  
But like the Judgment, closer examination is instructive.  Flanked by the infinitude of the 
heavens and the sea, Homer suggests that Hephaestus has somehow captured the essence of a 
boundless world in the confines of the shield.116  As such, the inner scenes represent the essential 
totality of human, social existence.  This existence is perfectly ordered and perpetual, as the end 
of Homer’s description (the courting dance of young men and women out in open fields (590-
606)) flows right back to the beginning (the wedding festival with brides marching and grooms 
dancing in the city streets (491-96)).  But though it is a perfectly ordered world, it is not a perfect 
world.117  The wedding party runs right into a legal dispute generated over a recent murder.  
Discord, again, attends the wedding.  Again judgment follows.  Although in this instance discord 
is contained by the city’s laws, which entertains the opinions of numerous judges and rewards 
the best (497-508).  Twice more discord appears: Strife appears personified on the battlefield in 
the City at War (535-540) and two lions devour a bull in the otherwise peaceful rural scenes 
                                                                                                                                                       
bibliographical information on the tradition of interpreting the Shield as a literary artifact, see Oliver Taplin. “The 
Shield of Achilles within the Iliad.” Greece & Rome, Second Series 27.1 (1980): 1-21; Calvin S. Byre. “Narration, 
Description, and Theme in the Shield of Achilles.” The Classical Journal 88.1 (1992):33-42; and Stephen Scully. 
“Reading the Shield of Achilles: Terror, Anger, Delight.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 101 (2003): 29-47. 
116 For a discussion of the Shield as a microcosm, see Taplin (“Shield” 11-12).  For the totality suggested by the 
framing of the human events by cosmos and Ocean, as well as a discussion of the theme of limit, see Scully 
(“Reading” 40-45).  The theme of limit also permeates Gregory Nagy’s analysis (“The Shield of Achilles: Ends of 
the Iliad and the Beginning of the Polis.” Homeric Responses. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. 72-87). 
117 As Taplin states, “the shield is a microcosm, not a utopia, and death and destruction are also there, though in 
inverse proportion to the rest of the Iliad” (“Shield” 12). 
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(579-585).  The message, it seems, is that discord is accounted for in the perfect order, not 
expelled. 
The conflict of the Iliad itself is played out in miniature in the City at War, as a unified 
city stands strong under siege against forces that are weakened due to internal fragmentation.  
There is something almost paradoxical here.  It is the fragmentation of the perfecting structure in 
the Judgment scene that leads to the war.  But war is a part of the perfect order.  Indeed, why 
would military prowess be appealing if such order guarantees peace?  The answer, quite simply, 
is that peace is never guaranteed.  But then what good is an ordered world, or an ordered soul for 
that matter?  While the shield suggests that discord is a fact of life, it also shows that adapting to 
the perfecting order can mitigate its consequences.  Thus, while wise rule does not guarantee a 
city without crime, the well-ordered city may confront and dissipate the corrupting effects of 
criminal activity.  The herdsmen lose a bull, not the herd.  The city at war stands strong against a 
divided foe.  If the divided foe represents the Achaeans,118 the totality of the Shield is symbolic 
of Achilles’ return to military action which itself signifies the reintegration of the Achaean forces 
and the restoration of military power.119  Though this reintegration signals Achilles’ personal 
demise, it means ultimate victory for the Achaeans.   
At the level of the Judgment and the Shield, Paris and Achilles are representative of 
larger motivational forces that effect entire societies.  Much like in the Republic, this 
macrocosmic representation provides an easily observable diorama of these forces at play.  
However, the rhetorical import of such interplay is not immediately apparent until we locate the 
same forces in the psychic structure of the Homeric individual.  Once we do, however, the 
                                               
118 The allusion is rather obvious, but see Taplin for a detailed correlation (“Shield” 6). 
119 This is not the same as arguing that the armor signifies Achilles’ social reintegration among the Achaeans.  I 
believe that Scully argues convincingly against this thesis (“Reading” 37-40).  Rather, I hold that the return of 
Achilles signifies the restoration of military prowess to the Achaean forces. 
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broader outline provided by the Judgment and the Shield allows us to view apparent mishmashes 
of rhetorical techniques as coherent, persuasive strategies that anchor the psychagogic tradition.  
In the next two sections I argue that the well-known appeals to Achilles by the Achaean Embassy 
and by King Priam demonstrate the same structural concerns on the psychological level of the 
individual and help account for the form of these appeals beyond a random collection of 
techniques.  
3.1.3 The Embassy to Achilles 
Book Nine of Homer’s Iliad describes the visit of three emissaries – Odysseus, Phoenix, and 
Ajax – to the malcontented Achilles.  It is an account that has warranted the attention of 
rhetoricians from antiquity to present day.120  Like the various motivational factors discussed 
above, the embassy scene presents a catalogue of rhetorical techniques that would later be 
identified and codified by the likes of Aristotle and Quintilian.121  But again, a seemingly 
random catalogue does not establish a structural tradition.  At first glance, it may appear that 
Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax form a somewhat arbitrary threesome, at most selected due to a 
                                               
120 In antiquity, for example, the exchange between Odysseus and Achilles is the topic discussed by Socrates and 
Hippias in Plato’s Hippias Minor and the embassy is the first example offered by Quintilian to support the totality of 
Homer’s presentation of rhetorical technique (10.47).  In modern rhetorical scholarship the embassy is consistently 
analyzed in disciplinary histories such as those offered by Kennedy, Corbett and Walker.  See George A. Kennedy. 
The Art of Persuasion in Greece. 36-38; Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to 
Modern Times. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 11-15; and A New History of Classical 
Rhetoric. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. 13-14; see also, Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. 
Connors. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 5-15; as 
well as Jeffrey Walker. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, 14-15; 162-163. 
121 For a reading of the Embassy in terms of Greek, predominately Aristotelian, rhetoric, see Kennedy (Art of 
Persuasion 36-38; Classical Rhetoric 11-15).  For the identification of various tropes and schemes that appear in the 
Embassy, see Kennedy (Classical Rhetoric 11-15).  For a reading of the Embassy in terms of both Quintilian and 
Aristotle, see Corbett (Classical Rhetoric 10-12). 
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particular personal regard for them held by Achilles.122  However, a close examination shows not 
only that the three envoys make separate appeals, but that they make very distinct types of 
appeals that foreshadow some of the more complex idiosyncrasies of the tripartite structure.  
Odysseus is rational, Phoenix is moralizing, and Ajax goads.  The superficial correspondence to 
the tripartite division is at least strikingly coincidental, but in order to understand the full 
rhetorical significance of this correspondence it is worth starting at the beginning of Book Nine 
and examining the embassy in light of the immediate rhetorical situation.   
At the Book’s beginning, Agamemnon has announced his decision to depart from Troy.  
The young and valiant warrior Diomedes interjects, claiming that Agamemnon is literally 
divided:123 he has been granted kingship, but lacks valor (9.1-40).  Thus, the problem is laid out 
plainly – fragmentation.  The old sage Nestor speaks next.  He complements Diomedes as both 
strong in battle and the most prudent in counsel of those his age – that is to say, as undivided, if 
somewhat unripe.  So Nestor takes over where Diomedes lets off, suggesting that they set up a 
guard, feast and then hold council (50-80).  After the feast, Nestor urges Agamemnon to speak 
but exhorts him to take heed of his counselors, for it was his neglect of wise counsel that led to 
the situation in the first place (94-113).  Agamemnon agrees that his actions were foolish and 
continues to list all the gifts he will grant Achilles if he would only submit to his rule once again 
                                               
122 In rhetorical scholarship, little analysis is given to the collection as a collection.  According to Kennedy, “There 
are three ambassadors, Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax, chosen for their potential influence on Achilles.  He 
acknowledges (9.204) that they are the men he loves most” (Classical Rhetoric). According to Corbett, 
“Agamemnon chose his ambassadors shrewdly: Odysseus, “the man who was never at a loss”; Ajax, reputed to be 
the mightiest Greek warrior after Achilles; Phoinix, Achilles’ beloved old tutor.  Each of them will work on the 
aggrieved and disgruntled Achilles in his own way” (Classical Rhetoric 10).  These statements are true, but give 
little consideration to how the three function together.  For a deeper analysis of the selection, see Section III (232-
238) of O. Tsagarakis. “Phoenix’s Social Status and the Achaean Embassy.” Mnemosyne, Fourth Series 32.3/4 
(1979): 221-242.  Though, again, Tsagarakis mainly considers their separate functions. 
123 Διάνδιχα.  It is worth noting that this is the same word Homer uses to describe Achilles’ internal division at the 
onset of his rage with Agamemnon (1.189).  Achilles is divided whether to slay Agamemnon or stay his anger.  It is 
safe to say that Achilles, like Agamemnon, is still divided at Book Nine.  Cf. n.106. 
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(114-161).  It is at this point that Nestor suggests sending an embassy to convey the offer to 
Achilles, insisting that he be allowed to organize it himself.  The construction of the embassy is 
careful and calculated, and Nestor spends some time offering instructions to the embassy to 
which we are not privy (162-181).  That it was the old sage Nestor that suggested and organized 
the embassy is often overlooked in rhetorical analyses of Book Nine, but it carries with it 
important psychagogic implications.   
By dissecting the encounter analytically, much of the nuance behind Nestor’s strategizing 
is lost and the separate speeches do little more than exhibit an array of rhetorical techniques.  The 
same core message – “come back and fight, your grievances will be redressed if you do and your 
kinsmen will die if you do not” – is communicated with a variance in tone and style as each 
speech fails a little less completely than the previous one.  That this is the typical view is 
evidenced by the tendency to analyze only Odysseus’ speech as representative of the whole 
encounter despite the fact that his is the most obvious failure.124  Viewing the embassy 
synthetically, we see that Nestor’s strategy actually does move Achilles from a course of action 
that would be catastrophic for the military campaign to a position that at least acknowledges the 
conditions of his return.  Moreover, we see that this movement takes place along a familiar path.    
As the Embassy arrives, it is worth noting the familiar fact that Achilles welcomes them 
as a special, unified group unique from the rest.  Even as he broods, those of the embassy are 
nearest and dearest [philtotoi] to him out of all the Achaeans (196-198).  After satiating their 
appetites once again through feast, Odysseus opens the plea of the envoys (225-306).  Despite 
his apparent failure, it is fairly well agreed that Odysseus offers the most composed speech by 
                                               
124 See, for example, Corbett (Classical Rhetoric 5-15) and Kennedy (New History 14).  To be sure, Kennedy and 
others elsewhere discuss all three speeches, but even then Odysseus is usually identified as the prime rhetorical 
representative and given the lion’s share of analysis (see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 12). 
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classical standards.  It is well organized, well thought out, and employs various reasoned and 
emotional appeals.125  Indeed, Odysseus provides Achilles with all the necessary content that the 
embassy has to convey.  As far as pure information is concerned, the following speeches are 
merely variations on a theme.  Thus, it is no stretch to label Odysseus speech as rational in the 
Platonic sense.  Not that it deals only with logical arguments, but that it displays more than any 
other speech offered a concern for all aspects of Achilles’ soul.  He does indeed lay out the facts 
clearly and the probable consequences that those facts will have, but in doing so he flatters 
Achilles, stokes his pride, appeals to his pity, and to his honor and valor.  Yet it is rational in yet 
another sense – not because it is wise per se, but because it is prudent.  He will be rewarded 
greatly, and even if he spurns Agamemnon’s rewards, he will be honored by his kinsmen as a 
savior.  Ultimately, he may gain the highest prize of slaying Hector.  On the face of it, such 
considerations may seem like material inducements aimed at the lower parts of the soul, but at 
the base of all of Odysseus’ arguments is the supposition that what is good for the Achaeans – 
Achilles’ return – is also good for Achilles himself.126   
Viewing Odysseus’ speech as a rational appeal to prudent action makes the most sense 
out of Achilles’ otherwise meandering reply (307-439).127  While it may appear the Achilles is 
simply being stubborn and the offer, as Diomedes later claims, merely pushes Achilles further 
into pride (696-709), his response to Odysseus is really a direct refutation of Odysseus’ claims to 
                                               
125 Kennedy recognizes Odysseus’ speech as being “well arranged rhetorically” (Art of Persuasion 37) and “the most 
carefully organized in the group” (Classical Rhetoric 12) while Corbett characterizes Odysseus’ speech as “a model, 
in miniature, of the well-organized oration” (Classical Rhetoric 11).  For a view that Odysseus actually makes a 
grave rhetorical blunder by possibly speaking out of turn and not correctly communicating Agamemnon’s contrition, 
see E. Watson Williams. “The Offer to Achilles.” The Classical Quarterly, New Series 7.1/2 (1957): 103-108. 
126 As Kennedy states, “Odysseus’ argumentation is based on an attempt to identify the interests of Achilles with 
those of the Greeks” (Classical Rhetoric 13).  Corbett also mentions various appeals aimed at Achilles’ self-interests 
on both the material and emotional plane (Classical Rhetoric 12-13). 
127 Kennedy calls it “personal and digressive” in contrast to Odysseus’ well-ordered speech, though he sees order 
beneath the surface in Achilles’ speech as well. (Classical Rhetoric, 13) 
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prudence.  While initially brooding over the offense that he has suffered, he comes to ponder the 
actual motive to fight (337-343).  Here we have Achilles at his most philosophical.  What good is 
fighting if those who do little get rewarded the same as those who do much (315-327)?  What 
good indeed if those who do much get stripped of their rewards by those who do little (328-337)?  
These are fair and prudent questions, but not so effective in the face of the grand offer that has 
just been made.128  Achilles is assured to gain more than any other hero for his services should 
he return.  True, as Achilles states, he has reason to suspect that the offer may not be so grand 
given Agamemnon’s earlier seizure of Briseis (344-345), but this doubt is not what fuels his 
refusal.  He would refuse the offer even if it were ten or twenty times greater (379-385).  The 
real reason is twofold.  First, he has more than enough to be satisfied with at home – wealth, 
natural resources and the potential for a happy family life (393-400).  This is not only a prudent 
response, but a calculatedly personal response that Odysseus should find it difficult to counter, 
for it was he who would have famously avoided the war altogether to remain with his family in 
Ithaca.129  Second, Achilles knows from his mother Thetis that his choice is even plainer: he may 
return home and live a long, uneventful life or die gloriously on the battlefields of Ilium (401-
416).  Thus he informs the embassy that he will be leaving early the next morning and directs 
                                               
128 For Kennedy, the gist of Achilles’ reply is just this “fighting gets one nowhere” (Classical Rhetoric 13).  
However, Odysseus has just made the claim that fighting will indeed get Achilles somewhere.  While Achilles does 
employ this maxim to open up his speech, the actual refutation is much more direct and much more prudent. 
129 This partially assumes that the story of Odysseus feigning madness to escape being drafted into the war, only to 
be outsmarted by Palamedes, was known before the Iliad.  Like the Judgment of Paris, the story only appears in text 
in the later Epic Cycles.  However, there is evidence in the Iliad that Odysseus was preoccupied with his family in 
ways that other heroes were not.  For while the standard form of addressing Odysseus was the typical reference 
“Zeus-born son of Laertes” [διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη], twice in heated argument he refers to himself as “Father of 
Telemachus” (2.224 [Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ]; 4.350 [Τηλεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα]).  The only other character in the epic 
properly referred to as a father by title is Zeus, “father of men and gods.”  Every other character is referred to by 
their noble lineage in the form of “son of…”  If we factor in that Odysseus is often addressed with the epithet “of 
many wiles” [ex. πολύμητις 1.285;πολυμήχανος 2.155], puns in speech play a special role when he utters them.  
“Telemachus” means “fighting from afar,” which suggests that he was named after being drafted into war.  Thus, 
whenever Odysseus loses his temper in argument due to the foolish actions or comments of others, he seemingly 
shouts “I am a father, fighting far away from his family, and now I have to deal with this!?” 
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them to take his message to the Achaean chieftains (421).130  Against this counterargument and 
new course of action Odysseus, the voice of prudent reason, has nothing left to say.131  But he 
has played his role by moving the dormant Achilles to action nonetheless and by laying a 
rational, factual foundation that the others may build upon. 
It is now Phoenix’s turn to speak, but his position is somewhat different than the other 
two.132  While it is easy to see Odysseus and Ajax as rationality and physicality personified and 
vocalized, Phoenix does not exude spiritedness in either visage or speech.  In fact, reading the 
characters as psychic representations of the polis, it is Achilles that plays the role of spirit.  But at 
the level of individual personality, Achilles is a single soul that Agamemnon seeks to persuade 
by means of the Embassy.  Who then does Nestor select to rouse Achilles’ spirit?  Not another 
spirited individual like Diomedes, but a paternal figure and a moral educator.  Not a rouser of 
spirit at all, but one who has taken on the duty of training Achilles as a “speaker of words and 
doer of deeds” (442-43).133  He speaks directly both to Achilles’ spirit and to Achilles as the 
spirited element by asserting his position as educator and parental figure to whom Achilles is 
disposed to listen (ibid; 485-495) and then by reminding him about what beliefs are to be 
preserved.  He does so by offering instruction through exemplars, first by appealing to the 
conduct of the gods themselves (497-514) and then through the recounting of mythic tales of 
                                               
130 ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν. Cf. n.138 
131  On the persuasive yet paradoxical logic of Achilles response, see Walker (Poetics, 162-163).  Kennedy sees 
Odysseus’ speech as counterproductive to the point of actually driving Achilles away (Classical Rhetoric 13), but 
the circumstance of Achilles’ impending death alone justifies his departure aside from anything Odysseus has said.  
He does not leave because he fears the approaching army; he leaves because he has decided on a simple life over a 
glorious death. 
132 Tsagarakis (“Phoenix’s Social Status”) addresses the controversy of whether Phoenix originally belongs to the 
Embassy or is a later addition.  He, I think convincingly, argues that Phoenix is an original participant despite any 
philological oddities that might suggest otherwise.  See also, Judith A. Rosner. “The Speech of Phoenix: Iliad 9.434-
605.” Phoenix, 30.4 (1976): 314-327.  Rosner argues for the genuine placement of Phoenix in the assembly based on 
the nature of his arguments and appeals and their consonance with the rest of the Iliad.  Regardless, the Embassy 
was set by Plato’s time.  Indeed, Plato references Phoenix’s speech in the Republic (390e). Cf n.135. 
133 μύθων τε ῥητῆρ᾽ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων. Il. 9.443 
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warriors past (523-599).134  There is still appeal to prudence and to the emotions, but the central 
concern of Phoenix is instruction in right conduct.  Achilles was once justified in his anger, but 
after Agamemnon’s atonement through gifts it is now time to let that anger subside and rejoin the 
fighting (515-523; 599-605).135 
 As the rhetorical ground shifts from prudence to morality, Achilles changes tact as well.  
He counters by reminding Phoenix that as a Myrmidon he is under Achilles’ rule, so loyalty 
demands that he not take the side of Agamemnon (611-615).  That is to say, Achilles turns the 
tables by reminding the moral teacher what right action demands.  But again, Phoenix has done 
his part.  While Odysseus had gotten Achilles thinking and acting prudently instead of brooding, 
Phoenix has indeed roused Achilles’ spirit.  For, although his response to Odysseus is somewhat 
frank, it is not until faced with the possibility of Phoenix’s insubordination that he becomes 
personally heated.  Note that at the end of Odysseus speech Achilles offers Phoenix a bed, but 
allows him to choose whether to stay or go (427-229).  At the end of Phoenix’s speech, Achilles’ 
offer turns into a command (617-619).  Still, Achilles is unsure of himself at this point and 
announces that he will decide whether to stay or go in the morning. 
Ajax is the last of the embassy to speak (624-642).  It is difficult to say that Ajax 
represents the appetite of the Achaean forces in so far as appetite means base desires.  However, 
insofar as appetite refers to basic physical nature, Ajax is a prime representative.  He is a 
towering physical specimen.  Indeed, he is the only physical match for Achilles, who identifies 
                                               
134 Kennedy, I think wrongly, points to Phoenix’s digression into myth as an artifact of Homer as poet, diverging 
from the purpose of the oration in order to relay a vivid story, “for he is not obsessed with logical proof; he is a poet 
rather than an orator and is more concerned with the past than with the present” (Art of Persuasion 38).  Walker 
seems to me closer to the mark when he recognizes Phoenix’s recounting of heroic myth as a larger appeal to 
“traditional wisdom-lore.” Walker argues that “in Phoenix’s telling of the tale, we are to see a skillful speaker 
invoking poetic lore in a skillful recitation of epea, verses, to invoke a “precedent” for determining the case in hand. 
Moreover, it seems likely that we are to think of these materials as being woven skillfully into the general texture of 
the speech” (Poetics 15).  Such a use of myth would be appropriate for Phoenix’s position as moral instructor. 
135 Although Plato mentions Phoenix’s speech, he notably condemns the appeal to gifts as bad moral advice. Cf. 132. 
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Ajax’s shield as the one possible replacement for the armor he had lost (18.192-93).  His speech 
is blunt and forceful.  He adds little by way of content save for the reduction of prudence and 
morality to basic material value – “all this for one girl, now you are offered seven and more!” 
(9.637-340).136  But his words hit harder than those previous.  In terms of the psycho-somatic 
analogies that Plato employs in the Timaeus: Odysseus appeals to Achilles’ mind, Phoenix to his 
heart, while Ajax offers the closest verbal equivalent to a punch in the gut – not a plea for pity, 
but contempt and disregard from an honored friend.  And yet Achilles responds that Ajax echoes 
his own mind, though he still cannot overcome his anger (645-648).137  He knows what he 
should do, yet wills not to act.  He remains internally fragmented, but now he sees it.  So he 
decides at that point to stay among the ships.  Should Hector reach his encampment, he will 
fight.  Thus Achilles sets forth the grim conditions for his return (649-655).   
It may seem that Ajax has succeeded, at least somewhat, where the others have failed.  
But Ajax is not simply the next batter up with the two quick outs looming over him.  Rather, the 
bases are loaded as he steps in to complete the movement that Odysseus began and Phoenix 
pushed along.  Ajax alludes to this totality himself, speaking for the embassy as a whole as he 
closes and correcting Achilles’ perception that they are representatives of the Achaean cheiftens.  
Instead, he says, they are representatives of all the Danaans, the entire body of the Greek forces 
that currently await slaughter (640-41).138  Would that Achilles should treat them as such (639).  
Inverting Achilles’ words of friendship upon their arrival, Ajax closes by voicing the collective 
desire of the Greeks to be nearest and dearest [kedistoi…philtotoi] to Achilles most of all (641-
                                               
136 My paraphrase.  
137 Here we have a clear picture of Achilles’ internal conflict, his mind [θυμός] resonates with what Ajax has said 
[μυθέομαι] in opposition to the anger [χόλος] that swells in his heart [καρδία]. Cf. n.106 and 123. 
138 ὑπωρόφιοι δέ τοί εἰμεν πληθύος ἐκ Δαναῶν.  Cf. n.130 ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν. 
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42).  Thus the embassy that was formed as a remedy for fragmentation ends by emphasizing their 
integration, acknowledging that it remains incomplete without Achilles.139   
3.1.4 Dialogue with Priam 
On the interpersonal level the Embassy represents a projection of Agamemnon’s wisdom 
(Nestor) meant to appeal to Achilles’ prudence (Odysseus), morality (Phoenix) and basic 
impulses (Ajax).  On this interpersonal level, the Embassy to Achilles is almost a direct contrast 
with the Judgment of Paris – three brought together to persuade one.  On the level of the polis, 
they are beseeching their own withdrawn spirit to come back and fight.  By most measures the 
Embassy cannot be called a success on either level and is very nearly a complete failure.  But 
although it seems like a small consolation at the time, it is Achilles’ decision to stay that 
ultimately paves the way for his return and the final victory of the Achaeans over the city of 
Troy.  Still, upon reading Homer’s account, there appears to be a glaring inconsistency between 
technique and efficacy.  For all the prowess and careful thought that went into their selection, the 
emissaries fail to reintegrate stubborn Achilles.140  This disparity is intensified when in the final 
Book King Priam, enemy of the Achaeans, confronts Achilles and persuades him to relinquish 
the hard won body of Hector – Priam’s son, hero of Troy, and the individual responsible for the 
death of Achilles’ closest friend.  What then is Homer saying about the power of persuasion and 
its effective execution?  Are there reasons that the single Priam succeeds where the trio of 
                                               
139 There is an interesting comment on this tripartite relationship during the funeral games of Patroclus, after 
Achilles has reentered the fold.  Wiley Odysseus and brawny Ajax wrestle to a standstill.  Bored with the inaction, 
the spirited Achilles adjudicates between the two, calling the match a tie in which both share the honor (22.700-39). 
140 This might speak against Nestor being wise at all.  For a discussion of the controversy over Nestor’s efficacy as 
sage counselor, with a portrayal of Nestor as a voice for justice and social cohesion that resonates with the role I 
have cast him in here, see Hanna M. Roisman. “Nestor the Good Counsellor.” The Classical Quarterly, New Series 
55.1 (2005): 17-38. 
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emissaries fail?  Does his “oneness” correlate more exactly to Achilles’ psyche then the 
disjointed “threeness” of the envoy?   
Achilles suggests an answer in his reply to Odysseus, when he mentions an alternative 
condition for his return to battle; one less bloody for the Achaean troops, but perhaps more 
difficult for Agamemnon himself.  He states that his soul [thumos] will never be persuaded 
[peitho] until Agamemnon pays back his heart-wrenching dishonor in full (9.386-87).141  Since 
such repayment is directly contrasted to the material gifts that have been offered, it is clear that 
Achilles desires a different kind of atonement from Agamemnon.  His displays of wealth only 
assert his kingly position.142  What Achilles’ desires is Agamemnon’s humbling, a true 
supplication.  
In understanding and enacting the role of the lowly supplicant, King Priam is very much 
the antithesis of King Agamemnon.  For while Agamemnon might acknowledge his folly and 
even regret his slight against Achilles, what he seeks is the hero’s return to subjugation.143  At 
the advice of his counselors he assembles and dispatches an embassy to present the abundance of 
gifts that he is assured will sway Achilles.  In deferring to his counselors and dispatching an 
embassy to communicate his message, he risks nothing of himself.  Though Nestor is deftly able 
to construct a technical representation of Agamemnon’s will – a representation that moves 
                                               
141 In this section, I am indebted to the analysis offered by Odysseus Tsagarakis in “The Achaean Embassy and the 
Wrath of Achilles.” Hermes 99.3 (1971): 257-277.  Although I had already developed the basic argument of this 
section prior to encountering the article, Tsagarakis’ philological and logical insights allowed me to develop and 
articulate the argument better than I had originally anticipated.  In particular, his contrast between the non-
supplicatory nature of the gifts offered by Agamemnon and his Embassy and the Supplication of Priam permeates 
this section (260-262). 
142 For discussion concerning traditions of interpreting Achilles’ refusal of Agamemnon’s gifts, including recent 
interpretations arguing that the kingly offer fails because its generosity is seen as lauding Agamemnon’s superiority 
over Achilles, see Benjamin Sammons. The Art and Rhetoric of the Homeric Catalogue. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010.  120-122. 
143 He admits as much at 9.160-61, citing that he is more kingly and older.  This is a point Odysseus is wise to leave 
out in communicating Agamemnon’s message, as is often noted (ex. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric 12; Sammons Art 
and Rhetoric, 122). 
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Achilles’ slightly as it also represents the will of the Achaeans – the king is still personally 
removed from the communicative encounter.   
However, Priam is unable to keep such a distance from Achilles.  In order to ransom 
Hector’s body he has been instructed by the divine messenger Iris to personally present the 
warrior with gifts that will melt his rage (24.160-187).  His offerings are valuable, but rather 
humble compared to those of Agamemnon.144  Indeed, he is assured by his wife, Hecuba, that the 
supplication will fail and that the mere attempt to ransom the body will result in his death (206-
08).  Priam proceeds against the advice of his wife and the collective will of his people, readily 
accepting death for the slight chance of bringing Hector’s body back to the city so that he might 
be properly mourned.145  With Hermes as his guide, he arrives safely at Achilles’ ship (352-467).  
Hermes instructs Priam to take Achilles’ knees and invoke Achilles’ father, mother and son 
(465-467); that is to say, he must close the physical and emotional distance completely.  Priam 
partially follows these instructions, but outdoes the strategic advice of the divine messenger:  He 
kneels before Achilles, embraces his knees and kisses his hands (476-478).  Invoking the image 
of Achilles’ father he asks for the body of Hector, announcing that he has now endured what no 
man has ever endured by kissing the hands of the man who killed his son (485-506).  Achilles 
assents. 
 It is tempting to explain the success of Priam’s supplication by appealing to one of two 
necessary but insufficient elements.  The first is to dismiss the episode as rhetorical at all, but 
rather as a product of divine intervention.  Zeus has decided that Achilles will turn Hector’s body 
                                               
144 Compare Agamemnon’s list (9.115-160) to Priam’s (24.228-237).  Whereas Agamemnon’s offer reaches its 
height with serving women, royal betrothals, and the rule of cities, Priam’s collection consisting of such things as 
stately robes, fine linens, gold bars, tripods and a royal cup all fit in a single wagon.   
145 Priam chastises the Trojan citizens and his own sons for their lamentation and fear (24.237-264) and his loved 
ones wail as he departs as if he rides to his death (327-28). 
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over to Priam and sends his messengers to see that it is done.  He has Thetis instruct Achilles to 
accept the ransom for the body and sends Iris and Hermes to instruct Priam how to approach 
Achilles.146  However, Homer does allude to the possibility that even the will of the gods does 
not guarantee the outcome; for Iris assures Priam that he will be safe because, in addition to 
Hermes guidance, Achilles’ is neither a brute nor a madman but dutiful to both the gods and to 
supplicants (185-188).  This suggests that either a brute or a madman might disregard the will of 
the gods or the mercy due to supplicants.  This subtle warning is echoed in Achilles’ own 
impatience with Priam, who refuses to sit with Achilles before the body of Hector is handed over 
to him (552-556).  Achilles warns Priam not to test his patience, lest he ignore the commands of 
Zeus and kill Priam in a rage (559-570).  Nevertheless, he prepares Hectors body, but does so out 
of Priam’s view for fear that seeing Hector might provoke the king into outburst, which might in 
turn induce Achilles to violence (582-586).  Thus the motives of the heroes still linger 
independent of the will of the gods, and the interaction of the agents still drive the action of the 
narrative.  Zeus has chosen not to have Hermes steal the body, but to have Priam confront 
Achilles for a reason.  Though the gods will Achilles to be persuaded by Priam, Priam must still 
have the courage of heart and presence of mind to execute that will.147 
Among rhetoricians, the tendency is to ignore the mystical backdrop and credit more 
technical aspects of Priam’s plea.  In reminding Achilles of his own father – both by invoking 
him in speech and resembling him in appearance – Priam is able to persuade Achilles through 
                                               
146 Such an explanation is consonant with views that the epic heroes are little more than playthings of the gods, as 
Johnstone (Listening) seems to assert.  See n.105 and n.106. 
147 Of course, Iris strengthens his courage and Hermes refocuses his mind.  Tsagarakis discusses the contrast 
between divine aid in the Supplication and the lack thereof in the Embassy (“Embassy” 262).  Miguel Herrero de 
Jáuregui (“Priam's Catabasis: Traces of the Epic Journey to Hades in Iliad 24.” Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 141.1 (2011): 37-68) specifically examines the role of Iris in fortifying Priam’s courage 
(50-51).  He also somewhat suggests Hermes as the restorer of Priam’s reason by observing that Priam becomes 
addled upon first seeing Hermes (52), but that Hermes then calms his fears (54).  Herrero de Jáuregui later points to 
the same episode to argue that intelligence [νόος] is a necessary attribute for Priam’s successful journey (61). 
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pathos and identification.148  These are in fact the techniques he employs, but such an 
explanation does not satisfy.  Odysseus repeats Peleus’ own words and Phoenix is an actual 
father figure, yet neither rouse him as Priam does.  Are we to assume that, despite the same 
technical content, he identifies more closely with the enemy king than with his own kinsmen?  
Yet Homer tells us that the invocation of Peleus does move Achilles, and that he cries for his 
father as he also cries for Patroclus, while Priam sheds tears for his own son (507-512).  They are 
both joined in a cathartic moment.   
Pity and identification, then, have less to do with any connection that is made between 
Priam and Achilles’ father and far more to do with the connection that is established between 
Priam and Achilles himself.  Here stands before him a man with incredible endurance, strong-
willed with a heart of iron who would not be dissuaded from his chosen course of action (205; 
219; 518-21).  Hector had made the same assessment of Achilles as he pleaded for his body to be 
ransomed after his death: Achilles would not be persuaded, his heart was of iron (22.356-57).  
Achilles had rejected the plea in much the same way he rejected Agamemnon’s gifts as offered 
by Odysseus.  Not if he was offered ten or even twenty times the normal price would he hand 
over the body (349-54).149  Yet, Priam found a way to melt his iron heart.  Not by ransom, 
despite what Zeus decreed.  The material offering was merely a formality.  He melted Achilles’ 
heart by having a heart of iron himself, and more besides.  He was able to do what Agamemnon 
was not, to pay Achilles back pain for pain, sorrow for sorrow, and dishonor for dishonor.  But as 
he humbled himself, he reinforced his regal status.  Whereas Agamemnon was internally divided, 
                                               
148 See Kennedy (Art of Persuasion 37) and Kirby (“Great Triangle” 5).  See also Gerry Philipsen. “Coming to 
Terms With Cultures.” The Carroll C. Arnold Distinguished Lecture: National Communication Association, 
November 2008, Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2010. 12-14.   
149 Notably, Hector unsuccessfully employs the mundane tactics that Priam later uses, imploring Achilles by life 
[ψυχή], knees and parents.  Achilles retorts that no such pleas will move him (22.337-345).  
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Priam quite literally presents an ethos of integrity.  With the help of the gods he retained his wits 
and his courage, and even regained his appetite (635-642).  The parts of his soul are intact and 
properly ordered, even if strife remains, like the images on Achilles’ shield.  It was the appeal to 
the integrity of the Achaeans, however fragmented their king, that moved Achilles slightly.  It 
was the inherent integrity of Priam, however emotionally broken he might be, that moved him 
completely. 
Neither divine intervention nor psychic integrity explains Priam’s success on its own – 
Priam was courageous and acted prudently only with the help of the gods, though it is his 
unguided actions that melt Achilles’ heart.  Ultimately, Priam is successful through the mix of 
divine aid and inner cohesion.  This is not to discount the technical skill that he exhibits, but to 
highlight those elements of his encounter that made it successful where the amazing technical 
skill of the Embassy failed.  Taken together, divine aid and personal integrity form the bedrock 
of psychagogic rhetoric upon which the skillful psychagogue operates.150  However, rather than 
guarantee success, these two elements indicate that the psychagogic rhetor speaks at great risk to 
self.  For in accepting divine aid, one must give up some degree of personal agency.  And 
integrity is only needed where others often fall apart.151  There should be no doubt that of all the 
perils Priam faced, it was his humbling before Achilles that was most threatening to a king.  
Agamemnon could never risk such harm to his kingly pride, and so he fails before he begins.   
Thus, Homer does not merely demonstrate a vast knowledge of rhetorical techniques and 
psychological motivations.  Rather, in the construction of the Embassy and in Supplication of 
                                               
150 As we shall see, “divine aid” does not always mean direct intervention.  As the psychagogic tradition evolves, aid 
is often granted to the rhetor through various means such as divine inspiration, the reading of sacred texts, or by 
simply being “in tune” with the transcendent.  
151 There is a paradox in giving oneself over to the gods in order to remain a personally whole agent.  Such 
paradoxes might also be identified as contributing to the foundation of psychagogy. 
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Priam, he demonstrates a philosophical structuring of the soul and a correlate structure of 
symbolic appeals which foreshadows much of what Plato has to say in the Phaedrus.  He offers 
the tradition the first representation of a tripartite motivational scheme that forms the basis of 
persuasion.  These motivations are most persuasive when appealed to as a whole and most 
effective when voiced by an integrated individual.  But this articulation comes only by way of 
personifications and allegories.  It is not until Heraclitus that we receive a vocabulary that makes 
precise description and theorizing possible – although his application of that vocabulary is 
anything but precise. 
3.2 LOGOS AND PSYCHE IN HERACLITUS 
In the case of foundational psychagogy, examining Heraclitus warrants almost the opposite 
methodological extreme for examining Homer.  While Heraclitus offers few obvious structural 
cues towards tripartition, he presents a watershed moment in philosophical terminology.  Indeed, 
he may have been the first to use the term philosophos.152   And among the most important terms 
he employed in philosophically substantive and original ways were the key-terms logos and 
psyche.  Moreover, although Heraclitus does not ostensibly render either term into triparitions, he 
does directly correlate the two in a way that indicates an analogous, or even identical, structure.  
Thus, in this section I investigate the relationship between logos and psyche in the Heraclitean 
                                               
152 In the following section, unless otherwise noted, I use the text and translations of Charles Kahn. The Art and 
Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979.  Kahn, in turn, follows “Marcovich’s edition wherever possible, but without his spacing and 
occasionally without his punctuation” (25).   
Clement attributes the word philosophos to Heraclitus in DK22b35 “Men who love wisdom [φιλοσόφους 
ἄνδρας] must be good inquirers into many things indeed].  Kahn argues that the vocabulary is a genuine attribution, 
which would make it the first recorded use of the Greek term (105).  For a brief digest of arguments against the 
genuine use of the term by Heraclitus, see 308n.69. 
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fragments.  I subsequently identify Heraclitus as a major figure in the history of psychagogy and 
so a primary influence on Plato’s views of rhetoric. 
Interpreting the thought and work of Heraclitus has many well-known obstacles.  Even in 
antiquity he was known as obscure by scholars who had more direct access to his works than the 
scattered fragments that we have today.  So it comes as no surprise that there is much debate 
amongst contemporary classicists and philosophers as to even the general meaning of obscure 
statements.  Recently, some of this debate has spilled over into rhetorical scholarship, but a 
definitive account of his influence on ancient rhetorical thought has yet to be given.  I make no 
claim to offer such an account here, but do hope to show that any such endeavor needs to focus 
on the relationship of these two terms – not just on Heraclitus’ notion of logos alone nor on an 
abstract notion of his “doctrine of flux.”153 
                                               
153 To my knowledge, there are only eight works that substantially evaluate Heraclitus in terms of rhetorical history 
and theory.  In chronological order, they are: Edward Schiappa.  Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek 
Philosophy and Rhetoric. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 92-102; 108-109; Carol Poster. 
“Being and Becoming: Rhetorical Ontology in Early Greek Thought.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 29.1 (1996): 1-14; 
Poster. “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus' Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 39.1 
(2006): 1-21; David C. Hoffman. “Structural Logos in Heraclitus and the Sophists.” Advances in the History of 
Rhetoric 9 (2006): 1-32; Jason Helms. “The Task of the Name: A Reply to Carol Poster.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 
41.3 (2008): 278-87; Poster. “Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason Helms.” Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 41.3 (2008): 288-99; Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Listening to the Logos, 53-59; and Robin Reames. “The 
Logos Paradox: Heraclitus, Material Language, and Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 46.3 (2013): 328-50. 
Of these eight, six have appeared since 2006.  So interest in Heraclitus, while increasing, is relatively 
nascent in rhetorical studies.  Moreover, of the eight, only a few are relevant to the current study.  Of those which 
are not relevant, Schiappa (Protagoras) argues that Heraclitus’ doctrine of flux is influential for Protagoras, but does 
not examine his concept of logos.  Helm’s (“Task of a Name”) attempt to read Heraclitus as a “pre-structuralist” in 
line with Heidegger and Derridas is easily refuted by Poster’s reply.  Poster (“Evidence”) defends, on account of 
ancient evidence, the more mainstream reading of Heraclitus as empirically skeptical, but adhering to a stable logos 
– a position that she had made clear in her earlier 1996 article (“Being and Becoming”), but did not need to mention 
in her 2006 article (“Task of the Bow”), since this study dealt with the exegesis of a single fragment.   
Of those that appear relevant because of their focus on logos, only a few really add to the current project.  I 
ignore Reames (“Logos Paradox”), who tries to restrict interpretations of logos in Heraclitus to material terms, 
denying any reference to metaphysical or even non-material qualities.  At the time of this writing, Reames’ article is 
very recent and so remains unrefuted, but most of the seeds for refutation are sown in the article itself.   So, I have 
chosen to not view it as a genuine obstacle to my reading in this case.  In brief terms, she relies on a questionable 
hermeneutic tool developed from references that Aristotle makes to Heraclitus.  Moreover, she feels justified in 
doing so based on an incomplete and incorrect reading of Poster (“Task of the Bow”) and her references to an 
unstable physical world, which Reames reads as contradicting her earlier statement about a stable logos in “Being 
and Becoming” (Reames, “Logos Paradox” 344 n.2).  Reames seems to be unaware of Poster’s reply to Helms in 
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3.2.1 Logos in Heraclitus 
Logos is a notoriously difficult word to translate, meaning at times story, account, speech, 
argument, measure, proportion, reason, ordering principle, Divine Intelligence, etc.  And its 
semantic depth has led commentators of Heraclitus, both ancient and modern, to grapple with 
exactly how he uses the term over the course of what is supposedly one small book.  Most have 
tried to narrow the semantic field through etymological hide-and-seek in an attempt to determine 
exactly what uses were available to him.154  But there seems to be a consensus that when 
Heraclitus uses the term, it carries with it the hint of multiple meanings hiding behind its most 
obvious reading.155  Martha Nussbaum, however, offers the most surprising analysis.  Nussbaum 
argues that most of these renderings appear at least a generation after Heraclitus’ death, and that 
he was not necessarily likely to have encountered those in use within his own lifetime (e.g., the 
early works of Pindar): 
                                                                                                                                                       
which she uses similar sections of Aristotle to show that one can adhere both to material flux and a stable logos.  
Thus Poster negates exactly the sort of restriction that Reames argues for.  Additionally, Reames focuses on a very 
few uses of logos in Heraclitus for which her meaning makes sense, largely ignoring other uses of the term in 
Heraclitus in which her proposed meaning is inelegant or even non-sensical.  Thus, Reames misuse of Aristotle, 
Poster, and even Heraclitus leads me to reject her criteria on how to read logos in Heraclitus.  
I will draw on Johnstone (Listening), who digests the earlier philosophical and classical secondary literature 
in terms germane for rhetorical study.  I will also draw on Poster’s characterization of the logos as divinely uttered, 
as stable, and as a source for extralingual knowledge in her three articles.  And finely, I find Hoffman’s analysis 
(“Structural Logos”) useful for its contribution of aptly extending the notion of logos as structure to the rhetorical 
concept of “composition.” 
Though sometimes mentioned, none of the above works analyze the concept of psyche. 
154 A brief timeline of some of the more important studies of logos in Heraclitus in English scholarship includes 
Edwin L. Minar, Jr. “The Logos of Heraclitus.” Classical Philology 34.4 (1939): 323-41; G. S. Kirk. The Cosmic 
Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954; W. K. C. Guthrie.  A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 
vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1962. 1.403-486; Martha C. Nussbaum, “ΨYXH in Heraclitus, I.” 1972; 
Charles H. Kahn. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 1979; and Kevin Robb. “Psyche and Logos in the Fragments 
of Heraclitus: The Origins of the Concept of the Soul” Monist 69.3 (1986): 315-51. 
155 See, Kirk, Cosmic Fragments 38-39. Guthrie disbelieves that it is “credible that even when he appropriates it 
[logos] for a concept peculiar to his own philosophy he should divorce it completely from its ordinary uses” (History 
1.419).  Kahn calls this linguistic density, meaning “the phenomenon by which a multiplicity of ideas are expressed 
in a single word or phrase” (Art and Thought 89).  Both Poster (“Being and Becoming” 4) and Johnstone (Listening 
54) reference and adhere to Kahn’s concept of linguistic density in interpreting Heraclitus. 
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What is interesting, however, is that if we examine the works of those writers known to 
have been read by Heraclitus (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Xenophanes), as well as 
those of other poets distinctly prior in date (Solon, Theoginis, etc.), we find instead of an 
impressive diversity of usage, a singular unanimity.  Λόγoς in early writers is not used 
frequently.  When it is used, it always means a story, or some sort of connected account 
told by a specific person.  And, in the vast majority of cases, this account is a falsehood, a 
beguiling tale, one which is intended to deceive the hearer or to make him forget 
something of importance.156 
 
Thus, Nussbaum suggests that Heraclitus is an innovator in his use of the term, if not by 
necessarily changing its meaning then by taking a word that usually carried with it negative 
connotations of untrustworthy speech and using it to denote his overall theory of language, 
which he then made central to his philosophy.  But while Nussbaum is content to view logos in 
Heraclitus as mainly representative of linguistic phenomenon, others have seen in its use at least 
a hint of what it would come to mean more explicitly in later generations.157  Charles Kahn is 
representative when he takes logos in Heraclitus to mean “not simply language but rational 
discussion, calculation, and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, in thought, and in 
action.”158  Edward Minar suggests what I take to be the best single-word English equivalent, 
                                               
156 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 3.  Lincoln’s lengthier analysis (“Competing Discourses”) corroborates this point. 
157 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 14-15.  Although Nussbaum focuses mainly on logos as language in Heraclitus, she does 
wonder if his use of the term, along with psyche “predicted the fifth century or created it” (14). 
158 Art and Thought 102.  Kahn continues to point out that he means “rationality as a phenomenal property 
manifested in intelligent behavior, not Reason as some kind of theoretical entity posited ‘behind the phenomena’ as 
a cause of rational behavior.  The conception of logos as a self-subsistent power or principle is foreign to the usage 
of Heraclitus” (102). 
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“account,”159 which captures the multiple verbal and calculative senses the word can carry 
without taking the term too far into abstract “reason” – a meaning of logos with which scholars 
do have significant disagreement in terms of Heraclitus’ usage.160  Regardless of the exact array 
of meanings available, most commentators seem to agree that logos as employed by Heraclitus 
carried with it at least a minimal range that encompassed verbal expression, physical measure, 
and some sort of ordering. 
That such a range is suggested can be evidenced by the variety of circumstances in which 
the word is employed in the fragments themselves.  The use of logos as verbal expression in the 
sense of “discourse” or “report” is obvious in what is considered the introduction to Heralcitus’ 
book: “Although this account [logos] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both before 
hearing it and once they have heard” (first sentence of D.1).161  Heraclitus even employs the 
original use that Nussbaum posits, false or suspicious speech: “A fool loves to get excited on any 
account [logos]” (D.87) and “Of all those whose accounts [logoi] I have heard, none has gone so 
far as this: to recognize what is wise, set apart from all” (D.108).  
 But logos seems to shift in meaning from simple “report” to something of quasi-
quantitative value when Heraclitus states that “In Priene lived Bias son of Teutames, who is of 
                                                                                                                                                       
In a helpful appendix, Kevin Robb (“Psyche and Logos) digests some of the responses of preeminent 
classicists on the question: “Diels also took λόγος to mean ‘reason’; Marcovich considers this impossible and treats 
λόγος as meaning “numerical ratio”… E. A. Havelock (in conversation) emphatically denies that logos could carry 
the meaning “reason” either in Heraclitus or Parmenides” (350).  However, Robb asserts that “this meaning cannot 
be ruled out by scholarly dictum on the grounds that only in later Greek did logos carry the connotations of 
“reason,” or by the accusation that one is importing Stoic connotations.  Parmenides, Heraclitus’ philosophical 
contemporary, has his goddess command the kouros to judge with logos the argument which she has spoken (B.7 
.5), where logos may imply the meaning “reason” and is often so translated” (337).  Nonetheless, Robb couches the 
translation as “reason(ing)” and so brings it more in line with Kahn’s treatment above. 
159 “Logos in Heraclitus,” see especially 326, 336.  Minar also rejects the notion of logos as reason in Heraclitus.  
Notably, I do appreciate Hoffman’s suggestion of “composition” as mentioned above (n.153) as a possible single-
word replacement, though the calculative connotations are much more latent than in the word “account”. 
160 For discussion of this disagreement, see notes 158 and 159 above. 
161 Following Kahn, and for ease of reading, I will forgo the customary DK22b before the numbering of the 
Heraclitus fragments, indicating a direct quotation by Heraclitus in Diels-Kranz, and simply refer to fragments by 
D.x. 
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more account [logos] than the rest” (D.39).  And it takes on full quantitative value when we are 
told that “Sea pours out <from earth>, and it measures up to the same amount [logos] it was 
before becoming earth” (D.31b).   
The use of logos to indicate a process or structure by which things are ordered is born out 
later in the introduction:  
 
Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account [logos], men are like the 
untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according 
to its nature and telling how it is.  But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, 
just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep.  (Sentences 2 and 3 of D.1) 
 
And again when Heraclitus asserts that, “Although the account [logos] is shared, most men live 
as though their thinking were a private possession” (D.2).  Though these passages are only 
suggestive of order, they resonate with other fragments in which Heraclitus discusses the 
everlasting cosmos (D.30), the divine nomos (D.114) and the “the plan [gnome] by which it 
steers all things through all” (D.41).  Thus, G.S. Kirk goes so far as to render logos as ‘the 
formula of things’.162  W.K.C. Guthrie calls it Heraclitus’ governing principle.163  And Kahn 
says that when Heraclitus employs the term in the first fragment he does not refer to his own 
                                               
162 Cosmic Fragments 39.  Kirk proceeds to attach this formula to the world-order, arguing, “it is undoubtedly true 
that, whether or not he attached the word aei to the Logos, Heraclitus would have agreed that the formula of things 
is unceasingly valid; in fr. 30 he states that the cosmos of things, which must be the manifestation of this formula, is 
eternal” (40-41).  He later also uses the apposite translations “structure, plan” (70).  
163 History 1.428 
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words but “the structure which his words intend or point at, which is the structure of the world 
itself.”164   
Christopher Johnstone summarizes the interpretive tradition in a way that connects the 
first sense of logos to its more cosmically significant sense and in terms that illustrate its 
significance for the rhetorical endeavor: “Language or speech, viewed as logos, is therefore itself 
a manifestation of the enduring kosmos or world-order, where the Logos is the principle of that 
order.”165  Though the implications might be subtly apparent, these three senses of logos – as 
language, as measure, and as guiding formula or shared structure – will merge with Heraclitus’ 
radically new conception of the psyche to form the first, albeit obscure, account of psychagogia.   
3.2.2 Psyche in Heraclitus 
That Heraclitus’ notion of the psyche is radically evolved from his predecessors is well attested 
to.166  But in comparison to Heraclitus’ use of logos, his use of psyche has garnered less 
                                               
164 Art and Thought 98.  Kahn uses this language throughout his commentary; for instance, commenting on D.2, he 
states, “In sum, the logos is ‘common’ because it is (or expresses) a structure that characterizes all things.” 
165 Listening 58. 
166 Snell: “The first writer to feature the new concept of the soul is Heraclitus” (Discovery 53); Robb: “the first 
significant changes in usage and meaning for the word psyche are to be found in the text of the philosopher 
Heraclitus” (“Psyche and Logos” 315); Thomas M. Robinson: “for Heraclitus psyche (“soul”) was  seen  as  a 
cognitive  principle,  not simply  a  biological  principle and/or source  of our “emotional,”  non-rational selves, as 
seems to have been thought by most of his  predecessors  (for  a  useful  discussion  see  Kahn,  127);  he  is,  as  far  
as  is known,  the first  Greek to have  adopted such  a  view” (“Heraclitus on Soul.” Monist 69.3 (1986): 305-14 (p. 
305));  Kahn: “This is apparently the first time in extant literature that the word psychē ‘soul’ is used for the power 
of rational thought” (Art and Thought 107).  In further discussion Kahn also cites Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff and Karl Reinhardt: “‘Heraclitus is the first to have given serious thought to, and had something to say 
about, the soul in man.’ (Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin, 1931), 375).  Wilamowitz’s point was that the psychē in 
Homer is mentioned only when it leaves the body…And so we find in Heraclitus, as Reinhardt said, ‘for the first 
time a psychology worthy of the name’” (126-27; citing Reinhardt. Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen 
Philosophie (Bonn, 1916; reprint, 1959.) 201).  Kahn continues to examine the material controversy of the psyche.  
Similar to Wilamowitz, Nussbaum performs the same sort of analysis as she does for logos to show that psyche, 
while not innately negative, had almost always been used in negative contexts e.g., to discuss soul departing upon 
death or the risk of death (“Psyche in Heraclitus” 1-2).  Notably, she doubts whether Heraclitus is the actual 
originator of these senses of logos and psyche, or whether the lack of textual evidence from this period merely 
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scholarly attention, less controversy and almost none of either amongst rhetoricians.167  Yet his 
employment of the term marks a more radical break from epic Greek and in many ways 
represents a more important development for rhetoric than that of logos.  At the very least he 
renders the importance of logos possible, since he is the first thinker on record to identify the 
defining characteristic of humanity as the possession of a unified soul capable of thought and 
speech.168   
There are only two short fragments in which both terms appear and they are two of the 
most perplexing because of it.  To emphasize the ambiguity, I have reinserted the Greek key-
words: 
 
D.45: You will not find out the limits of the psyche by going, even if you travel over 
every way, so deep is its logos. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
makes it look that way.  She assumes that he is not as novel in developing the meaning of the words as the radical 
new usages appear, but maintains that his novelty resides in the combination of the two terms (14-15). 
167 To be sure, the major commentaries on Heraclitus, such as Kirk (Cosmic Fragments) and Kahn (Art and 
Thought), spend a good deal of time considering the evolution and usage of psyche.  And of course, it is the focal 
point of inquiry in Nussbaum (“Psyche in Heraclitus”) and Robb (Psyche and Logos), to which I also add Snell’s 
reflections (Discovery 17-19); as well as Robinson. “Heraclitus on Soul”; and Joel Wilcox. “Barbarian Psyche in 
Heraclitus.” Monist 74.4 (1991): 624-37.  But the controversies seem to be minor in comparison to those concerning 
logos, focusing mainly on the degree of materiality the psyche had for Heraclitus (see Kahn Art and Thought 127).   
In the rhetorical studies I have noted on Heraclitus, only two mention the soul – Hoffman (“Structural Logos” 3; 16-
17) and Johnstone (Listening).  Of those two, Hoffman only mentions two psyche fragments to show that his 
meaning of logos makes sense in them, which it admittedly does.  And while Johnstone’s comments are rhetorically 
significant, they are again mainly a summary of earlier commentators.   
168 Nussbaum: “It is with ψυχή, that central and connecting life-faculty, that man may potentially understand λόγος, 
or connected discourse.  Because of the central importance of language in understanding, the central life-faculty in 
man is, first and foremost, the faculty of language.  Sense data are referred to ψυχή, and are interpreted according to 
the ψυχή’s degree of linguistic competence.  All mortal living creatures, one would suppose, have ψυχή; only in 
human beings can that ψυχή grasp λόγος” (“Psyche in Heraclitus” 13).  Kahn: “The new concept of the psyche is 
expressed in terms of the power of articulate speech: rationality is understood as the capacity to participate in the life 
of language, ‘knowing how to listen and how to speak’” (Art and Thought 107, referencing Heraclitus D.19). 
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D.115: To the psyche belongs a logos that increases itself.169 
 
A third fragment, in which logos does not appear, is widely accepted as implying logos due to its 
otherwise non-sensical suggestion of language: 
 
D. 107: Eyes and ears are poor witness for men if they have barbarian souls [barbaros 
psychas].170 
 
Interpretations of these fragments vary widely, but can be roughly divided into three familiar  
categories based on the triple meaning of logos: 1) physiological interpretations reading the 
logos of the psyche as a physical boundary that grows as the body grows, and the “language” of 
the soul as being its ability to interpret the data of the senses, 2) a language-centric interpretation 
in which the logos represents the psyche’s ability to learn and grow through language acquisition 
and reflection on language, and 3) a metaphysical interpretation that relates the logos of the soul 
to the cosmic logos.  Though some interpreters do insist on exclusionary readings in one 
category, they are not inherently exclusive in their nature.171  Robb combines aspects of the three 
in a polysemous rendering: “Psyche has (1) a measure, (2) an account/report, and (3) a 
                                               
169 Kahn mentions doubt about the fragment’s authenticity, but sees enough resonance to cautiously conjecture about 
its meaning for Heraclitus (237). 
170 I have altered Kahn’s primary translation “if their souls do not understand the language” in favor of the 
alternative that he lists, which is more standard. See Art and Thought 35.  Moreover, Kahn’s primary translation 
reads logos into the fragment, while the standard translation remains more cryptic.  At the time, βαρβάρους literally 
means those who do not understand Greek. 
171 See Robb (“Psyche and Logos”) and Wilcox (“Barbarian Psyche”) for bibliographical reviews of the various 
interpretations.  As an example of a non-exclusive reading, Kahn gives D.115 a physiological explanation (Art and 
Thought 237) and focuses on language in the commentary of D.107 (107).  Yet in both D.107 and D.45 he sees the 
logos of the soul as having an analogous or even identical relationship with cosmic logos (107; 130).  
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reason(ing).”172  Taken with Heraclitus’ Delphi-esque admonition that, “it belongs to all men to 
know themselves and to think well” (D.116) and his own admission that, “I went in search of 
myself” (D.101), the general consensus is that Heraclitus directs us to search the inner logos of 
our psyche in order to come to know the cosmic Logos.  This search is cognitively and 
linguistically oriented – but as a means, not as an end.173   
Thus Heraclitus is the first to identify a unified, central psyche in which human beings’ 
capacities for language and thought were located.  As such, he is the first to conceptualize and 
label both the object [psyche] and means [logos] of rhetoric that Plato will later recognize in the 
Phaedrus.  But beyond simple terminology, he charges those who would grasp the logos with 
tasks similar to Plato’s Socrates, who begins the Phaedrus by reflecting on the oracular charge to 
“know thyself” (229e-230a).  Moreover, the introspective task for Heraclitus takes the form of an 
impossible journey which we cannot complete, “even if you travel over every way” (D.45), but it 
is one we must undertake nonetheless.174  Heraclitus has already started this journey and is 
reporting to us what he has learned so as to guide us on our own.  The logos of his book tells of 
the cosmic Logos, which is mirrored in the logos of our own psychai.  In this way, Heraclitus 
                                               
172 “Psyche and Logos” 338. 
173 According to Robinson, “The activity which results in the self-augmenting of logos is, then, both the self-
exploration of the inner cosmos, i.e., one’s own mental and speech acts, and the exploration of the logos of the 
external cosmos” (339).  Kahn asserts that “by seeking his own self Heraclitus could find the identity of the 
universe, for the logos of the soul goes so deep that it coincides with the logos that structures everything in the 
world” (Art and Thought 130).  Even Nussbaum, who focuses her interpretation on logos-as-language, notes that the 
linguistic aspect is necessary to grasp “if one is to understand λόγος in its wider, cosmic sense” (“Psyche in 
Heraclitus” 10-11).   
The interpretation carries the day among rhetoricians as well.  Poster seems to tacitly accept it, identifying 
Heraclitus as an “early example of logos philosopher, in the Gadamerian sense, in that he believes that investigation 
of language can provide information that is not exclusively or trivially linguistic” (“Task of the Bow” 16n.2) 
Hoffman asserts that for Heraclitus “the soul has a structure analogous to that of the kosmos that it is profitable to 
investigate” (“Structural Logos” 17).  And Johnstone maintains that, “One person’s psychê is, in actuality, merely a 
particular embodiment of the singular cosmic Psychê…The quest for wisdom takes one into oneself, for the cosmic 
Logos is continuous with the logs of the soul” (Listening 56). 
174 For a comparison of Heraclitus’ use of hodos (“way”) in D.45 and its allusion to the Homeric journey, see Robb 
(“Psyche and Logos” 335-38). 
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appears as the first psychagogue in the Platonic sense, the first to deliberately and knowingly use 
logos to direct the psychai of his hearers on their journey.  He is the first thinker in the recorded 
history of the West to be concerned with soul-care and his method of caring for the soul was 
speech, divinely inspired but earthly directed. 
Yet, Heraclitus cannot be completely divorced from Homer, no matter how much he 
castigated the poet or revolutionized epic vocabulary.  In her contrast of Homeric thought with 
Heraclitean evolutions, Nussbaum articulates how Heracles is able to conceptualize and label the 
sorts of tensions and relationships I pointed out in the previous section between fragmentation 
and unity, which Homer could only personify and allegorize: 
 
In general, then, Homeric man fails to recognize explicitly that in virtue of which he is a 
single individual.  His use of the first person shows that he is conscious of the self, and 
that he is somehow aware that his limbs and faculties form a unity.  But he cannot explain 
what connects his separate faculties; and though he implicitly acknowledges the 
centrality of ψυχή as a necessary condition for consciousness, he has not yet acquired a 
notion of its activities and its role.  His understanding of language reveals similar 
limitations: he is aware of words rather than syntax, of the ear and the tongue rather than 
of the discursive reasoning and connection-making necessary for the proper learning of 
language.  Heraclitus sees deficiencies in this view, and attempts to formulate a more 
complex picture of human life and language, conceiving the rôle of ψυχή as that of a 
central faculty connecting all the others, and ascribing to it the power of connected 
reasoning and language-learning for which his predecessors have no explanation.175   
                                               
175 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 5. 
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So Heraclitus provides an advancement in the tradition we are outlining, not a break.  He 
maintains, with Homer, the necessity of internal integrity and guidance from the divine.  But he 
does take the tradition in a radically new direction.  He is the first thinker we know of to overtly 
identify the macro-microcosmic relationship between soul, city and cosmos that Homer possibly 
alludes to on the Shield.  And he is the first to suggest that the destiny of the individual is to 
journey across that identity, progressing from communication to self-knowledge to an eternal 
knowledge of the cosmos. 
3.2.3 Hints towards Tripartition 
Before leaving Heraclitus, it is worth noting how he may have preconfigured the structure of 
psyche and logos beyond simply implying that they shared a structure.  The first hint I want to 
consider lies within his method of soul-care.  It is difficult to say anything certain about his 
method because of the fragmented form in which we possess his work.  But it is suggestive that 
all the fragments that discuss the possible harms of the soul can be collected under three distinct 
and recognizable categories. 
3.2.3.1 Tripartition in Psyche 
In the first instance there are the fragments we have considered and others like them that 
admonish those ignorant of the true logos and exhort them to listen to and understand it – a path 
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that will take much inquiry (D.35) and introspection (D.116).  Thus, one of the harms, perhaps 
the most prominent, is ignorance and its remedy wisdom.176 
Yet another harm is prideful anger and the violence it can inflame in the soul: 
 
D.85: It is hard to fight against rage [thumos]; for whatever it wants its buys at the 
expense of the soul [psyche].177 
D.43: One must quench violence [hybris] quicker than a blazing fire. 
 
But at the same time, this admonition is not a blanket call against pride or even violence as such.  
For Heraclitus exhorts us to “realize that war is shared and Conflict [eris] is Justice [dike], and 
that all things come to pass…in accordance with conflict” (D.80).  He calls us to “great deaths” 
(D.25), reminds us that “Gods and men honor [timosi] those who fall in battle” (D.24) and recalls 
Achilles choice when he states that “The best [hoi aristoi] choose one thing in exchange for all, 
everflowing fame among mortals; but most men [hoi polloi] have sated themselves like cattle” 
(D.29).  It is hard to fight thymos, and Heraclitus does not quite indicate that we should always 
try.  Only when thymos flares with hybris – wonton violence – do we need to restrain it, for it 
                                               
176 Although Heraclitus tells us that neither deep inquiry nor much learning is any guarantee (cf. D.40, D.57, D.129).   
177 I have here altered the primary Kahn translation to one of the alternatives he lists for the text for a few reasons. 
Kahn originally translates thumos as passion, but he indicates that the ancients took it more in the sense of anger or 
righteous indignation (Art and Thought 77).  While “passion” can still carry that sense, it usually brings to mind 
lustful connotations that would be more akin to the appetites.  In his commentary on this passage (241-243), Kahn 
makes it clear that when Plato echoes the text in the Republic (375b), he is alluding specifically to thumos in the 
sense of righteous indignation and not lustful passion.  Moreover, Kahn contends that this is likely Herciltus’ own 
meaning, since it was the typical Ionic meaning of the time.  So Kahn himself takes “passion” to indicate “the 
passionate act of self-affirmation in righteous rage or indignation” (243).  Although he perhaps uses the term to 
preserve the possible ambiguity, I find it better to be clear on the meaning for the context of this study. 
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does a disservice to self and community.178  Constrained and focused violence wins us honor and 
fame.  We are thus called to have spirits of “controlled indignation.”179 
 Thirdly, Heraclitus warns us against the harms that come from drunkenness, for “a man 
when drunk is led by a beardless boy, stumbling, not perceiving where he is going, having his 
soul [psyche] moist” (D.117).  Although Heraclitus understands the pleasure [terpsis] that drink 
provides (D.77),180 he exhorts his readers that “it is death for souls [psychai] to become water” 
(D.36),181 while “a gleam of light is the dry soul [psyche], wisest and best” (118).182  Given the 
physical imagery of moistness and drunkenness, it is easy to think that this is the only pleasure 
the Heraclitus warns against.  However, remembering that the hoi polloi sate themselves like 
                                               
178 As we have seen, we learn this in the Iliad.  See also Kahn’s commentary on hybris in D.43 (Art and Thought 
241) and the commentary on thymos in D.85 mentioned above (241-243). 
179 Here Heraclitus does not only prefigure Platonic psychology but Dewey’s as well, who underscores the 
importance of Heraclitus’ point for both war and rhetoric and all prudent action of the body and mind:  
 
The positive control of feeling consists in so directing it that it becomes a stimulus to knowledge or to 
action. The emotion of indignation, for example, is controlled, not when it is obliterated, but when it is so 
directed that it does not expend itself in vague or violent reaction, but quickens thought and spurs to action.  
Many of the world's greatest orations, as well as deeds of valor, are so many illustrations of controlled 
indignation. (Psychology. 3rd ed.  New York: Harper and Brothers, 1893. 398.) 
 
180 Robinson, following Diels, translates the fragment as: “For souls it is joy or death to become wet” (“Heraclitus 
on Soul” 1), but Kahn rejects Diels correction of the text which renders a negation as a disjunction.  Rather, Kahn 
renders the text: “it is delight, not death, for souls to become moist.”  Kahn argues that the negation is an attempt by 
the author (Numenius, paraphrased by Porphyry) to render Heraclitus “death” that is experienced in drink as 
allegorical, not literal.  Further, Kahn notes that the fragment is suspect and dismissed by a number of interpreters, 
though accepted by a number as well (331-332n.337; 332n.338 and n.339).  He does not offer his own opinion to its 
authenticity though he does argue that the text in which it is found does also preserve other verbatim citations of 
Heraclitus.  Moreover, he does acknowledge that Herodotus, Heraclitus’ near contemporary, does use terpsis in this 
way.  Robinson, based on Numenius and Kahn’s analysis, seems to accept the fragment as likely genuine (308). 
181 I have switched the syntax of Kahn’s original translation in order to better fit the grammar of the sentence; 
moreover, I have only used the first clause.  The entire fragment is as follows: “For souls it is death to become 
water, for water it is death to become earth; out of earth water arises, our of water soul.”  
182 The ambiguity of this fragment has troubled interpreters, for another way to read the fragment is that “the best 
and wisest soul is a dry beam of light.”  Kahn argues that this does not make much sense, though he cites Porphyry 
as trying to explain it through reference to the soul being “clouded,” which is a type of moisture that blocks light 
(Art and Thought 246; further explained at 332-333n.347).  Though admittedly anachronistic, I wonder if Heraclitus 
perhaps noticed the fragmenting effect of rays of light passing through rain or other water splashes and saw this as 
analogous to the fragmentation of the private logos from the cosmic logos.  The science was not there, but perhaps 
the intuition was, making Heraclitus a precursor to Tolkien who wrote, “Man, Sub-creator, the refracted 
Light/through whom is splintered from a single White/to many hues, and endlessly combined/in living shapes that 
move from mind to mind” (“On Fairy Stories.” 1947. Accessed online 10/01/2013. http://brainstorm-
services.com/wcu-2004/fairystories-tolkien.pdf (p. 18)). 
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cattle, while the hoi aristoi achieve everlasting fame, it seems appropriate to take the admonition 
against drunkenness as a particularly strong instance of the general admonition against 
overindulgence.  Accordingly, he states that “it is not better for human beings to get all they 
want.  It is disease that makes health sweet and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest” (D.110-11; 
cf. D.64, D.67) 
 So in the fragments that address the psyche we see three dangers that seem to operate on 
the soul in three distinct ways: ignorance, violent anger and pleasurable overindulgence.  
Ignorance makes the soul deaf and blind, anger consumes the soul in fire and pleasure drowns 
the soul’s senses.  There could be more dangers in the lost parts of Heraclitus’ book, but that 
these three survive across multiple fragments at least suggests an ordering that prefigures the 
Platonic psyche. 
3.2.3.2 Tripartition in Logos 
I have already introduced the major hint – the triple meaning of logos as language, 
measure and structure itself.  At this point, one might be able to conjecture a correlation with the 
psyche based upon it, but it would be premature given the nascent development of either concept.  
Indeed my own triple rendering of logos is an amalgamation of other commentators who have 
struggled with formulating Heraclitus’ term into something manageable, yet suitably dense.  So, 
it is better to reflect upon these variations and let them guide the search for a tripartite logos as 
the concept develops further among ancient Greek thinkers.    
We have already seen Robb’s tripartition into measure, account/report, and reason(ing).  
Kahn continually tweaks his own mixture.  He indicates at first a tetradic logos that is “at once 
the discourse of Heraclitus, the nature of language itself, the structure of the psyche and the 
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universal principle in accordance with which all things come to pass.”183  He elsewhere suggests 
that a dyad is what really lies behind Heraclitus’ use, “For the logos of Heraclitus is not merely 
his statement: it is the eternal structure of the world as it manifests itself in discourse.”184  But 
Kahn seems to ultimately conclude that a triad best encompasses the full meaning of logos 
without being redundant, defining “the community of the logos” by “its triple application of 
discourse, soul, and universe.”185   
Although Guthrie is in the same semantic range as the other attempts to describe 
Heraclitus’ multi-layered usage of logos, he takes the present study furthest along its current 
trajectory by commenting that Heraclitus’ employment of the term “seems so puzzling to be at 
the same time the word he utters, the truth which it contains, and the external reality which he 
conceives himself to be describing.”186  Guthrie is by no means laying out any particular doctrine 
and is not far off from either Robb or Kahn, who each seem to have space carved out for 
discourse, interior thought and formal observation.  However, Guthrie’s attempt to encompass 
the peculiarities of Heraclitus’ logos along the lines of ontology, epistemology and speech 
provides the smoothest transition from the fragments of Heraclitus to the thought of Gorgias of 
Leontini, whose thought I consider next. 
                                               
183 Art and Thought 22. 
184 Ibid. 94 
185 Ibid. 131 
186 The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1968 (p. 14). 
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3.3 LOGOS AND PSYCHE IN GORGIAS 
Unlike Heraclitus, Gorgias has received a great deal of attention in rhetorical scholarship over 
the last thirty years.  With such attention comes a great deal of diversity in interpretation.187  In 
this section I hope to side-step some of the larger debates about Gorgias’ epistemology, so far as 
it can be understood from his fragments and seemingly extant compositions, and its relationship 
with his rhetorical theory.  Rather, what I would like to focus on is his role in “setting the 
agenda” for discussions of logos and psyche, regardless of his beliefs concerning either concept.  
This is not to ignore his role as an innovator, as I will consider those innovations that are attested 
to him without much controversy.  But I do not consider whether he is a foundationalist or an 
antifoundationlist, etc.  The reading I give in this overview should hold on any of those 
                                               
187 For a fairly comprehensive review of the general literature on Gorgias from antiquity to modern day, see 
Johnstone (Listening 101-118).  For a useful review of disciplinary interpretations of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, 
see John Poulakos. “Gorgias’ Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric.” Rhetorica 1.2 (1983): 1-16.  
Poulakos generally categorizes interpreters of the Helen into those who read it as a “model” and those who read it as 
a “pretext” for a larger discussion of rhetoric.  For a useful review of disciplinary interpretations of Gorgias’ On 
Nature, see 16-18 in Schiappa. “Interpreting Gorgias’ ‘Being’ in On Not Being or On Nature.” Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 30.1 (1997): 13-30.  Schiappa also divides interpretation into two camps – the “pure philosophy” camp that 
reads On Nature as a serious metaphysical work interested in questions of being, knowledge and language and the 
“pure rhetoric” camp that sees the work as a clever imitation of contemporary philosophers.  Schiappa later divides 
the “pure philosophy” camp into those who read Gorgias as a nihilist, those who read him as an existentialist and 
those who read him as a philosopher of language investigating the use of the predicate (23-27).  Moreover, the 
whole volume of Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 offers “state of the art” essays on translating and interpreting Gorgias 
metaphysical treatise from Robert Gains, who argues that no significant theory of communication is inherent in the 
work, as well as Michael Gagarin, John Poulakos, and Bruce McComiskey.  Recent book length analysis of Gorgias’ 
thought and influence have been published by Robert Wardy (The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and Their 
Successors. London; New York: Routledge, 1996.), Scott Consigny (Gorgias: Sophist and Artist) and Bruce 
McComiskey (Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002.).  
Consigny argues that Gorgias offers an “antifoundationalist” view of rhetoric, as opposed to a subjectivist or 
empiricist view, wherein “he depicts truth as a label of endorsement, a prize to be awarded by the audience or 
community to the accounts they find most persuasive” (60).  McComiskey similarly holds that Gorgias offers a 
“nascent social constructionist view of language in which perceived realities (ta  pragmata) condition the generation 
of statements (logoi) about the world” (34).  Interestingly, however, while McComiskey agrees with Consigny’s 
interpretation, Consigny maintains that McComiskey has misread both Gorgias and Plato.  (See McComiskey’s 
review in the Review section of Rhetorica 20.3 (2002): 299-301); See also, Consigny. “Misreading the Sophists.” 
The Review of Communication 3.3 (July 2003): 260–266).  Consigny’s problem has less to do with any view of 
Gorgias’ epistemology, but rather is geared towards McComiskey’s reading of Gorgias has a radical egalitarian who 
sought to “subvert the dominant institutions of the culture” (265). 
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interpretations; for it is grounded less in what he means, and more in what he says and how he 
says it – that is, insofar as the fragments are reliable.  If there is a controversial assumption in the 
methodology of this section, it is that Gorgias’ conceptual innovations are inseparable from his 
stylistic innovations.188  Thus, I do take his style to be indicating something beyond form for 
form’s sake. 
3.3.1 Logos in On Not Being or, On Nature 
Echoing Guthrie’s complex reading of logos in Heraclitus, G.B. Kerferd gives the following 
account of logos in general: 
 
In the case of the word logos there are three main areas of its application or use, all 
related by an underlying conceptual unity.  These are first of all the area of language and 
linguistic formulation, hence speech, discourse, description, statement, arguments (as 
expressed in words) and so on; secondly the area of thought and mental processes, hence 
thinking, reasoning, accounting for, explanation (cf. ortho logos), etc; thirdly, the area of 
the world, that about which we are able to speak and to think, hence structural principles, 
                                               
188 Consigny might disagree (see his, “The Styles of Gorgias.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 22.3 (1992): 43-53, for an 
argument that Gorgias’ style is subject to situational demands and not overly revealing of the substance of his 
rhetorical theory), but most other scholars writing on the subject seem to concur that his style and his philosophy of 
rhetoric are inextricably intertwined.  Representative comments to this effect can be found in George P. Segal 
(“Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 (1962): 99-155.):  “Thus 
there is  seen  to  be a  relation  between the formal  structure of the logos and  the  aesthetic-emotional  effect  
which  it  produces” (127); Jacqueline de Romilly (The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992.): Gorgias “discovers the magic inherent in speech and the potential power of style” (60).  Much of the 
Gagarin contribution to the Philosophy & Rhetoric volume mentioned above (“On the Not-Being of Gorgias’s On 
Not-Being (ONB).” Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 (1997): 38-40.) speaks of the importance of style to Gorgias’ 
argumentation, while acknowledging the differences in style within his own works that Consigny points out.  
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formulae, natural laws and so on, provided that in each case they are regarded as actually 
present in and exhibited in the world-process.189 
 
While one meaning may be emphasized, “the underlying meaning usually, perhaps always, 
involves some degree of reference to the other two areas as well.”190  This is an account Kerferd 
believes holds from Heraclitus through the Sophists to Plato and Aristotle, and the account 
prefaces his investigation into “Sophistic Relativism.”191 
 It is not surprising that Kerferd should offer a formulation of logos that so closely 
approximates those who were struggling with the term as Heraclitus obscurely employed it, 
which he simplifies as raising the question of being on three levels: “(1) is what that thing 
is…(2) is what we understand it to be…(3) it is what we say it to be.”192  What is surprising is 
that in his thorough investigation of the Sophists, and Gorgias’ On Nature in particular,193 
Kerferd makes no definitive connection between this triple understanding of logos and the 
structure of Gorgias’ famous argument that “(1) nothing is, (2) even if it is, it cannot be known 
by human beings, (3) even if it is and is knowable, it cannot be indicated and made meaningful to 
another person.”194  To be sure, Kerferd does argue that Gorgias’ tract provides a “starting point” 
for Plato’s Cratylus by questioning the relationship between “words, thoughts and things,”195 and 
ties this directly to his triple rendering of logos.  But his view is that Gorgias has introduced a 
                                               
189 G.B. Kerferd.  The Sophistic Movement.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 (p. 83). 
190 Ibid. 83. 
191 Ibid. 84.  
192 Sophistic Movement. 100. 
193 This is true both in the analysis offered in The Sophistic Movement and the earlier analysis Kerferd offers in 
“Gorgias On Nature or That Which Is Not.” Phronesis 1.1 (1955): 3-25. 
194 Ibid. 93. In this section, I look at the general style and argument shared between the two extant versions of On 
Nature offered by Sextus Empiricus, Against the Schoolmasters VII.65-87, and the anonymous De Melisso, 
Xenophane, Gorgia (MXG) once attributed to Aristotle and still often included in editions of his complete works. 
195 Ibid. 99-100. 
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“radical” or “fundamental” gulf between the three.196  To the contrary, I would argue that On Not 
Being is the first work on record to make the three senses of logos distinctly manifest in a 
manner that suggests that such a tripartition is both a complete and inseparable account of the 
realms of language.197 
 At first glance, this may be a counterintuitive position.  Gorgias definitely seems 
interested in “abolishing the criterion” to truth, as Sextus Empiricus states,198 by severing the ties 
between reality, thought and language.  However, as others have noted, real things, true thoughts 
and communal understanding through language are necessary for the argument to come off.199  
But that does not mean that the tract is simply “engaging nonsense.”200  The point that Gorgias 
seems to be making is that what can be said, that is, logoi about being and thought and even 
language itself necessarily lead to contradiction despite our common experiences.201  In this way, 
the argument is less an attack on the possibility of existence, knowledge, or communication and 
                                               
196 Ibid. 81, 98 respectively.  
197 In all fairness, although he does not make an explicit connection here, I believe that Kerferd’s investigation 
largely backs up this assertion and I acknowledge that my own position is inspired by his study. 
198 Against the Schoolmasters VII.65.  Unless otherwise noted, I use the translation of the Diels-Kranz fragments 
provided by George Kennedy in The Older Sophists. Ed. Rosamond Kent Sprague. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 1972.  Reprinted 2001. 42-46. 
199 According to Kerferd, Gorgias’ conclusions about communication hold “because of what would follow about 
things and our thinking about them.  There is no attempt to abolish thinking, only to deny that we can say of 
thoughts that they are – likewise there is no attempt to abolish things.  Indeed the whole argument depends 
completely on the retention of both thinking and things” (Sophistic Movement 97).  Likewise, concerning the 
impossibility of rational communication, Wardy makes the following observation: “Notice that the mere act of 
hearing or reading and understanding what Gorgias says is enough to show that this cannot be true” (Birth of 
Rhetoric 19).  This is so even for a “social constructivist view” such as that of McComiskey or Consigny, for 
communal recognition of even a socially constructed truth entails some sense of shared understanding, which 
Gorgias seems to deny. 
200 This is a characterization of Gorgias by Guthrie (History 3.197n.2), often cited in the literature. 
201 Here I am following Kerferd’s line of thought as laid out in “Gorgias on Nature”:  
 
A real advance in the study of the treatise came with the suggestion that the first section of the treatise also 
is concerned with the status of objects of perception, and that the question at issue was not the existence or 
otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but a different one, namely whether the verb “to be” can be predicated 
of phenomena without leading to contradictions.  (5; citing Calogero, Studi sull’ Eleatismo, 1932.) 
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more a problematization of any perceived one-to-one correspondence between the three.202  The 
certainty of knowledge and precision of linguistic reference are both indicted, but it would be 
folly for a professional teacher of rhetoric to seriously maintain that practical communication 
was impossible. 
What is particularly relevant to the tradition under consideration is Gorgias’ style and 
what it might indicate about the nature of logos.203  For Gorgias, style coalesced with 
argumentation, rather than simply augmenting it; and the structure of his arguments about 
language bring to the fore some of the latent assumptions already discussed in Homer and 
Heraclitus.  As de Romilly observes of On Nature, “At every turn, a sort of logical game is 
played out, sustained by rapid-fire verbal flourishes./The method is that of the master of rhetoric, 
but behind it stands the philosopher.”204  And her comments concerning his other works are 
equally apt here: “The impression given is that not a single possibility has been overlooked, and 
this makes that argument look like an impressive demonstration.”205  Thus, if the entire argument 
is seen as an exploration of the problems inherent within language, the structure of the argument 
suggests an exhaustive exploration of the realms of language.  In this way Gorgias is perhaps the 
first to articulate “being, thought, and communication” as the complete parameters of linguistic 
activity.206  This may seem like a small deal, as the trio is somewhat ubiquitous in ancient 
                                               
202 Here, again, I agree with Kerferd’s interpretation.  See especially Sophistic Movement 97-98. 
203 True, as Wardy points out, we should be cautious, since the text “neither can preserve anything like Gorgias’ own 
words, nor even necessarily keeps intact the sequence of his reasoning” (Birth of Rhetoric 15; here Wardy refers to 
the MXG, but he is even more dubious about the Sextus version).  But I agree with Gagarin that “despite their 
differences, in fact, both versions are stylistically similar” (“On the Not-Being” 39), and I take the similarity of 
general style in Sextus Empiricus and MXG to suggest some consensus concerning the overall structure of the tract.  
My investigation deals with this general structure on which both versions agree. 
204 The Great Sophists 96.  
205 Ibid. 62.  
206 Parmenides does introduce this language into his argument, and perhaps even suggests the formula’s exhaustive 
scope.  According to Kerferd, Gorgias “was pulling apart and separating three things which Parmenides had 
identified in his fragment 8.34-36.  On the traditional interpretation of Parmenides these lines read: ‘Thinking and 
the thought that it is are one and the same.  For you will not find thinking without the being wherein it is expressed’” 
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philosophy and easily overlooked in contemporary rhetorical theory.  But this is a watershed 
moment of classical rhetorical theory that sets the agenda for Plato, St. Augustine and St. 
Bonaventure, as I will show in the remaining chapters.  Moreover, its effects are not confined to 
the history of rhetoric, since many contemporary rhetoricians, philosophers, and communication 
scholars have adapted similar schema in their musings about language as diverse as Kenneth 
Burke,207 Richard McKeon,208 Jurgen Habermas,209 and Frank E.X. Dance.210 
What is more, though the liberal arts had not been codified, Gorgias’ argument suggests a 
correlation of each “realm of language” with a particular aspect of the nascent language arts or 
technai logon.  Of course, the overall form of the argument appears as a logical demonstration – 
a grand reductio ad absurdum.  But each segment focuses more on one art than another.  For the 
argument against “being” focuses on contradictions that occur in the employment of a single 
word, esti, and its application to phenomena.  This is true even if we accept the broadest 
interpretation of Gorgias’ use of the term as discussing the actual existence of things.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Sophistic Movement 99).  However, though suggestive, the comprehensive scope of the structure is not made 
explicit in the fragments we have, as the structure of the argument appears to be a two-part investigation into the 
Way of Truth and Way of Opinion. 
207 Burke identifies “words for the natural,” “words for the socio-political,” and “words about words,” as the three 
realms of words that “should be broad enough to cover the world of everyday experience” to which he also adds 
“words for the ‘supernatural’” (The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology.  Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1970: 15-16.)  
208 McKeon traces the shift in subject matter among the liberal arts from arts of being, to arts of thought, to arts of 
communication in his “Philosophy of Communication and the Arts.” (Selected Writings of Richard McKeon, Volume 
2: Culture, Education and the Arts.  Eds. Zahava K. McKeon and William G. Swenson.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 2005: 307-325.)  
209 According to Habermas, “language can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every 
successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) ‘the external world’ 
as the totality of existing states of affairs, (b) ‘our social world’ as the totality of all normatively regulated 
interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) ‘a particular inner world’ (of the speaker) 
as the totality of his intentional experiences.”  These three worlds, along with language itself, constitute the four 
Domains of Reality for Habermas’ theory of Universal Pragmatics. (Communication and the Evolution of Society. 
Trans. Thomas McCarthy.  Boston: Beacon Press, 1979: 67-68.) 
210 Dance identifies three functions of communication, “The Linking Function,” through which the individual is 
linked with the human social environment; “The Mentation Function,” through which the individual develops higher 
mental processes; and “The Regulatory Function,” through which individuals regulate their own behavior and the 
behavior of others (“Prolegomena to a Primitive Theory of Human Communication in Human Organizations.”  The 
Southern Speech Communication Journal 44 (1979): 233-243 (p. 238)). 
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Kerferd has persuasively argued that Gorgias is more interested with, perhaps only capable of 
interest in, the predicative use of the term.211  In either case, whether Gorgias is exploring the 
problem with saying “x is” or “x is y”, his problematization of esti occurs at the grammatical 
level and it is the grammatical ambivalence that allows the reductio against being to come off.  
The predicative application simply makes the grammatical issue explicit.  In contrast, Gorgias’ 
exploration of the capacity to think true things occurs wholly on the level of contradictory 
propositions.  In fact, according to the Sextus version of this section, as Johnstone points out, 
“Gorgias concludes each line of reasoning by saying that a proposition is ‘logical’ (kata logon, 
77) or that it is ‘sound and logically follows’ (hygies kai sôzon akolouthian, 78).”212  The logic 
of the argument attempts to show that both true and false things can be thought, so that thought 
cannot be an indicator of truth.213  The final section, while also employing logical form, is 
overtly about the disconnect between verbal communication and the things and thoughts about 
which communication occurs.214  That the section has implications for classical rhetorical theory 
is largely assumed for obvious reasons.215  Thus Gorgias does not simply provide an argument 
that complicates the relationship between being, thought and communication – the complete 
                                               
211 Kerferd explains how his own reflections on Gorgias build off of the work concerning the term esti of Kahn on 
Homer, G.E.L. Owen on Plato, and A.P.D. Mourelatos on Parmenides (Sophistic Movement 94-95).  See also, 
Schiappa “Interpreting Gorgias’s ‘Being’” for a review of literature and a conclusion on the same topic.  Gagarin is 
“inclined to accept Schiappa’s conclusion that for Gorgias esti is intentionally “polysemous,” combining existential, 
copulative, and veridical senses of the verb” (“On the Not-Being” 38). 
212 Listening 104. 
213 In commenting on this section, Johnstone notes that “The ‘logic’ of the argument, as it happens, is fallacious. 
Nonetheless, the ‘demonstration’ presents the form of a logical proof…” (Ibid. 104). 
214 As if in summary, we see the whole of the argument replayed in the final section in which things provide 
thoughts that are not the things themselves and words produce other thoughts that are not the original thoughts 
themselves.  “This suggests,” according to Kerferd, “a three stage analysis – the object itself together with its 
qualities, what we acquire from such an object, and the spoken words with which we attempt, but according to 
Gorgias inevitably fail, to pass on (knowledge of) such an object to someone else” (Sophistic Movement 98). 
215 This is the only section where Gorgias mentions speech outright.  This section of Sextus Empiricus (§82-86) is 
the only one in which Kennedy leaves the original Greek untranslated in the form of the term logos, which appears 
thirteen times (Older Sophists 46).  Likewise, in his brief translation of MXG for the Philosophy & Rhetoric 
collection, John Poulakos only translates this third portion of the argument (“The Letter and the Spirit of the Text: 
Two Translations of Gorgias's On Non-being or On Nature (MXC). Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 (1997): 41-44). 
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realms that words can be about.  He also provides a critical exploration of grammar, logic, and 
rhetoric – the complete arts of words, though perhaps not yet named as such.  So the correlative 
implication of the double triad is an assumed connection between grammar and being, logic and 
thought, rhetoric and vocal communication.  This correlation cannot be definitively proven from 
the primary text alone, especially given the pre-disciplinary status of the arts and the secondhand 
nature of the texts themselves, nor can more space be given to its defense at this time.  But the 
plausibility of such a suggestion foreshadows the convention of the Latin trivium and places 
Gorgias at the forefront of a tradition in which pedagogues will come to overtly articulate such a 
correlation.  For the time being, however, it is necessary only to have shown that On Not Being 
suggests an exhaustive tripartition within which the arts of language operate. 
3.3.2 Logos and Psyche in the Encomium of Helen 
If On Not Being problematizes logos on a metaphysical level, the Encomium of Helen continues 
to do so on an ethical level by arguing that speakers are responsible for the misdeeds of their 
hearers.216  However, the Encomium also offers solutions to these problems by demonstrating a 
perhaps nascent but nonetheless systematic understanding of both psyche and logos.   
                                               
216 Although less complex and varied than with On Not Being, there is still debate over exactly what Gorgias is 
trying to accomplish in the Encomium.  As early as Isocrates’ own Encomium to Helen, Gorgias is charged with 
failing to meet the criteria of encomia in general, offering rather a defense or apologia of Helen.  Again, for a good 
digest of the various interpretations, see John Poulakos (“Gorgias’ Encomium”).  Poulakos indentifies two broad 
schools of interpretation: those who see the piece as a “model” for rhetorical education and those who see it as a 
“pretext” in which more complex matters, namely the nature and power of logos, are discussed analogically within 
the mythic references to Helen (3-4).  Although I do not think that the two readings are exclusive, I mainly follow 
Poulakos and the “pretext” interpretation in the following analysis.  However, it cannot be overlooked that in 
extolling the power of the logos and defending the art of rhetoric, Gorgias also indicates the potential for its misuse 
and indicts its abusers.  For in defending Helen, he shifts the blame for wrongdoing to the one that persuaded her: 
“For speech constrained the soul, persuading it which it persuaded, both to believe the things said and to approve the 
things done.  The persuader, like the constrainer, does the wrong, and the persuaded, like the constrained, in speech 
is wrongly charged” (§12).  Unless otherwise stated, translations are from George Kennedy (“Gorgias’ Encomium of 
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The key analysis in regards to Gorgias’ theory of human motivation remains Charles P. 
Segal’s “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos.”217  Segal observes Gorgias combining 
terpsis and peitho, pleasure and persuasion, in a theory of rhetorical aesthetics that highlights the 
motivational effect that words have on the soul.218  According to Segal, Gorgias outlines a two-
fold emotional scheme in the psyche consisting of passive emotions like joy and pain and active 
emotions like fear and boldness.219  The scheme suggests a two-step process at the center of 
Gorgias’ rhetorical theory which starts at a proto-appetitive level and moves up to a proto-
spirited level:  
 
[Referring to §14] The grouping of both the passive and active effects enumerated at the 
beginning of the discussion of the logos (8) recurs as a kind of summary here at its end. 
Terpsis and lype are immediately paired by their proximity; phobos and tharsos go 
together as the two opposite forms of the active emotional state; and the description of 
the witchery of the kake peitho seems added as a summary of the final stage of the whole 
process…220 
 
Segal notes that Gorgias also describes a technique of rational persuasion.  This is most obvious 
in the Palamedes, where Gorgias-as-Palamedes shuns the emotive employment of rhetoric for 
logical demonstrations; though Gorgias’ overall argument in the Encomium employs rational 
                                                                                                                                                       
Helen.” The Older Sophists. Ed. Rosamond Kent Sprague. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1972. 
Reprinted 2001: 50-54). 
217 According to Poulakos, “The most comprehensive treatment of this discussion, as well as that of the (15)-(19) 
section, is provided by Segal…Segal's treatment is so thorough that it makes any original observations very 
difficult” (“Gorgias’Encomium” 12n.37). 
218 Segal, “Gorgias and Psychology” 122ff. 
219 Ibid. 124-25. 
220 Ibid. 125. 
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argument as well. 221  This would seem to suggest a tripartite psychic division, but for some 
reason Segal divorces the aesthetic from the rational in his investigation of Gorgias’ psychology 
of rhetoric.  The resulting analysis implies that the aesthetic and the rational are somewhat 
incompatible or at least distinct from one another, so that Gorgias’ multi-layered description of 
psychic movement and motivation in the Helen is taken to operate entirely on the aesthetic plane: 
    
the emotive process of persuasion occurs through a series of aesthetic moods and 
impressions evoked by the work of art is especially important for Gorgias and is, in fact, 
the keystone of his rhetorical techne, for it implies that through the artistic elaboration of 
the logos as a form of poiesis a chain of emotional reactions will occur leading from the 
aesthetic terpsis to the final ananke of peitho.222 
 
But Gorgias gives us reason to believe that rational persuasion is an integral part of his overall 
theory and is to be combined with the aesthetic framework laid out in the Helen.223   
Primary in this regard is the fact that Gorgias opens by stating that his purpose is to free 
Helen “by introducing some reasoning [logismos] into my speech” (§2)224 and his structure 
follows suit.  The Helen is literary in content, but logical in style; indeed, it is the Encomium that 
de Romilly refers to as “an impressive demonstration.”225  His style is replete with triads and in 
                                               
221 Ibid. 117-120.   
222 Ibid. 127.  
223 For a lengthier argument claiming to integrate the rational and the aesthetic in order to ‘complete’ Segal’s 
analysis of Gorgias’ psychology of rhetoric in the Helen, see D. Futter. “Gorgias and the Psychology of Persuasion.” 
Akroterion 56 (2011): 3-20. 
224 Greek text taken from Hermann Diels. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1922). Accessed online 10/14/2013. 
<http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/gorgias/helenuni.htm> 
225Great Sophists 62.  
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almost every case the triads distinguish separate categories.226  In fact, if Segal is correct in 
reading the kake peitho clause in §14 as a summary of the two stages of persuasion that precede 
it, it would be a unique instance in which Gorgias switches his balanced style from indicating a 
number of separate but related instances to one that summarizes the two preceding clauses by a 
third.  In considering the various triads that Gorgias offers, I believe that it becomes fairly 
obvious that he maintains his schematic system even at §14 and incorporates an element of 
rational persuasion into his overall psychology of rhetoric. 
 In investigating the structure, we should begin by noting that Gorgias gives a couple of 
key indications that his speech is concerned with structure throughout; indications that are often 
lost in translation.  The first word of the speech, translated variously as “what is becoming,”227 or 
“the glory,”228 or “the adornment,”229 is kosmos.230  While the various translations are all valid 
senses of the word, the underlying connection between these senses of the term is physical 
orderliness.  Combined with Gorgias’ later discussion of speech [logos] effecting the 
arrangement [taxis] of the soul [psyche] (§14), it is difficult to ignore that Gorgias is discussing 
the relationship between structural parallels in both logos and psyche.231  What, then, does his 
speech tell us about these structures and what do these structures tell us about rhetoric?   
In the beginning of the speech, Gorgias actually presents a pentad of objects and 
corresponding “cosmic” or “ordering” principles – city [polis], body [soma], soul [psyche], 
                                               
226 For some recognition of the importance of tripartite divisions in Gorgias’ organization, see Poulakos (“Gorgias’ 
Encomium” 16), Kirby (“Great Triangle” 13), and McComisky’s subtler discussion of bia, eros, and logos (Gorgias 
41-42).  See also notes 234 and 235 below. 
227 Kennedy (“Gorgias’ Encomium” 50) 
228 Kathleen Freeman. “Encomium on Helen.” Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1948: 131-133 
229 John M. Dillon and Tania Gergel. “The Encomium of Helen.” The Greek Sophists. London; New York: Penguin, 
2003: 76-84. 
230 To be fair, Freeman, as well as Dillon and Gergel, bracket the original Greek kosmos/cosmos in their translations.  
231 Freeman translates taxis as constitution (Ancilla 133) and Kennedy as condition (“Gorgias’ Encomium” 53). 
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action [pragma], and speech [logos], which are ordered by manpower [euandria], beauty 
[kallos], wisdom [sophia], virtue [arete] and truth [aletheia] respectively.232  However, the 
pentad reduces to a triad in the following manner.  First, “the city” does not play any role in the 
Helen after being named first in the speech.  This does not mean that the city is a throw-away 
reference, but rather indicates Gorgias’ position on a rather important question in rhetorical 
theory – the persuasion of the masses entails the same process as the persuasion of the 
individual.  This position in born out in the association of the polis with euandria, which at its 
core means simply “a collection of good men.”  Gorgias further supports the case in that the 
Helen itself is about the abuse of persuasion towards a single individual in whose defense he 
oscillates between describing individual and mass persuasion without distinction.233  Thus, 
Gorgias implies that if the city is a collection of men, it is necessary for the successful rhetorician 
to know the motives that compel man in general, or any person specifically, in order to move 
both the individual and the city to action.  The speech, then, is an exploration of those motives 
that persuade or compel the individual.  This leads directly to the second reduction, for what 
Gorgias explores are the forces that act upon the psyche.  Psyche and polis are thus related as a 
part to a whole, or a microcosm to macrocosm, both of which represent the proper object of 
persuasion.  The remaining triad of bodies, acts, and words house the forces under investigation; 
                                               
232 Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῆι δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγωι δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ 
ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία.  
233 See especially §15-17 and Segal’s discussion of that passage (“Gorgias and Psychology” 108):  
 
It is interesting to note in connection with the tarache and ekplexis of Helen 15-16 the ease with which 
these emotional phenomena are applied both to collective groups (the army, 16) and separate individuals. 
The individual psyche seems to be discussed at the end of 15 and again in 17, while section 16 is concerned 
primarily with group phenomena.  Similarly, while most of the section on the logos is concerned with the 
individual psyche and the specific case of Helen (especially 8-10), section 13 speaks of the “contests of 
words in which one logos persuaded and delighted a great mass (ochlos)”… 
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suggesting that beauty, virtue, and truth – and their opposites – are the motivational forces with 
which Gorgias is concerned.234   
In the main body of the speech (§6-20), Gorgias indeed focuses on these forces as reasons 
for acquitting Helen of blame.  In so doing, he superimposes another triad onto the ones already 
mentioned.  He first introduces (§6) a divine triad of Fate [tyche], the gods [theos], and Necessity 
[anagke] whose collective will Helen is understandably unable to resist.  Following the divine 
forces are the human forces of violence [bia], persuasion [peitho] and love [eros].235  Through 
the collective divine force, Gorgias introduces the idea that the weaker [esson] are blameless for 
succumbing to the power of the stronger [kreisson].236  After acknowledging the divine as a 
possible motivation to action, Gorgias then attends to each human force in turn. 
In discussing Helen as a possible victim of violence (§7), Gorgias is clear that she should 
be exonerated because someone else did the unjust deed, which she merely suffered.237  But the 
argument has further implications, especially in light of the weaker-stronger argument laid out 
just prior.  While Gorgias expressly addresses those who suffer the violent physical actions of 
                                               
234 Poulakos (“Gorgias’ Encomium”) reaches a similar conclusion and sees the introduction as foreshadowing 
Gorgias’ intention to deal with these concepts: 
 
In the case of the art of discourse, this means that what rhetoric can or cannot do depends on 1) the rhetor’s 
knowledge of the material he is working with, 2) his artistic ability to shape the material into an appealing 
(persuasive) form, and 3) his disposition to use it properly.  This threefold conceptualization suggests that 
rhetoric can be approached three different ways and evaluated on the basis of three corresponding criteria: 
logically (truth), formally (beauty), and ethically (goodness).  Gorgias seems to allude to this tripartite 
approach at the beginning of his speech… (15). 
 
235 I have admittedly taken a bit of grammatical license in rendering this list, since “words” [λόγοις] occupies the 
object of agency in the clause parallel to violence and love.  Persuasion actually occupies the verbal portion of the 
clause: “by words persuaded [πεισθεῖσα]” parallel to “by violence constrained [ἁρπασθεῖσα]” and “by love 
overcome [ἁλοῦσα]” (my translations).  This triad – bia, peitho, and eros – is what Kirby refers to as the “great 
triangle” of early Greek rhetoric.  While Kirby briefly mentions that the three terms actually appear in the Helen, he 
oddly describes them as being “under the umbrella of Divine Will” and leaves it at that (“Great Triangle” 13).  What 
my analysis suggests is that the great triangle that Kirby identifies is front and center for Gorgias as the motive 
forces inherent in the rhetorical act.  See also McComisky’s analysis of these terms (Gorgias 41-42) 
236 πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἧσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ 
ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἧσσον ἕπεσθαι. 
237 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε· 
 112 
others, the subtler implication is that being forced or compelled to act by the immoral actions of 
another, stronger agent frees the weaker agent from blame.  Thus, Gorgias’ first look at 
motivational forces under human control establishes a conceptual nexus between actions, agents, 
violence and virtue.  In other words, he offers a prototypical exploration of what will later 
become Plato’s spirited element. 
For reasons that should become clear shortly, I’ll next consider Gorgias look at erotic 
love as a motive towards action, which actually forms the fourth and final analysis of the speech 
(§15-19).  The focus here is on the effect that seeing things has on the psyche.  Strangely, 
Gorgias’ main example deals with how fearful sights can cause one to panic and act irrationally 
(§16-17), after which he discusses the pleasure that art can bring to the spectator (§18) and 
concludes that if a similar pleasure at the sight of Alexander’s body induced Helen to desire, she 
could not then be blamed for her actions (§19).  Thus he argues that certain emotions induced 
from our senses are so overwhelming as to free the agent from blame for acting upon them.  
Similarly, then, Gorgias sets up a motivational correspondence between bodies, appearances, 
sensations, and emotions.  Again, we see an early evaluation of a nascent appetitive element that 
motivates human action. 
Following this trajectory, we would expect that Gorgias’ investigation into logos (§8-14) 
would identify some rational component that complements both the active, forceful, moral 
element of human motivation and its sensual, emotive counterpart.  And sure enough, much of 
Gorgias analysis centers on speech’s ability to deceive opinion through persuasive arguments.  In 
fact, despite Segal’s attempt to distinguish rational argumentation from Gorgias’ emotional 
motivational complex, Gorgias’ examination of the nature of false arguments [pseude logon] 
(§10-13) seems to be entirely about the types of (pseudo-)logical arguments offered by 
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intellectuals in rational enterprises.  Emotive manipulation is conspicuously absent in this 
section, although it does take center stage in the previous discussion of how poetry can induce 
emotional states and vicarious experiences in an audience (§8-9).   
But there is more.  If we look closely, we see that Gorgias does an amazing thing in his 
discussion of logos, for he locates within its power the ability to wield all the characteristics of 
the other components of his motivational complex, both human and divine.238  He credits logos 
with having “the finest and most invisible body [soma]” through which it “effects the divinest 
works [theiotata erga]” (§8).239  He likens the poetic use of language to the emotive evocation 
that is appropriate to the senses and even grants to language the ability to allow the audience to 
experience various decrees of fate by hearing “of others in good fortunes [eutychia] and in evil 
fortunes” (§9).240  Gorgias then compares the power of argumentative persuasion to both 
physical violence [bia] and to the form, if not the force, of necessity [anagke].  He continues to 
relate argument, force and necessity together through the cognate verb constrain [anagkazein] 
(§12).  Logos, it seems, has the power to replicate and impress upon the psyche each and every 
form of motivation there is.   
However, there is an important omission in Gorgias’ analysis.  Despite the use of terms 
like ‘pity,’ ‘fear,’ and later, ‘boldness,’ which Segal argues indicates the active emotional state 
that words can induce, there is no example of words actually moving one to action.  There are no 
examples of rallying cries in battle or demagogues rousing the support of the masses or 
defendants pleading for mercy in the lawcourts.  And yet this is exactly the charge that Gorgias 
                                               
238 To be sure, Gorgias’ triads are by no means exclusive – action requires a body, love is perhaps a god, etc.  But no 
other element under consideration so thoroughly exercises the characteristics of all the others as does speech. 
239 ὃς σμικροτάτωι σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτωι θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· 
240 ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ 
ψυχή. 
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has taken up, to show that words can effect actions and thus that Helen is not to blame for hers.  
But his examples – audiences of poetry and debate – are notoriously passive.  Few, if any, act 
after hearing a rhapsode or seeing a stage play or watching a debate or discussing things with a 
philosopher, etc.  Again we have the riddle of the relationship between thought, emotion, and 
action.   
When we examine closely what is present and what is missing, we see that words operate 
like divinities, like physical strength, like seductive experiences, like all other motive factors 
analyzed in the speech – but Gorgias does not present us with any unique characteristic of logos-
qua-logos.  Speech can take the form of any motivational force whatsoever and it can do this 
because it has a structure, a kosmos, that mirrors that of the soul; but when and how does speech 
act like, well, speech?  I do not think that this is a mere oversight for Gorgias, but is rather 
intentional.  Though he perhaps does not yet have the term for rhetoric, he knows that the art of 
persuasion lies between the emotive force of poetry and the intellectual constraints of logic, 
perhaps entailing and utilizing both at times.  Yet in the Helen, I assume that he does not want to 
give the game away but rather is trying to pull others in.241  If the Helen is a display piece 
designed for public consumption, it is still designed to motivate students to study with Gorgias.   
In a sense – in what is not expressed in the speech, in the hidden conclusion of the 
enthymeme, if you will – Gorgias is saying “if you want to simply make people feel, become a 
poet; if you want to make them think, become a philosopher; but if you want to move them to 
action, come with me and I’ll show you how…just not now.”  But if we look at the conceptual 
clusters that are overtly discussed within the analysis of speech alone, what is absent will perhaps 
                                               
241 According to Poulakos, Gorgias in the Helen “is content to have participated in the game of words, to have 
demonstrated to his audience that he is a splendid player, and to have tried to bring them into the game” (Sophistical 
Rhetoric in Classical Greece. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995. 67). 
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indicate some of what Gorgias has in mind that is specific to rhetorical activity.  For, we see 
poetry on one side of the language arts spectrum, which is associated both with the fickleness of 
human emotion as well as with fickle Fate herself.  On the other side is logic, which takes the 
form of Necessity and constrains by violent force.  What is omitted, in addition to rhetoric itself 
and the impetus to action, is the will of the gods.  In joining the concepts together, we see that 
such a will is more deliberate than Fate, yet freer than Necessity.  Rhetoric, then, is neither 
random nor bound, but somewhere in the middle.  The rhetorician cannot simply respond to 
things as a brute to stimuli or a wanton to desire, but neither can the cold calculus of abstract 
thought always be a credible guide.  Yet the rhetorician should remain attuned to the nature of 
things and to considerations of truth so much as is possible and adapt accordingly.242  As such, 
when what is omitted is compared to what is present, there is an indication that the goal of 
rhetoric is to move the soul of another to action; and it achieves this goal neither through 
seduction nor force alone, but through evaluation of circumstance, strategic self-reflection and 
willful execution.  In other words, the rhetorician factors both what is and what is thought in to 
what will be communicated. 
   With the above framework in mind, it seems that Gorgias offers subtle hints in the 
Helen that speak to the metaphysical concerns he raises in On Not Being.  While still maintaining 
that a gap exists between what is said, what is thought, and what is, Gorgias introduces a 
rhetorical concept that can bridge that gap, at least for practical purposes.  Between the certainty 
of truth and necessity and the insecurity of false arguments and slippery opinions, Gorgias 
himself offers arguments of probability, of likelihood [eikos] (§5).  Similarly, between a thing 
                                               
242  Gorgias appears to assert a fairly objective ontology in the Helen, stating frankly that “things we see do not have 
the nature which we wish them to have, but the nature which each actually has” [ἃ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν, ἔχει φύσιν οὐχ ἣν 
ἡμεῖς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε] (§15). 
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itself and the perception of it in the mind, Gorgias offers an image in words, a likeness [eikon] 
(§17).  While neither the truth of thought nor the essence of things, Gorgias employs the doctrine 
of eikos that governs both likelihoods and likenesses not just because it is rhetorically effective, 
but because it is the best representative of being and thought that language provides.243  As such, 
Gorgias ties communication to thoughts and things in a sincere relationship that recognizes its 
own limitations while striving for practical verisimilitude.244 
The employment of eikos in this manner points to Gorgias’ solution for the ethical 
problems he raises as well.  For, in showing regard for both thought and things, he acknowledges 
that the power of logos is mighty while chastising those who would abuse that power.  His aim is 
to shift blame to the persuader of Helen, after all.  But in achieving this shift there is again 
another subtle indication of the solution to the ethical problem rooted in the famous claim of the 
Sophists to make the weaker case the stronger.245  For, as we pointed out earlier, blame is shifted 
from Helen because it is natural for the weaker to succumb to the stronger.  This principle holds 
true for humans succumbing to the might of the gods, for the physically weak succumbing to the 
strength of their physical superiors, for a typical audience being influenced by a talented poet or 
a deceptive debater, and for the sensual animal whose rational capacities fail when confronted 
with strong visions of terror and beauty.  But there are arts that exist that can mitigate the 
                                               
243 The Palamedes further supports this relationship between truth and probability. 
244 In many ways this conclusion is similar to Rosenmeyer’s famous analysis in “Gorgias, Aeschylus and Apate” 
(American Journal of Philology 76.3 (1955): 225-260).  However, as Rosenmeyer interprets apate, or deception, as 
somewhat freeing language from the constraints of material reality, I read Gorgias’ use of eikos as acknowledging 
some degree of limitation imposed by the true and the real.  I believe that the difference is more a matter of degree 
than one of contradiction, though perhaps others would disagree. 
245 This, itself, is a claim of questionable ethical quality mocked by Aristophanes in the Clouds by the emobodied 
contest between Just Speech [Δίκαιος Λόγος] and Unjust Speech [Ἄδικος Λόγος] (961-1104).  The claim is actually 
part of the charges that lead to Socrates condemnation and execution according to the Apology [καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον 
κρείττω ποιῶν] (19b-c).  Socrates associates these charges with Aristophanes’ caricature of him in the Clouds (19c). 
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differential in relative strength.246  Just like martial arts can give a smaller opponent advantages 
over a larger one,247 the language arts [technai logon] can provide a defense against those who 
are naturally gifted in the use of deception and manipulation.  These arts may be “unnatural” or 
“unconventional” in that they reverse the primitive laws of dominance; but in the framework thus 
described, the claim to make the weaker the stronger is actually an ethical imperative, not a mere 
advertising ploy aimed at the self-serving.248   
In his linguistic and psychic schemes, in his observations of metaphysical and ethical 
dilemmas, and in his practical and prudent solutions, Gorgias is not so far from Plato as 
contemporary scholars would have us believe.  Rather Gorgias falls in line with the tradition we 
have laid out.  He sees a similar kosmos running through speech and soul and indicates how the 
one can operate on the other by exposing the complexity of that shared, tripartite structure.  
Indeed, his brief exposition on the relationship between logos and psyche foreshadows Plato’s 
own call in the Phaedrus to correlate the one with the other.  And his ethical employment of 
eikos and the weaker/stronger dichotomy also previews Plato’s own idiosyncratic usage of these 
doctrines, as will be shown in the next chapter.  Thus, the potential influence of Gorgias’ 
theorizing on Plato cannot simply be dismissed by invoking the contention to rhetoric that Plato 
displays in the Gorgias.  Whatever Plato’s problem with Sophistic rhetoric, it was not a 
disagreement that words could mirror, motivate, or even restructure the soul.  In many ways, 
Gorgias is the first to overtly articulate and systematize the various latent threads that have been 
pointed out in the likes of Homer and Heraclitus; threads that Plato will interweave in his 
                                               
246 Just like the integrated ordering of society can help mitigate the consequences of discord. 
247 Remember Odysseus’ stalemate with Ajax. See n.139. 
248 Aristotle would later use the same analogy between rhetoric and physical self-defense to justify rhetorical 
training (Rhetoric 1355a38-1355b3).  But Plato would famously raise the question whether blame could be shifted 
further – from persuaded, to persuader, to teachers of persuasion (Gorg. 456c-457c; 460a-461b). 
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definition of rhetoric as a kind of psychagogia.  The final thread, however, the history of the term 
itself, remains to be retraced. 
3.4 THE TERM PSYCHAGOGIA 
The development of the term “psychagogia” has been recounted many times in a number of 
works over the last half a century.249  Rehearsing this history underscores the innovation, 
ambiguity, and playfulness with which Plato likely employed the term.  In brief, the term is a 
compound of psyche (soul) and agein (to lead) meaning, literally, “soul-leading.”  Elizabeth 
Asmis gives the most succinct account of its early meanings:  “The earliest attested meaning of 
the compound psychagog- is that of ‘conjuring’ or ‘evoking’ souls of the dead.  From this use, 
there evolved the notion of influencing the souls of living people, with the connotation of 
‘alluring’ or ‘beguiling’ them.”250  The necromantic meaning of the compound is found in 
Aeschylus’ Persians (687) written in 472 and Euripides’ Alcestis (1128) written in 438.251  It 
also “was probably the meaning of the word in Aeschylus’ play called Ψυχαγωγοί.”252   
By the fourth century, the verbal cognate psychagogein had transitioned from the magical 
to the technical among the intelligentsia of ancient Athens.  In this context the term indicated the 
process by which works of material and poetic art enchanted, allured, or even deluded the soul.  
For instance, Isocrates employs the term in To Nicocles (§49) to describe the desire of speakers 
                                               
249 See especially, Asmis, “Psychagogia” 154-156; De Romilly. Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece. 
Cambdridge, MA: Harvard Universtiy Press, 1975. 15; Glad, Paul and Philodemus 18; Yunis, “Taming Democracy” 
201n.49; Moss, “Soul-Leading” 2-6. 
250 “Psychagogia” 155-6. 
251 Both using the word ψυχαγωγός 
252 According to de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric 15. 
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to “demand the attention of their hearers” and again in the Evagoras (§11) to portray the ability 
of poets to “bewitch their listeners.”253  In Xenophon’s Memoriabilia (3.10.6), Socrates uses the 
term to describe the charming effect that fine sculpting has on a spectator.  Outside of the 
Phaedrus, Plato uses the term in the Timeaeus (71a) to indicate the effect that images have on the 
lowest part of the soul.  He also uses it twice in the Laws, employing both meanings in the same 
passage (909b), when the Athenian warns against those who beguile the living with claims of 
being able to raise the dead.  Finally, Aristotle employs the term in his Poetics (1450a33) in 
discussing the positive emotional effects of plot reversals and discoveries on the audience. 
 This shift in connotation suggests that the term transitioned in meaning sometime 
between Euripides and Plato.  That Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato all use the term in similar 
reference to the influence of art on the soul and that Xenophon and Plato both attribute the term 
to Socrates suggests that he was perhaps responsible for the term's new meaning, or at least made 
use of it.  Indeed, the only transitional use in the extant literature is a play on the word employed 
by Aristophanes in his Birds (1555), when the chorus of birds in “flight” over Athens describe 
seeing Socrates “evoking spirits” [psychagogei] among the Shadowfeet.  Either this is a pun on 
well-known Socratic terminology or the passage itself provides the source for the shift.  In any 
case, Socrates’ former pupils seem comfortable employing the term in a relatively uniform 
technical sense.   
 However, the case of Plato’s use is not so simple.  While Xenophon, Isocrates, and 
Aristotle employ the term in the new mundane sense seemingly abstracted from its magical 
roots, Plato continues to play with its ambiguous meaning.  Indeed, the fact that in the Laws he 
                                               
253 Using the translations of George Norlin from Isocrates with an English Translation in Three Volumes. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1980. Accessed online 10/10/2013 
from <www.perseus.tufts.edu> 
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employs both distinct senses demonstrates that the term still carried both meanings depending on 
context.254  However, in the Phaedrus, even the context is ambiguous.  Socrates had just finished 
his famous second speech, which draws an allegorical picture of a fallen soul attempting to make 
its way back up to the heavens, when he turns from rhetorical action to talk of rhetorical theory.  
There is a sense, then, in which “leading the soul” means more than just “aesthetically effecting 
the emotional state of the audience” and actually means, or at least also implies, guiding a lost 
soul to a specific, desired destination. 
 Perhaps Aristophanes can shine further light on Plato's ambiguous use of psychagogia if 
we consider another of his Socratic references.  I refer not to the lampoon of Socrates in the 
Clouds, but rather to his mention of Socrates in the Frogs (1491-99).  In this passage, 
Aristophanes mocks Socrates’ method of discourse as chatter that disregards the importance of 
the art [techne] of tragedy while wasting the time [diatribein] of its practitioners.255  But the 
Frogs’ plot is a comic psychagogic adventure in which Dionysus undertakes a katabasis, a 
descent into the underworld, in order to retrieve the soul of Euripides for his own pleasure; only 
to realize that it is the works and words of Aeschylus that would better serve both his needs and 
the needs of the polis.  The psychagogic force here is double, since Dionysus leads the soul of 
Aeschylus from the underworld in order that Aeschylus may in turn affect the souls that inhabit 
the polis through his words.  In a similar manner, Plato retrieves the soul of Socrates in his 
dialogues in order that Socrates might continue to perfect the souls of those whom he engages in 
conversation.  Ironically, though, in so resurrecting Socrates as a literary figure engaged in 
                                               
254 And as de Romilly notes, “This meaning [raising the soul from the dead] has never disappeared; it recurs, for 
instance, in Plato’s Laws (909b), in Plutarch’s De Sera Numinis Vindicta (560f), and in Lucian (Dialogi Deorum 
7.224.1)” (Magic and Rhetoric 15).  
255 Note the similarity in both sentiment and vocabulary between Aristophanes’ charge against Socrates’ practice of 
dialectic and Socrates’ charge against Gorgias’ rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias.  Socrates denies that rhetoric is an art 
[τέχνη] and instead calls it a “knack” [τριβή; a closely related cognate term to the verb διατρίβειν].  Both text and 
translation come from the Loeb edition edited and translated by Jeffrey Henderson (2002).   
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dramatic dialogue, Plato both acknowledges and answers Aristophanes’ critique of Socratic 
dialectic.  As if conceding to Aristophanes the cultural power of dramatic form, Plato executes 
the comedian’s plan of cultural reform by partaking in his own katabasis with the similar intent 
of having the words of a resurrected Socrates effect the souls of the living.  This of course means 
that both Aristophanes and Plato engage in the very double-edged psychagogic act for which 
Socrates is made fun of in the Birds.256 
That Plato had something like this in mind when he defines rhetoric as psychagogia can 
be supported by his other descriptions of the activity and significance of “leading.”  For as 
Jessica Moss argues, Plato’s other uses of the psychagog- compound are not as indicative of his 
employment of the term in the Phaedrus as are those of his other “guidance” compounds in the 
Republic.  In fact in the Republic, these terms seem to indicate the very activity he is advocating 
for rhetoric by calling it a kind of psychagogia: “The Republic allegorizes such attempts at 
conversion in its story of the philosopher who goes back down into the cave and tries to ‘lead up’ 
(ἀνάγειν, 517a5) the other prisoners into the light.  Socrates then declares that the aim of 
education is the literal analogue of such leading-up, namely ‘leading around’” or periagoge 
(518d).257  But, Moss argues, the realistic circumstances of Athens do not admit the possibility of 
the idealist education laid out by Socrates in the Republic.  Rather, it is the Symposium that opens 
the way for rhetoric as the practical art of soul-leading: “The Republic asks what could lead souls 
toward the Forms; the Symposium proposes a method sweeter than the laborious education 
                                               
256 Well, technically, not the very same, since Socrates in the Birds is caricatured as partaking in a nekyia in which 
he is calling souls up to him; whereas in the Frogs, Dionysus is undertaking a katabasis in which he is descending 
into the underworld to retrieve a soul.   
257 “Soul-Leading” 4.   
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described in the Republic, and not dependent on the political structure of the state.  A wise leader 
can use her disciple’s erotic desire for beauty as a tool by which to lead him to philosophy.”258   
For Plato’s Socrates the art of soul-guidance consists of a descent into the darkness in 
order to turn souls around from their delusions and lead them up to the light of truth and wisdom.  
Philosophy cannot be that method of turning the soul around, for it is that practice towards which 
we are want to turn.  What is needed is a certain kind of psychagogia that can function in both its 
historical and contemporary forms simultaneously.  The later meanings of the term are about 
moving the soul in the metaphorical sense of stirring the emotions, which is necessary but not 
sufficient for the task at hand.  The former sense is about actual movement – a journey into the 
darkest depths and back up again to the light.  Though they never used the term, the examples I 
have considered almost all employ this journeying: Priam’s descent to the camp of Achilles to 
retrieve the body of Hector;259 Heraclitus descent into his own soul to retrieve his own self; 
Dionysus descent into Hades to retrieve a great tragedian.  The only outlier is Gorgias, who 
affirms the almost magical influence of words on the soul, but does not employ the image of 
danger or descent.  In this way, he is closer to Isocrates and Aristotle than to Plato.  This, I 
believe, is the largest divide between Sophistic and Platonic rhetoric.  For the Sophist, rhetoric 
was a means for defense from attack and success in the polis.  Teachers guaranteed such success, 
as even Aristotle boasted that with rhetorical skill one could come as close to victory as was 
                                               
258 Ibid. 6.  While I agree with Moss’ conclusion that rhetoric in the Phaedrus is an art of loving soul-guidance that 
achieves the sort of “turning-around” indicated in the Republic, I think that she takes more steps than are necessary 
to reach that conclusion.  While she claims that the rhetoric of the Phaedrus is the practical equivalent to the 
education of the Republic; I believe that rhetoric, not “education” is implied at the very point in the Republic when 
Socrates talks about the art of turning the soul around.  For Socrates speaks of the capacity to learn being innate in 
us, though the instrument by which we learn is turned the wrong direction (517c).  If this is the case, education 
cannot be the art by which we turn around, but the aim for which we want to turn around – we want to calibrate the 
instrument by which we learn so that we can learn.  The art of turning around must be something different. Cf. 
Kolbet’s history of psychagogy for a similar account of the cave narrative as implying the use of rhetoric for 
“conversion” (Augustine 35). 
259  Not surprisingly, I owe this observation to Herrero de Jáuregui’s analysis in “Priam's Catabasis.” 
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possible in a given situation.  However for Plato, Priam, and the others, rhetoric involved the risk 
of descent – into the camp of the enemy or the psyche of another – and such descent not only 
lacked a guarantee of success, but carried with it the very risk of self. 260   
In this chapter I have traced the major historical threads that suggest the foundation of 
Platonic psychagogia.  I have argued that rather than a collection of random attributes scattered 
throughout ancient literature, there appears an identifiable trajectory of thought prior to Plato 
focused on the effect that speech has on souls.  Along this trajectory, I have demonstrated that a 
coherent picture develops that sees soul, language, and the universe of being as structurally 
analogous along amazingly consistent tripartite lines.  Aside from the structural similarities, each 
thinker has highlighted some aspect or another of psychagogic rhetoric that has aided the 
development of the tradition as Plato would have received it.  In Homer, we find the idea that the 
rhetorical situation is brought into being by an exigence of fragmentation within this structure – 
in either the individual or the community – which is best addressed by a speaker and message of 
integrity.  Heraclitus assigns names for these basic units of psychagogia that have persevered to 
the present day.  Moreover, he suggests not only that the structures of psyche, logos, and kosmos 
are analogous, but that through a contemplative journeying along the logos of our psyche we can 
come to know the Cosmic Logos.  Gorgias comes the closest to a technical account of the 
structure of both psyche and logos.  He suggests a logos that runs along being, thought, and 
speech; and a psyche consisting of emotion, reason, and a drive to action.  Though somewhat 
abstracted from the technical, structural tradition, Aristophanes provides the technical term – if 
only in jest – for the rhetorical activity of leading a soul on a journey through words, 
psychagogia; and even demonstrates this phenomena in action.  
                                               
260  Note that Nestor seems to assure the success of the Embassy to Achilles (Iliad 9.162-175), while Priam was 
warned of the imminent failure of his plea and his ultimate demise (24.206-208).  
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In the next chapter, I investigate how Plato appropriates this foundation and builds a 
robust model of psyche and logos upon it.  I argue that in constructing these models, Plato 
literally drafts a map of human motivation that guides readers on their own contemplative 
journey.  However, far from being a call to the ascetic, contemplative life, once this journey is 
undertaken these psychic voyagers are called to actively lead the souls of others through their 
rhetorical activity – they are called to be psychagogues. 
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4.0  PSYCHAGOGIC RHETORIC IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS 
According to Socrates in the Phaedrus any would-be rhetorician must have intimate and exact 
knowledge of the nature of the soul: its make-up, its actions, and its natural responses.  In 
addition, the rhetorician should be able to classify and coordinate the various types of soul with 
the appropriate type of speech (271a-b).  Such knowledge should enable the rhetorician to 
explain how each soul is persuaded (or not) and why (or why not): 
 
Since the nature [dynamis] of speech [logou] is in fact to direct the soul [psychagogia], 
whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds [eide] of soul [psyche] 
there are.  Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such sort; hence some 
people have such-and-such a character and others have such-and-such.  Those 
distinctions established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many kinds [eide] of speech [logon], 
each of such-and-such a sort.  People of such-and-such a character are easy to persuade 
[eupeitheis] by speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with such-and-such an 
issue for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are difficult to 
persuade [duspeitheis] for those particular reasons. (271c-d)  
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Accordingly, it would be only natural to find extended studies of Platonic psychology among the 
myriad of works that explore Plato’s rhetorical thought.  Amazingly, however, no such study of 
Platonic psychology vis-à-vis rhetoric seems to exist.   
This is not to say that the disciplinary literature is completely absent of references to 
Plato’s psychological theories as they appear in the Phaedrus.  Indeed, such references abound.  
But the abundance is largely a mirage.  As I indicated in the Introduction, many scholars cite the 
psychological criteria that Plato establishes in the Phaedrus only to argue that such criteria 
makes for an incomplete theory, or is impossibly idealistic, or is morally repugnant, or is in some 
other way insufficient.261  Those rhetorical theorists who treat Platonic psychology as worthy of 
positive investigation are relatively small in number and nothing like a systematic rendering of 
Plato’s rhetorical psychology is attempted by them.   
Perhaps the earliest investigation into the impact of Plato’s psychological thought on his 
rhetorical theory is offered in 1978 by David S. Kaufer in “The Influence of Plato’s Developing 
Psychology on His Views of Rhetoric.”262  I highly agree with Kaufer’s basic assumptions, 1) 
that “there is a systematic connection between rhetoric and psychology in the Dialogues, and it 
comes to this: Plato knew there was a way of using words to affect the soul for good or evil and, 
as he saw it, one of the tasks of psychology was to explain the moral difference between the 
two”; and 2) “In Plato's thinking, psychology must account for the power (dynamis) that 
underlies morally correct actions. The true art of rhetoric, in turn, is the procedure which 
                                               
261 See Introduction n.4. For instance, Kennedy argues that “Plato's account of rhetorical psychology is rather 
unsatisfactory, for it seems basically a matter of using ad hominem arguments and is reminiscent of the so-called 
‘noble lie’ of the Republic (414b7), where a hearer of inferior intelligence is brainwashed into acceptance of the 
truth by an omniscient philosopher-orator” (Art of Persuasion 79) 
262 Quarterly Journal of Speech 64 (1978): 63-78. 
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successfully transfers this power from one mind to another through language.”263  However, 
Kaufer stumbles in his attempt to construct Plato’s model of rhetorical psychology.  For, 
although he sees a great deal of significance in the tripartition of the soul in the Republic, he 
quickly reduces the soul’s complexity into a dualistic model of psychic confrontation between 
the rational and irrational.  As such, all that is “irrational” about the spirited part is lumped 
together with the appetites, while its positive psychic duties – like policing immoral behavior – 
are attributed to reason.264  Granted, Kaufer is operating in an interpretative tradition that sees 
Plato’s psychology as unnecessarily complex in its representation and so argues for a cleaner 
split between the rational and irrational part.265  Under this psychological model, rhetoric 
becomes the ability of reason to manipulate the unreasoning parts of the soul and for the rhetor to 
manipulate unreasoning audiences.  I do not think that such conclusions regarding Plato’s 
rhetorical theory are necessarily false – just necessarily incomplete and so much cruder than 
what is possible given the materials provided.266  What I demonstrate in this chapter is that 
engaging the tripartite soul on its own, complete terms offers a more fruitful reading of Plato for 
                                               
263 Ibid. 64.  
264 Kaufer goes so far in his redistribution as to label the horses in the Phaedrus’ charioteer myth of the soul as 
allegories for the driver’s own rational and irrational powers.  Thus, the driver, who is usually taken to represent an 
individual’s reason, is split into lower rational and irrational parts; and the “good” horse, who acts much like the 
spirited element in that it “restrains, resists and checks” the baseness of the irrational drives, becomes the reason of 
reason (73).  Johnstone makes a similar, though less radical reduction: “In the Phaedrus, as the myth unfolds, the 
soul is likened (246a-b, 253 c-e) to a union among charioteer (Reason, which steers the soul) and two winged horses 
(our bodily element), one representing the noble passions (such as the love of honor, temperance, and decency) and 
the other symbolizing such base appetites as wantonness, avarice, and gluttony (also see Rep. 4.439d-41a)” 
(Listening 170). 
265 Kaufer explicitly rejects the tripartite model in favor of a bipartite one at 70n.18.  At this point he becomes the 
first rhetorician to cite Jon Moline’s theretofore unpublished work on the complexity of the soul (see n.271 below), 
which provides probably the most complete account of Plato’s psychology in terms of intrapersonal communication.  
Unfortunately, Kaufer quickly dismisses Moline’s interpretation in favor of the reductive conflict model of 
psychological motivation offered by Terence M. Penner (“Thought and Desire in Plato.”  Plato.  Ed. Gregory 
Vlastos. Vol. II. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1971. 96-118), which is itself a classic account 
of the reductive model.  The reduction itself goes back at least as far as Plotinus and is indicated in Cicero. 
266 I do think that reading the psychological model as a binary as opposed to a triad is necessarily false.  But the 
conclusion that rhetoric enables reason to influence the “irrational” parts, and by extension enables the wise rhetor to 
manipulate less wise audiences is certainly true – just incomplete.  Such a conclusion on its own especially lacks the 
explanatory power to describe just how the rhetor is so enabled. 
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the historian of rhetoric and suggests a more important role for rhetoric in Platonic theory than is 
usually thought. 
More recently, Yunis’ 1996 study of rhetoric and democracy in ancient Greece focuses a 
good deal on the prominence that psychological theorizing has in Plato’s rhetorical theory, that 
is, as it is presented in the Phaedrus.  However, Yunis sees this theory as a marked development 
from the Republic.  In large part this is due to the overwhelming disciplinary tendency to view 
the Republic as a political text rather than a text about constitutions in general and psychic 
constitutions in particular.  This orientation leads Yunis to treat the soul-parts as representative 
as soul-types.  In so doing, he sees his interpretative options for locating rhetoric in the Republic 
as between analyzing the interplay amongst philosophers (which he disregards) and analyzing 
“the discourse between the (relatively small) class of philosopher-kings and the (relatively large) 
class of producers.”267  This line of analysis leads to the conclusion that “In the Repbulic 
political discourse is transformed into the imperative discourse of king to subject or master to 
slave;”268 whereas “the psychology of the Phaedrus provides the political expert with the 
necessary scientific framework to break down the recalcitrance of the masses, communicate with 
them as sentient, autonomous, though ignorant beings, and thereby improve them through 
instructive, persuasive discourse.”269  Yunis is discussing Plato’s call to know the nature and 
types of the soul.  However, as he points out, this “scientific framework” appears in the Phaedrus 
in the various myths contained in Socrates’ second speech – the charioteer and the horses 
                                               
267Taming Democracy 161.  
268Ibid. 172.  
269Ibid. 202.  
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indicating the nature of the soul (246a) and the nine-fold hierarchy implying the myriad of soul-
types (248c-e).270   
If we read the metaphors at the appropriate level, we see that the structure of the chariot 
team in the Phaedrus mirrors the structure of the city in the Republic.  Thus, the question to ask 
in order to assess whether the rhetorical psychology is consistent or evolved, is whether the 
charioteer treats the subordinate horses in the same way that the philosopher-king treats the 
lower classes.  The answer is yes, the charioteer commands the horses.271  Not much can be 
assessed by the fact that Socrates treats Phaedrus differently than the philosopher-king treats his 
subordinates.  We are called, not to be like the philosopher-king per se,272 but to be like the 
Aristocratic City.  A fuller assessment of the Republic along these lines shows that Socrates 
treats Phaedrus much like an Aristocrat would treat a Democrat.  That is to say, that the scientific 
framework that the Phaedrus intimates is developed more fully in the Republic, not less.273  The 
                                               
270 Ibid. 202-204.  
271 In technical terms, as Jon Moline has persuasively shown, the Republic demonstrates intra-personal interaction 
(“Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche.” Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie 60 (1978): 1-26.)  This has 
become a popular interpretation in contemporary philosophical analysis that has recently been advanced by the likes 
of Christopher Bobonich (“Communication and Persuasion” in Plato's Utopia Recast, 242-247) and Daniel Werner 
(Myth and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 59-77).  However, the 
interpretation has yet to have any significant impact on rhetorical studies of Plato outside of the conclusions that 
Moline himself drew concerning how this interpretation affects notions of credibility in rhetorical activity (see Jon 
Moline. “Plato on Persuasion and Credibility.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 21.4 (1988): 260-278).  This is somewhat 
ironic, seeing that Kaufer mentions having access to a prepublication of Moline but opts to take as his psychological 
model the reduction offered by Penner.  See n.265 above. 
272 I qualify here because the philosopher-king is often treated as a soul-type, or something close to it, which is 
complex (in that it seems to also have spirited and appetitive elements) and approximates the Aristocratic City itself.  
However, how the philosopher-king treats subordinates cannot be indicative of anything other than intrapersonal 
communication because neither the auxiliaries nor the productive classes clearly represent soul-types, but rather 
elements that only make sense as functioning members of the Aristocratic City. 
273 In the current work, Yunis points towards contemporary research in communications studies concerned with 
attitude change as the “blossoming” of “Plato’s psychology of rhetoric” (Ibid. 206n.54).  However, by rejecting the 
complex psychology of the Republic, Yunis is eventually led, almost ten years later, to the conclusion that “the vast 
systematic psychology of desire and discourse that [Plato] proposes has so far proved unachievable and seems likely 
to remain so” (“Eros in Plato” 120).  Still, Yunis accurately assesses much of what the psychological correlation is 
supposed to achieve in his analysis of the Phaedrus and the Laws by asserting that for Plato, the philosophically-
learned political rhetor approaches the auditor lovingly, not selfishly (Taming Democracy 189), in order to reshape 
their soul (194), so as to balance the auditor’s psychic elements.  The result is a combination of goals beyond simple 
dialectical instruction: “the preamble addresses the will and the emotions as well as the understanding” (226; See 
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model presented in the Republic, then, offers the rhetorician little by way of example of 
rhetorical interaction, but much in modeling the very thing that Socrates asserts we need 
knowledge of – the structure and activity of the psyche.  Thus, we need a reading of this model 
as it pertains to rhetorical activity, as well as a correlate reading of the logos.274  What follows is 
just such an assessment of the Platonic model of psychology in relationship to speech. 
4.1 PLATO’S GRAMMA OF MOTIVES 
In the ensuing analysis I loosely borrow Burkean, and to a lesser extent Weaverian, terminology 
for a couple of reasons.  I do this neither to argue that Plato is a proto-Burkean, nor that Burke is 
a Neoplatonist.275  Rather, I want to underscore the degree to which Plato ponders questions and 
                                                                                                                                                       
also 201: “More is at stake than conviction and understanding; the rhētōr needs to affect the auditor’s will”).  But 
this only appears to mimic the tripartite psychic structure, for as Yunis summarizes his findings he reduces the goals 
to a binary similar to Kaufer in asserting that Plato’s ideal rhetor “must address at once both the intelligence and the 
appetitive parts of the auditors’ souls” (236).  Again, excising the spirited element has major consequences that can 
only lead to an incomplete understanding of Platonic rhetoric.  However, I should note that another important aspect 
of Yunis’ analysis as pertains to the current study is his observation that the genre of the preamble in the Laws 
prefigures the Christian art of preaching as it would later be described and practiced by St. Augustine (212; 229-
235).  Ultimately, and with this I agree, Yunis sees the preambles as “Plato’s attempt to use articulate instructive 
discourse to communicate the divine directly to the ordinary citizen” (236). 
274 G.R.F. Ferrari (Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 101-102), Andrea Nightingale (Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 143-144) and Werner (Myth and Philosophy 68-73) all offer readings in which 
the speeches in the Phaedrus address different elements of Phaedrus’ soul.  Such readings, I believe, are on the right 
track, but also show some limitations that I wish to avoid.  For in their own way they are very mechanistic and 
fragmented.  If we are simply called to address each part of the soul individually, then we do know better than 
Nestor addressing Achilles with a disjointed delegation with each member speaking to a different part of his soul.  
Rather, I think Ferrari indicates the fuller truth when he notices that Socrates’ speech seems to appeal to the timocrat 
(101; See also Moss (“Soul-Leading” 19-20) and Yunis (Taming 190) who both seem to identify the target of the 
speech as a democratic soul.).  Ferrari oscillates between soul-type talk and soul-part talk, and Nightingale and 
Werner pick up only on the soul-part talk.  If there is a real model that Plato is trying to exhibit here, I argue that it is 
not simply showing how different speeches can appeal to different parts of the soul; rather, Plato is demonstrating 
the subtle reformation of Phaedrus’ soul-type from oligarch, to timocrat, to aristocrat (or close).  Each speech thus 
speaks to Phaedrus’ whole soul, not just a part.  In the following analysis, I demonstrate how this can be so. 
275 Whatever influence Plato might have had on Burke’s rhetorical thought, Burke admits that “Aristotle was 
probably the greatest schoolmaster that ever lived and ever will live.  And I feel most at peace with myself when I 
am on his side” (“Colloquy” 64). 
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proffers answers in the Republic and elsewhere that are often more germane and contribute more 
productively to contemporary rhetorical theory than those comments overtly about rhetoric in the 
Gorgias and the Phaedrus.276  Additionally, the terms that Burke employs are commonplace in 
the discipline and, though abstracted from his original analysis, they often provide an efficient 
vocabulary for explaining concepts that would otherwise necessitate more detail. 
As I mentioned above, the Republic is usually considered by contemporary rhetoricians – 
if it is considered at all – as a work dedicated to exploring issues in political philosophy.  Read in 
this way, it is ostensibly an anti-democratic work and thus an anti-rhetorical work.  But if we 
focus on the reason for the political allegory – the investigation into the concept of Justice – it is 
difficult to deny that Plato, too, is interested in the question: “What is involved, when we say 
what people are doing and why they are doing it?”277  For it turns out that in order to understand 
Justice, one must understand the motivations of the soul.  Moreover, Socrates also employs the 
terminology of the language arts in order to guide this inquiry.  Because the soul is difficult to 
examine, he suggests that those gathered should shift focus to some larger entity that is easier to 
observe but still mirrors the soul in structure – namely, the city:   
 
The investigation we’re undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyesight.  
Therefore, since we aren’t clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation 
that we’d use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters [grammata] 
from a distance and then noticed that the same letters [grammata] existed elsewhere in a 
larger size and on a lager surface.  We’d consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to 
                                               
276 This shouldn’t be surprising, since in exhorting the rhetorician to obtain knowledge of the logos and the psyche in 
the Phaedrus – topics which Plato only treats briefly in that text but in detail elsewhere – the text itself is directing 
the reader to search elsewhere within the Platonic corpus.  
277 Kenneth Burke. A Grammar of Motives. First Paperback Edition 1962. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945. xv. 
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read the larger ones first then to examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are 
the same. (368d) 
 
What Socrates is after, then, is his own grammar of motives – an understanding of how to read 
the language of the soul.  This is no mean metaphor either; for it is the same language that 
Socrates uses in the Phaedrus in contrasting Theuth’s invention of writing [grammata] (274d-
275d) with the type of a discourse [logos] “that is written down [graphetai], with knowledge, in 
the soul [psyche] of the listener” (276a).278  In the Republic, observing the motives operating 
within a city provides the student with an “easy reader” with the text writ large.  But the real goal 
is to read the fine print of the soul, and ultimately, to be able to rewrite its text through discourse.  
This is the sort of psychic grammar that the rhetorician must master.  Read from this perspective, 
the tripartite soul of the Republic offers the rhetorician a grammar of the soul that is consonant 
with the chariot metaphor in the Phaedrus, but is vastly more detailed.279   
The model of the psyche as it appears in the Republic has been examined at some length 
in the previous chapters.  But this is only half of what the rhetor needs according to Socrates.  In 
order to complete our grammar-school training, we need a similar account of the logos.  
Accordingly, I now turn to the following questions: Is there a correlative model of the logos that 
appears in the Platonic corpus whose elements correspond to those of the soul?  Does knowledge 
of the soul’s motivational structure give insight into the possible forms of speech?  Does 
knowledge of such forms grant the rhetor the ability to affect the movements of the soul with 
                                               
278 γράφω is the root of γράμμα.  Note also that Socrates has just called this sort of discourse [λόγος], somewhat 
oddly, a legitimate brother [ἀδελφός] of writing [γράμμα] (276a). It is difficult to imagine that, for the punning 
Plato, this is not a reference to the opening citation of the Delphic inscription [τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα] to “know 
thyself” (229e). 
279 Granted, there are differences as well, but that is no reason to dismiss the similarities insofar as they are 
insightful.   
 133 
technical precision?  If Plato is earnest in the Phaedrus, then the answer to each of these 
questions should be ‘yes.’  As such, the first step, which is my focus in the next section, is to 
identify Plato’s model of the logos. 
4.2 THE TRIPARTITE LOGOS IN PLATO 
The discussion of the tripartite logos in the previous chapter offers a good place to start the 
inquiry.  In the final analysis, the tripartition split along lines of communication, thought and 
being.  If we turn to Plato’s Theaetetus we find a strikingly similar split.  In the dialogue, 
Socrates and Theaetetus examine three possible definitions of logos:280 1) logos as a verbal 
account, 2) logos as accounting for the whole through methodical reference to its elements, and 
3) logos as account of a thing as different from all other things281 (206c-210b).  Now none of 
these definitions are found to be satisfactory in aiding Socrates and Theaetetus in their inquiry 
into the nature of knowledge.  However, as an account of the logos itself, none of these 
definitions are ever rejected.  And though the remarks concerning the logos can hardly be taken 
to be a sophisticated model of the concept, it is clear that the three definitions follow the basic 
pattern that we have traced up to this point.282  Thus, in line with the tradition established in the 
                                               
280 Note, also, that this comes as the third examination of what knowledge is following sense perception and true 
opinion.  That is to say, that the question of knowledge itself is divided into three parts: interaction with the world, 
personal opinion, and opinion with some sort of reason. 
281 The example that Socrates gives of such a logos is an account of the sun as “the brightest of the bodies that move 
round the earth in the heavens” (Tht. 208d).  In Aristotelian terms this turns out to be an essential definition – putting 
something in its proper genus and then differentiating it from things in that genus, which also sounds a lot like 
Socrates’ method of collection and division in the Phaedrus (265d-266b).   
282 Kerferd might take some issue with this split, as he breaks the concept of logos up along slightly different lines: 
“The logos of a thing is (1) the principle or nature or distinguishing mark or constituent elements of the thing itself, 
it is (2) what we understand it to be, and it is (3) the correct (verbal) description, account or definition of a thing.  All 
three raise the question of being.  For the logos under heading (1) is what that thing is, under (2) what we understand 
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previous chapter, Plato appears to have considered within the logos itself a level of objective 
knowledge, a level of subjective valuation, and an intersubjective level wherein the logos is 
manifested in the world and made capable of being shared with others.  At the very least these 
divisions provide a basis for a model of the logos which is capable of correlation with Plato’s 
model of the psyche.  In the absence of a more detailed model, the task is to read each level of 
the logos across to its corresponding element in the psyche to see if informative correlations can 
indeed be constructed.   
4.2.1 The Wise Logos 
The search for the first correlate, wisdom in the logos, leads to familiar territory and in many 
ways summarizes how the contemporary discipline characterizes Platonic rhetoric.  In the 
Republic, the particular virtue attributed to the deliberative class in the city, and later the rational 
element of the psyche, is wisdom – a sort of knowledge that exhibits itself through euboulia, 
‘good judgment’ or ‘prudence’ (428a-b).  However, it is clear that wisdom is not a knowledge 
that might “judge about any particular matter” such as the kind possessed by carpenters, metal 
smiths, farmers or the like, but knowledge “about the city as a whole and the maintenance of 
good relations, both internally and with other cities” (428c-d).  Similarly, the individual is called 
wise “because of that small part of himself that rules in him…and has within it the knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                                       
it to be, and under (3) it is what we say it to be” (100).  Logos as verbal account and logos as essential definition 
show perfect agreement between the two schemes with the only discrepancy being between the second levels.  On 
Plato’s second level, logos is the ability to account for a thing through some systematic reference to its elements.  
Kerferd seems to move this type of account to the first level and replaces it with a personal understanding of what a 
thing is.  However, Socrates’ example is of a student learning to spell and having some mastery over the method, in 
which case the student can have true belief about having spelled a name correctly and is even able to offer an 
account about how he did it.  However, that same student could just as easily spell another name incorrectly, and so 
we would not say that he had knowledge of names, just some command of the method of spelling (207d-208b).  
Such methods of accounting seem much more suited to Kerferd’s second level of individual understanding than they 
do to the actual being of a thing. 
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what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three 
parts” (442c).  Thus, Socrates describes two distinct aspects of wisdom: the sort of self-
knowledge that is distinguished by knowing what is good for the part and the whole; and another 
that deals with external relations, or how one should interact with others.   
This discussion of wisdom and the kind of knowledge that comprises it precisely echoes 
the discussion between Socrates and Phaedrus concerning truth and knowledge in relationship to 
rhetoric (Phdr. 259e-274b).  Here, Socrates outlines two necessary types of knowledge that the 
rhetor must possess and the method that should be followed to acquire such knowledge.  First, 
Socrates asserts that “he must not be mistaken about his subject; he must have a sharp eye for the 
class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs” (263b-c).  The art by which the rhetor 
achieves this knowledge is dialectic.  The acquisition of which gives a peculiar ability to the 
rhetor, for by this art one not only acquires knowledge of their subject, but also allows their 
“speech to proceed clearly and consistently with itself” (265d).   This is important because 
according to Socrates, “every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of 
its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and 
extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole” (264c).  Through dialectical 
knowledge the rhetor obtains true understanding of the thing that the logos represents, which 
subsequently allows the parts and the whole to be ordered properly.  Therefore, this knowledge 
manifests itself both in the ability to discuss the subject matter cogently and competently by 
providing exacting definitions and in-depth analysis, as well as the ability to structure the speech 
in a logical and appropriate manner.  So if the logos is like a living creature, the aspect of 
wisdom that allows it to know itself both in whole and in part has been identified. 
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But what of the other aspect of wisdom, the relational knowledge that lends itself to 
external affairs?  At 269d Phaedrus asks, “from what source could one acquire the art of the true 
rhetorician?”  Socrates acknowledges that the study of rhetoric necessitates an understanding of 
the “nature of the soul” (270b-c) and throughout the conversation he lists the various types of 
knowledge that must be gained both about the nature of soul and the nature of speech – the 
component elements and types of both and the correlates between the two (271a-b).  In other 
words, like the wise leader that knows how to maintain good relations with other cities, the wise 
logos maintains good relations with other souls.  Hence, two forms of knowledge must be 
present for the logos to be a truly wise account: a dialectical knowledge of the subject being 
discussed and a knowledge of how it relates to the psyche.  So a logos is considered wise when a 
rhetor can define terms, analyze concepts, order thoughts and words, and ultimately adapt this 
knowledge so as to move a given audience.  For many, this is a complete account of Platonic 
rhetoric, the application of the dialectical method to mass psychology.  While I believe that to be 
true in part, it is also so much more as the following correlations show. 
4.2.2 The Courageous Logos 
A relationship between the objective aspect of logos and the rational element of the soul is to be 
expected; but what of the spirited element and the subjective level of logos?  This is, after all, the 
level at which Socrates proposes a methodological exposition of elements.283  Such a correlation 
would suggest a systematic, calculative dimension to the spirited element that might seem 
                                               
283 Socrates continually refers to the account given at this level in terms of a systematic “way” or “method” – e.g., 
διέξοδος at 207c, 208a and ὁδός at 208b. Though Plato employs ὁδός often, it is perhaps telling that Heraclitus uses 
the term in discussing the inability to find the limits of the soul (D. 45) and the identity of the upward and downward 
way (D. 60).  For, I argue in this section that this is a level of self-reflection and moral method. In the next chapter I 
hold that by descending into the soul by this way, we gain the ability to raise it up. Cf. Johnstone Listening 179. 
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counterintuitive at first glance – especially given the commonplace characterization of spirit as a 
glory-hungry brute inside the soul poised to fight.  However, closer analysis reveals that Plato 
often refers to spirit as possessing cognitive capacities that are necessary for an agent to develop 
in order to achieve and maintain wisdom.  For that reason, it is worth demonstrating how in fact 
spirit does calculate on the Platonic model before addressing what such calculation implies about 
psychagogic rhetoric. 
4.2.2.1 The Courage to be Wise 
 
It is important to note that, at least in the first stage of educational development outlined 
in Books II and III of the Republic, the analogy is such that those being trained comprise the 
spirited part of the city, so that the education at this stage fosters the rational element indirectly 
through the spirited.284  Socrates is clear that such an order of education is not an arbitrary ideal 
but is indeed necessary given the nature of the elements of the soul.  Shaping of the spirit must 
come before the training of reason because guardians and rulers are selected from the auxiliary 
class after testing and observing their retention of true opinions (412d-414b).  They must not be 
persuaded against their true beliefs, nor by pain and suffering be compelled from them, nor by 
fears and pleasures change their minds.  Though not yet named, such training and testing 
prefigures what is said about the spirited element along with its corresponding virtue of courage 
                                               
284 Christopher Gill develops this argument fully, identifying “the first stage of education as, essentially, the 
education of one of the emotional elements (the θυμοειδές), and the second stage as the education of the rational 
element (the λογιστικόν)” (“Plato and the Education of Charachter.” Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie 67 
(1985): 1-26. (p. 7)).  The entire program is one in which “Plato clearly sees the first phase of education as a means 
of training the θυμοειδές to obey the principles reason lays down, and the second phase as a means of training the 
λογιστικόν to arrive at such principles by reasoned reflection” (18-19). 
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[andrea] (429ff).285  Courage is defined in the spirited element as “the power [dynamis] to 
preserve through everything its belief [doxa] about what things are to be feared, namely, that 
they are the things and kinds of things that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of 
educating it” (429b-c).  It is the virtue of a well-formed spirited element and a prerequisite for 
guardianship.   
This preparatory function of developing spirit is underscored if we look at the passage 
directly after the definition of courage.  Here we are presented with the metaphor in which 
Socrates compares the courageous with wool that has been properly dyed (429d-430b).  The 
wool is related to the guardians in two ways, nature and upbringing (430a).  Because of these 
factors, because it is pure and properly prepared, it is capable of taking a lasting dye – steadfast 
in color, resistant to the elements.  Its opposite quickly loses its potency in color, becoming 
washed out and faded.  These are, metaphorically speaking, some of the qualities that Socrates 
reveals as prerequisite for guardianship such as being a fast learner and having a good memory 
(486c-d).  So, a well-trained, developed spirited element is at least a precondition for achieving 
wisdom in the rational part.  But there is evidence that the rational element requires the 
development of the spirited element, not merely as a preparatory exercise, but as a condition that 
must be continually maintained.  If this is true, then courage cannot be completely bereft of 
cognitive value, it cannot be an element that must be mastered and continually kept in check, but 
rather it is a true ally to the rational element which plays an important role in sustaining 
cognition. 
                                               
285 It is worth pointing out that the virtue of the spirited element of the human psyche, which I have identified as 
correlating with the subjective, self-reflexive aspect of the logos, is literally ‘manliness’ or ‘of a man.’  That is to 
say, it is a self-reflexive virtue that exhibits or underscores or amplifies the very nature of the thing that possesses it.      
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If we look back at the preparatory education, we see that Socrates is keen to describe the 
spirit as being trained not merely in order to accept the mastery of reason, but also in order to 
provide a balance to it, so that distinct connections are made between the spirited and the rational 
elements such that they appear counterparts.  This connection is clearest when the pitfalls are 
articulated for those who cultivate either their spirited or their “philosophical” part of the soul 
but not both, resulting in “savagery and toughness” for the one and “softness and 
overcultivation” for the other (410b-412a).  Ultimately in Book V, Socrates suggests that these 
two elements, in conjunction, “do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against 
external enemies – reason by planning, spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out 
the leader’s decisions through its courage” (442b).  In political terms, reason might occupy the 
legislative branch, but it is spirit that executes the orders.  Such execution, especially in face of 
fears and temptations ‘in the field of battle’ would be impossible to imagine without at least 
some capacity for prudent calculation.  
When Socrates picks up the question of curriculum for the guardians at Book VII (521c) 
we are reminded that our rulers are equally warriors.  Analogously, this reminds us that we are 
continuing to educate both the spirited and the rational parts.  As the subjects of the curriculum 
are laid out, each – prior to dialectic – are explained in their practical, warriorly applications 
before their theoretical benefits are expounded.  This is true for calculation (522b-e, 525a-b), so 
that the guardian may be able to count the number of troops in his possession and in the 
possession of the enemy (522b-e), and so that he may keep his orderly ranks (522e, 525a-b).  
Here we should stress that Plato makes the study of numbers compulsory for the guardian as 
warrior “so that he is able to count and calculate” (525e).   
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Additionally, the discussion of geometry (526c-527c) allows the warrior to become adept 
at “setting up camp, occupying a region, concentrating troops, deploying them, or with regard to 
any of the formations an army adopts in battle or on the march” (526d).  Granted, Socrates states 
that only a little geometry is necessary for these things, and allots the study of geometry far more 
important philosophical characteristics.  But the point is that there is a clear and “not 
insignificant” (527c) warriorly use of geometry standing in contrast to its philosophical use.   
Lastly comes the discussion of astronomy (527c-530d), which includes a digression into 
a discussion about “solid geometry” (528a-528e) and concludes with a brief exploration of 
astronomy’s counterpart, harmonics (530d-531d).  Neither solid geometry nor harmonics 
mentions any warriorly application, but Glaucon praises the main topic, astronomy, in this regard 
since “better awareness of the seasons, months and years is no less appropriate for a general than 
for a farmer or navigator” (527d).  We do see a diminishing warriorly application as the arts 
become more complex, but we see them nonetheless.   
Only dialectics appears as a purely rational activity (531d-535a), and even then, the 
actual act of dialectical refutation has amazingly “courageous” undertones since: 
 
Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, 
can survive all refutation, as if in battle, striving to judge things not in accordance with 
opinion but in accordance with being, and come through all this with his account still 
intact, you’ll say that he doesn’t know the good itself or any other good.  (534b-c, 
emphasis added)  
 
 141 
These may just be simple allusions that emphasize the rigorous nature of dialectical encounters, 
but they are fairly specific allusions, and one must wonder why Plato would want to use phrases 
that are particularly reminiscent of the spirited element in describing the most rational of 
activities if not to suggest that even in such activities the spirit strengthens our fortitude and 
helps to see us through to the end.  Regardless, the relation of the spirited element to the rational 
in the art of dialectics notwithstanding, the remaining calculative arts appear to be connected as 
much with spirit as with rationality. 
Therefore the power for practical calculation, at least in terms of achieving 
predetermined goals and maintaining established standards, is attributed to the spirited element 
by Plato.  That is, of course, insofar as we take Plato’s insistence that “our guardian must be both 
a warrior and a philosopher” to indicate that the guardian must have developed and 
counterbalanced spirited and rational elements; and that in addressing the warriorly uses of a 
given subject, he is addressing the capacity of the spirit to make use of the subject, and in 
discussing the philosophical applications, he is discussing that of reason.  This seems to be a 
logical assumption given how the metaphors have been built up and employed throughout the 
entirety of the text.  Moreover, if this is not how they are employed, then the insistence on such a 
division is quite meaningless – or at most, it is a very weak division to insist upon.  
4.2.2.2 The Mathematics of Morality 
With the calculative capacity of spirit established, its importance to the rhetorical 
endeavor becomes evident once its virtue is properly taken into account.  As I stated previously, 
spirit is the element that serves as both a psychic police and military force by regulating internal 
and external behavior.  The distinctive virtue of the spirited element is courage [andrea], defined 
in the city as “the power [dynamis] to preserve through everything its belief [doxa] about what 
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things are to be feared” (429b-c), and indentified in the soul “when it preserves through pains 
and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t” (442b-c).  It 
is, perhaps, the most enigmatically defined virtue of the soul.  But insight can be gained if we 
turn to the discussion of this virtue in other texts such as the Protagoras and the Laches.286    
The Protagoras presents a discussion between Socrates and Protagoras concerning the 
teachability of virtue, in which Protagoras holds that courage is unique amongst virtue’s parts.  
The final digest of the argument (359a-360e) shows in great detail what Plato means when he has 
Socrates define courage in such a strange and abstract form.  Here the section ends with Socrates 
asking, “So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of 
this ignorance?” (360d).  The previous discussion is a contrast of the actions exhibited by the 
courageous and the cowardly which shows that each acts in similar ways concerning their 
confidence and fear.  What differs in their actions is that the coward is ignorant about what 
should be feared where the other is wise.  For instance, where war is concerned, the cowardly 
fear death over loss of honor, where the courageous know that it is more fearful to be disgraced 
than it is to die.  The result is that courage becomes the mathematics of morality.287 
Just as the second level of logos in the Theaetetus is an itemized evaluation of a things 
component parts, it is in the spirited element of the psyche that morally evaluative judgments are 
made – judgments that weigh the value of given propositions and actions with mathematical 
precision.  These evaluations calculate the relative worth of a thing based on subjective 
                                               
286 Again, there are important differences in the account of courage given in these texts, but the similarities are also 
insightful as long as they don’t lead to contradictions.  Indeed, as I show below, the differences can supply insight as 
well.  
287 According to W.Thomas Schmid (“The Socratic Conception of Courage.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2.2 
(1985): 113-129) “Courage must be rooted in the intellectual perception of the true values, and it implies therefore 
‘an understanding of the comparative moral worth of objects for which risks ought or ought not to be taken’ (118; 
citing Gregory Vlastos without further attribution).  Schmid maintains that such intellectual grounding is true on the 
Platonic conception, but must also be balanced with notions of endurance and self-mastery. 
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standards, though Plato would hold that a true standard does actually exist.  Hence, the cowardly 
and the courageous each use the same mathematical process to establish their confidence and 
fears, the difference being that the courageous use the correct standard of measurement. 
Rhetorically speaking, the initial implication of coordinating the evaluative sense of the 
logos with the spirited element of the psyche is the evolution of the emotional appeal.  We 
uncover a method by which one may evaluate both topic and audience and thus develop an 
appeal to morality that is reasoned and appropriate, rather than merely reliant on catalogues of 
emotive stimuli and responses.  So that if personal wellbeing were that which is held as the 
highest good of a given target, the rhetor would be capable of showing the audience how a given 
position actually secures their wellbeing when the opposite might be supposed.  Emotive 
arguments then become evaluative arguments, and so true allies of the rational aspect of both the 
psyche and the logos.  Informed by the rational, the spirited element’s appropriation of dialectic 
is diagnostic.  It results in the ability to show both the courageous and the cowardly where a 
given argument fits into their schema of confidence and fear, and so allows the courageous rhetor 
to craft emotional appeals to the psyche of a given audience based on their moral predispositions.  
In this way, spirited rhetoric works to establish and maintain the normative standards that reason 
dictates – in battle, as it were, but more in the sense of guerrilla warfare and psychic espionage 
than by blunt brute force.  The spirit is the military tactician of the soul.  How such adaptation is 
achieved will be more obvious in the next section when the different types of psychai are 
addressed.  Nevertheless, the emotional aspect is not the only implication that Plato’s discussion 
of courage offers for the subjective level of the logos. 
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4.2.2.3 The Spirit of Integrity 
The Laches is also concerned with courage as a virtue, and in it Nicias offers up an 
almost identical definition as those found in the Republic and the Protagoras, that courage “is 
the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other situation” (195a).  
Throughout the dialogue, the question of integrity is persistently raised, suggesting that integrity 
is a primary concern of courage and the courageous.  Moreover, the discussion bears directly on 
rhetorical activity for the two main topics are the integrity between words [logoi] and deeds 
[erga] on the one hand,288 and thoughts and words on the other. 
The dialogue features two accomplished generals, Laches and Nicias, discussing the 
preferred method of educating the young with Socrates and two older gentlemen.  The first 
question pondered is whether young students should learn the art of fighting in armor.  Nicias 
maintains that such learning is likely to lead to greater learning in military tactics.  Laches argues 
that what is taught in theory by such teachers is largely inapplicable to practical situations.  As 
the discussion turns to moral education, the question of courage arises.  Laches has acted 
courageously and can point to empirical instances of what the courageous do.  When pushed for 
a definition, he points to an active quality, defining courage as “a sort of endurance of the soul” 
[karteria tis einai tes psyches] (192B).  Ultimately, he admits that though “I still think I know 
what courage is…I can’t understand how it has escaped me just now so that I can’t pin it down in 
words and say what it is” (194b).  On the other hand, Nicias removes all tell-tale physical signs 
of courage and offers in their place a sophisticated theory rooted solely in one’s knowledge of 
fears and hopes.  Though this seems promising, it eventually proves to be his downfall since he 
                                               
288 For a detailed analysis of the logos/ergon distinction in the dialogue, see Robert G. Hoerber. “Plato’s Laches.” 
Classical Philology 63.2 (1968): 95-105.  The following analysis of the contrast between Laches and Nicias is 
indebted to his article. 
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lacks any criteria with which to separate courage from wisdom and hence the whole of virtue.  A 
like fate befell Protagoras in his dialogue.   
Socrates underscores this dual nature of courage in the evolved statement offered in the 
Republic, and at the same time avoids the pitfalls of the two previous formulations.289  For in 
showing courage to be “the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are 
to be feared” the intellectual object of courage shifts from knowledge to belief, while at the same 
time making it a quality of action rooted in theory.  It is no longer knowledge of what is to be 
feared, but the power to preserve the belief about what is to be feared, a belief derived from 
reason but not equal to it.  Such a spirit guards against incongruity between action and belief.  
Thus, Plato provides an ethical standard in the classical rhetorical sense.  One’s actions must be 
in accord with one’s argument.  To the degree that the two lack unity, the argument will be 
incoherent and the speaker will strain to defend it, as do both Laches and Nicias.  A courageous 
rhetor must align theory and action in order to exhibit a persuasive, credible ethos.290  Laches 
makes an appeal to exactly this kind of congruity when he begins his discussion [logos] with 
Socrates (188c-189b).  If the man with whom he is speaking exhibits this sort of harmony 
between words and deeds, if he is “worthy of the words he utters” (188c),291 then he enjoys the 
discourse, if not, then he cannot stand it.  Since he knows Socrates for his valor, he is ready to 
entertain his words.  
More important for the rhetor still, and more prominent, is the plea offered by 
Lysimachus in the opening speech of the dialogue: “we think it especially important to be frank 
                                               
289 Note that Socrates comes close to uniting the two at some point, refining Laches’ definition into a “prudent 
endurance” [φρονήσεως καρτερία] which is both “fine and good” [καλὴ κἀγαθή].  As Hoerber concludes, reason 
and spirit “must act in unison to produce true courage” (ibid. 101). 
290 As we will see, this standard is more akin to St. Augustine than Aristotle in that it suggests that one’s actions 
must go beyond appearing to be in accord with their arguments; it must actually hold that the rhetor practices what is 
preached.   
291 ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει 
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[parresiazesthai] with you.  Now there are some people who make fun of frankness and if 
anyone asks their advice, they don’t say what they think, but they make a shot at what the other 
man would like to hear and say something different from their own opinion” (178a-b).  This call 
to be frank connects the dialogue in general, and the ethical consideration of the rhetor 
specifically, to the Gorgias.  Here Socrates makes that same appeal to Callicles when he lists the 
three qualities that a fit interlocutor must possess: knowledge, good will, and frankness 
[parresia] (487a), which consequently prefigures both Aristotle’s own ethical principles and the 
three elements of the soul established in the Republic.  Concerning frankness, Socrates tells us 
that Gorgias and Polus are deficient, not in wisdom or fondness, but are “rather lacking in 
frankness, and more ashamed than they should be.  No wonder!  They’ve come to such a depth 
of shame that, because they are ashamed, each of them dares to contradict himself, face to face 
with many people, and on topics of the greatest importance”  (487a-b).  In other words, above all 
else it is important for the rhetor to align what is said with what is thought.  This not only 
includes a condemnation of malicious deceit, but also of incongruence due to humility or flattery.   
In the Sophist the unity between speech and thought is most clearly connected to the 
ethical consideration of the speaker, albeit in a somewhat ironic way since logos is used as 
speech rather than theory, and so transplants ergon as the active element to the more theoretical 
‘thought’ [dianoia] produced by the psyche.  Here the Visitor asks, “Aren’t thought and speech 
the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul 
in conversation with itself?” (263e).  The interlocutors are led on to see that false speech, and 
subsequently false belief, are produced when speech no longer represents the thought of the 
speaker, but is tainted by the external world and so becomes the appearance of reason, rather 
than representative of reason itself (264a-b).  The courageous account then, denies the 
 147 
temptations to deceive based on “pains, pleasures, desires, or fears” (Rep. 429d) and preserves 
through these temptations the beliefs derived from reason concerning what should truly be feared 
and hoped for.292 
In short, explication of the virtue of courage provides an insightful correlation between 
the spirited element of the psyche and the realm of subjective understanding in the logos.  
Through this correlation, Plato moves beyond basic emotional appeals towards a method that 
systematically valuates the moral dispositions of a given audience and places them in priority.  In 
returning to the literal meaning of the somewhat abstract moral terms ‘value’ and ‘priority’ he is 
able to create a mathematics of morality revealed by dialectical inquiry.  The use of this 
mathematics in order to create effective emotional appeals represents the practical force of the 
courageous account.  At the same time courage provides ethical considerations that require the 
rhetor to align both theory and action, as well as speech and thought.  In so doing the rhetor is 
able to comply with the definition of courage offered in the Republic, since a logos is derived, 
aligned with the psyche, that not only has the power to preserve its belief about what is to be 
feared, but has the power to produce that belief in others.  As such, spirit proves to be a much 
more important element for the rhetorician than previously thought – perhaps, in some senses, 
the most important. 
                                               
292 For a detailed argument of what Platonic psychology indicates about internal integrity and the credibility of the 
speaker, see Moline “Plato on Persuasion and Credibility.”  The greatest difference between his assessment and my 
own is that he almost wholly attributes the internal integrity of thought and word to the rule of the rational element.  
The easiest argument for spirit playing a major role in maintaining integrity is simply that that is its job – it is, after 
all, the internal police force as well as the military.  It may very well be reason’s job to map out a course of integrity, 
but it is spirit’s job to make sure the plan all hangs together under the worst of conditions – indeed, to preserve the 
belief that loss of integrity is to be feared should temptations towards a contrary belief present themselves.  In the 
final analysis the timocrat, who is ruled by spirit once civil war breaks out between appetite and reason, is the image 
of the Laconian (Rep. 545a).  The Spartan is not known for the love of learning or loquaciousness, but is known for 
frank and direct speech – hence the term, Laconic. 
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4.2.3 The Temperate Logos 
The final correlation to consider is between the intersubjective level of the logos and the 
appetitive element in the psyche.  Socrates identifies the virtue of appetite as sophrosune, 
‘moderation’ or ‘temperance.’  His account of this virtue appears more overtly concerned with 
the rhetoric and philosophy of the older Sophists than any of the other elements.  Moderation is 
described as a sort of consonance [symphonia] and harmony [harmonia] – a kind of order 
[kosmos] illustrated by the term “self-control” [kreitto autou] (430e).  This expression is taken as 
an indication that in the soul: 
 
there is a better part [beltion] and a worse one [cheiron] and that, whenever the naturally 
better part [beltion phusei] is in control of the worse [cheironos], this is expressed by 
saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself [kreitto autou].  At any rate, 
one praises someone by calling him self-controlled.  But when, on the other hand, the 
smaller and better part [smikroteron to beltion] is overpowered by the larger [and worse; 
plethous tou cheironos], because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being 
self-defeated [hetto eautou] or licentious and is a reproach.  (431a-b) 
 
Socrates admits that this virtue is peculiar in that it concerns itself with all three elements of the 
psyche, whereas courage and knowledge only affect that of which they are a virtue (432a): 
 
It makes the weakest [asthenestatous], the strongest [ischurotatous], and those in 
between [mesous] – whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or 
anything else – all sing the same song together.  And this unanimity, this agreement 
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between the naturally worse [cheironos] and the naturally better [ameinonos] as to which 
of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation.  (432a) 
 
In this passage, Plato expands upon, complicates, and uniquely justifies the Sophistic claim to 
make the weaker logos the stronger. 
Championed by Protagoras, the claim to be able to “make the weaker argument the 
stronger” [to hetto de logon kreitto poiein],293 or in its most disreputable interpretation, to make 
“the worse cause appear the better,” has long been seen as both a calling card for the Sophists 
and an illustration of their relativistic scruples.  In the analysis of Gorgias’ Helen, we already 
noted how making weaker agents stronger could easily be perceived as a good and as a civic 
necessity.  In a further evolution, Socrates’ account of temperance proffers a qualified version of 
the claim that appeals both to the stronger/weaker distinction as well as the better/worse.  On this 
view, one is not only justified in making the weaker part the stronger, but is required to do so by 
virtue.  But this requirement only holds insofar as the weaker portion is indeed the better.  Thus 
Plato grants the temperate logos both the power and the place to correct the upset in balance 
created by allowing the stronger but worse desires to rule over the weaker but better reason.294 
 That Plato confers such corrective power upon the temperate logos, and therefore to a 
moderate rhetoric, is further evidenced in the Timaeus.  After discussing how sight enables us to 
observe the orbits of reason in the heavens, and so aids us in imitating those orbits in ourselves, 
Timaeus considers hearing: 
                                               
293 The fragment appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1402a23.  The wording is nearly identical to the charge that Socrates 
recounts against him in Plato’s Apology: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.  For a detailed analysis of the interpretive 
history and possibilities of interpreting the phrase, see Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 103-116.  For a more 
general analysis of to hetton and to kreitton in Sophistic rhetoric, see Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric 64-67. 
294 I doubt that it is coincidental that similar language is used throughout the Protagoras.  
 150 
 
Likewise, the same account goes for sound [phones] and hearing – these too are the gods’ 
gift, given for the same purpose and intended to achieve the same result.   Speech [logos] 
was designed for this very purpose – it plays the greatest part in its achievement.  And all 
such composition as lends itself to making audible musical [mousikes] sound is given in 
order to express harmony [harmonias], and so serves this purpose as well.  And harmony 
[harmonia], whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls [psyches], is a gift 
of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding, not for irrational 
pleasure, for which people nowadays seem to make use of it, but to serve as an ally in the 
fight to bring order [katakosmesin] to any orbit in our souls that has become 
unharmonized, and make it concordant [symphonian] with itself. (47c-e) 
 
The passage shows speech, out of all the phonetic arts of the Muses, as particularly responsible 
for re-hierarchizing the elements of the soul in a way that mirrors Plato’s account of 
moderation.295  
The sentiment of the Timaeus is further repeated in the Charmides, a small treatise on 
sophrosune.  In promising Charmides a cure for his ailments, Socrates quotes a Thracian doctor:  
 
And the soul…is cured [therapeuesthai de ten psyche] by means of certain charms, and 
these charms consist of beautiful words [tous logous einai tous kalous].  It is a result of 
                                               
295 As Poulakos asserts: “When advocating something hetton, the orator relies on the resources of language and its 
surrounding circumstances to move what is regarded as weaker to a position of strength.  At the same time, and in a 
similar manner, the orator attempts to show how to kreitton, despite its dominance, is defective, ineffective, or 
harmful – that is, how to kreitton is weaker than generally thought.  To be successful in this endeavor means to 
reverse in some measure the established hierarchy of things” (Sophistical Rhetoric 64).  Plato would seem to agree, 
with the addendum that when a rhetor is successful, not only is the hierarchy of things rearranged, but the internal 
hierarchy of the psyche is as well. 
 151 
such words [logon] that temperance [sophrosunen] arises in the soul, and when the soul 
acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and for 
the rest of the body. (157a-b)   
 
Granted, these passages must be interpreted with caution.  Consisting mainly of a long speech 
given by a character other than Socrates, the Timaeus is recognized as uncharacteristically 
rhetorical and overly metaphorical in many respects.  And the passage from the Charmides is not 
owned by Socrates, but rather is given through quotation in such a manner that the audience is 
led to question whether it is real or not.   
However, nothing in either the Timaeus or the Charmides suggests that these passages are 
meant to be ironic or in any way negative accounts of speech.  Quite to the contrary, the works 
plainly suggest a positive, if a not-to-be-taken-literally account of the nature of speech’s ability 
to correctly align the soul.  Furthermore, these accounts are in accord with Plato’s comments 
about aligning rhetoric with the soul in the Phaedrus and with Socrates’ short account of true 
rhetoric in the Gorgias which is “that of getting the souls of the citizens to be as good as possible 
and of striving valiantly to say what is best, whether the audience will find it more pleasant or 
more unpleasant” (503a).  All of this sounds very much like Plato’s lone positive account of 
‘noble’ sophistry in the Sophist: 
 
Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit from any food that’s offered to it 
until what’s interfering with it from inside is removed.  The people who cleanse the soul, 
my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learning 
that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that 
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interfere with learning, and exhibit it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things 
that it does know, and nothing more.  (230c-d) 
 
However, this commendation is also granted with qualification and so leaves room for question 
about what is truly asserted concerning sophistry.   
What does seem clear is that the virtue of moderation has a direct correlation with the 
third, intersubjective level of the logos as a verbal, communicative account.  Whatever Plato 
means to say about sophrosune, it obviously applies to the spoken word.  However, the medical 
undertones cannot be dismissed, and so another link to the intersubjective realm is established.  
Unlike the other two levels, which deal with the formation and structure of the logos itself, this 
third level considers the effects and uses of the logos, the relationship that should be established 
between speaker and hearer.  This relationship is consistently expressed as a beneficent accord 
between benefactor and beneficiary.  In this way, the temperate account is never used for 
personal gain; it is always used for the benefit of others, or at least, for the betterment of 
everyone involved including oneself.  Once again, the list of preferred qualities in an interlocutor 
discussed in the Gorgias is underscored, so that the objective level ensures knowledge, the 
subjective demands candor and the intersubjective requires good-will. 
 Ultimately, the impact that temperance has on the rhetor and the logos is no small matter.  
It requires the rhetor to act in the best interests of those who would listen, striving to champion 
the better cause even though it might be the weaker account.  In so doing, the natural harmony of 
the logos is established, which is capable of restoring harmony in the souls of others.  The result 
is a logos that strives for truth over efficacy and harmony over discord.  It guides the 
intersubjective interaction between the rhetor and the audience.  Of course, this interaction is 
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effected by the subjective call to integrity, and it also influences the objective level by planting 
the fruit of cooperative dialectic.  So the model of the logos, and consequently of the psyche, is 
not a linear hierarchy from objectivity to intersubjectivity, but rather is a triangular model in 
which each element effects the other two. 
4.3 PLATO’S DRAMATISM 
Upon learning to read the gramma of the soul’s motives, Socrates and company map out the 
soul’s movements in the form of a grand degenerative drama in which the cohesion of the psyche 
literally disintegrates.  At the end of Book IV of the Republic, Socrates remarks that there exists 
“five forms of constitutions and five of souls” (445d).  At Book VIII, after a lengthy discussion 
of aristocracy, he finally makes good on his desire to, “enumerate [the remaining four kinds of 
constitutions] and explain how they developed out of one another” (449a).  The Book begins by 
summarizing the discussion of the aristocratic city and the aristocratic individual, which had 
developed since Book V.  Socrates frames the remaining four structures as a series of 
devolutions, examining first how one city emerges from its predecessor, then how the type of 
psyche that is similar to it develops.  With a parallel model of the logos established, we can see 
how relevant forms of speech also shift with each constitutional permutation.  The result is a 
striking hierarchization of the Burkean pentad complete with a Weaverian identification of 
relevant Ultimate Terms.  While a complete analysis of the psychological models offered by 
Plato in the Republic can yield a robust handbook of rhetorical psychological typographies,296 
                                               
296 This was the ultimate focus of my Masters thesis on which this analysis draws.  However, the recourse to 
Burkean and Weavarian terminology provides the most succinct, yet complete, way of summarizing this analysis for 
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the intent of the present account is to recognize the map of the soul’s movements and observe it 
as a guide for the purpose of psychic direction.   
4.3.1 The Aristocratic Logos 
The aristocratic logos is the most familiar and so is the easiest to explain.  For Socrates, the 
constitution that should govern a city or an individual is either a kingship or an aristocracy 
(445e).  The composition is such that the rational element rules the soul, aided by the spirited 
element, with the consent of the appetitive element.  Thus, the actions of both the aristocratic city 
and the aristocratic individual are wise, courageous, and temperate – and so are ultimately 
harmonious and just.   
The aristocratic logos follows suit in that it exhibits the virtues of speech laid out in the 
previous section.  It is wise because it is knowledgeable of both itself and others, and so it is well 
informed, well organized, and logically articulated so as to appeal to an average, reasonable 
audience.  It is courageous, first in that it is capable of valuating how given topics fit into the 
moral schema of its audience and so is able to demonstrate what should and should not be feared; 
second, in that it represents congruity in thought, word, and deed, and eschews incongruity 
resulting from deceit, humility, or flattery.  It is moderate in that it seeks only the truth and 
wishes to communicate that truth to its audience.  It works to correct maladies in the souls of its 
audience and cares not for personal gain.  It says only what is supported by argument, and so 
avoids sacrificing logical rigor, even if it means failing to persuade.   
                                                                                                                                                       
the current study, which is focused on the movements of the soul and the effect that words have on those 
movements. 
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Dramatisitically speaking, the aristocrat is purpose oriented and that purpose is the 
transcendence of the soul through beauty, goodness, and truth to a participation in being and the 
One beyond.  So the Transcendentals supply the aristocrat with its God Terms: Unity, Being, 
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.297  Thus, the aristocratic logos is the very picture of Plato’s ideal 
rhetoric, which seems indistinguishable from his concept of dialectical inquiry.  But to leave the 
issue there is to acknowledge only one fifth of Plato’s rhetorical types.  For, while an aristocrat 
might only be persuaded by another aristocrat, the converse is true – the aristocratic logos is only 
effective when offered to an aristocratic psyche.  But for Plato’s claims in the Phaedrus to hold, 
the aristocratic rhetor must be able to persuade anyone.  Regardless of whether we agree with the 
value hierarchy, it is difficult to devalue the observations that are made about symbolic 
motivation in the remaining four constitutions.  
4.3.2 The Timocratic Logos 
The aristocracy begins to disintegrate due to “civil war breaking out within the ruling group 
itself” (545c).  The city begins to shift away from rational rule and towards the appetites.  
However, the shift is not absolute and the struggle ends by settling on the middle way.  The 
divisions of rule are still respected but the rulers are more spirited, “more naturally suited for war 
than peace” (547c-548a).  The hallmark of the new city becomes “the love of victory 
[philonikiai] and the love of honor [philotimiai],” (548c), hence the name ‘timocracy’ or ‘rule by 
honor.’  The timocratic psyche, of course, is very similar and the timocrat “becomes a proud and 
honor-loving man” (550b).  Hence, Honor and Shame are the Ultimate Terms of the timocrat, 
                                               
297  Although the correlations below are based on my own analysis, Burke overtly connects Platonism with 
“purpose” in the Grammar.  See “Platonist and Neo-Platonist Purpose” 293-294. 
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who shifts priority from purpose to agent.  Such shift does not denote an egocentric withdrawal 
of the agent’s interests from the community.  Quite the contrary, timocrats are interested in 
raising the status of the community and their own status within it. 
 However, in shifting rule from the rational to the spirited part, the logos has slipped from 
the observance of objective Truth, though it still recognizes the existence of moral standards, as 
Protagoras-via-Socrates suggests in the Theaetetus: 
 
Similarly, the wise and efficient politician is the man who makes wholesome things 
seem just to a city instead of pernicious ones.  Whatever in any city is regarded as just 
and admirable is just and admirable, in that city and for so long as that convention 
maintains itself; but the wise man replaces each pernicious convention by a wholesome 
one, making this both be and seem just. (167c) 
 
This is quite appropriate considering the nature of courage, the virtue of the spirited element, 
which rules over the timocratic logos.  That is to say, that the key to a successful timocratic logos 
is the manipulation of a given moral schema in order to show the interlocutor or audience that 
the position of the rhetor is indeed the position that follows from the audience’s basic moral 
suppositions.  So persuasion would take place by correctly appealing to and manipulating those 
moral standards.   
 It is important to emphasize the shift in Ultimate Terms from the aristocratic to the 
timocratic logos.  The sole locus of authority for the aristocrat is objective Truth and the 
transcendental knowledge that such Truth provides.  Thus, the aristocratic logos is structured so 
as to best discover, communicate, and test unadulterated ideas.  For the timocrat, the locus of 
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authority shifts slightly.  While an objective standard of sorts is still observed – that is, a 
standard outside of a given rhetor, audience, or situation – that standard is relative in that 
“whatever in any city is regarded as just and admirable is just and admirable, in that city and for 
so long as that convention maintains itself.”   
 Here there is a peculiar mix of the objective, subjective, and intersubjective.  The major 
drawback is that the timocratic psyche is subject to a more coercive type of rhetoric that locks 
the audience into a conclusion based on previously held belief without the check of critical 
inquiry.  Plato alludes to this aspect of the timocrat when he states that, “they haven't been 
educated by persuasion [peithous] but by force [bias],” (Rep 548b-c).  So the model is that of a 
logos whose locus of authority rests in the conventions of the audience.  Upon identifying these 
conventions, the timocratic logos seeks to draw connections between the strongest and most 
central of these conventions away from an audience’s inhabited position and towards that 
tendered by the rhetor.  Such speech is agent centered, giving greatest consideration to the 
subject’s sense of honor and shame. 
4.3.3 The Oligarchic Logos 
The oligarchy develops by an increase of greed and desire for earthly wealth and personal 
possessions at the expense of virtue and so eventually the money-making, or appetitive, element 
takes over (550d-551b).  This results in a complete shift away from objective value towards 
subjective egoism.  Whereas the timocrat shifts from a “what is x?” attitude towards a “what is 
the value of x?” attitude (i.e., a shift from interest in the nature of a thing towards interest in what 
it is about a thing that should be respected or revered), the oligarchic structure shifts its inquiry 
towards the question “what is the value of x for me?”  Where both the aristocrat and timocrat 
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enjoyed some degree of shared control between the objective, subjective, and intersubjective 
elements, the oligarch becomes completely egocentric.   
Granted, self-centeredness may seem strange since the appetitive, or intersubjective, 
element is now ruling the rational and spirited elements.  But the oligarch is unwilling to let the 
worst appetites have free reign out of caution and some sense of decency (554b-d).  Another 
compromise is reached; the oligarch settles on procuring wealth, making “the rational and 
spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite… reducing them to slaves” (553c-d).  Although 
the oligarch is ruled by the appetitive part, it has relegated rule to the most egocentric of the 
appetites – personal gain.  Thus the oligarch shifts focus from the status of the agent to procuring 
the means of agency.   
The type of logos that originates under this constitution is plain to see.  The oligarch is 
motivated by God Terms that indicate Profit, Prosperity, and Utility.  Accounts of this sort center 
on promises of wealth or fear of loss, depending on what is deemed most expedient.  
Accordingly, bad appetites are checked or subdued, as Socrates points out, “not by persuading 
them that it’s better not to act on them [i.e., a timocratic logos] or taming them with arguments 
[i.e., an aristocratic logos], but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions” 
(554d).   
The oligarch’s thriftiness entails a miserly paradox – he wishes to procure the means of 
agency so much that he never acts unless necessary: 
 
Further, this thrifty man is a poor individual contestant for victory in a city or for any 
other fine and much-honored thing, for he’s not willing to spend money for the sake of a 
fine reputation or on contests for such things.  He’s afraid to arouse his appetites for 
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spending or to call on them as allies to obtain victory, so he fights like an oligarch, with 
only a few of his resources.  Hence he’s mostly defeated but remains rich. (554e-555a) 
 
This caution, however, means that the oligarchic logos is also rather reserved, spoken only when 
profit is assured, or else in attempt to stave off threat to wealth.    
The motives of the oligarch are something quite different than the other two that have 
been examined.  The oligarch does not love truth, honor, or even victory, so does not often enter 
into debate or discussion for the sake of intellectual discovery or moral conservation.  Hence the 
oligarchic logos appears in the realm of economics on various scales.  It is employed by 
salespersons who tout that the energy efficiency of given products will save the potential buyer x 
amounts of dollars over so many years (as opposed to, say, its positive impact on the 
environment).  And it is present in the twin fear appeals of illegal immigrants stealing jobs and 
draining the welfare system.  But the true oligarch is shrewd.  Rationality and valuation have not 
been abandoned; rather these faculties have been applied fully to increasing personal wealth.  
Thus, it is not enough to simply assert that a given position is profitable or costly.  It must also be 
systematically demonstrated, only this time using material value as the locus of authority.  Action 
must be shown to be of benefit, while inaction must be shown to yield negative results.  While it 
might seem the most obvious of tactics, it is not always the easiest, since doing the “right” thing 
is not always the most profitable.  When personal gain and morality appear to be in conflict, one 
must present arguments of indirect profit and cost.  So one may threaten (or enact) a boycott as a 
rhetorical tactic; or one might explain to a political candidate that going “green” will ultimately 
translate into more votes.  In short, any argument or tactic that can affect the bottom line will be 
the most likely means of moving the oligarchic psyche. 
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4.3.4 The Democratic Logos 
The democratic constitution evolves out of the oligarchy due to its love of money.  This love 
promotes laws that ensure that some become wealthy at the expense of others, leaving wealth in 
disproportion and strengthening the divide between the haves and the have-nots.  Eventually, due 
to the oligarchs’ focus on procuring the means of agency, and not wishing to expend it on 
training in combat, gymnastics, etc. the impoverished realize that they are superior in strength 
and numbers, overthrow the oligarchs, and redistribute power equally.  The result is the 
democracy (555b-557a). 
The individual is similar to the city.  Being ruled by the better appetites and keeping the 
worse in check, external desires eventually help the worse overcome the better.  However, as 
counter influences struggle back and forth, the ultimate result is an individual in which rule is 
granted to all desires equally (558d-561b).  The miserly conservation of agency leads violently 
towards the desire to act.  For the democrat, then, the God Terms are the twin concepts of 
Freedom and Equality, while the Devil Terms indicate Restraint and Oppression. 
 Thus, the democratic structure might seem at least as subjective, if not more so, then its 
oligarchic predecessor since no authority exists save for the whim of the subject.  However, the 
subject is not in control of these whims, rather “he lives, always surrendering rule over himself 
to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot.  And when that is satisfied, he 
surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying all equally” (561a).  So the 
democrat sees a shift from the more subjective oligarch, which seeks out self-interested gain, to a 
mix of influences both internal and external.  The freedom and equality that rule the democracy 
do not result in constantly identifiable characteristics, but are multifarious.  In this way it 
becomes what Socrates calls “a convenient place to look for a constitution” (557d) since it 
 161 
contains every kind of constitution within itself.  Likewise, the multiple whims of the democratic 
psyche make it varied and complex. 
Following Socrates’ observations, the logos that follows must be unstable and impulsive.  
This is not to say that it is without merit, or at least without meritorious specimens, but it is not 
systematic.  The democratic logos is a whimsical logos.  It may at times be oligarchic, 
timocratic, or even aristocratic, but these are fleeting moments, not pure productions of these 
more constant structures.  Nor could they be, since the democrat eschews any authority beyond 
the almost anti-authority of individual autonomy.  In fact, the democratic style is the diametrical 
opposite of the timocratic in that it works to reverse the moralistic mathematical calculation that 
is the driving force of the timocrat.  In order to dissolve this moralistic authority “they call 
reverence foolishness and moderation cowardice” and “persuade the young man that measured 
and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean” (560c-d).  In this way the democrat becomes 
“empty of knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth,” and “in the absence of these 
guardians, false and boastful words and beliefs rush up and occupy him” (560b-c).  
 With the objective standards abolished, there is established “a sort of equality to equals 
and unequals alike” (558c).  Which is exactly the sort of thing Prodicus warns against in the 
Protagoras, wherein he states: “Those who attend discussions such as this…ought to listen 
impartially but not divide our attention equally:  More should go to the wiser speaker and less to 
the more unlearned” (337a-b).  Lacking a standard of judgment, the democratic logos must be 
purely aesthetic, attempting to stir the audience by evoking pleasure or dissonance in the psyche 
rather than persuading the rational element or moving the spirited element.  Apparently then, the 
democratic logos is just that style of rhetoric Plato condemns in the Gorgias, wherein Socrates 
points out that only disciplines that have systematic knowledge of what they effect can be called 
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an art or craft; whereas those that “have investigated only, as in the other case, the soul’s way of 
getting its pleasure, without considering which of the pleasures is better or worse” (Rep. 501b-c) 
would be a knack, a form of flattery.  Of course, it makes sense that this would be the case 
considering that Athens was in the vanguard of democracy.   
 The difficulty for Plato is that in order to make good on the promise of the Phaedrus, the 
true rhetor must be able to move the democratic psyche just as well as the democrat.  To do this, 
the rhetor cannot avoid flattery but must be able to adapt it to a more rational and moral end.  For 
any other logos that has been previously established will automatically fail, since the democrat 
“doesn’t admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone tells him that some 
pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to evil ones… he denies all this and declares 
that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally” (561b-c).  Given Socrates’ outline of the 
democratic psyche, the correcting logos of the true rhetor must be presented in a palatable 
manner.  A spoonful of sugar must help the pharmakon go down.  On a cynic’s view, the 
democratic rhetor finds out what the audience wants to hear and gains an honorable reputation 
by presenting the audiences its own favorable predisposition.  On a more sympathetic reading 
the democratic orator, though well intentioned, is likewise mistaken about what is good for the 
community, confusing it with the will of the majority.  In contrast to both, Plato’s true rhetor 
must use what the audience finds pleasurable to convert the corrective message into an account 
that the audience will accept.  The resulting messages would then be rather indistinguishable 
from that of the pure democrat’s, save for the unknown desire of the speaker. 
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4.3.5 The Tyrannical Logos 
Tyranny emerges from democracy when the people get so drunk off the “unmixed wine of 
freedom” (562d) that any attempt at upholding order is seen as an attempt at enslavement.   
Eventually “rulers who behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers” are honored by 
the people of the city, and the old “stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and 
pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian” (562e-
563b).  This trend continues until ultimately “if anyone even puts upon himself the least degree 
of slavery, they become angry and cannot endure it” (563d, translator’s emphasis).  The resulting 
society falls into disarray as those who attempt to retain order are accused of oligarchy.  Civil 
war ensues, out of which arises a champion of the people who is given power and protection at 
the expense of the city.  Upon tasting the power over his fellow citizens, he becomes corrupt 
(564b-569c). 
 As Book IX opens the tyrannical psyche arises in similar fashion: “enjoying each in 
moderation, as he supposes, he leads a life that is neither slavish nor lawless” (572d).  Eventually 
the psyche loses control over this apparent moderation and is consumed by appetites.  No longer 
hovering between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the tyrant falls to the greatest intersubjective 
vice, loss of autonomy by surrender to insatiable worldly desire.  The tyrant becomes a slave to 
exterior circumstances, a victim of the scene.  The God Term for each tyrant is different, some 
single desire like Drugs, Alcohol, or Sex.  They may be high-functioning, sophisticated, even 
intelligent; but their motives are uncontrollable and cannot be deterred.  For the most part the 
tyrannical psyche is unable to be persuaded since it is driven not by reason, nor morality, nor 
even autonomy, but rather by a compulsive internal desire triggered by some external stimulus.  
However, Plato still offers some words concerning the rhetorical nature of the tyrant that the 
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would-be rhetor should heed.   
It seems impossible to redirect the focused tunnel vision of the tyrant.  At this point even 
the aesthetic appeal of the logos would matter little, if the aesthetic where not that which is 
already desired.  In such a case, it appears that the rhetor, upon realizing that a given interlocutor 
or mass audience is of the tyrannical stock, has little recourse save for avoidance, coercion (up to 
and including deceit and physical force) or yielding to the tyrant’s desire.  In his Letter VII Plato 
refers to these three possible reactions for dealing with a tyrant, and only really condones one: 
 
But a man who does not consult me at all, or makes it clear that he will not follow 
advice that is given him – to such a man I do not take it upon myself to offer counsel; 
nor would I use constraint upon him, not even if he were my own son.  Upon a slave I 
might force my advice, compelling him to follow it against his will; but to use 
compulsion upon a father or mother is to me an impious act, unless their judgment has 
been impaired by disease.  If they are fixed in a way of life that pleases them, though it 
may not please me, I should not antagonize them by useless admonitions, nor yet by 
flattery and complaisance encourage them in the satisfaction of desires that I would die 
rather than embrace.  This is the principle which a wise man must follow in his relations 
towards his own city.  Let him warn her, if he thinks her constitution corrupt and there is 
a prospect that his words will be listened to and not put him in danger of his life; but let 
him not use violence upon his fatherland to bring about change of constitution.  If what 
he thinks is best can only be accomplished by the exile and slaughter of men, let him 
keep his peace and pray for the welfare of himself and the city.  (331c-d) 
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It is obvious that Plato promotes disengagement from the tyrant and from tyranny, as opposed to 
violence or compliance.  Though in suggesting the possibility of piety in using force against a 
slave or one impaired by disease, it does leave open some situations wherein persuasion may be 
abandoned for force as the best recourse, since Plato uses both the metaphor of slave and disease 
to describe the tyrant. 
4.4 THE MAP OF THE PSYCHIC JOURNEY 
Though the Republic is often read as presenting a hierarchy of constitutional types, which in 
itself is practical for the rhetorician to understand, it offers something far more important to the 
would-be psychagogue.  If we strip away the value judgments that so often raise the ire of 
rhetoricians and democratic adherents in general, we simply see the movements of the soul 
mapped out in its downward trajectory.  Such a map is unnecessary for those ascendant souls 
who have broken free of their material bonds and follow the orbits of the spheres in heaven.  It is 
only of use for those practically minded philosophers who wish to make the perilous return to the 
depths of the cave for the purpose of guiding other souls on their journey.   
The way down, it turns out, is not very surprising.  As is logical, it is the reverse of the 
way up.  That is to say, that if we traced the process backward from the tyrant to the aristocrat, 
we would be tracing another well-known movement of the soul in Platonic philosophy.  For if 
the soul were to reverse itself, the tyrant would move from the singular attraction to some outside 
stimulus – let’s say an erotic fixation on a beautiful woman – to an appreciation of all such 
objects equally, which would lead to a democratic appreciation for the act of looking at beautiful 
women.  From the democrat’s appreciation for looking at beautiful women in general, we would 
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see in the emergent oligarch an appreciation for the agency of women and a desire to increase the 
effectiveness of that agency.  From there, as the oligarch transforms into a timocrat, we would 
see the valuation of the moral goodness and overall virtue of womankind.  And finally, the 
aristocrat comes to contemplate and appreciate the very purpose, the essential concept of 
womanhood.  The constitutional degeneration is thus Diotima’s ladder in reverse; that ladder 
upon which Diotima instructs us to move from the love a beautiful body, to the love of all 
beautiful bodies, to the love of beautiful souls, to the love of beautiful laws, to the love of 
beautiful thoughts, to the love of the Beautiful (Sym. 210a-211c). 
At the heart of the Platonic pentadic movement, however, is a triad of appetite, spirit and 
reason that provides the basic roadmap of outward, inward, and upward – and, of course, its 
reverse.  Plato indicates the significance of this movement for the rhetorician especially; for if 
you juxtapose the Gorgias with the Phaedrus on either side of the Republic, you see more than 
arguments for and against rhetorical practice.  You see the katabasis and anabasis of Socrates – 
his descent into the underworld and subsequent return.  In the Gorgias, Socrates moves from a 
theoretical discussion with Gorgias about the nature of rhetoric, to a spirited discussion with 
Polus about the power of rhetoric,298 to a hedonistic discussion with Callicles about the appetites 
that rhetorical practice can satiate.299  Callicles warns Socrates that his lack of rhetorical 
knowledge might be his demise should he ever be brought up on false charges, thus 
                                               
298 Polus means “colt.”  Socrates puns on the name in conversation, calling him a colt that is young and passionate – 
hence, “spirited” (463e). 
299 For a detailed analysis of the three interlocutors as personifications of distinct aspect of rhetoric, see Adele 
Sptizer. “The Self-Reference of the Gorgias.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 8.1 (1975): 1-22.  Although Spitzer 
specifically compares concepts between the Gorgias and the Republics, she does not realize, or at least does not 
acknowledge, the close relationship that these characters have with the elements of the psyche.  See also Seth 
Benardete’s comment that “The three interlocutors of the Gorgias exhibit rhetoric.  They are the logos of Socrates’ 
geometrical schemes” (The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 7).  
 167 
foreshadowing the manner of his death (486a-486b).300  And at the end of the movement, 
Socrates relays an eschatological myth about the final judgment of the soul (523aff).301  By way 
of the logos, Socrates has descended into the depths of the democratic psyche and has come to 
realize an astonishing fact: his dialectic alone cannot cure it.  Socrates, in the Gorgias, is a 
failure.302  He has spoken the truth bluntly and has persuaded no one, just as he remains 
unpersuaded.  Both arts have failed.  He is the mirror image of the Embassy to Achilles – one 
great philosophical hero sent to reintegrate the personifications of a fragmented soul, but to no 
avail.  And as Achilles plight began with a mortal’s judgment of three naked goddesses, Socrates 
ends with three gods judging his naked soul.  He expects, however, to spend eternity in the Isles 
of the Blessed (526c). 
In the Republic, Socrates descends [katabaino] into the depths of the underworld through 
a strange reflection of the movement in the Gorgias.303  Before discussing the nature of the soul 
with Plato’s brothers, Socrates speaks about justice first with the old temperate money-maker, 
Cephalus; next with his rough but agreeable son, Polemarchus;304 and finally with the intelligent 
and tyrant-praising sophist, Thrasymachus.305  At the end of this dialogue we are met with 
another eschatological myth, this time about eternal reincarnation.  It ends with the return of a 
soul back to its home by way of the hot plains and flowing river of forgetfulness.  But this soul 
                                               
300 It is worthy to note that Callicles is saying this as a friend, and such good-will does not seem to be ironic.  
301 Actually, Socrates refers to it as both a myth [μῦθος] and an account [λόγος] of the truth . 
302 On the failure of Socrates, and by extension, his dialectic, to cure any of the souls in the Gorgias, see Charles 
Kauffman.  “Enactment as Argument in the Gorgias.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 12.2 (1979): 114-129.  See also, 
David Roochnik. “Commentary on Teloh.” In Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. 
Volume XXIII, 2007. 2008. 88-92. 
303 ‘κατέβην’ is literally the first word of the dialogue.  For a thorough analysis of the underworld journey motif in 
the Republic, see Eva Brann. “The Music of the Republic.” St. John’s Review 39.1&2 (1989-90): 1-103.   
304 Much like Polus, Polemarchus’ name is indicative of the middle element as it literally means “warlord.”  
305 This brief interpretation of the opening characters as they represent elements and/or types of the soul is indebted 
to the analysis of Kenneth Dorter. “Socrates’ Refutation of Thrasymachus and Treatment of Virtue.”  Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 7.1 (1974) 25-46. 
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has retained with it the knowledge of the psyche that it had obtained in the underworld, 
remembering what others had forgotten.  Socrates is thus armed with the knowledge of a 
complex, immortal soul whose intrapersonal communication dictates the motives and actions of 
human beings.  He ends the story in his own voice telling the interlocutors to remember the 
upward way [ano hodon] (221c). 
 The Phaedrus finds Socrates on a hot day alongside a running river.  It is the only 
dialogue in which he is not at home within the walls of Athens.  Before his return home, he 
enters into a speech competition with an absent sophist, Lysias, brother of Polemarchus.306  In 
this competition, three speeches are offered for the affection of an absent boy, though Phaedrus 
plays the role of judge.  It would be easy to agree with other commentators that each speech 
speaks to a different element in the auditor’s soul, the first highlighting pleasure, the second 
honor, the third the true love of wisdom.307  But then Socrates’ method would have not evolved 
at all from the Gorgias with the minor exception that instead of three separate appeals to a 
distinct part of the soul personified, we would have three separate appeals to a part of the soul 
housed in a single body.  As with the Embassy and the Gorgias, this approach is bound to fail.308   
                                               
306 We learn in the Phaedrus that Polemarchus has turned to philosophy (257b). 
307 See n.274. 
308 I hold that this is what Socrates means when he cryptically connects Gorgias and Thrasymachus to the Rhetoric 
of Nestor and the Rhetoric of Odysseus written “in their spare time in Troy” (261b-c).  Not only do these two 
sophists mark the beginning and the end of Socrates’ psychic decent in the above narrative, but both have a detailed 
knowledge of some aspect of psychology.  Gorgias, as we have seen, has a practical theory of the soul’s motives that 
directly prefigures Plato’s own model.  And Thrasymachus is heralded in the Phaedrus as one “who knows best how 
to inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again with his words’ magic spell” (267c-d).  
Likewise, it is Nestor, in forming the Embassy, who knows the general make-up of the soul; while Odysseus is the 
wily manipulator who heads the Embassy.  Moreover, the Embassy speeches that each gives are two of the only 
speeches in the Iliad that could have been composed beforehand, during some time of leisure, as both take place 
after a feast with prior knowledge of the impeding rhetorical situation.  Conversely, Socrates’ mention of Palamedes 
in connection with Zeno (261b; 261d) indicts a purely dialectical inquiry as insufficiently complete for the guiding 
of souls through speech.  Palamedes, though cunning in his own right, was brought up on false charges by Odysseus 
and killed, much like Socrates himself (in fairness to Odysseus, it was Palamedes who exposed his ruse to escape 
military service. It is worthy to note that Gorgias appropriates the trial of Palamedes for one of his extant speeches.  
For a related exploration of the interconnection between Gorgias’ speech and Socrates’ later myth of Theuth (274c-
 169 
What I suggest, following Ferrari’s observation that Socrates’ first speech appears crafted 
to a timocratic soul,309 is that the whole soul of the auditor is addressed in each speech.  Thus, we 
are witnessing an example of the subtle reformation of the soul’s elements through words – the 
three speeches serving as intermediaries between soul types, yet still following the basic path of 
“outwards, inwards, upwards.”  For each speech contains appeals to pleasure, honor, and reason; 
but with different orientations.  The first speech casts the lover as wanton pleasure-seeker who 
lacks self-control.310  In the constitutional terms of the Republic, the lover is a democrat who 
cares little for honor or shame, for keeping promises or being loyal, for anything other than the 
satisfaction of his own momentary desire – a democrat is flippant, so untrustworthy in most 
respects.  What Lysias proposes is a business-like contract with an oligarchic soul, which would 
transform the beloved in to an oligarch as well.  For this reason the entire speech is a cost/benefit 
analysis that illustrates that such an arrangement maximizes utility, pleasure and profit.  Hence, 
the closing of the speech: “this sort of thing is not supposed to cause any harm, and really should 
work to the benefit of both sides” (234c). 
In the second speech, Socrates admits that Lysias is right to condemn the wantonness of 
the lover and the constancy of the non-lover (235e-236a).  The oligarch maintains a high degree 
of self-control after all, with reason and spirit underfoot.  Socrates’ first speech opens with 
similar talk of analyzing benefit and harm, but the orientation is decidedly different.  Rather than 
focus on material benefit, which is mentioned as a final consideration, the entire analysis is cast 
in the terms of strength and weakness.  The lover seeks to exercise his strength over the beloved, 
                                                                                                                                                       
275b), see Nightingale, Genres 149-154).  What is needed is not a theoretical, analytic model of the soul but an 
integrated, organic model that could only be gained by the perilous decent into the depths of the soul itself – what is 
needed, and what Socrates offers upon his return, is a Rhetoric of Priam.     
309 Again, see n.274. 
310 Speaking in terms almost straight from the Republic, the lover is not σωφρονέω, ‘of sound mind’ – a cognate of 
sophrosune – and “cannot control himself” [ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δύνασθαι αὑτῶν κρατεῖν] (231d). 
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weakening him in mind, body, and possessions – and there is no pleasure to be found besides, 
only disgust.  This is not a speech designed to appeal to the spirited element qua spirited element 
– for it is Socrates’ spirit that protests the speech from start to finish, such that he hides his head 
in shame while he speaks (237a) and cannot even bring himself to conclude (241d) – this is a 
speech aimed to transform an oligarch into a timocrat, shifting orientation from material 
cost/benefit analysis towards the care of the inner possessions of the psyche.  Accordingly, the 
conclusion is a call to shift priority from material value to moral value so that the beloved does 
not end up “giving himself to a man who is deceitful, irritable, jealous, disgusting, harmful to his 
property, harmful to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the cultivation if his soul, 
which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men” (241c). 
With the orientation now turned to the moral valuation of one’s soul, Socrates can 
identify the shame he felt while chastising love (243b; 243d).  Socrates’ motives to rectify his 
transgressions are one that any timocrat could appreciate, for he has been warned by his guiding 
spirit and familiar divine sign [to daimonion te kai to eiothos semeion]311 that he should fear 
insulting the gods more than loss of victory in a speech contest (242b-c).  By resolving to 
literally “take back” his previous words in the palinode, Socrates can now turn back from the 
cave which he had entered in order to reach Phaedrus’ soul, and so he emerges from his own 
head covering, leading Phaedrus with him (243b).  So in his second speech, Socrates hopes to 
turn Phaedrus, if not to aristocracy, at least towards it by showing him a likeness [eoiken] in 
words of the properly balanced soul (246a).  In so doing, he brings his own soul one step closer 
to breaking free of the cycle of psychic reincarnation; one step closer to the ascent into heaven 
                                               
311 The wording suggests one of the more enigmatic fragments of Heraclitus (D. 119): ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.  
Though it is admittedly anachronistic to read any relevance to rhetorical theory in the terminology, it is worthwhile 
to note that in this case, Socrates’ daimon and characteristic sign did influence the ethos of his speech. 
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and a union with Being.  Thus rhetoric is a psychagogic art on two plains; it is an art of 
periagoge – leading around – for the audience; and an art of anagoge – leading upwards – for the 
speaker. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that a model of the psyche and a model of the logos 
can be discovered within the corpus of Plato that meet the criteria for a psychagogic rhetoric laid 
out in the Phaedrus.  The result is a map of the soul’s movements and a guidebook for leading 
the soul on its journey by means of speech.  But so far I have only established that such a 
rhetoric can be constructed.  In the remaining chapters, I demonstrate that these movements were 
recognized by rhetoricians and orators and provided the basis for a rhetorical tradition that 
flowed through late antiquity and the Middle Ages.  I take as my own guide these two plains of 
psychagogic activity.  In the next chapter on St. Augustine, I explore rhetoric as the art of turning 
the audience around in orientation towards ascent.  In the final chapter on St. Bonaventure I 
explore the transformative and uplifting affects of rhetoric on the speaker.  
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5.0  THE PERIAGOGIC RHETORIC OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 
Having traced out the components and mechanisms of the psychagogic tradition as they 
culminated in the works of Plato, I now turn my attention to the reception and innovation of this 
tradition in the rhetorical thought of St. Augustine.  In most disciplinary histories, establishing 
the continuity of the tradition up to and through Augustine would be a simple task of tracing its 
dissemination through such figures as Cicero, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Victorinus.  The primary 
texts which Augustine would have engaged are filled with descriptions of the structures and 
movements necessary for psychagogic rhetoric, and the secondary scholarship has demonstrated 
a pervasive Platonic influence on the thought of the saint.312  Frederick van Fleteren has gone so 
far as to trace the Porphyrian influence on Augustine’s notion of spiritual reformation through 
liberal arts study as presented in the first three books of On Christian Doctrine (DDC).313   
In his own writings, Augustine displays an awareness of the basic “outward, inward, 
upward” motion of ascent found in Plato and reformed in Plotinus.314  He describes such a 
contemplative ascent after reading the “books of the Platonists” [platonicorum libros] in the 
Confessions (7.17.23),315 and presents a radical transformation of the ascent in conversation with 
                                               
312 Both the primary and secondary texts will be described in more detail below.  
313 “St. Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts: The Background to De doctrina Christiana.” De doctrina 
Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture. Ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and Pamela Bright.  Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995. 14-24. 
314  For example, see Enneads 1.6 “On Beauty”. 
315 Unless otherwise noted, English translations of the Confessions come from the F.J. Sheed translation.  I find it 
especially fitting for this study as it is recommended by notable Augustinian scholars such as Peter Brown and 
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his mother, Monica, at Ostia (9.10.23).  Methodologically, the philological and philosophical 
evidence to support Augustine as part of this tradition is abundant.   
However, rhetorical histories of St. Augustine are somewhat unique regarding the 
question of Platonism and must be examined closely for the purposes of the present study.  
Compared to Plato, the secondary rhetorical literature concerning Augustine is fairly small.316  It 
is, however, fairly positive in its assessment.  Much of that, I would argue, has to do with the 
noticeable absence of Plato.  The vast majority of treatments tend to overlook any connection to 
Plato and Platonic thought in Augustine’s rhetorical theory, while those that do entertain the 
question tend to systematically remove Platonic connections from Augustine’s work on 
rhetoric.317   
None have been so thoroughgoing in their attempts to sanitize St. Augustine of Platonic 
thought as Calvin L. Troup in the only book-length treatment of the subject within the discipline, 
                                                                                                                                                       
James O’Donnell for its ability to capture the “poetry” and “eloquence” of Saint Augustine’s language. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Co. 2006.  It is a reprint of the 1942 Sheed and Ward edition with additional 
notes by Patristics scholar Michael P. Foley).  The Latin comes from James J. O’Donnell’s Augustine: Confession 
Text and Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Accessed online 12/12/13. <http://www9.georgetown.edu/ 
faculty/jod/conf/>. 
316 Though by no means exhaustive, in addition to the treatment Augustine finds in broader histories like Kennedy’s 
Classical Rhetoric and James J. Murphy’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages:A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint 
Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), articles often cited, or recently 
published, in prominent disciplinary journals or by historians of rhetoric would be Murphy. “St. Augustine and the 
Christianization of Rhetoric.” Western Speech Communication Journal 22 (1958): 24-29; “Saint Augustine and the 
Debate about a Christian Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (1960): 400–410; and “The Metarhetorics of 
Plato, Augustine, and McLuhan: A Pointing Essay”; Ernest L. Fortin, “Augustine and the Problem of Christian 
Rhetoric.” Augustinian Studies 5 (1974): 85-100; Michael C. Leff. “St. Augustine and Martianus Capella: 
Continuity and Change in Fifth-Century Latin Rhetorical Theory.” Communication Quarterly 24.4 (1976): 2–9; W. 
R. Johnson. “Isocrates Flowering: The Rhetoric of Augustine.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 9 (1976): 217-231; Gerald A. 
Press. “The Subject and Structure of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana.” Augustinian Studies 11(1980): 99-124; 
and “Doctrina in Augustine's De doctrina christiana.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 17.2 (1984): 98-120; Martin 
Camargo. “‘Non solum sibi sed aliis etiam’; Calvin L. Troup. Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of 
Augustine’s Confessions; James M. Farrell. “The Rhetoric(s) of St. Augustine’s Confessions.” Augustinian Studies 
39:2 (2008) 265–291; Dave Tell. “Augustine and the ‘Chair of Lies’: Rhetoric in the Confessions.”  Rhetorica 28.4 
(2010): 384-407. 
317 For example, Johnson “Isocrates Flowering,” Camargo “Non solum,” and Troup Temporality each either suppose 
or attempt to demonstrate a substantial distance between Augustine’s rhetorical thought and Platonism.  Major 
recent exceptions have been some investigations by Rita Copeland, which are discussed more fully below. 
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Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions.318  His arguments 
present an apparently formidable barrier that it is prudent to deconstruct before reading 
Augustine’s rhetoric as Platonic.  Fortunately the arguments that Troup makes for such a 
dismissal are easily refuted.  But contemplating the uncritical disciplinary reception of his basic 
assumptions reveals some of the biases that rhetoricians have against Plato and his successors, 
and the problems to which those biases can lead.319 
5.1 METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 
In Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom, Troup dismisses the notion that Saint Augustine was 
influenced by the Platonists while writing the Confessions.  Accordingly, anyone who reads the 
Confessions as being Neoplatonic in nature reads it incorrectly.  This realization would have a 
profound impact on how one could interpret Augustine’s rhetorical theory.  So as not to risk an 
overly reductive exposition of Troup’s position, it is best to present him on his own terms: 
 
Troup’s Roadblock 
Here we arrive at a pivotal point for interpreting the Confessions.  Regarding 
rhetoric, philosophy, and interpretation, the Incarnation contradicts Neoplatonism.  Just 
as the Neoplatonists of Augustine’s day denied the Incarnation, today’s dominant critical 
debate about the degree of Neoplatonic influence in the Confessions discounts the 
                                               
318 Cited above in n.316. This statement is true so far as I am aware, and it is the only book on Augustinian rhetoric 
consistently cited in the disciplinary literature. 
319 This is not to suggest that no one has been critical of Troup’s analysis, though few have.  Dave Tell, for example, 
asserts that Troup’s conclusion about Saint Augustine’s rhetorical theory simply place him, ironically, in a common-
place tradition that finds it roots in Plato.  See Tell, “Chair of Lies” 391, 406. 
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Incarnation as an issue in interpreting the text.  Therefore, textual criticism within the 
terms of the debate produces inadequate readings, for they cannot account for the 
Incarnation or its grounded and time-bound rhetorical implications. 
Readings that presume Neoplatonic ascendancy in the text before they engage it 
must discount the Incarnation, because any serious attempt to account for the embodied 
Logos as significant reveals their presumption and explodes the interpretation.  The 
Neoplatonic interpretive paradigm, once imposed upon the Confessions, cannot allow the 
Incarnation to disrupt the tendency of that paradigm to produce readings of the text that 
promote the Neoplatonic impulse to escape the material world in pursuit of a purely 
intellectual, disembodied, and transcendent union with “the One.” 
The Neoplatonic impulse is profoundly anti-Incarnational and decidedly 
antirhetorical.  It eschews the human body and the material world as the cause of evil; 
despises society, community, and human relations; and covets departure from time and 
space into a transcendent eternity.  The incarnational impulse, by contrast, invests the 
human being – soul and body – with eternal significance in the temporal, social, and 
communal dimensions of experience.320  
 
If Troup’s basic assumptions are true, St. Augustine should have no place in the present study, 
since Neoplatonism would be patently incompatible with both rhetorical activity and orthodox 
Christianity.   
Of course, this may just be a problem in terminology.  There is no reason that one could 
not reject the Platonism of Plotinus or Porphyry, but still remain an adherent to the general tenets 
                                               
320 Temporality 5-6. 
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of Plato and rhetorical psychagogy.  In this case, my thesis could continue unchallenged.  
However, Troup makes it clear that his aim is to purge notions of Plato from Augustine as far as 
possible: from minimizing Cicero’s indebtedness to Plato;321 to arguing for Augustine’s 
preference for Cicero over Plato;322 to Augustine recognizing “himself as a creature, radically 
other than God, with no internal means of achieving union with God in any Platonic or 
Neoplatonic sense”;323 to concluding that Augustine’s conception of his relationship to God is 
“anti-Platonic.”324  In Troup’s reading, Augustine’s rejection of Platonism is broadly defined. 
Troup warns us against identifying latent Neoplatonic systems in Saint Augustine 
“without textual evidence or contrary to it.”325  Rather, he proposes to leave the “terms of the 
debate” about Platonism behind while returning “to the Confessions itself to inquire directly into 
Augustine’s work on its own terms and in its own context.”326  This is a curious move, since he 
has just spent a good deal of time supporting the thesis that when Augustine says he rejects 
rhetoric, what he is really doing is rejecting the Second Sophistic and transforming rhetorical 
practice.327  Where he sees Augustine redeeming rhetoric, the term itself is not to be found.328  
                                               
321 Ibid. 16-20. 
322 Ibid. 20-23; See especially the interpretation that Troup gives to City of God 2.14 (22).  In this chapter, Augustine 
agrees with Plato’s views on censuring poetry that would dishonor the gods.  Augustine goes so far as to “award the 
palm to a Greek, Plato” [Graeco Platoni potius palma danda est] for his views.  Augustine closes his argument with 
a supporting quote from Cicero. Troup argues that Augustine “having drawn on Cicero, diminishes the image of 
Plato.  This passage is particularly important because in it Augustine privileges Cicero’s view over Plato’s, even 
though the two views are somewhat similar” (Temporality 22).  In this passage of Augustine, Cicero is clearly used 
as a secondary source that endorses Plato’s view, and Augustine gives no noticeable endorsement of Cicero over 
Plato – he does not hand the palm over in any obvious way.  This interpretive practice of reading an author in or out 
of St. Augustine’s good graces when no obvious endorsement or rejection is offered by Augustine is typical of the 
overall strategy of Troup throughout the book.  Translations of City of God are taken from Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2. Trans. Marcus Dods.  Ed. Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing 
Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. Accessed online 12/10/2013. <http://www. 
newadvent.org/fathers/120102.htm>.  Latin text comes from J.P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 42. 
323 Ibid. 131. 
324 Ibid. 147.  
325 Ibid. 35.  
326 Ibid. 35. 
327 This is the basic argument of his Ch. 1 “The Integrity of Philosophy and Rhetoric” (Ibid. 11-35).  
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Augustine says that he has rejected rhetoric.  Conversely, Troup argues that when Augustine 
advocates appropriating what is true in Platonic philosophy for use in Christianity, as the 
Israelites did gold from Egypt (7.9.15), what he is really advocating is a wholesale break from 
Platonism.329  Surely it is an odd sort of interpretive strategy to take Augustine’s own 
acknowledged critical appropriation of Neoplatonic principles as really signifying a wholesale 
dismissal, while also taking his wholesale dismissal of rhetoric as really signifying a critical 
acceptance.  This is simply the presumed antipathy of Plato versus rhetoric transferred onto the 
interpretive field of St. Augustine’s texts.  If we look closer at Troup’s central claim we can see 
just how powerful the anti-Plato bias truly is. 
The central claim upon which Troup’s dismissal of Neoplatonic thought rests is the 
assumption that Neoplatonism is inherently and essentially anti-Incarnational.  It is true the 
Porphyry and other Platonists rejected the idea of the Incarnation.  However Troup transforms 
this well-known historical fact into an a priori indictment of all who might read Augustine as 
having appropriated Platonic thought.  Such interpreters, he maintains, cannot account for the 
Incarnation.  It is a totalizing indictment that rejects out-of-hand the works of Etienne Gilson, 
                                                                                                                                                       
328 See the section in Ch. 1 “Confessions Revisited” (Ibid. 28-32).  Troup goes so far as to quote St. Augustine’s 
encounter with the Cicero’s Hortensius, at which point he rejects the style of what is being said for the substance of 
what is being said, as evidence that what Augustine is really advocating is a union of style and substance (29).  The 
relevant portion of Troup’s text and translation runs as such: “Nor did it impress me by its way of speaking but 
rather by what it spoke” [neque mihi locutionem, sed quod loquebatur persuaserat] (Conf. 3.4.7).  If we take 
Augustine on his own terms, he was persuaded by what was said, not how it was said.  Nowhere do the terms 
themselves advocate the union of the two.  This is not to say that I disagree with Troup’s positive interpretation of 
rhetoric in the Confessions, but I acknowledge that this interpretation also identifies a latent system, albeit of 
rhetoric, that runs “contrary to the textual evidence.” 
329 Ibid. 69.  Granted, Troup admits that St. Augustine “recovered truths of great value from the Neoplatonists” but 
emphasizes that the “Israelites were not sharing the gold with the Egyptians, they were ‘redeeming’ it from their 
slave masters.  And they left.”  However, he gives no indication of what these truths were or how they were 
redeemed.  If Troup means to say that Augustine learned about the immateriality of God and His Trinitarian nature 
from the Neoplatonists, and rejected their rejection of the Incarnation, that is not a novel position and can be found 
in many of the contemporary authors that Troup dismisses.  
 178 
John J. O’Meara, Mary T. Clark, Robert J. O’Connell,330 and by extension, H.I. Marrou, Pierre 
Hadot, and van Fleteren, to name a few.  The argument and evidence in support of the claim is 
simple: 
 
For instance, one of the most renowned current scholars in the debate about influence of 
Neoplatonism on Augustine, Robert J. O’Connell, dismisses the significance of the 
Incarnation in the Confessions (Odyssey, 24).  Although most scholars are not so explicit, 
the Incarnation is rarely if ever made central in the interpretation of the Confessions and 
is often ignored entirely.331 
 
The statement is, quite simply, false.  But let us be clear on what Troup thinks he finds from 
taking such a radical departure “from the predominant assumptions guiding interpretation of the 
Confessions on exactly this point.”332  He summarizes the rhetorical significance of the 
Incarnation for Augustine in this way:  
 
In Augustine’s terms, what he embraces is the speaking, embodied, Logos, who brings 
eternal wisdom into the contingency of temporal life.  This “Lord Jesus Christ” becomes 
a model for temporal life because through the Incarnation the Logos volitionally enters 
time to enact and embody eternal principles of goodness and wisdom, producing a 
coherent and fully integrated life in a world defined by its contingent, temporal frame.333 
 
                                               
330 Temporality 34. 
331 Ibid. 6-7.  Note that O’Connell is the most controversial of such interpreters writing in 1969. 
332 Ibid. 75. 
333 Ibid. 
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A few examples of works taken from some of the scholars Troup identifies will suffice to 
demonstrate that his indictment is fallacious and that his departure from their ideas is not so 
radical.  
5.1.1 The Incarnation and Philosophy in Etienne Gilson 
Perhaps the most obvious disconfirming example of Troup’s assumption would be Gilson’s 
Philosophie et Incarnation selon saint Augustin, a published version of his 1947 address to the 
Institute of Medieval Studies at the University of Montreal.334  It is a meditation on being and 
becoming that not only considers the Incarnation as central to the Confessions, but considers 
Augustine’s account of the Incarnation in the Confessions as central to philosophy.  Benoit 
Lacroix, an original attendee at the address, summarizes the argument in the most germane 
terms: “Following his usual method, and expressing himself with his habitual delicacy and depth, 
the eminent medievalist guided his audience, through the various stages of his research, to the 
conclusion that philosophy must lead to the Incarnation unless the philosopher is to retrace his 
steps along a road that can lead only to despair.”335  Indeed, Gilson appears to prefigure Troup’s 
own assessment, and deserves to be cited as supporting, not conflicting, with his findings:  
 
God alone has saved Augustine from this despair, because the Christian God is at once 
He who is, He who creates and He who saves.  Philosophy does not lack knowledge of 
Him who is, and even of Him who creates, but He who saves remains a mystery for 
philosophers who cannot penetrate its secret.  And yet, this mystery alone makes the 
                                               
334 Institut d'Etudes medievales, Universite de Montreal, 1947. 
335 Traditio. 6 (1948): 377-378. 
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world intelligible. An historical cause, which itself transcends history and which 
nevertheless could desire to be involved in history, in order to transform time into 
eternity – how could philosophy grasp such a cause?336 
5.1.2 Rhetoric as Theology in John J. O’Meara 
O’Meara also continually identifies the significance of the Incarnation in Augustine’s conversion 
throughout a number of his works and routinely acknowledges it as one of major differences that 
Augustine’s thought has in contrast to that of the Neoplatonists.  In “Neoplatonism and the 
Conversion of Augustine,”337 O’Meara recognizes that in the Confessions: 
 
Augustine marveled at the similarity, as he thought, between the Neoplatonic principles, 
sometimes called the Father and the Father’s mind, and the Christian Father and Word.  
He goes on to say that the Platonists did not recognize the Word when it became 
incarnate.  Their pride could not accept the humiliation of birth of a woman, and still less 
death on a cross…They saw whither they were to go, but did not see the way, that is 
Christ.  He himself, however, although he at first shared in their pride and consequently 
their foolishness, did accept Christ, and in that acceptance found strength to overcome all 
difficulties.338 
 
                                               
336 Translation of Philosophie 54-55, from Benoit “Review” 378. 
337 In O’Meara. Studies in Augustine and Eriugena. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992. 
121-131. Originally published as “Neoplatonism in the Conversion of Saint Augustine.” Dominican Studies 3 
(1950): 331-43.   
338 Ibid. 124. 
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O’Meara acknowledges this contrast as central to Augustine’s theological rhetoric, stating that 
both the similarities and differences that Augustine identifies in the Confessions “give at once the 
history of his conversion and at the same time a statement of an idea, a theme, or τόποϛ, to which 
he is ever recurring and which reveals to us the germs of the master-ideas of the great Doctor 
Gratiae.”339  More importantly, in “A Master-Motif in Augustine,”340 O’Meara argues that such a 
synthesis of Platonist triads and Christian Trinitarian theory could only be possible by a master 
rhetorician such as Augustine: 
 
It will hardly be disputed that St. Augustine was capable of formulating a synthesis, 
exploiting its possibilities, and commending it in enthusiastic language to the sympathetic 
consideration of his fellow men…Augustine had the kind of mind which worked, not 
meticulously in groping analysis, but universally, if I may say so, in intuitive synthesis.  
His rhetorical training and profession, moreover, tended to help him in the development 
of a particular theme, whether by the suggestion involved in antithesis, chiasmus, and 
alliteration, or the over-elaboration and likewise neglect of detail incidental to 
hyperbole…Augustine was a mastermind of his age.341 
 
But Troup seems to dispute just this point.  He argues that St. Augustine is incapable of making 
just this synthesis.  In so doing, Troup does not realize that he is not indicting the Platonists, but 
is instead indicting Augustine’s own rhetorical ability, transforming the saint into a rigid 
dogmatist who cannot see beyond systematic differences and so has no recourse other than 
                                               
339 Ibid. 125. 
340 Studies 132-139.  Originally published as “A Master-Motif in St. Augustine.” Actes du premier Congrès de la 
Fédération Internationale des Associations d’études classiques.  Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1951. 312-317. 
341 Ibid. 132.  
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wholesale dismissal.  Time and time again O’Meara quotes or cites Augustine’s Letter 118, 
which demonstrates that as late as 410 he held no such a priori objection to the essence of 
Platonism on the grounds of the Incarnation, though he did object to certain Platonic 
philosophers: 
 
the example of divine humility, which in the fullness of time was furnished by our Lord 
Jesus Christ – that one example before which, even in the mind [animo]of the most head-
strong and arrogant, all pride bends, breaks, and dies [17]…The Platonist school of 
philosophers [Platonicae gentis philosophos] felt it necessary to submit with pious 
homage to Christ and to apprehend the Incarnate Word of God [et intelligere Verbum Dei 
homine indutum] [21]…Then flourished at Rome the school of Plotinus which had as 
scholars many men of great acuteness and ability.  But some of them were corrupted by 
curious inquiries into magic, and others, recognizing in the Lord Jesus Christ the 
embodiment of Truth and Wisdom, passed into his service [33].342  
 
There is an important lesson here, for this is, I think, a limitation with histories of Augustine’s 
rhetorical theory in general: they often focus on how his religious conversion transformed his 
rhetorical theory.  Here we are one-upped by the historians of his Neoplatonic appropriations, for 
they indicate how his rhetorical training enabled his conversion and informed his theology.  In 
synthesizing Platonic thought with orthodox Christianity, Augustine is thus engaged in the 
                                               
342 The translation is taken from O’Meara. The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine's Mind up to His 
Conversion. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Alba House, 2001. 142.  Though it appears as a continuous quotation in the 
text, it is actually a compilation from the letter, which I’ve indicated with the addition of bracketed paragraph 
markers and ellipses. He often cites the letter, see “Neoplatonism and Conversion” 126 and “Master-Motif” 136. 
The Latin text is taken from Migne, PL 33. 
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venerable rhetorical tradition of finding concordance in discordant canons.  Rhetoric for 
Augustine, as for many of the Patrisitics, was not simply a tool for evangelization; it was a 
method of theological inquiry. 
5.1.3 The Incarnation as Symbolic Communication in Robert J. O’Connell 
The final, and most ironic, of the disconfirming examples to Troup’s foundational hypothesis 
comes from O’Connell himself.  To be fair, O’Connell does appear to diminish the importance of 
the Incarnation in the citation given by Troup.343  But to be equally fair to O’Connell, Troup 
ignores what significance he does give to the Incarnation – as a model for symbolic action: 
 
Incarnation, Symbol, and Authority 
In this comprehensive economy of return, the ultimate condescension of Divine 
Providence is Incarnation: The Logos Himself has been “made flesh” to call us back, 
“remind” us, make us “know again” the happiness we left. 
 All the works and words of men perform a similar admonitory function.  Their 
effect is to remind the soul, turn its attention from “outer,” sensible realities to “within” 
itself where it can contact the intelligible Light…fallen into a body and immersed in 
sense-realities, it must communicate with other souls through the indirect medium of 
language, gesture, sign, and symbol…344 
 
                                               
343 St. Augustine’s Confessions: Odyssey of Soul.  Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969. 24. 
344 Ibid. 28.  
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Even O’Connell then, who alone among the authors I’ve canvassed appears to diminish the 
significance of the Incarnation in the Confessions, sees the Incarnation as a model for human 
rhetorical activity.  Indeed, the model is very similar to Troup’s own, with notable differences, 
namely the allusions to Neoplatonism.  Troup may disagree with O’Connell’s assessment; he 
may disagree with the assessments of Gilson and O’Meara as well.  We do not know, because he 
does not engage their thoughts on the issue, nor does he simply ignore their thoughts on the 
issue; rather, he states that their thoughts on the issue mostly do not exist and cannot exist in any 
positive sense, but can only exist in antipathy to the Incarnation and to rhetoric.  He identifies 
such an antipathy as a short-coming in the methodology of their analysis, and moves on. 
5.1.4 Un-Critical Reception 
Misrepresenting the nature of, and subsequently dismissing, the last seventy years of Augustinian 
studies is a weakness in Troup’s argument to say the least.  But the uncritical reception of his 
characterization signals a problem within the discipline itself.  In framing the study as “rhetoric 
versus Platonism” in the interpretation of St. Augustine, and adjudicating in favor of rhetoric, the 
work has been heralded as a “dismantling of the Neoplatonic paradigm surrounding the 
Confessions” that demonstrates “that Neoplatonism, as a system of meaning, could not cope 
adequately with the Confessions…”345  As Martin J. Medhurst’s endorsement states “Troup pulls 
no punches…convincingly demonstrating that anyone who purports to teach Augustine, his 
                                               
345 Michael E. Eidenmuller. “Review: Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom.”  Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4.1 (2001): 
178-180 (p. 179). 
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rhetoric, or his Confessions must first understand the centerpiece of Augustine’s thought – the 
Word incarnate.”346   
But no one seems to see that Troup is shadow-boxing.  The Incarnation is well accounted 
for amongst the “Neoplatonizers” of Augustine, even if some do not make it the focus of their 
study, and his rhetoric is as well.  Rather, concerning Neoplatonic philosophy, Troup shows only 
that Porphyry likely would not have enjoyed the Confessions, for it was he who was unable to 
reconcile the Incarnation with his system of philosophy.  As a discipline, we seem only too 
happy to make the equation of Gilson and O’Meara to Plato and Porphyry, and thereby 
uncritically accept the assessment of an Augustinian rhetoric sanitized of its Platonic elements.  
But such a wholesale dismissal gravely under-appreciates both the internal struggle that 
Augustine underwent concerning just these issues, as well as his own genius in reconciling the 
one mode of thought with the other.  What is more, it quarantines insightful scholarship that can 
inform our own.  Ultimately, dismissing the Platonic aspects that Augustine does embrace 
greatly impoverishes our ability to understand his rhetorical psychology.  If he can profoundly 
transform rhetorical theories, he can also transform Platonic ones – especially when he 
repeatedly tells his readers to take from just these philosophies what is good and useful.347 
Thus I propose an opposite strategy for interpreting St. Augustine.  Rather than 
systematically removing Platonic elements from his rhetoric, we should attempt to identify them 
as much as we attempt to identify any other aspects of the acceptance and transformation of the 
rhetorical tradition in his work. 
                                               
346 Temporality dust jacket material.  
347 See Confessions 7.9.15 and DDC 2.40.60.  As van Fleteren points out, “One of the ironies of Augustine’s thought 
is that he understood the role of God incarnate in terms of the philosophy of a pagan who explicitly denied its 
possibility” (“St. Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts” 22). 
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5.2 THE TRANSMISSION OF THE PLATONIC TRADITION 
In this section I survey the confluence of rhetorical and Platonic thought in a number of the key 
sources that Augustine cites as influential to his intellectual and spiritual development.  I do this 
in order to establish that Augustine had been introduced to the concepts and vocabulary 
necessary to produce the foundations of a distinct branch of intellectual activity that Richard 
McKeon claims was an integral part of the rhetorical tradition in the Middle ages: “the tradition 
of philosophers and theologians who found in Augustine a Platonism reconstructed from the 
Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies (conscientiously reversing the process by which they 
were derived from Plato’s doctrines) and formulated in terms refurbished and simplified from 
Cicero’s rhetorical distinctions.”348 
5.2.1 Cicero 
The secondary literature on Ciceronian rhetoric is massive and I have neither the space nor the 
need to review it here.  What concerns me at this point is the explicit material about Platonic 
thought that is present in those texts of Cicero with which St. Augustine would have been 
familiar.  For this reason, Cicero takes up the largest portion of this review, since in following 
O’Meara’s principle of interpretation, I find most of what I need from Plato in Cicero himself: 
“in the matter of tracing Plotinian influence (and this holds true for all Platonist influence here) 
on Augustine…one should always ask oneself what may be inspired by Cicero.”349 
                                               
348 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” 4. 
349 Saint Augustine: Against the Academics. Trans. John J. O’Meara. Ancient Christian Writers, No.12.  
Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press. 1950. 169n.5. 
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As the major portion of my analysis of Augustine focuses on the Confessions and De 
doctrina christiana (DDC), I will confine my review of Cicero’s works to those Augustine is 
known to have read prior to 395.350  Of particular concern is evidence of those structures that 
have been identified in the previous chapters.  In the case of Cicero that means a survey of the 
tripartite condition of the soul and the four virtues of the Republic.  I do not claim this review to 
be anywhere near exhaustive, as Cicero often recounts these topics in a number of works, with 
two of the most important – the Academica and the Hortensius – being either incomplete or 
completely fragmented.  I do, however, hold the review to be minimally representative of the 
Platonic elements and terminology that Augustine would have encountered in diligently reading 
Cicero’s works.  Ultimately, I find what I need in texts other than those that are incomplete and 
can only speculate that further knowledge of those texts would reveal a more complete 
grounding in the tenets of Platonism. 
5.2.1.1 The Tripartite Soul in the Tusculan Disputations 
Cicero describes the tripartite soul explicitly in the Tusculan Disputations, stating that 
“Plato, the teacher of Xenocrates, made the soul threefold [triplicem finxit animum], placing its 
sovereign, reason [rationem], in the head [as in a citadel]; while he separated the two parts 
subject to its command, anger [iram] and desire [cupiditatem], giving to anger its seat in the 
breast [pectore], and to desire, under the diaphragm [praecordia]” (1.20).351   
                                               
350 395 is the year Augustine began writing DDC, though the fourth book was not taken up and completed closer to 
the end of his life in 426.  The Confessions was written between 397-401.  For dating the readings of Cicero, I 
follow the analysis offered by John J. O’Donnell. “Augustine’s Classical Readings.”  Recherches Augustiniennes 15 
(1980): 144-175.  Accessed online 10/12//2013. <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/texts/augread.html> 
351 English translation from Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. Trans. Andrew P. Peabody. Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Co. 1886.  The Latin text is taken from Tusculanae Disputationes. M. Tullius Cicero. Ed. M. Pohlenz. Leipzig. 
Teubner. 1918.  Accessed online 12/13/2013.  <www.perseus.tufts.edu>. 
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One prominent omission or transformation in the Latin account that concerns this study is 
the absence of the “love of honor” in the middle part.  However, the motive that honor presents is 
prominent in the Disputations.  Cicero tells us early on that “Honor nourishes the arts, and all are 
inflamed by the love of glory [ad studia gloria] to the pursuits by which it may be won” (1.4).  
He subsequently describes how although the Greeks prided musicians above all else, the Romans 
gave the greatest honors to the orator (1.4-5).  Thus he overtly connects a desire for honor with 
the practice of oratory which we will later see in the Confessions.  In the second book, Cicero 
addresses honor in terms similar to the Platonic definition of courage in that it urges 
acknowledging what is to be valued and what is to be feared.  However, this is a particularly 
Stoic permutation as what is despised as disgraceful is succumbing to pain.   
Later in the second book, Cicero introduces the concept of a more general bipartite soul, 
in which the lower [demissus/humilis], weaker [languidus] part must be controlled by reason, in 
order to control pain “as a master commands his servant, or as the general his soldier, or as a 
father his son [vel ut dominus servo vel ut imperator militi vel ut parens filio]” (2.47-48).  
Finally, while discussing the passions that effect the rational functioning of the soul in the fourth 
book, Cicero again refers to a general two-fold distinction in between the rational and irrational 
parts, placing reason in the one and specifying anger’s place alongside desire in the other 
(4.10).352 
Thus, Augustine would have encountered the basic vocabulary and conceptual structuring 
of the tripartite soul – though somewhat disjointed and reduced – in the Tusculan Disputations, if 
                                               
352 Augustine echoes both the tripartite division of the first book and the bipartite division of the fourth later in the 
City of God (14.19).   
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nowhere else within the Ciceronian corpus.353  The concept of honor, however, seems somewhat 
abstracted from the middle part with which it was joined in the Platonic psychology.  Although it 
is still connected with the warriorly attitude, it is also identified with rational virtue as a whole.  
The structure of virtue and a partial rehabilitation of the middle part of the Platonic soul will be 
our next consideration.    
5.2.1.2  The Virtues in De Inventione 
Virtue as a topic is discussed throughout the Tusculan Disputations, De Officiis, and 
elsewhere in Cicero’s writings, but perhaps the most systematic and compact treatment occurs in 
De Inventione.  Investigated for the purpose of rhetorical invention, a lengthy discussion of the 
four virtues that were the focus of the Republic – prudence, justice, courage [fortitudo], and 
temperance – takes place in De Invetione 2.159-165.  Here Cicero again defines the virtues as 
honorable [honestum] (2.159) and lays out the definition of each virtue, further identifying and 
defining its parts.  For instance “Temperance is a firm and well-considered control exercised by 
the reason over lust [libidinem] and other improper [non rectum] impulses of the mind.  Its parts 
are continence, clemency, and modesty” (2.164).354   
The explication of courage is very important for the argument that Augustine repairs the 
balanced integrity, if not of the tripartite soul specifically, then of the triple motivations of the 
soul which cause the will to act in ways analogous to Plato’s tripartite structure: 
 
                                               
353 Cicero also relates the divisions of the soul more abstractly through his partial translation of the Timaeus 
(§44=Tim. 42a-b), but there is no evidence that Augustine read this translation prior to 410.  See O’Donnell 
“Classical Readings.” 
354 Latin text and English translation from H. M. Hubbell. De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica. 
Loeb Classical Library Latin Authors. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949.  
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Courage is the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships. 
Its parts are highmindedness [magnificentia], confidence [fidentia], patience, 
perseverance.  Highmindedness consists in the contemplation and execution [cogitatio 
atque administratio] of great and sublime [magnarum et excelsarum] projects with a 
certain grandeur and magnificence of imagination [animi].  Confidence [fidentia] is the 
quality by which in important and honourable undertakings the spirit [animus] has placed 
great trust in itself with a resolute hope of success.  Patience is a willing and sustained 
endurance [perpessio] of difficult and arduous tasks for a noble and useful end. 
Perseverance is a firm and abiding persistence in a well-considered plan of action [in 
ratione bene considerate]. (2.163) 
 
Therefore, in the virtue that was once assigned to the spirited element, we still see all the 
distinctive features that had been located there: honor, administrative acumen, executive power, 
endurance and self-esteem.  However, we now see added to it notions of a certain magnanimity 
of the soul.  The constellation of ideas, I argue, will be crucial for understanding St. Augustine’s 
psychology of rhetoric. 
5.2.2 The Platonists  
Compared to Cicero, the secondary literature on rhetoric and the Neoplatonists – such as Plotinus 
and Porphyry – is noticeably scant.  That is not to say that it is non-existent, but it can be quickly 
reviewed.  Given Troup’s assertion that Neoplatonism is intrinsically anti-rhetorical, it should be.  
Reference to Neoplatonic commentaries on Hermogenes and Minucianus and other works by the 
likes of Porphyry, Iamblichus and their successors appear throughout Kennedy’s 1983 Greek 
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Rhetoric under Christian Emperors.355  Carol Poster dedicates a chapter to the subject in her 
1994 dissertation, noting the paucity of research on the subject despite the historical influence 
that Platonic thought had on late classical rhetorical theorizing.  She opines that “perhaps the 
most significant cause for this idiosyncrasy in our historical perspective is the current hostility to 
philosophy (and especially Platonism in all its incarnations) common among specialists in 
classical rhetoric.”356  The bias has seemed to endure in the main,357 though Malcolm Heath has 
provided some noticeable contributions by translating the fragments of Porphyry’s rhetorical 
work on stasis theory and providing a summary study about those fragments.358  But even he 
must admit that the commentary “has inevitably focused on technical details that readers 
unfamiliar with the intricacies of issue-theory are likely to find confusing, if not positively 
repellent.”359 
However, like with Cicero, I am not here constrained by the lack of secondary literature 
on Neoplatonic rhetorical theory, as I need only identify some key concepts in the primary texts.  
Specifically, I’d like to show that Augustine had access to some of the transcendental writings of 
the Neoplatonists that transmitted the basic movements of the soul’s ascent from its embodied 
state to the divine plain of God.  Fortunately, this has been well attested to by the historians of 
philosophy and theology that were the topic of the previous section on methodology.   
                                               
355 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.  See especially 77-79 for a brief history of rhetoric among the 
older Neoplatonists.  See also Kennedy. “Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 13.3 
(1980). 181-197. 
356 “Chapter 5: Silence, Exile, and Cunning: Neoplatonic Rhetorical Theories of Late Antiquity.”  Writing the 
Ineffable: A Rhetoric of Ancient Speculative Thought. Dissertation. University of Missouri, 1994. 84-118 (p. 85). 
357 The case is a bit different concerning the effect of Platonic philosophy on Medieval histories of rhetoric, which I 
will discuss in the next section on Victorinus and the next chapter on Saint Bonaventure.   
358 Malcolm Heath. “Porphyry’s Rhetoric: Texts and Translation.” Leeds International Classical Studies 1.5 (2002): 
1-41.  Accessed online 1/12/14. <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/>; and “Porphyry’s Rhetoric.” The Classical 
Quarterly, New Series, 53.1 (2003): 141-166. 
359 “Porphyry’s Rhetoric” 166.  
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5.2.2.1 Ascent and Conversion in Plotinus 
As for who exactly the Platonists were that influenced Augustine and which readings he 
had access to, there has been much debate.  For the current study, all I need is John J. O’Meara’s 
assessment that, “There is general agreement nowadays that Augustine in 386 read among other 
treatises of Plotinus that On Beauty (Ennead 1:6)” as well as some Porphyry,360 and it is to these 
early works that Augustine attributes the ability to conceive of an discarnate, transcendent God.   
On Beauty itself is a collage of Platonic psychagogic imagery.  John Dillon and Lloyd P. 
Gerson indicate numerous references or allusions to the central psychagogic dialogues that we 
have focused on in the previous chapter – Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium, and even Gorgias.361  
However, the opening of the Ennead offers a key allusion that they miss.  It brings clearly to 
mind the passage of the Timaeus (47c-e) concerning the ability of words to reorder the hierarchy 
of the soul, and makes such sense perceptions the first step in the soul’s ascent.  Note the subtle 
tripartite structure of “outward” sense perception, “inward” moral and mental reflection and 
“upward” transcendence: 
 
Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight; but there is a beauty for the hearing too, as in 
certain combinations of words [logos syntheseis] and in all kinds of music, for melodies 
and cadences are beautiful; and minds that lift [ano] themselves above the realm of sense 
to a higher order are aware of beauty in the conduct of life, in actions, in character, in the 
                                               
360 Young Augustine 131. 
361 “I 6 (1) On Beatuy (complete).” Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 
2004. 18-29. 
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pursuits of the intellect; and there is the beauty of the virtues.  What loftier beauty there 
may be, yet, our argument will bring to light. (§1)362 
 
Gerson and Dillon alert us to the importance of the concept of “turning” one’s attention as a 
propaedeutic for this ascent in terms synonymous to periagoge: “The word ἐπιστρέφει, a central 
term in Plotinus’ philosophy and Neoplatonism in general, indicates a reorienting of the soul in 
the direction of the One, away from other objects of desire.”363  
In On Beauty alone the concept of turning or reorienting appears at three important spots.  
First, Plotinus opens the investigation into beauty as a means of ascent by asking “What is it, 
then, that moves the eyes of spectators and turns [epistrephei] them towards it and draws them 
on and makes them rejoice at the sight?” (§1).364   Second, he tells us that “We must, then, 
ascend [anabateon] to the Good, which every soul [psyche] desires…the attainment of it is for 
those who ascend upward and revert [epistrapheisi] to it and who divest themselves of the 
garments they put on when they descended [katabainontes]” (§7).365  Finally, Plotinus warns the 
ascending contemplative to “go and follow inside [eiso], leaving outside the sight of his eyes, not 
allowing himself to turn back [epistrephon] to the splendor of the bodies he previously saw” (§8).366   
Of course, Augustine tells us that he was reading the Latin translations of Victorinus, 
whom we will discuss next, so we can’t be certain that keywords carry the same wait.  But 
insofar as Victorinus was a knowledgeable Neoplatonist and an attentive rhetorical theorist, it is 
                                               
362 English Translation from Stephen Mackenna and B. S. Page. The Enneads. 2d ed. London: Faber and Faber, 
1956. I use McKenna’s translation in general for its noted poetic quality, however, at some points, when noted, I use 
the translation offered by Dillon and Gerson cited above (n.361), which stays closer to the literal Greek text.  
363 “I 6 (1) On Beatuy” 19 n.5. 
364 This translation comes from Dillon and Gerson. It was in reference to this particular passage that they noted the 
importance of reorientation in Plotinus’ philosophy. 
365 Dillon and Gerson translation.  
366 Dillon and Gerson translation. 
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a likely conjecture that Augustine would have been exposed to the central idea of “turning 
around” or “converting” one’s orientation as a propaedeutic for ascent.  His own focus on 
conversion would suggest as much.367  Especially as he uses similar terms in the description of 
his own ascent in Book VII of the Confessions, which he was able to undergo with the help of 
God after reading the books of the Platonists: “Being admonished by all this to return [redire] to 
myself, I entered into my own depths, with You as my guide…and with the eye of my soul 
[animae], such as it was, I saw Your unchangeable Light shining over the same eye of my soul 
[animae], over my mind [mentem]” (7.10.16). 
Ultimately, the entire Ennead 1.6 goes through the outward, inward, upward motion, and 
the psychic movement is summarized in the final sections, moving from beautiful external 
images (§8), to contemplating beautiful actions, then beautiful souls, to the beauty of the Forms, 
to the first principle of all Forms, the Good (§9).  It is a variation of the of Diotima’s Ladder, on 
which Augustine offers his own variation (7.17.23).368  In the same passage, Augustine tells us 
that he could not maintain his sight turned towards God and ultimately “returned [redditus] to his 
old habits.”  We should not, however, be too hasty to attribute any particular failure to Augustine 
in this return; nor speculate that he abandoned hope of union with God.  As Pierre Hadot points 
out, commenting on the fact that Porphyry only knew Plotinus to have achieved such a union 
four times in his life and himself only once (Life of Plotinus 23.1-27), “This goal can be achieved 
                                               
367 See O’Meara’s claim in reference to Plotinian epestrophe and Augustine’s notion of conversion: “In particular 
the term conversio, ‘turning to,’ was for him an emotional touchstone of deep and lasting importance. The 
Confessions is the story of his own and everyman’s conversion to God.  The City of God is the same theme writ 
large in terms of all angels and humanity that ever was or will be.  The intellectual inspiration is in Plotinus” (“The 
Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine” 38). 
368 Michael P. Foley, annotating the Sheed translation, also notes similarities as well as differences to Ennead 5.1.11.  
See Sheed translation 133n.100.  
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during life, but only very rarely.  It is a precise experience, which is transitory and cannot 
last.”369   
If anything, Augustine addresses this particular failure in the Plotinian system of ascent 
based on rational contemplation that only few can accomplish and only rarely.  Here I follow 
O’Meara who argues that at least as late as the City of God, “Augustine held the view that the 
Neo-Platonists, observing that the mass of men were incapable of raising themselves to a life of 
purgation and intellectual contemplation, supposed that there must be some Mediator between 
the Father and mankind, some commanding authority, some universal way of the soul’s 
deliverance.”370  Thus, blinded by their pride, Porphyry and others were wrong to reject Jesus as 
the Mediator between humanity and the Godhead.  For Augustine, the Incarnation presented not 
the easiest way towards a sustained union, but the only Way.  But this, perhaps, only the 
rhetorician could see.  St. Augustine’s role, then, was not to lead others in an ascent to God, but 
to turn others in a conversion to Christ.   
5.2.2.2  Porphyry’s Rhetoric 
Among the several of Porphyry’s fragments on issue theory, there is one in particular that 
bears heavily on the psychagogic tradition and on the rhetorical significance that St. Augustine 
might have seen both in the Incarnation and in the duties of the rhetor: “Since speech [logou] is 
thought to have a soul [psychen] and a body [soma], one could justly regard the invention of 
thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body.”371  This seems to be a fairly important 
evolution of Sophist 263e which identifies speech as thoughts uttered aloud instead of to oneself.  
                                               
369 “Plotinus and Porphyry.” Trans. Jane Curran. Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman. Ed. 
A.H. Armstrong. New York: Crossroad, 1986.  230-249 (p. 233). 
370 Young Augustine 139.  
371 Heath, “Text and Translation” 27.  Translation of F4a Syrianus 2.14.9-14 (Porphyry 416F Smith). 
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For it introduces, or at least transmits, the notion of speech as ensouled and embodied and at the 
same time appears to reduce the rhetorical canons down to two – invention and expression.372  
As we will see, whether or not Augustine was aware that the formulation traces back to 
Porphyry, his appropriation of this scheme signals the psychagogic nature of his rhetorical theory 
and helps to elucidate its details.  
5.2.3 Marius Victorinus 
Scholarly interest in Victorinus has come in a couple of waves over the last fifty years.  By far 
the largest wave was from the late sixties to the early eighties as an offshoot of the wider interest 
in Neoplatonism and St. Augustine.  The high-water mark of this theological and philosophical 
interest included a number of important studies by Pierre Hadot,373 and the translation of 
Victorinus’ Trinitarian works into English, as well as a number of critical essays, by Mary T. 
Clark.374  More recently, historians of rhetoric have shown interest in Victorinus’ work as 
portions of his Explanationes, or commentary of Cicero’s De inventione have been published in 
two collections in the last ten years along with contemporary scholarly commentary.375  
                                               
372 Alcidamas comes close when he compares a spoken speech to a live body, versus written speech compared to a 
statue (On the Sophists 28). 
373 Porphyre Et Victorinus. Vol. 2. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1968; Marius Victorinus; Recherches Sur Sa Vie Et 
Ses Œuvres. Paris,: Études augustiniennes, 1971. 
374 Marius Victorinus. Theological Treatises on the Trinity. Trans. Mary T. Clark.  The Fathers of the Church. Vol. 
69. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1978; See also Mary T. Clark.  “The Earliest 
Philosophy of the Living God: Marius Victorinus.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association, 41 (1967):87-93; “The Psychology of Marius Victorinus.” Augustinian Studies 5 (1974): 149-66; “A 
Neoplatonic Commentary on the Christian Trinity: Marius Victorinus.” Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Ed. 
Dominic J. O'Meara, Albany: SUNY Press, 1982. 24-33; “Victorinus and Augustine: Some Differences.” 
Augustinian Studies 17 (1986): 147-159. 
375 See the translation of the introduction of Victorinus’ commentary in “Appendix: Commentaries in Action.” The 
Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition. Eds. Virginia Cox and John O. 
Ward. Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006. 409-413. See also the 
Introductory Essay and the longer translation consisting of the introduction and the commentary from 1.1.1-1.3.5 in 
“Marius Victorinus, Commentary on the De Inventione, Before 355.” Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language 
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Understanding both the theological and rhetorical thought of Victorinus will help to immediately 
contextualize Augustine’s psychagogic theory. 
5.2.3.1 Language, Psychology and Trinitarian Thought 
In order to situate Victorinus’ thought on the Trinity, it is useful to understand the 
development of Trinitarian thought before him.  As early as the first century philosophical 
writing of Philo, we see the dual sense of the logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos being 
associated both with the inner/outer word of man and the indwelling and expressed Word of 
God.376  As Trinitarian theory developed in the pre-Nicene Fathers, these dual senses of logos 
become an important early attempt at understanding the relationship of the Father and the Son by 
way of an analogy to human thought and speech.  Explicit employment of the endiathetos and 
prophorikos in order to explain the Father-Son relationship can be found in Theophilus (Ad 
Autolycum 2.10; 2.22), while less technical talk of a two-stage logos can be found in Tatian 
(Oratio 5) and other second century apologists.  In addition, Tertullian utilizes the Latin sermo 
and ratio to make much the same analysis (Adversus Praxean 5).  This interpretive strain is 
ultimately condemned by Irenaeus (Against Heresies 2.13.3-10) and rejected by later Fathers due 
to the subordination of the Son to the Father that was suggested by the terminology.377 
                                                                                                                                                       
Arts and Literary Theory, Ad 300-1475. Eds. Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 104-124. 
376 Philo used this terminology throughout numerous writings.  For an older but still useful survey of his two logos 
doctrine, see §49.16-22 in Albert Stockl. Handbook of the History of Philosophy, Part 1, Pre-Scholastic Philosophy. 
Trans. Finlay, Thomas A. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, 1887. 165-167.  For more recent studies that provide 
extensive bibliographical citations see Henry Chadwick. “Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought.” The 
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. Ed. A. H. Armstrong. 1967. 133-157; and Adam 
Kamesar. “The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia 
to the Iliad.” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 44 (2004): 163-81. 
377 For a succinct discussion of the theological implications of this development in the theory of the logos see Jules 
Lebreton. “The Logos.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. Accessed 
online 10/06/2013. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09328a.htm>.  For a critical evaluation of this history see 
M.J. Edwards. “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos.” Vigiliae Christianae, 54.2 (2000): 159-177.  
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The internal/uttered word analogy made way for other, triadic, psychological analogies 
that avoided the subordination problems.  Marius Victorinus suggested the first such analogy by 
way of the Neoplatonic noetic triad of being, life, and intellect [esse-vivere-intelligere] as a 
psychological analogy through which we could begin to understand the interactions between the 
three Persons of the Godhead.  In so doing, according to Marcia Colish, he “maintains the 
intellectualism implicit in the Greek patristic use of the Stoic notions of logos endiathetos and 
logos prophorikos while he expands the functions of spiritual beings to include not only speech 
and intellection but also action, energy, and motion,” an innovation that “has important 
implications for human psychology as well as Trinitarian theology.”378  
That St. Augustine became familiar with Platonism through the translations of Victorinus 
and that he was influenced by his conversion he tells us explicitly in the Confessions (8.2.3-5, 
8.4.9).  To what extent his own theology is influenced by Victorinus is less clear.  He appears to 
accept Victorinus’ psychological analogy of being-life-intellect as both psychological 
constituents of the self (Soliloquies 2.1.1) and in some way analogically indicative of the trinity 
(De trinitate 6.11; 10.13).  Moreover, he indicates that even in the deprived state of his youth he 
had some sense of that unity that formed him for “I was [eram]; I lived [vivebam]; I felt 
[sentiebam]” (1.20.31).379  However accepting Augustine might be of this triad, he offers a more 
historically influential variation as the paradigmatic analogy between human psychology and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
It is, however, not clear which of the early adherents of the two-stage logos supported such subordinationism.  See 
George Joyce. “The Blessed Trinity.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 15. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 
1912. 10/06/2013. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15047a.htm>.   
378 Marcia Colish. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Volume 2. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985. 
141. 
379 Sentio can be used as a synonym for intellego, but primarily indicates sense perception whereas intellego 
primarily indicates mental perception.  That a connection is meant here between the two types of perception is 
demonstrated when Augustine adds that “in my interior sense [interiore sensu] I kept guard over the integrity of my 
outward sense perception, and in small thought upon small matters I had come to delight in the truth” (1.20.31). 
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Divine Trinity: being-knowledge-will [esse-nosse-velle] (13.11.12).380  He does connect this 
triad with that of Victorinus in the same passage, stating that, “I am a being that knows and wills: 
I know that I am and that I will: I will to be and to know.  In these three there is inseparable life, 
one life [vita], one mind [mens], one essence [essentia].”  In so doing, however, he reorders 
Victorinus’ triad.381 
5.2.3.2 Neoplatonic Rhetorical Theory 
As with the theological writings, it is not clear if Saint Augustine was familiar with 
Victorinus’ rhetorical texts.  However, Augustine does mention Victorinus in the DDC as one of 
those scholars who had beneficially appropriated Neoplatonic thought for the service of the 
Church (2.40.60), thus connecting him with his own rhetorical theory at least indirectly.  Rita 
Copeland argues in support of the conjecture that Victorinus’ rhetorical work provided an 
important precedent for Augustine by integrating Neoplatonic concepts into Cicero’s justification 
of rhetorical activity.382  The opening of Cicero’s De inventione itself is reminiscent of the 
Isocratean “Hymn to Logos” (Nicocles 5-9) as it argues that eloquence has allowed humanity to 
elevate itself above its original animal nature (1.1.2-1.3.5).  But there is a strong undercurrent of 
Plato, as he articulates the common-place that wisdom without eloquence is unable to help 
society very much, while eloquence without wisdom is actually dangerous (1.1.1; 1.2.3; 1.3.4).  
                                               
380 Although the permutation memory, intellect, will [memoria, intellegentia, voluntas] is more influential still.  See 
De trinitate 10.11.17.  
381 Although these structural shifts may be significant, it should be remembered that Augustine articulates the 
original, Neoplatonic order as early as the Soliloquies and as late as De trinitate.  The point here is that Augustine is 
capable of reordering the triad and finds it appropriate to do so when discussing his own psychological analogy, as 
he does at De trinitate 10.18  
382 “The Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition and Medieval Literary Theory.” In Cox and Ward, The Rhetoric of Cicero 
239-265 (pp. 241-243).  
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What he advocates then is a union of wisdom and eloquence; a union that neither Plato nor 
Isocrates would deny, though they might argue over concerns of balance and definition. 
What latent Platonism there might be in Cicero’s early rhetorical writing is brought to the 
fore by Victorinus, who transforms Cicero’s argument of utility and ethics to one of metaphysics 
and psychagogic transcendence.  As Hadot notes, Victorinus transforms virtue from conformity 
with the “immanent Logos” to the “pure, intelligible, and transcendent essence”383 that our soul 
once knew before being embodied, it “is conformity to the logos without doubt, but it is above 
all a return to our original nature.”384  Building upon Hadot, Copeland argues that the 
“redefinition of virtue enables Victorinus to elaborate Cicero’s fable of the origins of rhetoric in 
the persuasive powers of a sage who used his eloquence to tap the virtue inherent in (as yet) 
uncivilised people (De inv. 1.2.2)”385   
In explaining the process of the sage’s salvific endeavor, Victorinus reworks some 
familiar Platonic metaphors.  Much like Porphyry, he likens eloquence to the embodiment of 
wisdom, arguing that “Every perfect good [Omne perfectum bonum]…attains its full essence 
through two things: the thing itself [re ipsa], and its external form [specie] and image [imagine],” 
and for the sage and those who follow him, wisdom is “the thing itself” and eloquence the 
“external form.”386  Moreover, Victorinus tells us of the possibility of literally embodied 
persuasion, through the life and actions of the sage: “Wisdom [sapientia] by itself can be 
persuasive [persuadet] about something in two ways.  It may be silent [tacet], and somebody else 
imitates [imitatur] something that wisdom does, because it is good…or it may persuade by 
                                               
383 Hadot, Mariuis Victorinus 82.  My translation. 
384 Ibid. 83. My translation. 
385 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 242.  
386 English translation from Copeland and Sluiter, “Marius Victorinus” 120.  Latin from Karl Halm. Rhetores Latini 
Minores. Lipsiae: in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1863.  165, lines 32-35; 43-44. 
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words.”387  So, Victorinus raises the Platonic notion of a fully integrated rhetoric – thought, word 
and deed – though Cicero denies that a silent, ineloquent wisdom would be enough to bring 
about such a societal conversion.   
It is on this point that Victorinus, and indeed Cicero, is the most psychagogic; for in 
commenting on Cicero’s statement that an ineloquent wisdom could not have “suddenly [subito] 
turned [converteret] them away from what they were used to and led [traduceret] them to a very 
different way of life.”  Victorinus tells us that this is a token quality of rhetoric: “Great is the 
power [Magna vis] of eloquence, if it causes sudden conversion [subito converteret] – this is 
what wisdom cannot do [quod non potest sapienta].  Elsewhere, wisdom too is effective, but not 
suddenly.”388  Factor in the overall theme of a sage who remembers the nature of his soul and 
uses eloquence to turn others back towards their own true nature, and you have the Allegory of 
the Cave retold through Cicero by Victorinus.  Although we cannot be sure that Augustine read 
this work, we can agree with Copeland that “Victorinus’ commentary could thus provide a 
certain philosophical, if not explicitly theological, platform for a transposition of rhetorical 
principles into a Christian hermeneutics,”389 and, I would add, psychagogic praxis. 
5.2.4 The Cure of Souls 
Before I depart from the traditional sources that St. Augustine would have been familiar with, it 
is worth noting a recent study published by Paul R. Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls.390  
Kolbet’s study also looks at psychagogy from Plato to Augustine, but the scope is much 
                                               
387 “Marius Victorinus” 117; Rhetores 163, lines 23-34. 
388 “Marius Victorinus” 118; Rhetores 163, line 43 to 164, line 1. 
389 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243. 
390 Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010. 
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different.  He focuses not on the technical aspects that such a practice might entail, but looks at 
the wider concept of “healing souls through words” that we located in the temperate aspect of the 
logos.  As such, the transmission of the tradition he traces runs along quite a different trajectory 
meant not to establish Augustine’s direct reception, but rather to paint a general picture of the 
intellectual landscape in which Augustine would have functioned.   
It is worth rehearsing the figures through which Kolbet weaves his somewhat 
asynchronous history of psychagogy, finding echoes, traces, and direct appropriations in the 
writings of the Second Sophistic sophist Dio,391 who “presented himself as a physician who 
brought with him medicine truly curative of the soul and productive of the moral good”;392 the 
Epicurean philosopher and poet Philodemus,393 whose “handbook provides a number of 
guidelines clarifying the optimal use of speech by members of the Epicurean community in the 
cure of the soul”;394 Maximus of Tyre,395 who stated that “a genuine teacher would ‘rouse young 
men’s souls and guide…their ambitions’ through instruction (λόγος) that is not ‘lax or slovenly 
or casual, but so combines appeals to both character (ἤθει) and emotion’ (πάθει) that it compels 
them ‘to rise and share its fervor’”;396 the Stoic philosopher Seneca,397 whose “exposition of the 
nature of the links between philosophical doctrines, affections, and moral exhortation supplies 
important presuppositions for his practice of spiritual guidance”; 398 and Plutarch,399 who “in the 
familiar language of Plato’s cave…proposes that people who have resided in utter darkness can 
                                               
391 Ibid. 19-24. 
392 Ibid. 21. 
393 Ibid. 42-44.  
394 Ibid. 43. 
395 Ibid. 44-45. 
396 Ibid. 44. Quoting Maximus of Tyre Dissertation 1.8. 
397 Ibid. 46-56. 
398 Ibid. 46. 
399 Ibid. 57-61.  
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only come to see the truth in all its brilliance when they are introduced to it gradually.”400  Thus 
Kolbet demonstrates the transmission of Platonic metaphors and psychagogic concerns that 
surrounded the general philosophical and rhetorical environment throughout much of the 
intervening period between Cicero and Augustine. 
5.3 THE PLATONIC NATURE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE’S RHETORIC 
With some notable exceptions – like the studies of Copeland and van Fleteren mentioned above 
– Platonic thought is often overlooked or overtly rejected as a source for St. Augustine’s 
rhetorical theorizing.  However, with the tradition of psychagogic rhetoric firmly established 
within Augustine’s own admitted influences, I will now review the conclusions of some of the 
more prominent studies of his rhetoric and demonstrate that they situate the saint squarely within 
that tradition, rather than apart from it.  This does not mean a refutation or a rejection of these 
sources or their findings – in most cases, I agree with them completely.  But I also maintain that 
they are incomplete and abstracted from a wider tradition that would help to shine light on them.  
Thus, I do not wish to rob Augustine of any claim to innovation, but simply want to claim that 
his rhetorical thought is informed by a tradition that he himself transforms.  
5.3.1  Rhetoric as Love 
Perhaps the most obvious intersection between observations of Augustine’s rhetoric and what we 
can readily admit of Plato’s is the equation of rhetoric with love.  This is one of the key points of 
                                               
400 Ibid. 58. 
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the Phaedrus: the transformation of eros into philia.  Thus, when Murphy holds that “there is no 
possible rhetorical technique or skill that can be learned (or taught) that will equip one human 
heart to speak to another heart.  Only Christian love (caritas) can supply this interconnection,”401 
a similar sentiment equating the effectiveness of rhetorical activity with the intimate loving 
relationship between souls could be made about Platonic psychagogy.  This is a common 
assessment of Augustine’s rhetoric, because it is true – he is preoccupied with the proper 
orientation of our affections.  But this is exactly because he is a psychagogue.  Similar 
observations can be found in Copeland, who draws attention to the distinction that Augustine 
makes between cupiditas and caritas in Book I of the DDC,402 and in Troup, who argues that 
“The means by which the Incarnation moves Augustine toward true rhetoric – rhetoric in the 
service of wisdom – is love (caritas).”403  
Camargo offers a variation of this theme – speaking for the benefit of the audience: “It 
follows that we become most like Christ when we too love our neighbors in such a way that we 
use them to their advantage rather than our own, although such use is also to our advantage, 
since God rewards us for it.”404  Speaking for the benefit of the audience, and the indirect benefit 
that such activity bestows on the speaker, is one of the traits of the temperate aspects of the logos 
that were observed in the last chapter.  Indeed, the benefit of the beloved was one of the key 
themes in the Phaedrus speeches.  Thus, when Farrell argues that this “is one of the startling 
differences between classical rhetoric and Augustine’s sacramental Christian rhetoric.  In the 
classical attitude, the end of discourse is always victory for the speaker…With Augustine, the 
                                               
401 “Metarhetorics” 208.  
402 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243. 
403 Temporality 115.  Compare this to McCoy’s observation that “in some sense, the forms are the real ‘rhetoricians’: 
they alone have the power to move the soul” (Plato on Rhetoric 191). 
404 “Non solum” 402. 
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good and the just are presupposed, and the purpose of discourse is to utter that truth for the good 
of the audience”405 he is perhaps right in that it sets Augustine apart but from the practicing civic 
orators of his day, but he is wrong if by “startling differences” he is suggesting that there is no 
precedent in the classical tradition. 
5.3.2 The “Platonic Heresy” 
In one of the earlier articles on Augustine’s rhetoric in the contemporary discipline, Murphy 
warns against characterizing Augustine as a proponent of the “Platonic Heresy.”  He generates 
this term to contrast with the so-called “Sophistic Heresy” that Augustine is ostensibly reacting 
against, the notion that style is sufficient for rhetorical success without regard to content.406  Its 
counter-heresy, exemplified in Plato’s Gorgias according to Murphy, is the notion that “the man 
possessed of truth will be able to communicate his ideas effectively because he does know the 
truth.”407  Murphy believed that Augustine rejected both rhetorical heresies, and I agree with 
him.  But I bring it up because this is a rather ironic theme that ties Augustine to the Platonic 
rhetorical tradition as it is usually perceived. That is to say, scholars seem to perennially 
characterize Augustine as a Platonic heretic.  For instance, Fortin argues that Augustine inverts 
the Ciceronian duties of the orator so that teaching takes priority over delighting and persuading.  
In fact, Fortin goes so far as to maintain that “The duty to teach is not merely the Christian 
orator’s first duty, it is his highest and in a sense his only duty.  The preacher will have 
accomplished all that is essentially required of him if what he teaches is the truth.”408  Camargo 
                                               
405 “Rhetoric(s)” 282. 
406 “Christianization” 28-29; “Debate” 409-410. 
407 “Christianization” 28.  
408 “Problem” 92. 
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also sees Augustine as clearly subordinating the other duties to that of teaching.409  It is true that 
Augustine reoriented the duties, and in a sense, it is true that he gave teaching the truth priority – 
this will be discussed in the next section.  However, amongst rhetoricians, as Murphy points out, 
doing so should more closely associate Augustine with Plato, not separate the two. 
5.3.3 The Integrity of Rhetorical Activity 
The vast majority of scholars situate Augustine outside of Murphy’s rhetorical heresies, as a 
theorist who sought to integrate disparate aspects of public and intellectual life within the 
functions of rhetorical activity.  Indeed, Murphy himself coined the terms in order to illustrate 
that Augustine argued for a union of wisdom and eloquence, thought and expression, matter and 
form, etc.410  The union can be found in abundance, articulated in Murphy, Kennedy, Troup, 
etc.411  But as Tell rightly points out, while the identification of this union in Augustine “is 
surely correct…it is also repetitive: Cicero and Quintilian made similar claims, as did Plato 
before them”412  and we have added Porphyry and Victorinus to that list.  This union definitely 
positions Augustine in the Platonic tradition, but it can’t be his sole claim to innovation.  
Camargo offers some indication of Augustine’s further innovations for the integrity of 
rhetoric in his discussion of the “embodied truth” in the orator’s imitation of Christ.  Thus, the 
preacher’s “own good life is the Christian orator’s most powerful means of persuasion.”413 
Importantly, he points to Victorinus as a prime illustration of such “incarnate rhetoric” because 
                                               
409 “Non Solum” 406-407. 
410 See “Christianization,” especially 29; and “Debate” especially 409. 
411 In addition to Murphy, see Kennedy Classical Rhetoric 152; Troup, Temporality especially 6, 16. 
412 “Chair of Lies” 406.  
413 “Non solum” 403.  
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although Augustine never heard his words, he was persuaded by his example.414  This is a subtler 
line of Platonic rhetorical theory, but one that we have discovered in the writings of Victorinus 
himself and in Laches’ refusal to listen to anyone whose actions did not accord with their speech. 
Troup brings both these unions together later in his analysis.  He notes that in addition to 
knowledge and eloquence Augustine realizes that he must also add “control of fleshly 
desires.”415  Ultimately, following this rhetorical scheme means “serious consideration of the 
Incarnation on Augustine’s terms, a union of form, substance, and morality.”416  As we have 
seen, these terms are meant to be in opposition to those of Platonism, but what Troup articulates 
here is the courageous aspect of the logos that demands integrity of thought, word and deed. 
Perhaps the most complete integration is that offered by Johnson, who in trying to 
demonstrate that Augustine was more influenced by Isocrates than Plato, defined his rhetoric in 
the most Platonic terms possible.  I have no disagreement with the notion that Isocrates, through 
Cicero, also exerted influence on Augustine; for I do not see the two theorists as mutually 
exclusive.  But, surely, to come to the conclusion that for Augustine, if “the communitas was to 
become a reality, the voluntates of individuals had to be chastened, enlightened, encouraged, and 
unified,”417 is to give more credit to Plato than we perhaps realize.  The bettering of the 
community by making individual souls wise, courageous, temperate, and integrated (i.e. “just”) 
is the very definition of the Platonic rhetorical project.  The notion of Augustine’s rhetoric as 
aimed at entire psychic unity is echoed by Tell, who argues that in the Confessions “the place of 
rhetoric is figured not so much by its relationship to wisdom as by its relationship to the self.”  
                                               
414 Ibid. 406. 
415 Temporality 73. 
416 Ibid. 83. 
417 “Isocrates Flowering” 228.  
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Thus, Tell sees Augustine as choosing between a distended, dispersed self, “whose professions 
distend the self; and a gathered self that confesses, and whose confessions gather the self.”418 
5.3.4 Reduction to Invention and Expression 
An important variant of the integration theme that highlights the inextricable union between 
thoughts and words is the realization that in DDC St. Augustine reduces the canons of rhetoric to 
two – invention and expression.  This observation is made by Press, Tracy, Copeland, etc.419  As 
stated previously, Copeland recognizes that although the general reduction may be traced 
directly to Cicero’s union of wisdom and eloquence in De inventione, the philosophy and 
theology behind it might better be traced through Victorinus.420  But more than a simple 
reduction to a dual canon in line with preceding Platonists, Copeland points out that in DDC: 
 
Under the modus inveniendi Augustine also synthesizes the adjacent arts of what would 
later be the trivium, for a Christian hermeneutical and evangelical purpose: grammar 
(including philology) is necessary to an understanding of the literal signs of Scripture, 
both unknown and ambiguous (2.11 - 16; 3.2- 3); and dialectic is implicit in the treatment 
of signification, where a theory of signs is joined to a theory of how meaning is 
produced.421 
                                               
418 “Chair of Lies” 406.  
419 Press “Structure.”  David W. Tracy “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity: Augustine’s Search for a True Rhetoric” in Enos 
and Thompson, The Rhetoric of St. Augustine 267-288; Copeland. “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 239-247; see 
also “Augustine and the Modos Inveniendi.” Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic 
Traditions and Vernacular Texts. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 154-58. 
420 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243. 
421 Ibid. 240.  
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If we operate under the assumption, as with Press,422 that the entirety of DDC is a rhetoric, then 
this subordination of dialectic to rhetoric might strike us immediately as anti-Platonic.  However, 
if we acknowledge that in the Phaedrus the union that Socrates suggests is that dialectic should 
furnish content and rhetoric form and adaptation, then the DDC’s reduction of the canons 
produces, in broad terms, a Platonic rhetorical handbook.   
Admittedly, the lion’s share of this handbook focuses on the discovery of truth, that 
which is needed for the wise logos, but a significant share is allocated to style and adaptation.  
Although at the time of Press’s writing it may have been true that most studies of the rhetorical 
aspects of DDC were aimed at Book IV,423 the attention has since then shifted considerably to 
the exploration of the first three books.  Indeed, Tracy admits “that the opening sentence of book 
4.2 is somewhat disconcerting for my reading of DDC as providing a full rhetorical theory of 
inventio insofar as it seems to suggest a somewhat sophistic understanding of rhetoric.”424  My 
hope is to show that Book IV has a much greater role to play in Augustine’s rhetorical theory 
than has recently been acknowledged. 
My plan in the final section is to offer a reading of the fourth book of DDC in 
conjunction with the Confessions in order to demonstrate that: (1) Augustine is indeed an 
innovator in the psychagogic tradition, not merely a passive recipient of it.  (2) His innovation 
can be seen as a synthesis between Platonic psychology and Ciceronian rhetorical theory.  (3) 
This synthesis involves a good deal more than the simple subordination of the duties of the orator 
to the teaching the truth. 
                                               
422 Press “Structure” 118.  
423 Ibid. 118. 
424 “Charity, Obscurity, Rhetoric” 285.  
 210 
5.4 SAINT AUGUSTINE’S RHETORIC OF CONVERSION 
To claim that St. Augustine’s rhetoric is aimed at conversion is not in itself unique.  This has 
been a steady observation in the literature for some time.425  What I propose to investigate here, 
as with my previous analyses of psychagogy, are the psychological and rhetorical mechanisms of 
Augustine’s distinctly periagogic rhetoric.  The technical vocabulary, the general movements, 
and the inducements of the soul, we shall see, are very much the same; though their 
employments and interactions show a great deal of ingenuity in synthesis and arrangement.     
5.4.1 The Psychology of Desire 
One of Augustine’s greatest theological innovations was the introduction of the psychological 
analogy by way of which humanity could come to understand some aspect of the Trinity.  This 
analogy consisted in understanding our being or memory as analogous to the First Person of the 
Trinity, our intellect as analogous to the Second, and our will as analogous to the Third.  By 
understanding ourselves as one individual with three distinct faculties, we could get a sense of 
the mystery of Three Persons in One God.  Moreover, Augustine is known for his various 
Trinitarian analogies and metaphors with which De trinitate is filled.  Kenneth Burke, in his 
study of Augustine, noted that, “Every triad, however secular, was for him another sign of the 
Trinity.”426  As such, one might take Troup’s notion of an Augustinian integrity between 
philosophy, rhetoric, and moral self-control as somehow grafting on to this Trinitarian model.427  
                                               
425 See, for example, O’Meara “The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine” 38; Camargo “Non Solum” 395; Farrell, 
“Rhetoric(s)” 291. 
426 Rhetoric of Religion 2.  
427 Temporality 73; 83.  
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Such an exploration may very well be fruitful.  But to understand the full force of Augustine’s 
psychagogic rhetoric, I think that it is well to remember that Trinitarians often see Trinities 
inside of Trinities – and the level that is most explanative of his rhetorical theory, I suggest, is 
that of the will alone. 
St. Augustine discusses the will [voluntas] explicitly in Book VII of the Confessions and 
at Ch.5 he begins to explore the idea of conflict within the will.  He wants to follow the example 
of Victorinus, but is bound by his own perverse will.  He investigates the possibility of two wills 
inside him, the spiritual and the carnal and roots this conflict biblically by quoting St. Paul: “the 
flesh lusts [concupisceret] against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh” (Gal. 5:17).  These 
perverse lusts are further expanded into “the lusts of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride 
of life [concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitione saeculi]”428 (1 John 2:16 
quoted at 10.30.41).  This triplet forms an exhaustive frame for Augustine’s examination of 
conscience (10.30.41-41.66), which consists of the temptations that flow from the senses, 
intellectual curiosity, and prideful ambition.  In fact, this triplet forms a frame for the entirety of 
the first ten autobiographical books, since the first book ends with the following triad laden 
acknowledgement: “But in this lay my sin: that I sought pleasure [voluptates], nobility 
[sublimitates], and truth [veritates] not in God but in the beings He had created, myself and 
others.  Thus I fell [inruebam] into sorrow [dolores] confusion [confusiones] and error [errores].  
Thanks be to thee, my Joy [dulcedo] and my Glory [honor] and my Hope [fiducia] and my God” 
                                               
428 Augustine does not acknowledge this phrase as a quote, although it is nearly identical to the Vulgate, except that 
the last part of the triad is superbia vitae which is quite literally the “pride of life.”  Augustine’s ambitione saeculi is 
more properly translated “worldly ambition.” 
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(I.20.31).  In so framing we see that it is not the drives themselves that are perverse; rather, it is 
our material orientation that perverts them.429 
Rendering the English a bit differently430 we see that Augustine sought pleasure 
[voluptates] in the material world and ran headlong [inruebam] into pain [Dolores] until he 
experienced the sweetness [dulcedo] of God.  He sought elevation [sublimitates] amongst the 
creatures of the earth and so eagerly mingled [confusiones]431 with them; or perhaps, stretching 
the Latin to the fullest, he entered eagerly [inruebam] into shame [confusiones], until finding true 
honor [honor] in God.  He sought the truth in worldly things and so threw himself [inruebam] 
into error, until finding confidence or trust [fiducia] in God.   
Although biblically grounded, the three desires, for pleasures, for honors, and for truth, 
show a definite affinity with the Platonic tradition of the tripartite soul.  So even if Augustine 
does not accept the tripartition as representative of actual elements of the soul, he does 
apparently accept the triad as an exhaustive map of the psychology of desire from which he 
develops his theory of motivation of the will.  Moreover, we can see in this tripartition those very 
elements that he is called to reorient and integrate – philosophy, rhetoric and bodily temperance. 
For Augustine, it was his intellectual curiosity that drove him to false philosophies, his prideful 
ambition that led him to a professorship in rhetoric, and his carnal lusts that made him hesitant to 
take up a chaste life.  His goal, then, is technically analogous to Plato’s: the reorientation and 
integration of the psychic motives.  And as Plato calls on the student of rhetoric to seek out, 
analyze, and correlate the logos with the psyche in order to lead the soul through rhetoric, 
                                               
429 For a positive account of these desires cf. Cicero, De officiis, especially 1.4.11-5.16. 
430 Recognizing Augustine as an author that is cognizant that a single text can have multiple meanings (cf. 
Confessions XIII) I suggest that it is fruitful to offer alternative readings of Augustine’s texts without claiming them 
to be definitive readings.  In the case of this study, I am considering what his wordplay might mean concerning the 
psychology and theology of rhetorical theory.  
431 Taking the noun in a verbal sense, lit. inruebam confusiones “entered eagerly into a mingling.” 
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Augustine too appears to align the structures of rhetoric with the desires of the soul in a similar 
psychagogic endeavor. 
5.4.2 Rhetorical Correlations 
In DDC, Augustine reminds the reader of the duties of the orator laid out by Cicero: “to instruct, 
to please, and to persuade [ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat]” (4.12.27).432  In her translation of 
the work, Sr. Therese Sullivan provides a lengthy footnote that outlines the tradition of these 
officia oratoris and traces them back through Cicero’s Orator to the triple atechnic pisteis of 
Arsitotle, correlating instruction with logos, pleasing with ethos, and persuading with pathos.433  
It is a fairly accepted tradition.  However, in his Latin edition of De orator John E. Sandys 
questions the correlation, pointing out that, while there may be a rather clear correspondence 
between logos and probare (for which Augustine substitutes docere), and between pathos and 
flectere, there is no seeming relation between delectare and ethos.  Rather, Sandys argues, ethos, 
pathos and logos are, for Aristotle, all modes of proofs – what Cicero call probare, with one 
happening to coincide with flectere.434   
No doubt Augustine is consciously working in the Ciceronian tradition as he himself 
attests, but he seems to be consciously modifying it to adapt to his own Platonic psychology of 
                                               
432 Unless otherwise noted, Latin text and English translation come from Sr. Theresa Sullivan “Latin Text, 
Translation, and Commentary of Book IV of De Doctrina Christiana” in Enos and Thompson, The Rhetoric of St. 
Augustine 33-186. 
433  Ibid. 92n.1 
434 M. Tulli Ciceronis Ad M. Brutum Orator: A Revised Text. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885. 77. 
The tradition can stand a bit sturdier, however, if we take into consideration that Cicero offers a modified list of 
duties at De oratore 2.27 and replaces delectare with conciliare, which carries some of the sense of “pleasing,” but 
more along the lines as making a certain thing or person seem pleasing to another.  And this is exactly how Cicero 
intends it, for he tells us that, “the feelings of the hearers are conciliated by a person’s dignity, by his actions, by the 
character of his life” (II.43).  As such, conciliation provides a conceptual link between pleasing and ethos in the 
tradition of Cicero. 
 214 
desire.435  For delectare in this case as well has nothing to do with the character of the speaker.  
Indeed the character of the speaker is discussed explicitly elsewhere in the text as an element 
distinctly separate from, and more powerful than, the duties listed above (4.27.59).  Rather, the 
duties each appear coordinated to attend to a particular element of the triadic desire complex.  
The relation of ‘instruction’ to the desire for truth and that of ‘pleasing’ to the desire for pleasure 
are rather obvious, especially since pleasing is a matter of suauitatis (4.12.27), a synonym for the 
dulcedo used to identify the sweetness of God in the Confessions.436  The relation of 
‘persuading’ to worldly ambition and honor, however, needs some explanation.   
The key here is the fusing of the duties with the rhetorical styles: plain [genus 
submissum], temperate [genus temperatum], and grand [genus grande] (4.17.34).  For the grand 
style or genus grande carries with it the connotation of loftiness or elevation of style.  Indeed it is 
synonymous with the genus sublime of which the term sublimitates is a cognate.437  This is the 
term that Augustine uses to describe the middle desire that motivated him in his ambitious youth; 
so that the element for which we are seeking to connect to the sublime style is that element 
which seeks sublimity.   
The above connection could be just a happy coincidence of language, but I appeal to two 
probabilities: 1) Being a learned instructor of rhetoric St. Augustine would have surely been 
                                               
435 Of course, if Plato’s Phaedrus provides the roadmap for Aristotle’s Rhetoric as some have suggested, then one 
may be able to trace the entire tradition of the atechnic pisteis back to Plato’s tripartite soul in the same way that we 
have already suggested that the Aristotelian components of ethos might find their origin in the attributes of a good 
interlocutor listed in the Gorgias (see p. 146 above). 
436 Both can be rendered as either ‘sweetness’ or ‘charm.’  Augustine explicitly draws a connection between the two 
terms at DDC 4.5.7.  Although here he is referring to harmful sweets [perniciosa dulcedo] in contrast to wholesome 
sweets [salubri suauitate] or sweet wholesomeness [suaui salubritate] the point is that he sees the terms as both 
satisfying the desire for pleasure.  For an examination of Augustine’s attitudes towards the synonymous pair, as well 
as a general history of the rhetorical uses of the terms, see Mary Carruthers. “Sweetness.” Speculum 81.4 (2006): 
999-1013, especially 1003, 1009, and 1012. 
437 This synonymy is attested to in Sullivan’s translation IV.17.34n12.  See also the glossary entry for μέγεθος in W. 
Rhys Roberts. Demetrius On Style. Cambridge University Press. 1902 (p. 292); and the entries for διηρμένος and 
ὑψηλός in Larue Van Hook. The Metaphorical Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, University of 
Chicago Press, 1905 (p16); as well as the entries for grandis, sublimis and their cognates in Lewis and Short. 
 215 
familiar with the rhetorical import of the term and 2) being a wordsmith, such plays on words are 
likely intentional.  Moreover, this connection is supported by the fact that Augustine illustrates a 
dramatic and telling shift away from Cicero’s notion of the grand style.  In Orator, Cicero is 
explicit that the grand style is the most ornate style of the three (27.97).  For Augustine, 
ornament is paradigmatic of the temperate style, whereas the grand style is concerned little with 
ornament.  Although ornamentation may be present, the distinguishing marks of the grand style 
reads like a litany of attributes of the Platonic middle element: 
 
[I]t is…rendered passionate by the heart’s emotions [violentum animi affectibus]…borne 
on by its own vehemence [impetus suo]…governed by the ardor of the heart [pectoris 
sequantur ardorem]…For if a brave man [vir fortis] be armed with weapons adorned 
with gold and jewels, being fully intent on battle, he accomplishes indeed what he does 
with these very arms, not because they are precious, but because they are arms; and still 
he himself is the same, and very formidable even when but anger [ira] furnishes a 
weapon for him at his seeking.  (4.20.42) 
 
In Cicero’s rendering of Platonic psychology with which Augustine would have been familiar, 
we have already seen that the heart [pectus] is the physical location of the spirited element and 
anger [ira] its paradigmatic emotion.  But here we see the restoration of the entire complex of 
concepts proper to the middle element.  Courage [fortis] is once more its virtue and thus it 
aspires to lofty [sublime] ends.  It moves the soul through the passionate impulses of the 
emotions [violens/affectus].  Indeed, it is the executive power of the soul itself [impetus suo].  St. 
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Augustine, it appears, has reconstituted the spirited element of the soul, or at least, the spirited 
drive.  But to what end? 
If we rework Sullivan’s rendering and translate flectere not as ‘to persuade,’ for which 
Augustine uses persuadere elsewhere in order to characterize the aim of all three duties 
(4.25.55), but as ‘to move,’ we see that it is the only duty that is concerned with movement; 
whereas the search for sublimitates (elevation) is the only desire that is concerned with 
movement.  If we ask ourselves what the object of this movement is, the more literal translation 
of flectere will tell us.  For its primary meaning is ‘to bend’ or ‘to curve’ or even to ‘turn 
around,’438 from which the metaphorical meaning ‘to persuade’ or ‘to move’ an audience comes 
out of the more literal transformation ‘to bend one’s will.’439  The movement, then, is a turning 
of the will, making flectere akin to periagoge.  However, when we consider the act in connection 
with its directional aim, sublimitates, the movement is specifically that of the soul towards its 
ascent.  It is the art of turning one away from the shadows and towards the light.  It is the art of 
conversion.440 
                                               
438 This translation establishes a deliberate relationship between the verb flectere and the noun conversio whose 
primary meaning is ‘a turning around,’ which can come to indicate either a moral change (i.e., religious conversion) 
or change of opinion (i.e., the result of being persuaded).  In this sense, the effect of the orator’s duty flectere – 
bending the will, could be understood as bringing about conversio – turning the will around.  See DDC 19.38 where 
Augustine prescribes the use of the grand style if a soul averse to the truth is going to be compelled to conversion 
[…granditer si aversus inde animus ut convertatur impellitur]. 
439 See the dictionary entry of flecto in Lewis and Short. 
440 There is an interesting check that we can perform to further support the hypothesis that Augustine is involved in a 
realigning of the duties and styles of the orator with the elements or drives of the soul.  For in transferring ornament 
to the temperate style, another constellation of concepts is reestablished.  The temperate style would be assigned to 
that element in which temperance is the virtue; ornament becomes the most important consideration for that element 
that is most enamored with form; and the duty to delight is aimed at that element which is most driven by pleasure. 
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5.4.3 The Psychology of Persuasion and Ascent 
That Augustine had something like the conversion of the soul in mind becomes evident when we 
consider what for him is the ultimate aim of rhetoric and how this aim relates to the crisis of the 
will.  For Augustine, it was possible to be successful in the endeavor of instructing and 
delighting without moving one’s audience to action.  If the goal was action, then the first two 
successes were in vain.  Granted, the attainment of the first two goals is necessary, and the first 
especially can be a goal unto itself.  That is to say, teaching is a priority, if only temporally.  It is 
a necessary, but insufficient condition in cases where action is the desired result.  So action is the 
consummate aim of the rhetorical endeavor and where it is concerned the first two are but 
preliminaries.  For this reason, Augustine exhorts the would-be psychagogue: 
 
It is necessary, therefore, that the sacred orator, when urging that something be done, 
should not only teach in order to instruct, and please in order to hold, but also move in 
order to win.  For indeed, it is only by the heights of eloquence that that man441 is to be 
moved to agreement who has not been brought to it by truth, though demonstrated to his 
acknowledgement, even when joined with a charming style.  (IV.13.29; emphasis added) 
 
oportet igitur eloquentem ecclesiasticum, quando suadet aliquid  quod agendum est, non 
solum docere ut instruat, et delectare ut teneat, verum etiam flectere ut uincat.442  ille 
                                               
441 Earlier in this passage, Augustine characterizes this man as duris, an adjective meaning ‘hard’ or ‘inflexible’.  
Taken as a substantive it refers to one who has a hard nature or is hard-hearted.  Cf. n.445 below. 
442 Sullivan refers to this sentence as “a ‘linking summary,’ almost a refrain; given in order to make sure that the 
‘rhetorical progression’ is under stood” (n.9). 
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quippeiam remanet ad consenionem flectendus eloquentiae granditate443, in quo id non 
egit usque ad eius confessionem demonstrata veritas, adiuncta etiam suauitate 
dictionis.444  (IV.13.29; emphasis added) 
 
In other words, in shifting ornament to the temperate style, Augustine opens up a third space 
which makes the union of substance and form incomplete for the purposes of effective rhetorical 
action.  What is needed in addition to substance and form is power – more specifically will-
power.   
The parallels of what elevated rhetoric can achieve to what Saint Augustine requires 
during his own internal conflict of the will are such that it is difficult to deny that he intends his 
psychology of desire to be read to some degree into his theology of rhetoric.  For he relays what 
was a hypothetical scenario in DDC as biographical fact in the Confessions using synonymous 
language: 
 
I regarded it as settled that it would be better to give myself to Your love rather than go 
on yielding to my own lust; but the first course delighted and convinced my mind, the 
second delighted my body and held it in bondage445…and whereas You showed me by 
every evidence that Your words were true there was simply nothing I could answer… 
(8.5.12; emphasis added) 
 
                                               
443 Granditas is a synonym for sublimitas.  See Sullivan’s note (n.12) on this passage, which connects its usage as a 
rare but extant technical term in rhetoric used by Cicero and Pliny. 
444 According to Sullivan, this sentence is “a final statement of the importance of flectere.  Augustine finds the 
climax of his chapter in the culmination of the officia” (n.11). 
445 Earlier, Augustine refers to this condition as dura servitus, commonly translated as hard or harsh bondage 
(VII.5.10).  Thus, he further links his own inflexible condition with that of the man whose only remedy is the grand 
style of speech by reference to the adjective durus. See n.441 above. 
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ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere, sed 
illud placebat et vincebat, hoc libebat et vinciebat…et undique ostendenti vera te dicere, 
non erat omnino quid responderem veritate convictus…(8.5.12; emphasis added) 
 
Lest we too hastily conflate conversion with conviction, we should note that this conflict of the 
will is exactly the impediment that thwarts Augustine’s own spiritual ascent, in which he begins 
with a contemplation of corporeal bodies, rises up [erexit] through the faculties of the mind, and 
attains a glance at That Which Is [id quod est].446  However, Augustine cannot maintain his gaze 
and is forced to return to his habits of the flesh.  He is left with nothing “but a memory of delight 
[amantem memoriam] and a desire [desiderantem] as for something of which I had caught the 
fragrance but which I had not yet the strength to eat [comedere nondum possem]” (7.17.23).  He 
knows and desires but lacks the will to act.  It is at precisely this critical moment that Augustine 
prescribes the rhetor to employ the genus sublime.  In fact, Augustine is explicit that this is the 
only remedy. 
5.4.4 The Rhetoric of Conversion 
I am not arguing that Augustine’s impeded conversion means that God is a bad rhetor.  Only that 
Augustine is following the rhetorical progression of being convinced of the truth and finding 
delight in it before being transformed by it.  But any worry about priority or hierarchy should be 
assuaged when we realize that Augustine, like Plato, is only providing an analytical account for 
                                               
446 The stages of ascent parallel those of the Neoplatonist Plotinus (cf. Enneads 1.6).  However, there are important 
differences, the most notable of which is that for Plotinus ascent terminates with a convergence with the One beyond 
Being.  For Augustine, it is the vision of Being, That Which Is [id quod est], which is the ultimate goal (i.e., the 
Judeo-Christian God who calls Himself “He Who Is” [qui est] (see Vulgate, Exodus 3.14)). 
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the purpose of instruction.  The key is adaptation and integration.  None of the styles can be 
employed nor the duties met without the aid of the others (DDC 4.25.55-26.58).  Indeed, 
Augustine recounts this fact in his own conversion.   
In Book VIII of the Confessions, Augustine’s whole soul is primed by God with three 
stories of conversion each addressing a different aspect of his soul.  In the second chapter, he is 
told of the conversion of the most learned [doctissimus], highly skilled [peritissimus] rhetorician 
Victorinus (8.2.3), who through his study of the Bible was converted to Christianity.  In the sixth 
chapter, Augustine hears the story of two Roman officials whose encounter with the Life of 
Antony turned them from their ambition in civil service to a life in service to Christ (8.6.15).  In 
the final chapter, while his crisis comes to a climax, Augustine relays what he had been told of 
St. Antony, that he had heard the scriptures read aloud an had felt admonished to give up all is 
worldly possessions and live a life of asceticism (8.12.29).  Thus God had sent three stories of 
conversions, of reorientations of desires, to Augustine’s ears: one of intellect, one of ambition 
and one of material possession.   
With his whole soul thus primed, Augustine completes his conversion by reading a 
passage from the Bible; a triple admonition against three false paths reminiscent of the three 
psychological desires in their perversion: “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and 
impurities, not in contention and envy, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no 
provision for the flesh in its concupiscences” (Rom. 13:13-14).447  Thus the Word of God 
                                               
447 non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudicitiis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed 
induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis.  Although at first glance the 
passage seems only to address carnal desires and worldly ambition, much like with Gorgias, it would be odd for a 
rhetorician, an a Trinitarian at that, to suddenly switch from distinct tripartitions to apparent triads that were really 
dyads.  Thus, we should ask ourselves if there is any way to interpret the triad as a distinct group of three.  The 
answer is pretty straight forward.  Comissatio is associated with Bacchanalian revelry (see Lewis and Short), 
Bacchus being the god of madness; whereas drunkenness dulls the mental faculties.  Augustine addresses both 
Bacchus and drunkenness in his discussion of the faulty philosophy of Epicureanism in Contra Academicos 3.7.16.  
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ultimately satisfies the officia oratoris by integrating the disparate elements of Augustine’s 
tripartite will into a unity in Christ; and thereby turning Augustine’s soul, suddenly, as 
Victorinus had said, away from his worldly desires and towards the Word Incarnate.  This is 
ultimately achieved not by the clunky technical process that is at best a preparation (and an 
education for the reader), but by addressing his whole, integrated soul.448   
I am not, however, arguing that Augustine suggests rhetoric is sufficient for conversion 
over and above the role of God’s grace, it is not.  In fact rhetoric alone is not sufficient for any 
true act of the rhetor as Augustine describes it, for he follows Cicero in maintaining that the true 
rhetor must possess both wisdom [sapientia] and eloquence [eloquentia] (4.5.7-8).  Since 
wisdom for Augustine is found in the Holy Scriptures, then insofar as docere must precede 
flectere, the grace of God’s Word must precede any sudden conversion or sublime elevation of 
the audience.  But, insofar as humanity has some intellectual machinery that contributes to the 
soul’s conversion, it is a rhetoric of three duties and three styles geared toward the soul of 
another culminating in the act of their reorientation through the genus sublime.  Since this 
rhetorical act is grounded in an understanding of the Scripture, as is made clear in the first three 
books of the DDC, it outlines in what way human teachers may aide in guiding another’s soul in 
their conversion and subsequent ascent: through sacred reading and spoken word.  This is, by 
Augustine’s own admission in his Retractationes, what the Confessions itself was meant to 
                                                                                                                                                       
In his commentary on the text, James O’Donnell refers to Augustine’s explanation of the same biblical passage in 
his Ep. 22 in order to show that both the first and the second come from our carnal desires 
(http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/conf/).  However, in applying the first pair to the specific problem of 
feasting at the gravesite in honor of the dead, Augustine suggests that this is a problem of ignorance that can be 
cured with teaching and advice.  As such, I maintain that in both the Confessions and Ep. 22 he treats this trio as the 
perversion of the three psychological desires when oriented to the temporal world. 
448 See n.438 above on the relationship between the duty flectere and conversio. 
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achieve: to “draw [excitant] a person’s mind [intellectum] and emotions [affectum] towards God” 
(2.6.1).449       
I have argued that a thoroughly Platonic psychology of desire runs throughout St. 
Augustine’s Confessions, which consistently speaks of the desires of our intellect, our ambitions, 
and our senses.  Likewise, I have demonstrated that a similar tripartition runs throughout 
Augustine’s discussion of rhetorical action in On Christian Doctrine in the form of the three 
Ciceronian officia oratoris (to teach, to please, and to move) joined to the three styles of rhetoric 
(plain, temperate, and grand).  By investigating the parallels that exist between Augustine’s 
account of the soul’s conversion in the Confessions and his account of the movement of the will 
by persuasion in On Christian Doctrine, I maintain that one of the main roles of rhetoric for 
Augustine is to aid in the soul’s conversion along its tripartite lines.  Ultimately, I suggest that it 
is the Platonic tripartite soul that gives Augustinian rhetoric an object, an aim, and a structure 
that undergirds its more obviously Ciceronian framework.  Similar to Platonic rhetorical 
psychology, the Augustinian theory sees the rhetorical enterprise culminating in its effect on the 
spirited element.  Thus, I hold that regardless of any theological differences, Augustine’s theories 
of psychology, language, and divine ascent place him squarely in the Platonic tradition of 
rhetorical theory.  Reading Augustine in this manner reveals a number of connections between 
the theory of rhetoric presented in On Christian Doctrine and the theory of spiritual progress 
found in the Confessions.  These connections not only indicate a more mystical foundation for 
the technical aspects of Augustinian rhetoric than Ciceronian theory alone, but also suggest how 
Augustine’s rhetorical theory impacts his spiritual theology.  In the next and final chapter, I take 
                                               
449 English from Revisions (Retractationes). Trans. Boniface Ramsey. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2010.  Latin 
from PL 32. 
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up Augustine’s psychological analogy and demonstrate how it provides St. Bonaventure with a 
template for a theology of communication that aids the soul of the speaker in its ascent to God. 
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6.0  SAINT BONAVENTURE’S ANAGOGIC THEOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 
The thirteenth-century scholastic St. Bonaventure is at best a marginal figure in the history of 
rhetoric.  Kennedy mentions Bonaventure’s classificatory scheme of the language arts as one of a 
number of permutations that attempted to categorize rhetoric amongst its counterparts in the 
philosophical tradition in the Middle Ages.450  Murphy’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages mentions 
Bonaventure only to point out that certain works had been wrongly attributed to him.451  Conley 
mentions him once, wrongly situating him in a tradition that assimilates rhetoric to dialectic.452  
McKeon, it seems, is unique among prominent historians of rhetoric for considering Bonaventure 
in-depth, identifying him as the culminating figure of the Augustinian-Platonic tradition of 
theological rhetoric.453  I should, however, note the 1972 dissertation and summary article by 
Harry C. Hazel, Jr. that review Bonaventure’s philosophy of linguistic communication in order to 
establish the importance of the Ars concionandi, the art of preaching that was questionably 
                                               
450 Classical Rhetoric 82.  While Kennedy does not suggest a tradition, it is notable for reasons that will become 
evident below that the three examples of classificatory schemes he gives are from St. Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor 
and St. Bonaventure.  In the second revised and “enlarged” edition of Classical Rhetoric, Kennedy does suggest “a 
form of the philosophic tradition of rhetoric” connecting Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure.  However, he 
diminishes their importance by no longer mentioning any of the details of their classificatory schemes (97). 
451 Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 326-329.  Murphy’s point is that the Ars concionandi that was once attributed to him 
and know thought spurious might be attributable to Richard of Thetford. 
452 Rhetoric in the European Tradition. New York: Longman, 1990. 73.  Here Conley mentions Bonaventure with 
the twelfth-century Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury, neither of which assimilated rhetoric to dialectic.  
Both, as we will see below, did place rhetoric and dialectic under the class of “probable logic.”  St. Bonaventure did 
not even go that far. 
453 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 23-25. 
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attributed to him.  Hazel’s review is fairly straightforward, as the majority of the analysis deals 
with the manual itself.454 
Conversely, consideration of rhetoric is noticeably absent from contemporary studies of 
Bonaventure.  That is not to say that rhetoric is belittled, as it is often mentioned positively as 
part of his overall theological schema.  But it is not often treated as a topic worthy of 
investigation in itself, and often curious mistakes occur.  For instance, more than one otherwise 
careful scholar has noted that Bonaventure learned all he knew about rhetoric from Aristotle.  
While Bonaventure shows some degree of familiarity with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, his rhetorical 
training is clearly Ciceronian.455  There are, of course, exceptions.  A few works have looked at 
Bonaventure’s style of preaching or philosophical argumentation in terms of rhetoric.456  And 
Ewert Cousins explores the general relationship between language and mysticism in 
Bonaventure in terms that are helpful for my analysis.457  But no work from Bonaventuran 
scholars of which I am aware treats Bonaventure’s philosophy of language in terms of the history 
of rhetoric, the language arts, or pedagogy.  As such, this chapter establishes St. Bonaventure as 
an important figure in the history of rhetoric, not only as a great rhetor and theorist, but more 
                                               
454 Harry C. Hazel, Jr. A Translation with Commentary of the Bonaventuran “Ars Concionandi.” Dissertation. 
Washington State University, 1972; and “The Bonaventuran ‘Ars condonandi.’” Western Speech 36.4 (1972): 241-
250. 
455 See Sr. Emma Therese Healy. De Reductione Artium Ad Theolagiam: A Commentary with an Introduction and 
Translation. Saint Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, Saint Bonaventure University, 1955; and Jacques 
Guy Bougerol. Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure. Trans. Jose de Vink. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild 
Press, 1964.  
 Healy professes a thought that was commonly held by Bonaventure’s contemporaries but, as we will see, 
not by Bonaventure himself: “Rhetoric may be considered a popular branch of logic.  It is an art by which the 
speaker aims to persuade the reason or move the feelings.  It is the art of argumentative composition which, in 
almost all essentials, must be regarded as the creation of Aristotle” (87).  Bougerol simple says that “As as a student 
in the faculty of arts, [Bonaventure] received from [Aristotle] all he knows of rhetoric and dialectic” (26). 
456 See, for instance, Mark D. Jordan. “The Care of Souls and the Rhetoric of Moral Teaching in Bonaventure and 
Thomas.” Spirit and Life: A Journal of Contemporary Franciscanism 4 (1993): 1-77; Kevin L. Hughes. “St. 
Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron: Fractured Sermons and Protreptic Discourse.” Franciscan Studies 63 
(2005): 107-129; and Joshua C. Benson. “Identifying the Literary Genre of the De reductione artium ad theologiam: 
Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris.” Franciscan Studies 67 (2009): 149-178. 
457 Ewert H. Cousins. “Bonaventure’s Mysticism of Language.” Mysticism and Language. Ed. Steven T. Katz. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 236-257. Cousins’ analysis will be considered again below. 
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importantly as one of the few theologians of rhetoric to emerge in the Middle Ages; second, 
perhaps, only to St. Augustine, to whom he admits his debt. 
The first part of this chapter establishes the various threads of the intellectual tradition 
within which St. Bonaventure is working.  The second part demonstrates how Bonaventure 
brings these threads together systematically into a pedagogy of psychic reformation and ascent.  
It should be remembered that in this chapter I often speak of the arts of language – grammar, 
logic, dialectic, and rhetoric – or the “trivium,” as a single entity; since, for Bonaventure and his 
predecessors these arts were inextricably intertwined as they collectively dealt with the human 
faculties of thought and speech.  
6.1 THREE TRADITIONS 
In his seminal 1942 essay, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” Richard McKeon identifies three key 
lines of intellectual development that were either determined or considerably influenced by 
rhetorical thought: the tradition of the rhetoricians proper, “who found their problems assembled 
and typical answers discussed in the works of Cicero and Quintilian”; the tradition of 
‘Aristotelian’ logicians who “followed Aristotle only in the treatment of terms and propositions, 
and Cicero in the treatment of definitions and principles”; and as we saw in the preceding 
chapter, the tradition of philosophers and theologians, “who found in Augustine a Platonism 
reconstructed from the Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies…and formulated in terms 
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refurbished and simplified from Cicero’s rhetorical distinctions.”458  As McKeon notes, 
Bonaventure by his own admission is most firmly situated in the tradition of Augustinian 
Platonism.  However, he is not completely abstracted from the other two.  As an educated 
scholar of the Middle Ages, he is well trained in the precepts of Ciceronian rhetoric and the 
methodology of Aristotelian logic.  In order to understand the uniqueness and innovation of his 
system, it is important to know the basic contours of the traditions in which he is trained.459  
6.1.1 Ciceronian Tradition 
According to McKeon, the tradition of rhetoric proper “took form, for the most part, not in 
controversy or theory but in a vast number of textbooks which grew in three distinct groups 
differentiated according to the subject matters once treated by rhetoric but now concerned with 
verbal forms employed in those three fields in lieu of direct treatment of subject matter.”460  This 
is the tradition of the appropriation, transmission, and adaptation of Ciceronian and other Roman 
rhetorical precepts to the particular educational and practical needs of the Middle Ages. 
Appropriately, most contemporary scholarship has focused on this tradition, with James 
J. Murphy’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages still offering the most comprehensive and concise 
statement.  In the preface to this work, Murphy is clear that all he offers is a preliminary survey 
of the preceptive tradition, and so he specifically limits the breadth and depth of his pioneering 
                                               
458 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 4.  Note, for matters of exposition I have rearranged the original order in which 
McKeon presented the traditions, which ran Ciceronian, Augustinian-Platonic, Aristotelian.  However, in McKeon’s 
own document, the particular order does not seem to matter. 
459 Much of the following sub-sections contain rehearsals of the basic historical facts and broader trajectories 
concerning rhetoric in the Middle Ages as they can be found in McKeon’s article and developed further in the 
primary texts and introductory materials in the Copeland and Sluiter anthology.  Both works offer plentiful primary 
and secondary bibliographies for further research into topics and figures that I treat here as providing important 
context, while acknowledging that deeper inquiry into them would take the current study too far afield from its 
object of investigation. 
460 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 27. 
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research.  Yet despite his intention that the work be an opening foray into a long neglected field 
in the history of rhetoric, it seems to have become accepted as the definitive statement on the 
subject by the discipline at large.  In fact it has become a disciplinary commonplace to view 
medieval rhetoric almost exclusively as a preceptive art that persisted in the classroom and was 
further trifurcated in its development into three distinct genres: the art of verse-writing [ars 
poetriae], the art of letter-writing [ars dictaminis], and the art of preaching [ars praedicandi].461  
But influenced by Murphy and determined that his initial organic inquiries not become ossified 
dogma, historians of medieval rhetoric have continued to do productive work to expand both the 
breadth and depth of inquiry into this tradition.462 
As a scholar at the University of Paris in the mid-thirteenth century, the rhetorical 
tradition could have been transmitted to Bonaventure by the primary texts of Cicero (e.g., De 
inventione) and Horace (e.g., Ars poetica) as well as commentaries and encyclopedic renderings 
by Martianus Cappella, St. Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus, and Alcuin in which the trivium as a 
curriculum would have be codified, at least generally, though the authors displayed different 
biases in their arrangement and emphasis of the arts.  While there are later figures and works in 
the ensuing trifurcation of the rhetorical tradition which Bonaventure might possibly have 
encountered – such as Alan of Lille’s late twelfth-century preaching manual, Summa de arte 
praedicandi, or Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s early thirteenth-century Poetria nova – Bonaventure gives 
few medieval citations in rendering his theory of the language arts and none that would be 
                                               
461 For instance, the entry for “Medieval Rhetoric” in Sloane’s Encyclopedia of Rhetoric consists of two essays.  One 
by Rita Copeland summarizing the preceptive tradition and one by Jan Ziolkowski summarizing controversies in 
Medieval grammar.  Indeed, at the 2010 Biennial Conference of the Rhetoric Society of America, Murphy chaired a 
roundtable discussion entitled, “Do We Know Enough about Medieval Rhetoric?”  He answered this rhetorical 
question with a resounding (and ironic) “Yes,” referencing his own work as an essentially complete statement on the 
matter. See n.462 below. 
462 See, among others, the works of Martin Camargo, Rita Copeland, Marjorie Woods, Jill Ross and Beth Bennett, 
who were all present at the roundtable mentioned in n.461 above and who emphatically (and not ironically, though 
in good fun) refuted Murphy’s opening assertion. 
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considered as coming from the rhetorical tradition proper.  Bonaventure does quote Cicero and 
Horace directly however, indicating a grounding in at least the classical texts of the tradition.463  
Of course, Augustine’s DDC also had a major impact on Bonaventure’s reception of the 
tradition proper.  This is most evidenced in the Bonaventuran Ars Concionandi.  Although its 
authorship is disputed, most commentators agree that it depicts a line of thought consonant with 
Bonaventure’s own writings.464  The tract opens with text from DDC stipulating the twofold 
duties of the preacher: “every interpretation of scripture depends on two things: the method of 
understanding the necessary meaning, and the method of expressing the meaning once it is 
understood.” (38, quoting DDC 1.1.1).  As such, the author lays out his plan to cover the three 
components that constitute the preacher’s efforts: Divisions, Distinctions, and Expansions, meant 
to instruct, delight, and persuade – again echoing Augustinian rhetorical theory.  These three 
goals of the preacher are further connected to the arts of the trivium, at least implicitly, as Hazel 
demonstrates how these categories align with Bonaventure’s own description of grammar, logic, 
and rhetoric; as the first deals largely with grammatical divisions, the second with logical 
distinctions, and the third with rhetorical expansions designed to adapt to a particular 
audience.465   
Whether the text is from Bonaventure’s hand or not, there can be no doubt that he saw the 
art of preaching as one of the foremost duties of his order.  As we will see, he offers practical 
advice on the mundane arts of exegesis and homiletics throughout his various works.  As such, 
                                               
463 For instance, in discussing the art of poetry in the Reduction of the Arts to Theology, Bonaventure offers two 
quotes cited from Horace concerning the desire of poets to both serve and please (§2).  Bonaventure cites Cicero (De 
invetione) and quotes him at length on the virtues in the Collations on the Six Days (6.15-18).  As is usual, 
Bonaventure often quotes without citation, and some of those quotes from Cicero will be discussed below. 
464 See Hazel, Translation 10-17; McKeon, “Rhetoric” 23: “Bonaventura wrote no work on logic but did compose 
an excellent Art of Preaching, which is useful for the interpretation of his theological treatises and commentaries as 
well as his sermons.” 
465 Hazel, Translation 28-30.  
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he recognizes the traditionally observed powers of the language arts to spread the message of the 
Sacred Scriptures and in so doing, bring souls to God.  To this extent, Bonaventure’s view of the 
arts of the trivium is fairly traditional: they are important for their capacity to aid the preacher in 
understanding and expressing the Divine Word. 
6.1.2 Aristotelian Tradition 
A detailed history of the tradition of rhetoric and the logicians in Medieval Europe is yet to be 
written.  But since it is virtually impossible to separate from the pedagogical concerns of the first 
tradition, one can find general outlines of it in most histories of rhetoric that consider the Middle 
Ages, such as Murphy and Kennedy.  The historian of rhetoric who wishes to investigate this 
tradition further can find a rhetoric friendly foundation in the many translations and 
commentaries of the philosopher Eleonore Stump, who offers a summary history in her Dialectic 
and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic.466  It is sufficient to say that the history of 
logic in the Middle Ages is quite a dense topic, and only a brief sketch is needed to understand 
the significance of Bonaventure’s scheme in relation to both the history of the trivium and the 
current state of the linguistic and logical arts among the scholastics. 
 The thought of Aristotle was always present in medieval pedagogy due to the digests 
offered by the encyclopedists, along with the translations and commentaries of Boethius on the 
first two books of what would be known as Aristotle’s Organon – the logical “instrument” – 
which consisted in its old form of Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation.  In the twelfth-
                                               
466 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989.  One looking for a comprehensive survey of the interrelations of all 
the arts of the trivium (logic and rhetoric and grammar) can turn to the recently published 1943 dissertation of 
Marshall McLuhan, The Classical Trivium: The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time (Corte Madera, 
CA: Gingko Press, 2005), which offers a brief, accessible, and comprehensive intellectual history of the arts from 
antiquity to the Renaissance. 
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century the “New Logic” expanded to include translations of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, 
the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations.467  With the translation of Arabic commentaries of 
Aristotle into Latin, especially those of Al-Farabi, the Organon gradually expanded to include 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics.468  Thus, at the time of St. Bonaventure’s writing, St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ schema of the logical arts offered in his Expositio of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 
“represents a culmination of twelfth- and thirteenth-century thought about the division of logic in 
response to the continued diffusion of Arabic Aristotelianism.”469   
In Thomas’ Preface, he goes through the entirety of the expanded Organon and assigns 
each to certain “acts of reason.”  The first two acts of reason are those of the intellect.  The 
Categories deals with the first of these acts, which is the “understanding of indivisible or non-
compounded things.”  On Interpretation deals with the second act which is “the combining or 
dividing of powers of understanding, in which true and false are now introduced.”470  McKeon 
gives a concise partial translation of the remaining act of reason in Thomas’ account, which is 
the act of reasoning proper and comprises the remaining books of the Organon:  
 
there are three processes of reason: those by which scientific certitude is acquired and in 
which no deviation from truth is possible; those which come to conclusions true for the 
most part but not necessary; and those in which reason deviates from the true because of 
some defect of principle.  The part of logic which treats the first of these processes is 
called Judicative, since its judgment is made with the certitude of science, and this part is 
                                               
467 See McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 7-8. 
468 For the general progression of this tendency see Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: 
introductions and translation of “Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philisophiae, ca. 1150-1160” 461-483; 
“Hermannus Alemannus, Al-Farabi’s Didascalia on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1256” 735-752; and “Thomas Aquinas, 
Preface to his Expositio of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 1270” 787-791. 
469 Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, “Thomas Aquinas” 785. 
470 Ibid. 790. 
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treated in the Analytics: the Prior Analytics is concerned with the certitude of judgment 
which is based only on the form of the syllogism, the Posterior Analytics with the 
demonstrative syllogism in which the certitude depends on matter or on the necessary 
propositions of which the syllogism is composed.  The part of logic which is subject to 
the second process of reason is called Inventive, for discovery is not always with 
certitude.  Topic or Dialectic treats of this process when it leads to conviction or opinion 
(fides vel opinio); Rhetoric treats of it when it leads only to a kind of suspicion without 
total exclusion of the contrary possibility; Poetic treats of it when estimation inclines to 
one of the two parts of a contradiction only because of the manner of its representation.  
Finally the third process of reason is called Sophistic and is treated by Aristotle in the De 
Sophisticis Elenchis.471 
 
In Thomas account “rhetoric and poetics are no longer part of the toolbox of the language 
sciences, or even of an art of logic whose object is speech…but instead are incorporated into a 
descriptive system of cognitive procedures that pertain to different acts of reason.”472  
Bonaventure would reassert the separate provinces of the language arts, while at the same time 
arguing for their inextricable integrity. 
 One of the major differences between Sts. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure was their 
opinion concerning the relationship between faith and reason.  Thomas, along with his fellow 
Aristotelians, felt that theology and philosophy operated in separate spheres of inquiry, so that 
his vast logical apparatus could reflect acts of human intellect without necessarily indicating 
anything about the nature of God.  Thus, “he could use the devices of Aristotle in the a posteriori 
                                               
471 McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 24. 
472 Copeland and Sluiter, “Thomas Aquinas” 788. 
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proofs of his systematic theology and those of Augustine in his commentaries on Scripture.”473 
Bonaventure was the preeminent master of the Franciscan-Augustinian counter-current in 
scholastic thought which deemed that philosophy was subject to theology, such that even the arts 
of logic and language revealed the Divine Nature through their arrangements and interactions.474  
It is for this reason that St. Bonaventure is more inclined to offer a theology of the language arts 
than he is to appropriate them as tools for logical inquiry.475  This is, of course, a simplification, 
as Bonaventure was a master of Aristotelian logic and Thomas Aquinas argued against the 
Aristotelian excesses of Averroism.476  But the general contours of the Aristotelian tendency 
towards arranging the arts under logic are adequate for the purposes of my analysis. 
6.1.3 Platonic Tradition 
Until the last decade, the history of medieval rhetorical activity rooted in the Augustinian 
appropriation and reconstruction of Platonic philosophy was virtually non-extant in the rhetorical 
discipline outside of the treatment it received by McKeon.  Granted, much has been written 
concerning Augustine and rhetoric and his subsequent influence on sacred reading and 
                                               
473 McKeon, “Rhetoric” 23. 
474 For a further exploration of the philosophical disagreements between the “Aristotelians” and the “Augustinians” 
see Gilson. The Philosophy of Bonaventure. Trans. Illtyd Trethowan and F.J. Sheed. Paterson, N.J., New York: St. 
Anthony Guild Press; distributor: Desclée Co., 1965. 21-28.  
475 This can be seen in the two saints’ differing disposition to analogical thinking according to Bougerol: “In the 
works of the two masters, the vocabulary and even certain texts may seem to correspond, but their spirit is 
profoundly different.  While the Thomist analogy is as much difference as resemblance, the Bonaventurian analogy 
takes on a fundamentally dynamic and positive character.  It appears in its own logical form as an EFFECTIVE 
means of knowledge, for Bonaventure insists most of all on its ‘anagogical’ function” (78, emphasis in original). 
476 See the passage cited in n.474 above for a brief account of this controversy as well.  For a deeper account, see 
Gilson’s Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. The Richards Lectures in the University of Virginia 1937. New 
York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1938.  It should also be noted that Bonaventure had his own problems with Plato, while 
Thomas Aquinas appropriated many Platonic concepts.  For studies on Thomas’ relationship to Platonic thought, see 
Fran O’Rourke. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1992; see also, 
Patrick Quinn. Aquinas, Platonism, and the Knowledge of God. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt.: 
Avebury, 1996. 
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preaching.  But for reasons demonstrated in the previous chapter, little has been done by way of 
following the trajectory of his Platonic tendencies through to their effects on the rhetorical 
thought of his later adherents.   
Recently, however, Copeland has investigated a major thread of that tradition as it 
developed in the cathedral school at Chartres.477  That history begins with Thierry of Chartres’ 
commentaries on Cicero’s De inventione and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herrenium.    
According to Copeland, Thierry’s refiguring of the Ciceronian myth of the origin of rhetoric 
through the commentary of Victorinus “becomes a universal spiritual paradigm, because the 
beginning of rhetoric is not just at a moment in time, but in the soul.”478  So for Thierry and his 
students, “rhetoric begins, not just in past historical time, but also at the moment of its definition 
in the individual soul, which has been prompted towards action.”479  Additionally, Copeland 
notes that Thierry’s commentary on allegory in the Ad Herennium “bears little relation to the 
teaching of the Ad Herennium…it reaches back, instead, to a post-Augustinian fusing of 
theology and rhetoric-semiotics.”480   
But it would be wrong of me to characterize Thierry simply as an Augustinian-Platonist 
commenting on Ciceronian rhetoric; rather, the Chartres school demonstrates that the Ciceronian, 
Platonic, and Aristotelian impulses mixed in various proportions throughout the intellectual 
history of the Middle Ages.  For Thierry includes large portions of the “New Logic” in his 
                                               
477 See “The History of Rhetoric and the Longue Durée: Ciceronian Myth and Its Medieval Afterlives.”The Journal 
of English and Germanic Philology 106.2, Master Narratives of the Middle Ages (2007):176-202; as well as 
“Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition.”  The Copeland and Sluiter collection also highlights much of the Chartrian 
Platonic influence in the medieval history of rhetoric.  See the two sections on Thierry of Chartres, the first on his 
two rhetoric commentaries on De inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium 405-438, the second on his encyclopedic 
Heptateuchon and Prologues to Donatus 439-443; the section on Dominicus Gundissalinus mentioned in n.468; the 
section on John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon 484-510; and the section of Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus 518-530. 
478 “History of Rhetoric” 191. 
479 Ibid. 192. 
480 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 250. 
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encyclopedic Heptateuchon, so that he could rightly be presented as “both as supreme explicator 
of the mysteries of Platonic thought about cosmic creation, and innovative exponent of 
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and Sophistical Refutations – that is, what we would now see as the 
early wave of the logic nova.”481  This scientific and allegorical legacy of Thierry culminates in 
the “Neoplatonist poetics of the Chartrian school, from William of Conches and Bernardus 
Silvestris to the greatest Latin beneficiary of that tradition, Alan of Lille.”482  Bernard’s 
Cosmographia and Alan’s Anticlaudinianus are grand allegories that use Platonic imagery to 
explore the nature of the arts and sciences, what Copeland describes as a Neoplatonic 
mythography and “poetics of integument (literary narrative seen as allegorical veiling of 
philosophical truth).”483 
Perhaps the most overt fusion of these lines of thought comes by way of the Metalogicon, 
a twelfth-century defense of the arts of the trivium, written by Thierry’s former student John of 
Salisbury.  The work begins with a Ciceronian claim: “Just as eloquence, unenlightened by 
reason, is rash and blind, so wisdom, without the power of expression, is feeble and maimed.  
Speechless wisdom may sometimes increase one’s personal satisfaction, but it rarely and only 
slightly contributes to the welfare of human society” (1.1).  John even offers a very Platonic 
linguistic re-appropriation of the Augustinian-Stoic physical principal of seminal reasons:  
 
Scientific knowledge is the product of reading, learning, and meditation.  It is accordingly 
evident that grammar, which is the basis and root of scientific knowledge, implants, as it 
were, the seed [sementem] [of virtue] in nature’s furrow after grace has readied the 
                                               
481 Copeland and Sluiter, “Thierry of Chartres” 406. 
482 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 257. 
483 Ibid. 257. 
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ground.  This seed, provided again that cooperating grace is present, increases in 
substance and strength until it becomes solid virtue, and it grows in manifold respects 
until it fructifies in good works, wherefore men are called and actually are “good.”  (1.23)  
 
However, John transfers this role to grammar, whereas Plato would have identified the 
inseminating language art as dialectic.484  Ultimately, John dismisses the idea that Plato’s 
dialectic is a systematic, scientific art of logic and identifies Aristotle as logic’s rightful founder 
(2.2).  Indeed, most of the book is a defense of the need to learn Aristotelian dialectical and 
logical principles (Books 2-4). 
 For all its rich history, however, St. Bonaventure does not seem to have been greatly 
influenced by the Chartrian branch of Platonic thought.  Rather, he credits a parallel tradition not 
wholly unrelated485  – that which can be traced back to the school of St. Victor with its roots in 
the doubly Platonic foundation of St. Augustine and the mysterious Dionysius the Areopagite.486  
This strand has been little explored since McKeon.  With the general contours of the intellectual 
landscape now established, it is to consideration of Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor, and 
ultimately, St. Bonaventure that I now turn. 
                                               
484 While I’m not claiming that John had access to the Phaedrus, the allegorical description of the effects of 
grammatical training is remarkably like those that Socrates attributes to dialectic: “The dialectician chooses a proper 
soul and plants and sows within it a discourse accompanied by knowledge – discourse capable of helping itself as 
well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed [σπέρμα] from which more discourse grows 
in the character of others.  Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy 
as any human can be” (276e-277a). 
485 I say “not wholly unrelated” because John of Salisbury mentions Hugh of St. Victor with reverence and respect in 
the Metalogicon (see 1.5).  However, Copeland and Sluiter do note some possible areas of disagreement as well 
(Medeival Grammar 486). 
486 Once thought to be the Dionysius that was converted by Paul at the Areopagus in Acts 17:34, doubt began to 
arise about this attribution in the first half of the fifteenth century.  It is now believed that he was a fifth or sixth 
century author writing under the pseudonym “Dionysius the Areopagite.”  Consequently, he is variously referred to 
in modern scholarship as “Pseudo-Dionysius” or “Dionysius the Psuedo-Areopagite.”  However, as the authors I am 
dealing with in this paper accept his identity and make reference to him as such, I will refer to him simply as 
“Dionysisus” from this point onward in order to avoid any confusion.  
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6.2 PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 
In discussing the interpretation of Sacred Scripture in On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology, 
St. Bonaventure rehearses his major influences.  He tells the reader that although Scripture is one 
in the literal sense, “there is understood a threefold spiritual meaning: namely, the allegorical, by 
which we are taught what to believe concerning the Divinity and humanity; the moral, by which 
we are taught how to live; and the anagogical, by which we are taught how to be united to God” 
(§5).487  Each spiritual level is assigned to a certain type of churchman, and each type 
exemplified by certain individuals: 
   
The doctors should labor at the study of the first; the preachers, at the study of the 
second; the contemplatives, at the study of the third.  The first is taught chiefly by 
Augustine; the second, by Gregory; the third, by Dionysius.  Anselm follows Augustine; 
Bernard follows Gregory; Richard (of Saint Victor) follows Dionysius.  For Anselm 
excels in reasoning; Bernard, in preaching; Richard, in contemplating; but Hugh (of Saint 
Victor) in all three (§5). 
 
A comprehensive analysis of Bonaventure’s theory of scriptural hermeneutics and homiletics 
would be most complete by situating him amongst all seven of these scholars.  However, as we 
are seeking to ground Bonaventure in the general tradition of Platonic psychagogy, in particular, 
                                               
487 English from Saint Bonaventure’s De reductione atrium ad theologiam: A Commentary with and Introduction 
and Translation.” Trans. Sister Emma Therese Healy. Saint Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, Saint 
Bonaventure University Press. 1955.  Emphasis in original translation, but present in the Latin manuscript.  All Latin 
texts for St. Bonaventure come from the relevant Quarrachi edition.  
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in its anagogical function, what is required is a review of the thought of Dionysius and Hugh of 
St. Victor. 
6.2.1 Dionysius and the Hierarchy of Macrocosm and Microcosm 
While St. Augustine transmits the psychagogic structure of tripartite desire and the psychological 
analogy of the Trinity to the Western Church, it is the late fifth-century mystic known as 
Dionysius the Areopagite who provides the grand triadic cosmological scheme that would so 
influence the Middle Ages in general, and St. Bonaventure in particular.  In his Celestial 
Hierarchy, Dionysius attempts to explicate the overall structure of the heavenly hosts as a 
reflection of the nature of God.  For Dionysius a hierarchy is “a sacred order [taxis iera], a state 
of understanding [episteme] and an activity [energeia] approximating as closely as possible the 
divine” (CH 164D).488  As such, we are presented with a concept of hierarchy that is overtly 
triadic in structure, comprising order, understanding, and activity.   
In depicting the celestial hierarchy, Dionysius emphasizes the triadic nature of the 
universe by establishing a larger hierarchy encompassing three lesser hierarchies each consisting 
of three separate orders, which in turn illustrates the macro-microcosmic nature of the 
hierarchical order.  The first hierarchy is composed of the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, 
who are most similar to what God is and most like His image (205B-212D).  As such, they 
“possess the highest order [taxin] as God’s immediate neighbor” (205B) and so the entire first 
hierarchy shares an intimate kinship with the first attribute of hierarchy: order.  However, once 
                                               
488 English translation comes from Colm Luibhéid and Paul Rorem. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. New 
York: Paulist Press, 1987.  The numerical markers can be found in that text, but indicate the column and letter 
markers in Migne, PG 3, from which the Greek text is taken. 
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the nature of each constituent group is analyzed, we see that each maintains a particular 
relationship with the attribute of hierarchy that shares its triadic position.   
The seraphim engage in “a perennial circling around diving things…the overflowing heat 
of movement that never falters and never fails” (205B).  In this way, the seraphim exemplify 
order by maintaining a perfect arrangement of position and movement.  Furthermore, through 
their perfect arrangement the seraphim possess “a capacity to stamp their own image on 
subordinates by arousing and uplifting in them to a like flame” (205C).  And so they participate 
in the more abstract notion of order as a formal principle through which order arises.  However, 
the triadic macro-microcosm is so complete that, though order is their primary function, they are 
not divorced from understanding and activity since they are busy in the activity of ordering 
through which they “do away with every obscuring shadow” that clouds the minds of their 
subordinates (205C).  In like manner the cherubim are primarily concerned with understanding, 
as their name means “the power to know and to see God…to contemplate the divine 
splendor…to be filled with the gifts that bring wisdom and to share these generously with 
subordinates” (205C).  As the seraphim provide formal guidance to subordinates, so the 
cherubim guide subordinates to understanding.  Finally, the emphasis of the thrones falls upon 
the perfection of their activity.  They are “completely intent upon remaining always and forever 
in the presence of him who is truly the most high, that, free of all passion and material concern, 
they are utterly available to receive the divine visitation, that they bear God and are ever open, 
like servants, to welcome God” (205D).  By discussing each group in turn and then as a unity, 
we are shown that the hierarchical progression of subordinates is achieved through purification 
[katharsis], illumination [photismos], and perfection [teleiosis] (208A-209D); a tri-fold ascent 
that mirrors the hierarchical structure.  It is the superior hierarchy as a whole that ultimately guides 
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subordinates in this process, although one can see how each order shares a special relationship 
with its respective hierarchizing function – formal purification through the transformative fire of 
the seraphim, cognitive illumination through the divine wisdom of the cherubim, and perfection 
in action through the chaste and continent motivations of the thrones (205B-D).   
In the second hierarchy, Dionysius seems to fuse the cosmological middle part of 
“understanding” with the Platonic middle part of “spirit.”  For later in the text we are told that all 
divine minds are divided into three: being, power, and activity [ousian kai dynamin kai 
energeian] (284D-285A).  Indeed, the middle hierarchy consists of three powerful orders bearing 
the near synonymous names of dominions [kyrioteton], powers [dynameon] and authorities 
[exousion], which all are geared towards imposing order over temporal affairs.   
Taking “understanding” as a power that operates between form and action, we can see 
that the intermediate orders play both a mental and material role.  For in returning to their 
nominal sources (which is, of course, the same source in the Divine) the dominions “accept no 
empty appearances [eike]” (237C); the powers refer to “a kind of masculine and unshakable 
courage [andrea]…which abandons all laziness and softness during the reception of the divine 
illumination” (237D-240A); and the authorities “are so placed that they can receive God in a 
harmonious [eukosmon] and unconfused way and indicate the ordered nature of the celestial and 
intellectual [noeras] authority” (240A).  Thus the middle hierarchy exemplifies not only the 
dominion, power, and authority that one would associate with the executive power of the 
auxiliaries, but also the intellectual dominion, power, and authority that come from 
understanding achieved through the purification, illumination and perfection of the higher order. 
The third and final hierarchy is made up of the principalities, archangels, and angels who 
are most concerned with humanity.  Yet, “principalities” translates archon, indicating once again 
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a formal principle at the head; the archangels mediate between these formal principles by 
interpreting and announcing what they have learned to the angels; and the angels administer to 
the material world, functioning as the actual mediums of communication between heaven and 
earth.  So the third hierarchy also follows the paradigm by being primarily focused with activity, 
yet tripartitioned appropriately. 
According to Dionysius, this same triadic hierarchy repeats itself in the institutions on 
earth as well as within every rational being: 
 
Each intelligent being, heavenly or human, has his own set of primary, middle, and lower 
powers, and in accordance with his capacities these indicate the aforementioned 
upliftings, directly relative to the hierarchic enlightenment available to every being.  It is 
in accordance with this arrangement that each intelligent entity – as far as he properly can 
and to the extent he may – participates in that purification beyond purity, the 
superabundant light, that perfection preceding all perfection.  (273C). 
 
As each hierarchy is lifted up toward God by the hierarchy that precedes it, there should be for 
Dionysius some process of purification, illumination, and perfection that human beings could 
participate in.  He identifies such a process in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: 
 
As for us, this gift [of hierarchy] which the heavenly beings have received uniquely and 
unitedly has been passed on to us by the divinely transmitted scriptures in a way suited to 
us, that is, by means of the variety and abundance of composite symbols.  Hence, the 
being of our hierarchy is laid down by the divinely transmitted scriptures…Furthermore, 
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whatever was given by these sacred men in a more immaterial initiation, as already given 
to our neighbors in the heavenly hierarchy, from mind to mind, this too our leaders have 
revealed, through the means of verbal expression and thus corporeal, but at the same time 
more immaterial since it is free from writing.  (376B-C) 
 
Thus, Dionysius names two processes by means of which intelligent corporeal beings may order 
their soul in imitation of God: by reading sacred texts and by means of speech.  In so doing, he 
sets the structural frame for the remainder of the chapter, which will endeavor to uncover the 
hierarchizing triadic connections the existed in the psychagogic tradition that placed the use of 
language at its heart. 
6.2.2 Hugh of Saint Victor’s Pedagogy of Re-Formation 
As a scholar and teacher writing in the early twelfth-century, Hugh’s work covered a wide range 
of topics from the various arts and sciences, to scholastic philosophy and theology, to mystical 
spirituality.  Yet as we have seen elsewhere, these topics are not distinct.  Consequently, in what 
is perhaps his best-known and most influential work, Eruditionis Didascaliae or Didascalicon de 
studio legend [on the study of reading],489 Hugh presents a treatise that orients all the medieval 
arts and sciences towards a theory of reading dedicated to the spiritual reformation of the student 
reader.  For Hugh, “properly ordered reading in the liberal arts serves to begin to restore the 
original order of humankind as the created image of God.”490  In reviewing the place of the 
                                               
489 For a detailed summary of the Didascalicon and its place in Hugh’s larger pedagogical framework, see Paul 
Rorem. Hugh of Saint Victor. Great Medieval Thinkers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 21-34. 
490 Franklin T. Harkins. Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St. 
Victor. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009. 74. 
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language arts in this scheme of restoration through encountering texts, we can get a good sense 
of Bonaventure’s appropriations and innovations. 
Hugh saw the trivium as fundamental for the practice of reading.  He discusses the 
trivium under the heading of the “logical” arts, acknowledging the derivation of its name from 
the Greek “logos” which could mean either word [sermo] or reason [ratio].491  Grammar, 
dialectic, and rhetoric comprise what he calls “linguistic logic” with dialectic and rhetoric being 
further subdivided into arts of “rational logic” which deal with probable argument.  Hugh also 
makes ratio a division of sermo: “Linguistic [sermocinalis] logic stands as genus…thus 
containing argumentative [disertivam] logic as a subdivision” (I.11).492  Later, Hugh divides 
discursive argument into a fuller range of demonstrative, probable, and sophistic; with probable 
containing dialectic and rhetoric.  So while he recognizes the unity of the trivium, he also seems 
to foreshadow the expanded Organon of the later twelfth-century that lays claim to rhetoric as a 
mode of argumentation.493 
Admittedly, the entire Didascalicon is written so as to supply what is necessary for the 
reader to engage the text.  When one considers that the logical arts are presented last after the 
                                               
491 Medieval pedagogues often acknowledged the origin of the language arts in the concept of the logos, arguing as 
Cicero did for their reunification.  The tradition goes back to the Stoics, who noted multiple aspects of the logos in 
the inner word of thought (logos endiathetos) and the uttered word of speech (logos prophorikos).  We can see this 
motive plainly in the fifth-century encyclopedic work of Martianus Capella, The Marriage of Philology and 
Mercury (De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii), for philology itself means “the love of the logos” and the marriage 
between the two figures serves as an allegory of the union between learning and eloquence (Stahl, et. al. 83).  Isidore 
of Seville defined logic as dialectic and rhetoric, noting the logos means “rational” (McKeon, “Rhetoric in the 
Middle Ages” 15; citing De Differentiis Rerum c. 39; PL 83, 93-94.).  And John of Salisbury, writing after Hugh and 
with reference to him, notes that ‘logic’ may be “limited to the rules of [argumentative] reasoning,” but holds that, 
“the twofold meaning of ‘logic’ stems from its Greek etymology, for in the latter language ‘logos’ means both 
‘word’ [sermonem] and ‘reason’ [rationem].” (Metalogicon I.10).   
492 English translation Jerome Taylor. The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961; Latin from PL 176, in which this is passage 1.12. 
493 See 2.28-30; 29-31 in PL 83.  Hugh does not include poetics in his version of the expanded Organon, 
downgrading it from an art to an ‘appendage’ that may be worth reading occasionally, but not for serious study.  
Hugh also includes in this category certain philosophers “who are always taking some small matter and dragging it 
out through long verbal detours” (3.4).  
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theoretical, practical, and mechanical arts, it might appear that the trivium holds no more special 
place in the art of reading then does, for example, fabric-making, which is one of the mechanical 
arts.  But Hugh is quite clear that although logic is discussed last, as it was the last of the arts to 
be discovered, it is of the first necessity to learn for sacred reading:  “It is logic which ought to 
be read first by those beginning to study philosophy, for it teaches the nature of words and 
concepts without both of which no treatise of philosophy can be explained rationally” (1.11).  As 
such, we see that the trivium is fundamental to the practice of reading.  However, this conclusion 
is not merely a mundane practice of rational import.  To the contrary, Hugh is quite conscious of 
the spiritual significance of his pedagogy and describes it in an almost Dionysian manner: 
 
This, then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they intend, namely, to restore 
[reparetur] within us the divine likeness [similitude], a likeness which to us is a form 
[forma] but to God is his nature.  The more we are conformed [conformamur] to the 
divine nature, the more do we possess Wisdom, for then there begins to shine forth again 
in us what has forever existed in the divine Idea or Pattern [ratione], coming and going in 
us but standing changeless in God.  (2.1) 
 
Hugh’s program of spiritual restoration through reading is one based, literally, in the reformation 
of the soul so that “salvation entails receiving again the form of Wisdom.”494  St. Bonaventure 
inherits much of Hugh’s reformative impulse.  Like Hugh, the language arts will have a 
predominant place.  However, Bonaventure will bring the Dionysian elements to the fore and 
                                               
494 Boyd Taylor Coolman. The Theology of Hugh of St. Victor: An Interpretation. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 17.  Coolman is commenting on this very passage.  His broader interpretation situates Hugh’s theology 
as one of Re-Formation. 
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cast his project as one of inner rehierarchization through both knowledge and practice of the arts.  
Through this process of properly orienting ourselves, we might make our ascent to God. 
6.3  SAINT BONAVENTURE’S TRIVIUM OF ASCENT 
In this final section, I consider three anagogical aspects of St. Bonaventure’s theorizing and 
theologizing of the language arts.  The first is the reorientation of the arts themselves and the 
“reduction” of their classificatory scheme.  Second is the uplifting consequence of reading and 
preaching.  Third is the anagogical effect of the speech act itself.  
The first step in understanding the significance of Bonaventure’s spiritual interpretation 
of the language arts is to understand his reassessment of them in contrast with the dominant 
intellectual milieu.  Even in Hugh of St. Victor we see a tendency towards the expansion of the 
Organon to include rhetoric.  In the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure’s contemporary 
at the University of Paris, the expansion is completed to include poetics and relate each art to the 
acts of reasoning in a descending order of rational certainty.  Bonaventure’s scheme is something 
quite different.  Though perhaps not innovative in its ordering, it is literally “original.” 
6.3.1 The Reduction of the Trivium 
Paul Rorem has recently brought to light a previously obscured fact of translation that radically 
affects the unease that the modern scholar might feel upon encountering the title of one of St. 
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Bonaventure’s more prominent works, On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology.495  In 
contemporary academic parlance, to “reduce” something is either to oversimplify it or to 
subordinate it or both.  So Bonaventure’s title might indicate a desire to rob the arts of their 
independent identities and bring them under the yoke of theological inquiry – an act of 
intellectual colonialization not unlike St. Augustine’s “Gold from Egypt.”  In the Latin, however, 
reductio, a compound of re- meaning “back” and ductio meaning “to lead” means literally “a 
leading back” or “a restoration.”496  Bonaventure is not interested in yoking.  Like Hugh, he is 
interesting in restoring; but unlike Hugh, he is not only interested in restoring through the arts, 
but also in restoring the arts themselves.497   
Rorem adds mightily to the concept of “leading back” by noting that not only is 
Bonaventure greatly influenced by Dionysius, but that the translation he used of the Celestial 
Hierarchy – likely some version of John Scot Eriugena498 – would have been accompanied by 
the commentaries of Eriugena and Hugh.499  The significance is that Eriugena explains that he 
uses the Latin prefix re- to denote the Greek ana, so that “reductio was used to translate 
‘anagogy,’ literally, ‘uplifting’” 500 with Hugh following suit.501  Therefore, Bonaventure’s 
                                               
495 De reductione artium ad theologiam. 
496 See Lewis and Short reductio. 
497 See Bougerol’s section on reductio for a similar analysis that interprets the term as part of Bonaventure’s 
dialectical method (Introduction 75-77).  Bougerol concludes that “the reduction is not merely a technique – it is the 
soul of the return to God” (76).  See also Burke’s comment that Bonaventure reduces “a ‘lower’ subject to a ‘higher’ 
one” (Grammar 97). 
498 Bougerol shows through philological analysis that the translation itself was likely a version of Eriugena (ca. 867) 
modified by that of Jean Sarrazin (ca. 1167) (Introduction 39-48). 
499 “Dionysian Uplifting (Anagogy) in Bonaventure’s Reductio.” Franciscan Studies 70 (2012): 183-188 (p. 185).   
500 “Dionysian Uplifting” 185. True, Eriugena also transliterated the term, and Bonaventure employs anagogicus in 
his texts.  But the point is that both Eriugena and Hugh are explicit that reductio is a Latin equivalent.  Moreover, 
knowing that Bonaventure was aware of the equivalency makes a great deal of sense out of the way he employed the 
term reductio.  This is the major thesis of Rorem’s article. 
501 Ibid. 186.   
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reduction is not a distillation or a simplification or in any way a diminishing, but is an anagogical 
endeavor aimed at leading the arts themselves back to their original form and purpose.502   
In order to understand his design, we must realize that St. Bonaventure is a consummate 
Trinitarian.  He sees in every artistic scheme the image of the Trinity.  This means that there can 
be hierarchy in the sense of order and emanation; but there can be no subordination in the sense 
of diminished importance or inferior capacity within any given triplet.  For Bonaventure, the 
trivium is just such a triplet which he acknowledges simply as being comprised of the arts of 
grammar, logic, and rhetoric – three distinct arts of speech without which the others are 
incomplete.  The emancipation of rhetoric from logic and the reemphasis of grammar as the 
essential grounding of the arts mark a radical departure from the dominant scholastic tendency of 
the times, evidenced even in Hugh and perfected in St. Thomas.  But Bonaventure’s ordering 
best conforms to the psychological and cosmological schemes of St. Augustine and Dionysius 
who offer variations of the archetypical order of being, intellect and will.  An order, I have 
argued, that was always implicit in the logos and was first made explicit in the negative 
proclamations of Gorgias.  Grammar gives speech form, logic provides understanding, and 
rhetoric infuses vitality, activity, and communicative force.503 
In an inversion of Hugh, Bonaventure goes so far as to name speech [sermo] as the 
primary concern [principalis intentio] of rational [rationalis] philosophy (Reduction §15).  Thus 
he follows the tradition of unifying the fractured concepts of logos by reintegrating the bifurcated 
Latin circumlocution ratio et sermo.  But the implication here is as subtle as it is revolutionary.  
                                               
502 On Bonaventure’s inclination to treat forma in more of an Augustinian-Platonic sense as participation in the 
metaphysical ideas of God, than an Aristotelian sense (though he was capable of both), see Bougerol “The Language 
of Saint Bonaventure” (Introduction 55). 
503 This is a general summary culled from the various expressions that Bonaventure offers about the trivium.  The 
technical vocabulary he employs is examined in the final subsection. 
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Speech is no longer the manifestation of reason, it is its content.  This is no longer a simple 
inversion of Hugh, but of the received tradition going back through Victorinus and Porphyry.  
Speech does not simply provide a body for the soul of thought, for there is no thought without 
words - speech is the substance of thought. 
Of course, anyone with a disciplinary neurosis can find things to complain about in 
Bonaventure’s system.  His complex way of looking at triplet within triplet results in some 
simplified statements when he looks at one triad, like the trivium, through a single aspect of 
another, like a single Person of the Trinity.  For this reason Charles Sears Baldwin can complain 
that Bonaventure “is content to give rhetoric the narrow and barren field of ornatus, assigning 
docendum and verum to logic,”504 because he does so when “considering speech in the light of 
its delivery” in which he sees the “pattern of human life” (§17).  Baldwin declines to mention 
that in the ornatus of speech, Bonaventure sees a basis for human action “regulated [ordine] and 
adorned [ornate] by uprightness of intention,” which suggests that Bonaventure saw ornatus as 
anything but barren, but rather was referring to the classical canons of arrangement and style as 
manifested in delivery. 
As Baldwin notes, but dismisses as a mere summary,505 St. Bonaventure treats the arts 
most comprehensively in the Collations on the Six Days (CSD).506  Here he does summarize 
across the arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric.  But he does so in a manner the reasserts the 
distinctions of the arts, respecting the provinces and implicit classical authorities of each.  For 
grammar he cites Priscian and notes that the art treats such things as moods, gender, syntax, 
prosody, number, case, etc. (4.19).  For logic, without citing Aristotle or naming his works 
                                               
504 Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400): Interpreted from Representative Works. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 
1959 (p. 178). 
505 Ibid. 177n.56. 
506 Collationes in hexaëmeron. 
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directly, he covers the whole New Logic.  He speaks of the “First Analysis” [prima analysi] and 
the “Second Analysis” [secunda analysi] that deal with syllogisms based on necessary 
arguments; Topical (i.e. dialectical) proofs [loci topici] that deal with probable arguments; 
Sophistical proofs [loci sophistici] that deal with errors in argument; and he finishes by 
mentioning the need to deal with “the nature of things” [nature rerum] through the “ten 
predicaments” [decem praedicamenta] and the “treatment of sentences [enuntiationes]” (4.20).  
The summary of rhetoric is indeed an outline of De inventione without direct attribution.  But in 
that outline he asserts the nature of rhetoric in a way that demonstrates his position in a number 
of debates.  He mentions that the orator provides a civic function [civili utilitati]; that its three 
types are demonstrative (i.e., epideictic), deliberative and judicial, explaining each through 
triplits of their own; that a proper speech has an exordium, narrative, etc.; and that rhetoric has 
five canons: invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery (4.21-25).507   
Bonaventure’s remarks might seem like a simple summary, but amidst debates about the 
civic function of rhetoric, its relationship to logic, and the canons that rightly belonged to it, it is 
a subtle argument for an integrated art of language constituted of the trivium and organized by a 
hierarchy without subordination.  It is a reductio of the language arts to their most spiritual form, 
which happens to be their most classical.  So while a rhetorician might complain that in the CSD 
Bonaventure identifies logic with Christ and privileges it as the center of the trivium (1.11; 1.25-
26); such a complaint only comes from misunderstanding that Christ is the Center [medium] of 
the Trinity, just as logic is the second art of the trivium.  Conversely, and appropriately, in his 
Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit (CHS),508 which deals with the Third Person of 
the Trinity, Bonaventure – paraphrasing Cicero on the deliberative mode that considers utility, 
                                               
507 Inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. 
508 Collationes de septem donis spiritus sancti. 
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security, and honorableness – asserts that it is “certain that rational philosophy is consummated 
[consummatur] in the discipline of rhetoric.”509  Whether it is better to be the center or the 
consummation is a moot point for Bonaventure.  What he cares about is the leading upward of 
the soul through the rehierachized trivium.  That anagogic project takes two basic forms, the 
reading and preaching of the Word of God and the contemplation of our own ability to language. 
6.3.2 Hermeneutic Ascent 
One might get the sense that although St. Bonaventure theorized about the language arts, he was 
no rhetorical theorist.  This would be a mistake.  Even outside of the Ars concionandi, much of 
his works focus on the interpretative and expressive tasks of the preacher that occupied St. 
Augustine’s DDC.  Although he does not always make the connection explicit, Bonaventure tells 
us in the Reduction that one of the roles of rational philosophy is to guide interpretation (§4) and 
its role in expression is obvious.  Often, however, the word ‘rhetoric’ is not present.  For 
instance, when Bonaventure opens the CSD he situates it as, among other things, an investigation 
into preaching: 
 
In the midst [medio] of the Church the Lord shall open his mouth, and shall fill him with 
the spirit of wisdom and understanding and shall clothe him with a robe of glory (Eccl. 
15:5).  In these words the Holy Spirit teaches [docet] the prudent man to whom he should 
address his speech [sermonem], from where he should begin [incipere] it, and finally 
where he should end [terminere] it. (1.1) 
                                               
509 English translation from Joan Frances Crist. Saint Bonaventure’s “Conferences on the Seven Gifts of the Holy 
Spirit”: A Translation and Commentary. Dissertation. University of Notre Dame, 2004. 
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He should direct it to the Church, he should begin from the center [medium], which is Christ,510 
and end in wisdom and understanding.  Hence, it is worth investigating in what way the art of 
preaching impacts the preacher’s ascent to wisdom and understanding.  
In the Journey of the Mind to God,511 Bonaventure tells us that by observing “the certain 
and infallible laws” (3.7) of the constituent disciplines of natural, rational, and moral philosophy, 
we prepare our mental faculties to be reformed by the three theological virtues.  These virtues 
reorder our mind in line with the mystical hierarchization of the Church through a threefold 
Dionysian process of “purgation, illumination, and perfective unity” (4.6) which is brought about 
by the threefold mystical meaning of scripture: tropological, allegorical, and anagogical.  In this 
way, we see that the trivium is not only necessary for the effective communication of Scriptural 
Truths; but also plays quite literally a central role in the full understanding of the Scriptures 
themselves insofar as it lays at the very center of the third step towards God, without which our 
minds cannot move on towards the fourth step: receiving the “hierarchical revelations of Holy 
Scripture” (4.7).  If we follow Bonaventure’s advice on where to begin, then we must begin our 
hermeneutic encounter with the wisdom of Scripture at the center, with the trivium. 
A sort of mystical circularity comes into play however, because hermeneutic 
interpretation is far from being sufficient for the task at hand.  Indeed, prayer must augment the 
rhetorical process and the Spirit must guide the preacher even as the laws of rhetoric guide his 
                                               
510 For the importance of Christ as Center in Bonaventure’s schemes, see Zachary Hayes. The Hidden Center: 
Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure. New York: Paulist Press, 1981; also, see J. A. Wayne 
Hellmann and Jay M. Hammond. Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology. St. Bonaventure, NY: 
Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 2001. 61-77. 
511 Itinerarium mentis in deum.  Saint Bonaventure’s Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. Trans. Philotheus Boehner. 
Works of Saint Bonaventure. Saint Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, Saint Bonaventure University, 1956. 
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mind.  In his Commentary on the Gospel of Luke,512 Bonaventure gives a spiritual reading of 
Luke 9:16-17 wherein he discusses how the multiplication of the loaves serves as a “mystical 
and figurative example” to preachers, who should: 
 
not search out new things from their hearts, for the Lord did not create new loaves to feed 
the crowd.  But as the Lord multiplied five barley loaves by means of a divine blessing, 
so too must every abundance of true teaching be taken from the foundation of Sacred 
Scripture, multiplied by prayer, through which one looks to heaven, and devotion, 
through which it is blessed, and meditation, through which it is broken, and preaching, 
through which it is distributed and explained. 
 
Rhetorical invention, then, becomes a spiritual gift, obtained through divine reading, prayer, 
devotion, and meditation, culminating in the act of preaching.  The preacher seeks not for 
creative genius, but to be inspired by the Holy Spirit, at least in part.  That is to say that 
Bonaventure does not want to divorce the labor of the preacher from the process of preaching, 
but points to the Holy Spirit as the foremost instructor on the subject.  He tells us that the “Spirit 
is the best teacher, for the Spirit teaches men and women to understand and to express 
themselves in a refined manner” (12:12, Paragraph 20), which brings us right back to the two 
Augustinian duties of the preacher.  However, the preacher should not rely solely on his own art, 
for as Bonaventure states, “when people rely on their ingenuity, their inventiveness is poor, their 
judgment falls short, and they frequently miss the mark.  For which reason Proverbs 3:5 reads: 
                                               
512 Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae. 
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‘Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and do not rely on your own cleverness.’” (12:11, 
Paragraph 19).  The reliance on the spiritual thus aids in invention, but does not dominate it. 
Of course the preacher must still work hard, in fact, “All preachers are instructed that 
they give time first to their own perfection and then to the edification of others” (1:80, Paragraph 
143).  Elaborating on this point, St. Bonaventure tells us concerning the finding of Jesus in the 
temple that “in this, too, it is to be noted spiritually that Christ teaches us that we must first learn 
before we teach, according to what Sirach 18:19 says: ‘Learn, before you speak.’ And thus, he 
wanted to be found in the midst of the teachers and in the temple because truth is attained 
through the reading of the Scriptures and through prayer.” (2:46).   
Scripture becomes the beginning and end of the rhetorical journey.  The preacher begins 
to read so that he may understand the literal level and become learned, and meditating upon it he 
is cleansed, enlightened and perfected.  By partaking in the rhetorical act, which is the 
consummation of the grammatical act of interpretation and the logical act of understanding, the 
preacher sees the image of God in his own work.  By reflecting on this image he begins to 
perfect the mind further and prepares it for the revelatory Truth of Scripture in its threefold 
sense, and his mind is thus hierarchized by it.  The journey continues beyond this point into 
contemplation.  This is the progression stated in Bonaventure’s De triplici via.  For not only does 
this work discuss the individual’s progression to union with God through the steps of divine 
reading, meditation, and prayer culminating in the contemplative practice, but it also ends in a 
description of a Dionysian ascent to contemplation which explicitly hierarchizes these practices: 
“Note that on the first level, truth is to be invoked by sighs and prayers, which pertains to the 
Angels; it is to be received by study and reading, which pertains to the Archangels; it is to be 
communicated by example and preaching, which pertains to the Principalities” (3.13).  Needless 
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to say that the process ascends six more levels into contemplation, but the practices we are 
concerned with are those that deal with the first level of truth.  As such, true preaching is both a 
human and divine endeavor, consisting of prayer, sacred reading, and meditation; but also the 
earnest zeal for study and communication indicative of the human rhetor.  It is indeed a circular 
activity of sorts, in which the preaching makes for better reading the reading for better prayer the 
prayer for better preaching, etc.   
As St. Bonaventure points out in the preface to his Lucan commentary: “because the 
teacher or interpreter is like a farmer who must eat of the fruits of his own labor, he must not 
seek the curious, but the nutritious, not the praise of others, but the witness of a good conscience, 
not a display of vanity, but the edification of charity” (§11).  Thus, this circularity is no different 
for the preacher than it is for a farmer whose quality of sustenance is directly proportionate to his 
quality of labor – they both work to live and live to work.  Thus we see a mystification of the 
basic hermeneutical principals of On Christian Doctrine in the spirit of the Didascalicon, 
whereby the preacher is lifted up by the very reading and preaching of the Word through which 
others are moved.  Such a process has definite undertones of Platonic psychagogy, but in the 
final subsection I look at Bonaventure’s most overtly Platonic program of ascendency through 
the correlation of language with the movements of the soul. 
6.3.3 The Consummation of Rational Philosophy 
In many respects, St. Bonaventure reflects the traditions handed down from St. Augustine, 
Dionysius, and Hugh of St. Victor.  Yet he is an important innovator within this tradition along 
several lines.  Working off the basic structures he inherits, he explicitly assigns each art of the 
trivium a particular cognitive function in the communicative process as a whole: 
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For reason [ratio] thinks of making whatever is in itself to exist in another, and whatever 
is in another to exist within itself: and this cannot be done except by means of speech 
[sermonem].  Whatever is contained in the soul [anima], then, is there either as a concept, 
as an assent, or as an affective disposition.  And so, to indicate concepts, there is 
grammar, to induce assent, there is logic, and to move affective dispositions [ad 
inclinandum affectus], there is rhetoric.  (CSD 4.18) 
 
As such, he does not simply see an analogy between the structure of the trivium and the acts of 
the mind, but assigns to each art a definitive role to play in the expressive, argumentative, and 
persuasive aspects of the communicative act.  While this description ostensibly concerns the 
communicative act as it pertains to the relationship between a speaker and an auditor, this 
correlation allows Bonaventure to analyze the act of speaking in terms of his overall Trinitarian 
system.  Thus, he is able to explore not only how the act of speaking affects the auditor, but also 
how it affects the speaker as a reflection of the Trinity; for with Bonaventure, as with Plato, 
while one individual is capable of bettering another, it is really through self-reflection that they 
are truly reformed. 
A major point of St. Bonaventure’s analysis of the arts of speaking, and indeed all the 
arts, is perfection through self-reflection.  This is made clear in the Journey of the Mind to God, 
in which Bonaventure appropriates the Platonic itinerary of outward, inward, upward.  However, 
as with the Dionysian hierarchy, every stage replicates the entirety of the journey.  It is easy to 
get lost as Bonaventure begins to lay out his various tripartite schemes, six in all, analogous to 
the wings of the Seraph who appeared to St. Francis (Prologue 6).  Two each deal with the 
 256 
mind’s three principal powers of perception:  two with the outward material world, two with the 
inward world of the mind, and two with the supernatural (1.4).  The focus of this analysis will be 
that of the middle stage, in which the project is to “enter [intrare] our own mind [mentem], 
which is the image of God [imago Dei]” (1.2).   
Looking directly at the two middle steps, those which reflect on the powers of the mind, 
we find a clear adoption of St. Augustine’s psychological analogy.  Chapter 3 outlines the nature 
of these faculties – memory, intellect, and will or “elective capacity”[virtus electivus] – which 
themselves are tripartite.  Memory retains and recalls things present, corporeal and temporal 
(3.2).  Intellect understands the intelligible content of terms, propositions, and inferences (3.3).  
And the will consists in taking counsel, judgment, and desire (3.4).  Here, Bonaventure discusses 
how reflection on a triple triplet of human sciences illuminates our understanding of God:  
 
For this consideration which the soul has of its principle, one and triune, through the 
trinity of its powers, by which it is the image of God, it is aided by the lights of the 
sciences which perfect it, inform it, and represent the most blessed Trinity in a threefold 
manner.  For all philosophy is either natural, or rational, or moral.  The first is concerned 
with the cause of being [causa essendi] and thus leads to the Father; the second is 
concerned with the basis of understanding and thus leads to the Wisdom of the Word 
[sapientiam Verbi]; the third deals with the order of life [ordine vivendi] and thus lead to 
the goodness of the Holy Spirit…The first, natural philosophy, is divided into 
metaphysics, mathematics, and physics…The second, rational philosophy, is divided into 
grammar, which makes men capable of expressing themselves; logic, which makes them 
keen in argumentation; and rhetoric, which makes them apt to persuade and move others.  
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This likewise suggests the most blessed Trinity…The third, moral philosophy, is divided 
into individual, familial, and political.  (3.6) 
 
While we are concerned with rational philosophy, which is comprised of the linguistic arts of the 
trivium, its central relationship amongst the philosophical arts is important to understand.  Set 
apart, physics and politics seem unconnected, but the trivium provides a bridge between them.  
That is to say, that although rational philosophy itself leads to the Wisdom of the Word, grammar 
approaches God the Father as an essential cause of language and rhetoric relates to the Holy 
Spirit as the active principle that orders life.  Language can aid in both reading the book of nature 
and ordering the body politic, and so can mediate between the needs of the two. 
Still, it might be argued that within Bonaventure’s scheme the trivium is presented as 
merely a portion of a much larger framework and holds no special place as concerns the 
reformation of the soul and the ascent of the mind to God.  It should be noted, however, that 
Bonaventure literally places the trivium in a central place of importance; and as we’ve seen, for 
Bonaventure, the center is the place to start.513  For as the philosophy of reason, the trivium is the 
philosophical system that deals with the mind itself, presented in the stage of spiritual progress 
when the mind is reflecting upon itself.  The first and third philosophies represent the lower and 
higher mental perceptive powers, natural and supernatural, within the perceptions of the mind.  
The trivium represents the mental perceptive powers to the inward looking mind, thus providing 
the most exact correlate to the mind among the various philosophies.  Consequently, the arts of 
                                               
513 Remembering Bonaventure’s advice to the preacher, speech begins at the center, which is representative of Christ 
(see p. 251 above).  When we look there, we find speech itself.  In this case, the medium really is the message.   
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the trivium most closely correlate the faculties of the mind with the Persons of the Trinity.514  
When we investigate the correlation, we see the process of ascent inherent in language.  
We are told in the Reduction that the main concern of rational philosophy is speech 
[sermo], and so St. Bonaventure considers the “three elements corresponding to the three aspects 
of speech itself: namely, the person speaking, the delivery of the speech, and its final purpose or 
its effect upon the hearer” (§15).  We find the perfection of speech in its final purpose, which 
comprises a modification of the classical duties of the orator: 
 
Considering speech in the light of its purpose, we find that it aims to express [ad 
exprimendum], to instruct [ad erudiendum], and to persuade [ad movendum]; it never 
expresses except by means of a likeness [species]; it never teaches except by means of 
clear light [lumine arguente]; it never persuades except by power [virtute]; and it is 
evident that these effects are accomplished only by means of inherent likeness, light, and 
power intrinsically united to the soul [animae unita].  Therefore, St. Augustine concludes 
that he alone is a true teacher who can impress a likeness, shed light, and grant power to 
the heart of his hearer.  (§18)  
 
Here we can see a clear correspondence with the Augustinian psychological triad.  First, 
realizing that ‘likeness’ translates specie, meaning, not simply ‘species,’ but rather ‘form’ and a 
visible form in particular, we see a direct correlation between the formal nature of grammar and 
the mental faculty of memory, which stores in itself the sensual forms of past experiences.  
                                               
514 According to Cousins “in our use of language – in our internal thinking and in our external expression – we 
reflect the dynamic process of the inner Trinitarian life…For Bonaventure – and the mainstream Western Christian 
theological tradition – we are Trinitarian images precisely in our linguistic activity.  In our formulation and 
expression of words we mirror the inner Trinitarian life” (“Bonaventure’s Mysticism” 251).  
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Second, that teaching and light correlate to the intellect is obvious.  And finally, realizing that 
‘persuade’ translates moveo, meaning more properly ‘to move,’ and virtute means not only 
power but a complex of terms associated with the Platonic middle element (e.g. courage, moral 
excellence, etc.); we see that such action means specifically the ability to move the will of 
another, not so much by force, but by the virtuous power of the speaker’s own will.   
Thus, it is in aligning the threefold aims of speech to the threefold faculties of another’s 
soul that we come to perfect the act of speaking.  It is in the reflection of this act that our own 
soul is perfected as well.  For in analyzing the union that takes place between our own soul and 
the soul of the hearer in this act, we become aware of the process by which we are united with 
the knowledge of God: 
 
Now as perfection of speech requires the union of power [virtute], light [lumine], and a 
likeness [specie] within the soul [unitis animae], so, too, for the instruction of the soul in 
the knowledge of God by interior conversation with Him, there is required a union with 
Him who is “the brightness of his glory and the image of his substance, and upholding 
the word of his power”515 (§18).   
 
So, by leading speech back up to its theological beginnings and so obtaining its perfection, the 
speaker begins to reform, that is, perfect, their own soul. 
The correlation with the Trinity becomes clearer if we return to the Journey.  In speaking 
of the faculties of the mind, Bonaventure shows how considering their relationship with one 
another aids us in our ascent: 
                                               
515 Heb. 1:3 
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Moreover, if one considers the order, the origin, and the relationship of these faculties, he 
is led up to the most blessed Trinity Itself.  For from the memory comes forth the 
intelligence as its offspring, because we understand only when the likeness [similitudo] 
which is in the memory emerges at the crest of our understanding and this is the mental 
word [verbum].  From the memory and the intelligence is breathed forth love [amor], as 
the bond of both.  These three – the generating mind, the word, and love – exist in the 
soul as memory, intelligence, and will [voluntatem]…The soul then, when it considers 
itself through itself as through a mirror, rises to the speculation of the Blessed Trinity, the 
Father, the Word, and Love.  (3.5)   
 
And while this is meant to refer to the interaction of the mental faculties abstracted from the arts 
of language, it is strikingly reminiscent of the description of rational philosophy in the 
Reduction, that is, of speech specifically.  Yet it differs in that its culminating effect is not 
internal, but is manifested in the soul of another: 
 
Considering speech in the light of the speaker, we see that all speech signifies a mental 
concept [mentis conceptum].  That inner concept is the word of the mind [verbum mentis] 
and its offspring which is known to the person conceiving it; but that it may become 
known to the hearer, it assumes the form of the voice, and clothed therein, the intelligible 
word becomes sensible and is heard without; it is received into the ear of the person 
listening and still it does not depart from the mind of the person uttering it.  Practically 
the same procedure is seen in the begetting of the Eternal Word, because the father 
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conceived Him, begetting Him from all eternity…But that He might be known by man 
who is endowed with senses, He assumed the nature of flesh…and yet He remained “in 
the bosom of the Father.”516  (§16) 
 
If we read these two descriptions across one another and incorporate the earlier analysis of the 
final purpose of speech, we can see that for Bonaventure speech stands between the speaker and 
the hearer as an image that connects both their souls, and in so doing, mirrors not only their own 
souls, but the Holy Trinity as well.517   
Therefore, this is another, specifically anagogic way in which rhetoric is the 
consummation of rational philosophy.  For only when the mind generates a concept, incarnates it 
in spoken word, and through it moves the soul of another in the rhetorical act do the rational arts 
of language truly mirror the Blessed Trinity.  The preacher is then not only called to interpret and 
communicate the Word of God, but also to mirror the Divine Activity by the very act of 
speaking, through which the soul of the auditor is uplifted.  By looking into this mirror the soul 
of the rhetor is further perfected, readying it for its continuing rehierarchization by the virtues 
and the Scriptures, and so the mystical circularity spirals ever upwards. 
                                               
516 This may be seen as an evolution of the analogy drawn by the Pre-Nicene Fathers concerning the logos 
endiathetos and the logos prophorikos. 
517 Again, see Cousins:  
 
For Bonaventure, the Trinity provides the foundation of the worldview within which he sees language 
related to mysticism.  The Trinity is primarily the mystery of the divine self-expression, the divine speech 
uttered from all eternity in the Word.  Hence the divinity is dynamic and expressive; from all eternity the 
fecundity of the divinity wells up in the person of the Father and expresses itself in its perfect Image and 
Word, who is the Son, and who is joined to the Father in the love of the Holy Spirit.  Thus we can say that 
the Son is the linguistic expression of the Father – the Language of the Father.  Because of this, human 
language is not merely functional – an instrument or a tool for operating in society.  Rather, it has its 
grounding in the most intimate life of the divinity.  (“Bonaventure’s Mysticism” 240) 
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This is by no means St. Bonaventure’s final word on the role of rhetoric in the 
reformation and ascent of the soul.  His works are replete with advice to his Franciscan brothers 
and students, who were both preachers and contemplatives, concerning the various ways in 
which the language arts work in conjunction with prayer, meditation, and contemplation to raise 
their souls in a rehierarchizing ascent.  However, this chapter serves as a summation of his 
theology of the language arts which both transforms and is transformed by the soul in its upward 
journey.  More importantly, this account highlights the Trinitarian foundation of his linguistic 
theory and places it squarely in a Platonic tradition that saw the individual as an analogue to the 
cosmos, and language as a mirror through which the structure of the Divine Order is reflected 
back to us.  More than just an important figure in this tradition, Bonaventure synthesized the 
various strains and analogies that then existed and generated a cohesive and innovative model of 
ascent that connected the individual to the divine through a triadic linguistic hierarchy that is 
consummated in rhetorical practice.   
What is perhaps most surprising for the history of rhetoric is that Bonaventure explores 
the effect that rhetorical practice has on the speaker, who is raised up by the very contemplation 
of the abilities to express a concept, explain an idea, and move the soul of another.  This is a 
noticeable departure from the thought, of say, Victorinus, who argued that eloquence did nothing 
to affect the wisdom of the sage, but merely enabled the sage to be publicly effective.  Tracing 
this insight back to the beginning of its intellectual tradition, we are reminded that Plato’s lover 
in the Phaedrus is also lifted up by love, indeed higher than the beloved, in the same manner that 
the preacher is reformed by rhetorical practice in St. Bonaventure.  As Plato’s lover mentors his 
beloved, it is he that grows wings.518  To my knowledge, this aspect of rhetoric has been little 
                                               
518 Both souls sprout wings after death, if they are chaste, as a result of the lover’s psychagogic activity (256b). 
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explored, and while it is implicit in Plato’s love metaphor, it is systematically demonstrated in 
Bonaventure.  The exhortation, then, in both Plato and Bonaventure and presumably all 
adherents of psychagogic rhetoric, is to love the audience – not for what they can offer the 
speaker in terms of material gain and not simply because loving is good and we ought do it, but 
for how the very act of loving transforms all who participate in it.  Thus, rhetoric is a practice 
that should not be taken lightly, for in attempting to move the souls of others, rhetors cannot but 
affect their own souls – for better or for worse. 
 264 
7.0  CONCLUSION 
In this study I have attempted to demonstrate two major theses.  In the first part, I maintained 
that Plato’s reference to a true, psychagogic art of rhetoric was neither ironic nor idealistic nor 
simply dialectic in disguise.  Rather, I argued that in consideration of Plato’s source material and 
his own exhortation to correlate the psyche and the logos, a robust rhetorical theory could be 
developed from the Platonic corpus based on the analogous structures running through language, 
the cosmos, and the soul.  In order to illustrate that this rhetorical theory was more than a mere 
possibility of contemporary interpretation, the second part explored the recognition, 
appropriation, and evolution of Platonic psychagogic structures and methods across antiquity and 
into the Middle Ages, establishing a rhetorical tradition of soul-care amongst Platonic adherents.   
Despite philosophical or theological differences, the Platonic rhetorical theory seems to 
remain fairly consistent.  Indeed, the historical case studies often corroborate some of the more 
surprising aspects of the Platonic theory.  St. Augustine confirms what Plato implies, that where 
rhetorical activity is concerned clear instruction is necessary but insufficient to produce action in 
an audience, thus placing the onus of movement on the spirited element or drive.  St. 
Bonaventure demonstrates that rhetorical activity is never one-directional and only truly benefits 
the speaker the more the message benefits the audience.  From Plato to Bonaventure, moreover, 
the basic structures remain the same – a tripartite scheme that promotes the movement of the soul 
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through speech rooted in wisdom, integrity, and love, thereby integrating the arts of the trivium 
in a single psychagogic act. 
7.1 FROM HERE TO MODERNITY 
There is, however, an irony to be appreciated here, and it is not the simple irony that Plato 
developed and practiced a rhetorical theory – Cicero had long ago recognized and appreciated 
that fact.519  It is the curious detail that when rhetoric was most threatened by cultural forces, a 
Platonist intervened on its behalf: St. Augustine among the Patristics, St. Bonaventure among the 
Scholastics and, of course, the ironic phenomena of the Renaissance which saw an interrelated 
revival in both rhetorical and Platonic thought along with a joint hostility towards Aristotelian 
disputation.520  Consequently, we should not be surprised to see vestiges of the psychagogic 
impulse in Renaissance thought.  And we find it where one would expect, in the great translator 
and commentator of Platonism, Marsilio Ficino. 
In having access to all of the dialogues of Plato as well as other Neoplatonic writings, 
Ficino’s Platonic philosophy and theology differed in many ways from his predecessors; but 
many of the structural and functional aspects of psychagogy remained the same.  Hubert 
Damisch brings this study full circle, when expounding on the “Theme of Choosing” in The 
                                               
519 “But I neither assented to those men, nor to the originator of these disputations, and by far the most eloquent of 
them all, the eminently grave and oratorical Plato; whose Gorgias I then diligently read over at Athens with 
Charmadas; from which book I conceived the highest admiration of Plato, as he seemed to me to prove himself an 
eminent orator, even in ridiculing orators” (De oratore 1.11; English from Cicero on Oratory and Orators. Trans. 
J.S. Watson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). 
520 Like with Plato and Aristotle in the Middle Ages, this is, of course, a simplification – but the irony must still 
surely be felt.  However, Paul Oskar Kristeller has shown that Aristotelianism survived as much in the Renaissance 
as Platonism did in the Middle Ages.  He has done so in a number of works, but for a thorough investigation into the 
various strains of Platonism, Aristotelianism, rhetoric, and philosophy that run up to and through the Renaissance, 
see Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. Ed. Michael Mooney.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. 
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Judgment of Paris, he notes Ficino’s endorsement to Lorenzo de’ Medici of the triplex vita – the 
integrated life of contemplation, activity, and art: 
 
Ficino insisted on the danger of favoring one of the three routes over the two others: 
Paris, like Hercules, like Socrates was punished by the two goddesses he had offended 
and Ficino flattered his prince by stating that, having been instructed by the oracle of 
Apollo, Lorenzo had been wise enough to acknowledge and adore all three goddesses in 
accordance with their respective merits, with the happy result that he had been accorded 
wisdom by Pallas, power by Juno, and grace, poetry, and music by Venus.521 
 
Although it seems that the language arts are lowest on this hierarchy of lifestyles, Ficino offers a 
hierarchy of the arts in his Platonic Theology in which rhetoric and poetry are at the top of 
another triarchy.  First are the arts of the lower senses that consist of “perfumes or tastes and 
flavors,” in between are the physical arts of health and exercise, and atop, the arts of sight and 
sound.  However, while painting and architecture are privileged among the others, “the artificer’s 
soul is most fully manifest in the works that pertain to the hearing: in speeches and poems and 
vocal music.  For in these the disposition and the will of the entire intelligence is present for all 
to see.”522   
                                               
521 150-151. Citing Ficino’s introductory epistle to his Philebus commentary. 
522 10.4. Translation from Michael J. B. Allen. Icastes: Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist: Five 
Studies and a Critical Edition with Translation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 161. 
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According to Michael J.B. Allen, this “hierarchy reflects the three tiers of the traditional 
division of society into the learned, the knights, and the artisans.”523  Outside the structural 
implication, however, Ficino’s rendering of rhetoric is significant because: 
 
these arts of hearing…are more exactly correspondent to the mind’s forms…and are thus 
closer to the world of the purely intelligible Forms. / They are closer, furthermore, 
because they are not required to shape base matter but rather air…The arts that pertain to 
hearing are therefore for Ficino “spiritual” arts in the literal sense of spirit as understood 
in the Galenic and Platonic traditions.524 
 
Thus, Ficino advocates the spiritually reformative aspect of rhetoric as a mode of art that can 
literally connect one soul to another through the medium of words spoken into the air. 
 One finds similar psychagogic tendencies even in modernity.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge – 
speaking of both Plato and poetry, and noting the poetry need not be metered as Plato has proven 
– defines poetry as a psychagogic endeavor that unifies the soul:  
 
The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with 
the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and 
dignity.  He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and, (as it were,) fuses, each 
into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively 
appropriated the name of imagination.  (Biographia Literaria 2.14) 
 
                                               
523 Ibid. 162. 
524 Ibid. 162-163.  
 268 
Orestes Brownson contrasts Platonic with Aristotelian philosophy asserting for Platonic 
psychagogy what he denies to Aristotelian inquiry – the ability to guide the soul and society in 
ascent: 
 
Peripateticism, considering everything under the form of abstract thought, loses sight of 
life, of the real living universe, and therefore is unable to detect in the natural order the 
analogies, resemblances, copies, or reflections, without which this supernatural would be 
in every sense inapprehensible to our intelligence.  Hence it never enables us to connect 
the intelligible and the superintelligible, and embrace the natural and the supernatural as 
one harmonious whole, having its unity in the Divine Essence.525 
 
In so doing, he critiques modern philosophy and religion for having lost sight of the connection 
between the natural and the supernatural, between society and the Trinity.   
In contemporary times, we would not be surprised to find Richard M. Weaver repeating 
such sentiments in the opening and closing essays of his Ethics of Rhetoric.  He tells us exactly 
what we would expect from a psychagogue, which might be why no one quite expects to hear it: 
“All of the terms in a rhetorical vocabulary are like links in a chain stretching up to some master 
link which transmits its influence down through the linkages,”526 so that: 
 
rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, 
links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend 
                                               
525 “Liberalism and Socialism.” Brownson’s Quarterly Review. Third Series, Vol. 3 No.2 Art.2 (1855): 183-208 (p. 
188). 
526 “The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric.” The Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1953. 3-26 (p. 23). 
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and only the soul have affection for.  This is the justified affection of which no one can 
be ashamed, and he who feels no influence of it is truly outside the communion of minds. 
Rhetoric appears, finally, as a means by which the impulse of the soul to be ever moving 
is redeemed.527 
 
Although, perhaps, overlooked unless read in conjunction, it is this psychagogic idea that 
underscores Weaver’s very notion of “ultimate terms” for contemporary rhetoric: “We have 
shown that rhetorical force must be conceived as a power transmitted through the links of a chain 
that extends upward toward some ultimate source.  The higher links of that chain must always be 
of unique interest to the student of rhetoric, pointing, as they do, to some prime mover of human 
impulse.”528 
But it is C.S. Lewis, with reference to Coleridge and the sublime and other pertinent 
persons and topics that we have discussed, who takes the most direct aim at the problem of 
psychagogic language in a world of post-Cartesian dualistic psychology: 
 
We were told it all long ago by Plato.  As the king governs by his executives, so Reason 
in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the ‘spirited element.’529  The head rules 
the belly through the chest – the seat, as Alanus [Alan of Lille] tells us, of 
Magnanimity,530 of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments.  The 
Chest – Magnanimity – Sentiment these are the indispensible liaison officers between 
cerebral man and visceral man.  It may even be said that it is by this middle element that 
                                               
527 Ibid. 25. 
528 “Ultimate Terms in Contemporary Rhetoric.” Ethics 211-232 (p. 211). 
529 Lewis here cites Republic 442b-c.  
530 Lewis here cites Alanus ab Insulis. De Planctu Naturae Prosa, iii. 
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man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.  The 
operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce Men without Chests…And all the 
time – such is the tragic-comedy of our situation – we continue to clamour for those very 
qualities we are rendering impossible.  You can hardly open a periodical without coming 
across the statement that what our civilization needs is more ‘drive,’ or dynamism, or 
self-sacrifice, or ‘creativity.’  In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and 
demand the function.  We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and 
enterprise.531 
 
For Lewis, both the problem and the cure start with the language arts, with the formation or the 
deformation of the soul through reading and writing and – one would imagine since the work 
was first a public lecture – speaking and hearing.   
If it is by the systematic removal of psychagogic language that the spirited element is 
excised from our souls, then, I maintain, it is by employment of such language that it can be 
returned and nurtured.  But it is not simply through the dynamic communication of lofty ideals 
that psychagogy can begin to reestablish what has been lost in the modern mindset.  Rather, it is 
by realizing that all the great psychagogues have been pedagogues.  Plato, Augustine, and 
Bonaventure each theorized about instruction in the arts.  Indeed, Weaver and Lewis were both 
professors and were both discussing the role of language arts education in the college classroom. 
Thus, I close with some modest implications that such a return of psychagogic concepts might 
yield for the contemporary discipline with a particular sensitivity towards the student of rhetoric.  
                                               
531 “Men without Chests.” The Abolition of Man; or, Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the 
Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools. Riddell Memorial Lectures. New York: The MacMillan Co., 
1947. 1-16 (pp. 15-16). 
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7.2 SOME NEO-MEDIEVAL IMPLICATIONS 
I have investigated three aspects of Platonic psychagogy as they developed through the Middle 
Ages that I believe have the potential to beneficially impact the contemporary rhetorical 
discipline.  The first is the general cosmic worldview in which it operates.  The second is the 
notion of the soul as the target of rhetorical activity.  The third is the concept of love as the 
method of persuasion.  While they might seem quite alien at first glance, I contend that 
contemporary correlates already exist within the discipline that need only be brought to the fore 
in order to be taken advantage of for the benefit of both theorist and student. 
7.2.1 Cosmic Worldview 
Now the macro-microcosmic progression that marks the context of psychagogic rhetoric might 
seem too esoteric an element to import into the contemporary rhetorical discipline, and I am not 
suggesting that we should attempt to show students their place in the cosmos or in the 
metaphysical ascent.  However, I do maintain that the core hierarchical elements – of being, 
knowledge, and communication – are still pervasive in the contemporary worldview and that 
recognizing them is of benefit.  That is to say, despite attempts to frustrate the ideas of ‘being’ 
and ‘knowledge,’ they persist for most audiences.  Most people still think that things exist and 
can be known.  Thus, the shared Platonic and medieval metaphysical view can help to re-
establish a “three-dimensional” view of rhetoric; one in which we do not attempt to isolate the 
objective from the subjective from the intersubjective.   
Granted, it is chic to think of rhetoric as a process by which we engage in shared meaning 
creation.  I do not deny that this is sometimes, or even always, the case.  I simply deny that it is 
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the whole case.  Individual rhetors always approach a situation with their own subjective 
understanding and are likewise subject to the objective pressures of the situation (gravity, 
famine, natural disasters) before entering into the shared meaning making process.  Yet, by 
focusing on or excluding any one of these perspectives we limit our rhetorical resources.   
Much damage has been done by fighting amongst and within disciplines concerning 
whether ‘truth’ is an objective, subjective, or intersubjective concept.  The Medieval-Platonic 
worldview provides the contemporary rhetor with a perspective that attempts to manage all three 
in a single rhetorical act – a template of communicative encounters by individuals who held fast 
to concepts of truth, yet still engaged those of different standards of inquiry on relatively civil 
grounds.  Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas were, after all, contemporary Masters at the 
University of Paris.  More than that, they held irreconcilable philosophical views while both 
remaining under the umbrella of a supposedly monolithically dogmatic Church.  If such a variety 
of considerations could be balanced in the Middle Ages – considerations of truth, conscience, 
and community – then it would seem regressive for contemporary rhetoricians to be more 
dogmatic about the status of truth claims.  Worse than that, it is rhetorically inexpedient in the 
case of most audiences.  The Medieval-Platonic communicative paradigm illustrates an attempt 
to balance belief, reason, and communication – fides et ratio et oratio.  While we need not adopt 
the paradigm, the effort itself is worthy of emulation. 
7.2.2 Moving the Soul 
Again, we may wonder in what way a concept as mystical as the soul might be introduced into 
the rhetorical discipline.  However, I maintain that more than any other element of this study, the 
concept of soul is manifest in contemporary rhetorical theory, especially in its social scientific 
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iteration.  For it is a truism in today’s scholarship that the goal of persuasion is attitude change; 
and attitude change, I maintain is nothing other than an attempt to operationalize the desires of 
the soul.  Subsequently, the concept of ‘attitude’ is beneficial for gaining a scientific 
understanding of what the rhetor is attempting to achieve in speech or writing.  However, in so 
speaking, we run the risk inherent in what Weaver calls “semantically purified” speech.532  That 
is, we forget that the target of our persuasion is the “whole man,” as Weaver elsewhere puts it.533 
What this means escapes contemporary students of rhetoric and, perhaps, contemporary theorists 
as well, for it widens the ethical scope of our activity immensely.   
It is easy for students to consider that in the rhetorical act we are attempting to get the 
audience to do something, to perform some action that we desire.  But this action is often 
temporary.  We often, if not always, fail to consider that in getting an audience to perform some 
action, we are actively attempting to reform their soul, literally attempting to “change their 
minds.”  Granted, some rhetors such as teachers and preachers are quite cognizant that their 
target is the “whole person” and count on the reforming power of speech.  But we seldom impart 
to our students that “changing someone’s mind” is not merely a metaphor, but carries with it all 
the weighty ethical considerations that its literal interpretation would suggest.534  If we brought 
this element to the fore in our rhetorical classrooms, then students would think much more 
critically, not only about others’ attempts to change their own mind, but about their attempts to 
change others’ as well. 
                                               
532 “The Phaedrus” 7.  
533 “Language is Sermonic.” Language is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970. 201-226 (p. 205). 
534 At least, as a student, the long-lasting effect of changing someone’s mind was never stressed to me.  Ethical 
considerations revolved more around things like honesty, the morality of a given action or immediate goal, and the 
potential for immediate harm.  
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7.2.3 Love 
Of course in today’s academic climate one cannot suggest that the goal of rhetorical training is to 
bring the student to a love of God or the Forms or another human being or any other entity that 
might suggest religious (or sexual) undertones.  Yet there is still persistent in communicative 
relationships the residue of love, a residue that would be beneficial to emphasize in the rhetorical 
discipline.  This residue comes by way of the Latin term caritas, which can also be translated as 
charity.  We often hear that we should be charitable to our colleagues, offer them charitable reads 
and charitable treatment in our critiques of them.  This is a commonplace in academia, but not so 
much in the field of rhetoric.535  If we can adopt the concept of love for the audience under the 
auspices of charity, then we can continue with the monetary metaphor and ask rhetors to see 
worth and value in their audience.  So, then, treating an audience charitably not only means 
attempting to understand their point of view, which is still a good thing; but also means asking 
whether or not the messages that we plan to offer our audiences are charitable in the sense that 
they add value to them, that they make them better in some way.  As one might be charitable to 
any who are in need of extra resources of which we have abundance, we should ask our students 
and ourselves to likewise treat audiences.  “Are we giving generously of our intellectual and 
creative resources for the benefit of our audiences?” should be a major question for both the 
rhetor and the student of rhetoric; and I contend that if we are, we will find that, with 
Bonaventure, Augustine, and Plato, we reap greater benefits as well. 
                                               
535 Wayne Brockriede, in his well-known essay, “Arguers as Lovers” (Philosophy & Rhetoric 5.1 (1972): 1-11) uses 
the lover metaphor to express the ideal orientation individuals in a dialogical encounter should maintain towards one 
another.  My usage here is concerned more with the rhetor in a public speaking encounter and deals less with the 
sexual aspects of “lovers” and more, appropriately, with the benefits of a “Platonic love” – a phrase coined by 
Ficino. 
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I have argued that Plato articulated a rhetorical theory of soul-leading and soul-care that 
was transmitted from antiquity through the Middle Ages into modernity.  Today the essentials of 
that theory still remain, if only as artifacts of language.  I contend that those elements of 
psychagogic rhetoric – the context of cognitive integration, the object of reformative motivation, 
and the method of charitable interaction – although latent in contemporary rhetorical thought, 
would be of great benefit if acknowledged, developed, and presented explicitly to the student of 
rhetoric.  I have endeavored to uncover the theoretical materials for such a practical project and 
so have been engaged in a historical study of rhetoric.  But what this history has taught us is that 
the very study of rhetoric can move the soul and that eloquence itself is an impetus to action in 
the mind of the speaker.  So in discovering something about our disciplinary past, I sincerely 
hope that I have recovered something of use for our rhetorical future. 
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